Case Digests 1d1c2t

Calalang vs. Williams Facts: The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from ing along the following for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic: 1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and 2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of the Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to and pick up engers in the places above mentioned

to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well. Issues: 1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion? 2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people? Held: 1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.

2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex. Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number. Association of Small Landholders of the Philippines vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform FACTS: These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions including serious challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988" In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No. 27 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229 on the grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the

constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to the Congress and not to the President, the also allege that Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No. 229 should be annulled for violation of the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process and equal protection. They contended that the taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation which such payment is not contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O No. 229. In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President and that the said executive orders violate the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation which was denied to the petitioners. In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules of the decree. They therefore ask the Honorable Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to issue the said rules. ISSUE: Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid exercise of Police power or Power of Eminent Domain. RULING: Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain, though there are traditional distinction between the police power and the power of eminent domain, property condemned under police power is noxious or intended for noxious purpose, the compensation for the taking of such property is not subject to

compensation, unlike the taking of the property in Eminent Domain or the power of expropriation which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner of the property expropriated.

Cayetano and Tiongson vs. Court of Appeals

agricultural land; 3) there is consent; 4) the purpose is agricultural production; and 5) there is consideration

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Manotok delivered and transferred to his 8 children and 2 grandchildren a 34 hectare lot in Old Balara QC. There were no tenants or other people occupying said property. Manotok allowed Macaya to live on the property to guard the fruit trees and prevent squatters on the condition that he has to vacate the property when the heirs already want to live in it. He was also allowed to plant trees and raise animals but can only use 3 hectares. The agreement was not put into writing. The owners organized themselves as a real estate business known as Manotok Realty Inc. and used the 34 hectare land as capital. Macaya was requested to remit 10 cavans of palay every year for his contribution for the realty taxes and was asked for an increase of 10 but cannot afford to pay anymore as the palays dried up. Manotok Realty Inc. executed a “Unilateral Deed of Conveyance” of the property to Tiongson and other Manotoks. The Manotoks told Macaya that they needed the property to build their houses. Macaya requested that he be allowed to stay longer only to harvest his palay. He did not vacate the property. Macaya brought the matter to Ministry of Agrarian Reform. The Manotoks threatened him that they will bulldoze the properties of Macaya. Macaya brought the matter to Court of Agrarian Relations for peaceful possession. It ruled in favor of the Manotoks. CA reversed the decision. Issue: W/N a tenancy relationship exists between the parties. Essential requisites of tenancy relationship are: 1) the parties are the landholder and the tenant; 2) the subject is

Petition is granted. -

Caballes vs. DAR Andrea Millenes allowed Bienvenido Abajon to construct a house on a portion of her landholding, paying a monthly rental of P2.00. Millenes likewise allowed Abajon to plant a portion of the land, agreeing that the produce thereof would be shared by both on a 50-50 basis. When Millenes sold her land to the spouses Arturo and Yolanda Caballes, the spouses told Abajon that they intended to build a poultry close to his house and persuaded him to transfer his dwelling to another portion of the landholding. Abajon refused to leave, even after confrontation before the Barangay Captain of the locality. Subsequently, Yolanda filed a criminal case against Abajon for malicious mischief for harvesting bananas and jackfruit from their property without her knowledge. All the planting on the property however, had been done by Abajon. The trial court ordered the referral of the case to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform for a preliminary determination of the relationship between the parties. The Ministry ruled that a tenancy relationship existed between the parties, and, as such, the case is not proper for hearing. On appeal, the DAR (the new MAR) reversed the findings and declared that the case was proper for trial as the land involved was residential. The new minister of the DAR, however, set aside thesaid order and declared that the criminal case was not proper for trial, as there was an existing tenancy relationship between the parties. Issue: W/N Abajon is an agricultural tenant. NO. To invest Abajon with the status of a tenant is preposterous. He only occupied a miniscule portion (60m lot, which cannot by any stretch of imagination be considered as an economic family-sized farm. Planting camote, bananas,

and corn on such a size of land cannot produce an income sufficient to provide a modes standard of living to meet the farm family’s basic needs. Thus, the order sought to be reviewed is patently contrary to the declared policy of RA 3844.Moreover, there exists no tenancy relationship between the parties because Abajon’s status is more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or comion to live in the premises and to have a garden of some sort. Agricultural production as the primary purpose being absent in the arrangement, it is clear that Abajon was never a tenant of Millenes. Essential requisites of a tenancy relationship:(7)The parties are the landowner and the tenant;(8)The subject is agricultural land;(9)There is consent;(10)The purpose is agricultural production;(11)There is personal cultivation; and(12)There is sharing of harvests. Unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing laws. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production. Obiter: If justice can be meted out now,why wait for it to drop gently from heaven?

