Article 1352 - Effect Of Illegality Of Cause - Batarra Vs. Marcos; Velez Vs. Ramas; Arroyo Vs. Bernin 2z129

ARTICLE/TOPIC: ARTICLE 1352 – Effect of Illegality of Cause CASE TITLE: BATARRA vs. MARCOS, 7 Phil. 156 CASE FACTS: G.R. No. 2929, December 7, 1906 FAUSTA BATARRA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO MARCOS, defendant-appellant This is about a trial upon a complaint filed by the plaintiff, before the court, to recover damages for breach of promise of marriage by the defendant to the plaintiff, the defendant inducing/impelling the plaintiff to submit herself to sexual relation with him on of such promise of marriage. The judgment was entered in that court in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of 500 pesos. The defendant excepted to such judgment and has brought the case here by bill of exceptions. ISSUE: WON the defendant is liable? DECISION: The judgment of the court below is reversed and the defendant is acquitted of the complaint, with costs of the first instance. No costs will be allowed to either party in this court. ISSUE: WON the contract, i.e. the promise of marriage with sexual considerations, is valid? DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: ARTICLE 1352, “Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect whatever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to laws, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.” The said promise of the marriage of the defendant to the plaintiff based upon carnal connection is founded on an unlawful cause and therefore, void and no action can be maintained by the woman against the man thereof. In addition, ARTICLE 1306, “The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.” In this case, the cause (or consideration) is immoral (contrary to morals)—contrary to norms of good and right conduct evolved in a community. In addition, the Supreme Court have ruled out that the facts do not show the commission seduction, as that crime is defined by Penal Code, because it does not appear that the plaintiff was under 23 years of age. The judgment cannot therefore, be based upon Article 449 of Penal Code, which provides indemnification in cases of rape, seduction and abduction. It cannot be maintained upon the proposition that the defendant, having failed to perform his promise of marriage, is liable for the breach of that contract and for damages resulting from his seduction of the plaintiff, the carnal connection being the consideration (cause) of the promise. If the criminal intercourse between the parties was a crime or misdemeanor, the crime or misdemeanor was common to both parties, and Article 1305 of the Civil Code prevents a recovery. The same is true if the act did not constitute a crime or misdemeanor. It was in any event an immoral act and the fault lay with both parties. By the provisions of Article 1306 of the Civil Code, there can, is such a case, be no recover by one against the other.

Furthermore, nor can there be a recovery under the provisions of Article 1902 of the Civil Code, “A person who by any act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done;” for the plaintiff voluntarily participated in the act.

ARTICLE/TOPIC: ARTICLE 1352 – Effect of Illegality of Cause CASE TITLE: VELEZ vs. RAMAS, 40 Phil 787 CASE FACTS: G.R. No. 14997, February 16, 1920 TEODORO VELEZ, et al., plaintiff-appellants, vs. SALOMON RAMAS, et al., defendants-appellees The defendant Roberto Quirante is the father of Restituta Quirante, who in turn is the wife of the defendant Salomon Ramas. Prior to perfection (birth) of the contract, the plaintiffs, Teodoro Velez and wife, Hermenegilda Chiong Veloso, were the owners of a pawnshop and had employed Restituta Quirante in some capacity or other therein. While thus employed, Restituta Quirante abstracted various sum of money belonging to the plaintiffs, amounting altogether to P 2,303.60, under conditions which supposedly constituted the offense of estafa. Whereas, in order to prevent said woman from being brought before the courts for the unlawful act she has executed, the defendants subscribing the contract in question, have guaranteed to the said plaintiffs the payment of the aforesaid sum plus an interest of 12% per annum to bring against Restituta Quirante. Whereas, by virtue of the foegoing obligation, said Velez and Veloso agree to suspend the action they intend to bring against Restituta Quirante. Thus action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Cebu by the plaintiff, Teodoro Velez and his wife, to recover of the defendants, Salomon Ramas and Roberto Quirante, a sum of money evidenced by a written obligation signed by said defendants on July 30, 1917, wherein they acknowledged themselves to be tly and severally bound for the payment to the plaintiff of the sum of P 2,303.60. It is itted that the defendant Ramas had paid P300 upon said obligation prior to the institution of the suit, leaving a balance of P 2,003.60. Salomon Ramas answered the complaint, itting in effect the facts alleged therein, and stating as his sole ground of defense that the alleged contract was illegal on its face. This defendant further interposed a counterclaim, seeking to recover P 300 which he had already paid. The defendant Roberto Quirante did not appear, and no defense was made for him. When the case was submitted for decision the trial court sustained the defense, absolved both the defendants from the complaint and gave judgment upon the counterclaim in favor of Salomon Ramas tly and severally against the plaintiffs for the sum of P 300, with interest at the legal rate from the date the answer was filed. From this judgment the plaintiffs appealed. ISSUE: WON the contract is valid? DECISION: No. The Supreme Court is of the opinion that the trial court was correct in the conclusion that an action cannot be maintained upon this contract. And it is so ordered, with costs against the appellants. RATIO DECIDENDI: ARTICLE 1306 (Article 1255 of the Civil Code), “The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.” In this case, by the universal consensus of judicial opinion in all ages it has been considered against public policy to allow parties to make agreements designed to prevent (stifle) prosecutions for crime. It is self-evident that the law

cannot sanction an engagement which is subversive of the law itself or which tends to weaken the foundations of human society. The machinery for the istration of justice cannot be used to promote an unlawful purpose. ARTICLE 1352 (Article 1275 of the Civil Code), “Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect whatever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to laws, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.” As declared by the court, and in my opinion too, the consideration for this agreement is clearly illicit, which fact is apparent on the face of the contract. A contract based upon an unlawful consideration or designed to promote an unlawful object is an always has been void ad initio by the common law, by the civil law, moral law, and all laws whatsoever. It is immaterial whether the illegal character of the contract is revealed in the matter of the consideration, in the promise as expressed in the agreement, or in the purpose which the agreement, though legal in expression, is intended to accomplish. If the illegality lurks in any element, or even subsists exclusively in the purpose of the parties, it is fatal to the validity of the contract. ISSUE: WON the action of the trial court in absolving the defendant Roberto Quirante, although he had made no defense, was correct and valid? DECISION: The action of the trial court in absolving the defendant Roberto Quirante, although he had made no defense, was correct and is worthy of some comment as embodying a point of practice which should be called to the attention of courts and practitioners. RATIO DECIDENDI: The rule is: Where a complaint states a common cause of action against several defendants and some appear to defend the case on the merits while others make default, the defense interposed by those who fail to appear; and if the court finds that a good defense has been made, all of the defendants must be absolved. The proper mode of proceeding where a complaint states a common cause of action against several defendants, and one of them makes default, is simply to enter a formal default order against him, and proceed with the cause upon the answers of the others. The defaulting defendant merely loses his standing in court, he not being entitled to the service of notices in the cause, not to appear in the suit in any way. He cannot adduce evidence; nor can he be heard at the final hearing. If the case is finally decided in the plaintiff’s favor, a final decree is then entered against all the defendants; but if the suit should be decided against the plaintiff, the action will be dismissed as to all the defendants alike.

ARTICLE/TOPIC: ARTICLE 1352 – Effect of Illegality of Cause CASE TITLE: ARROYO vs. BERWIN, 36 Phil. 386 CASE FACTS: G.R. No. L-10551, March 3, 1917 IGNACIO ARROYO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ALFRED BERWIN, defendant-appellee The defendant is a procurador judicial and is duly authorized by the court to practice in justice of the peaces courts of the Province of Iloilo. The defendant represented Marcela Juanesa in the justice of the peace court of Iloilo in proceeding for theft prosecuted by the plaintiff Ignacio Arroyo. On August 13, 1914, the defendant requested the plaintiff to agree to dismiss the said criminal proceeding, and that his client Marcela Juaneza would recognize the plaintiff’s ownership in the land situated on Calle San Juan, suburb of Molo, municipality of Iloilo, which land and which cut cane are referred to in the cause for theft; and the defendant furthermore agreed that the plaintiff should obtain a Torrens title to the said land during the next term of the court for the trial of cadastral cases, and that the defendant’s client, Marcela Juaneza, would not oppose the application for registration to be filled by the said plaintiff; provided that the plaintiff would ask the prosecuting attorney to dismiss the said proceedings filed against Marcela Juaneza and Alejandro Castro for the crime of theft. The plaintiff on his part complied with the agreement, and requested the prosecuting attorney to dismiss the above-mentioned criminal cause; and the court did dismiss the said cause; however, the defendant did not wish to comply with agreement; so the plaintiff delivered to the defendant for the signature of the said Marcela Juaneza a written agreement stating that the defendant’s said client recognized the plaintiff’s ownership in the described land and that she would not oppose the plaintiff’s application for registration; but, up to the present time, the defendant has not return to the plaintiff the said written agreement, notwithstanding the demands of the plaintiff. So, the plaintiff prays that the court will render judgment ordering the defendant to comply with the agreement, and further, by awarding to the plaintiff the costs of the present suit, as well as any other relief that justice and equity require. ISSUE: WON the cause (consideration) of the contract is valid? WON the defendant shall be liable to comply with the agreement? DECISION: NO. The court dismissed the complaint of the plaintiff on the ground of the illegality of the consideration of the alleged contract; and with the costs of the instance against the appellant. RATIO DECIDENDI: ARTICLE 1306 (Article 1255 of the Civil Code), “The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.” In this case, the agreement of the by the owner of stolen goods to stifle the prosecution of the person charged with theft, for a pecuniary or other valuable consideration is contrary to public policy and due istration of justice. It is in the upmost interest of the society that crimes should be punished, and that all criminal proceedings should be instituted and maintained in the form and manner prescribed by law. Moreover, to permit an

offender to escape the penalties prescribed by law by purchase of immunity is manifestation of perversion of justice. In addition, ARTICLE 1352 (Article 1275 of the Civil Code), “Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect whatever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to laws, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.” In this case, the consideration (i.e. stifle of persecution of crime by purchase of immunity) is illicit. Therefore, a contract with an illicit cause is void and inexistent in the first place, and as declared by the Supreme Court.