Hilario vs. IAC Facts: -

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Baltazar filed a complaint with the Court of Agrarian Relations alleging he had been in continuous possession as a share tenant of a parcel of land with an area of about 2 hectares situated in San Miguel, Bulacan, which was previously owned by one Socorro Vda. de Balagtas. The complaint was against Spouses Hilario who allegedly began to threaten him to desist from entering and cultivating a portion. Baltazar claims that he became a tenant by virtue of a “Kasunduan”. Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) in determining whether or not respondent Baltazar is the tenant of the petitioners ruled that the land in question is not an agricultural landholding but plain "bakuran," hence, Baltazar is not a tenant on the land. CA remanded back to lower court as CAR decision was not ed by substantial evidence. CAR ruled Baltazar not a tenant and ordered his ejectment from the property. IAC reversed the decision saying that Baltazar is a leasehold tenant entitled to security of tenure on the land in question.

Issue: W/N Baltazar is a tenant Ruling: No. In favor of petitioners. Spouses Hilario gave sufficient evidence that Baltazar is not a tenant. Corazon Pengzon (daughter of Vda. De Balagtas) said she did not receive any fruit from the land after her mother died and she knew that spouses Hilario were now the owner of the parcels of land.

The respondent court also failed to note that the alleged tenant pays no rental or share to the landowners. Baltazar made a vague allegation that he shared 70-30 and 50-50 of the produce in his favor. The former owner flatly denied that she ever received any thing from him. The requirements set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationship, to wit: (1) The parties are the landholder and tenant; (2) The subject is agricultural land; (3) The purpose is agricultural production; and (4) There is consideration; have not been met by the private respondent. Petition granted.

Tan vs. Pollescas

Ruling: Yes

Facts:

Section 7 of RA 3844 as amended provides that once there is a leasehold relationship, as in the present case, the landowner cannot eject the agricultural tenant from the land unless authorized by the court for causes provided by law.27 RA 3844 as amended expressly recognizes and protects an agricultural leasehold tenant’s right to security of tenure.

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Tan heirs own a coconut farmland in Ozamis City. Esteban Pollescas is the original tenant of the land. After his death, his son Enrique was appointed as tenant by Tan. Reynalda Pollescas, Esteban’s second wife, demanded she be appointed as tenant. Tan did not agree. Reynalda then filed before DARAB a complaint for Annulment of Compromise Agreement, Quieting of Tenancy Relationship and damages. DARAB declared Reynalda as the lawful tenant of the land. DARAB apportioned the harvests between the Tan Heirs and Reynalda based on the customary sharing system which is 2/3 to the landowner and 1/3 to the tenant. Reynalda failed to deliver to the Tan Heirs 2/3 of the harvests amounting to P3,656.70. The Tan Heirs demanded Reynalda to pay such amount. Reynalda ignored the demand. Tan heirs filed estafa against Reynalda before MTC. She was found to be guilty. Tan heirs filed an ejectment case against Reynalda before DARAB-Misamis as she failed to deliver the fruits. It terminated the tenancy relationship between the parties. Reynalda was ordered to vacate the property. Reynalda appealed before DARAB, which reversed the decision of DARAB-Misamis. CA affirmed. held that Reynalda’s failure to deliver the full amount of the Tan Heirs’ share could not be considered as a willful and deliberate intent to deprive the Tan Heirs of their share.

Issue: W/N Reynalda is a tenant

The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that for nonpayment of the lease rental to be a valid ground to dispossess the agricultural lessee of the landholding, the amount of the lease rental must first of all be lawful. If the amount of lease rental claimed exceeds the limit allowed by law, non-payment of lease rental cannot be a ground to dispossess the agricultural lessee of the landholding. Even assuming Reynalda agreed to deliver 2/3 of the harvest as lease rental, Reynalda is not obliged to pay such lease rental for being unlawful. There is no legal basis to demand payment of such unlawful lease rental. The courts will not enforce payment of a lease rental that violates the law. There was no validly fixed lease rental demandable at the time of the harvests. Thus, Reynalda was never in default. Reynalda and the Tan Heirs failed to agree on a lawful lease rental. Accordingly, the DAR must first fix the provisional lease rental payable by Reynalda to the Tan Heirs pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 34 of RA 3844 as amended. Until the DAR has fixed the provisional lease rental, Reynalda cannot be in default in the payment of lease rental since such amount is not yet determined. There can be no delay in the payment of an undetermined lease rental because it is impossible to pay an undetermined amount.