Crim Pro Digest 66702t

G.R. No. 182677

August 3, 2010

JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE, Petitioner vs. HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, HON. EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, HEIRS OF THE LATE RAFAEL DE LAS ALAS, Respondents. CARPIO MORALES, J.: FACTS: Jose Antonio Leviste was charged with homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas before the Regional Trial Court , presiding Judge Elmo Alameda, issued a commitment order against petitioner who was placed under police custody while confined at the Makati Medical Center. The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying, for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to reexamine the evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. The RTC issued an order deferring petitioner’s arraignment and allowing the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense and submit a recommendation within 30 days from its inception, inter alia; and denying reconsideration of the first order. Petitioner assailed these orders via certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals. Meantime, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion before the trial court to defer acting on the public prosecutor’s recommendation on the proper offense until after the appellate court resolves his application for injunctive reliefs, or alternatively, to grant him time to comment on the prosecutor’s recommendation and thereafter set a hearing for the judicial determination of probable cause. Petitioner also separately moved for the inhibition of Judge Alameda with prayer to defer action on the ission of the Amended Information. The trial court nonetheless issued the other assailed orders, which itted the Amended Information for murder and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest; and order which set the arraignment on February 13, 2007. Petitioner questioned these two orders via supplemental petition before the appellate court. Hence this petition. Records show that the scheduled arraignment pushed through during which petitioner refused to plead, drawing the trial court to enter a plea of ―not guilty‖ for him. The trial court, absent any writ of preliminary injunction from the appellate court, went on to try petitioner under the Amended Information. The trial court found petitioner guilty of homicide. From the Decision, petitioner filed an appeal to the appellate court. The appellate court dismissed petitioner’s petition, hence, his present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is considered a substantial amendment, which would make it not just a right but a duty of the prosecution to ask for a preliminary investigation.

RULING:

The Court answers in the affirmative.

A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. T he test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance. Any remedial measure springing from the reinvestigation – be it a complete disposition or an intermediate modification of the charge – is eventually addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which must make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case. Since the trial court would ultimately make the determination on the proposed course of action, it is for the prosecution to consider whether a reinvestigation is necessary to adduce and review the evidence for purposes of buttressing the appropriate motion to be filed in court. More importantly, reinvestigation is required in cases involving a substantial amendment of the information. Due process of law demands that no substantial amendment of an information may be itted without conducting another or a new preliminary investigation. In Matalam v. The 2nd Division of the Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that a substantial amendment in an information entitles an accused to another preliminary investigation, unless the amended information contains a charge related to or is included in the original Information. Matalam adds that the mere fact that the two charges are related does not necessarily or automatically deprive the accused of his right to another preliminary investigation. Notatu dignum is the fact that both the original Information and the amended Information in Matalam were similarly charging the accused with violation of Section 3(e) of theAnti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Considering that another or a new preliminary investigation is required, the fact that what was conducted in the present case was a reinvestigation does not invalidate the substantial amendment of the Information. There is no substantial distinction between a preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both are conducted in the same manner and for the same objective of determining whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of murder after the claimed circumstances were made known to him as early as the first motion. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97761 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 110315. January 16, 1998] RENATO CUDIA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, The HON.CARLOS D. RUSTIA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch LVI, Angeles City, respondents. DECISION ROMERO, J.: FACTS: Petitioner was arrested in Mabalacat, Pampanga allegedly for possessing an unlicensed revolver. He was brought to Angeles City, where he was detained. A preliminary investigation was thereafter conducted by an investigating of prosecutors. The City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information against him for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.(Crim case no. 11542) The case was raffled to Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City . Upon his arraignment, petitioner pleaded ―not guilty‖ to the charges. During the ensuing pre-trial, the court called the attention of the parties to the fact that, contrary to the information, petitioner had committed the offense in Mabalacat, and not in Angeles City. The case was re-raffled and assigned to another branch of the Angeles City RTC. Consequently, the provincial prosecutor of Pampanga also filed an information charging petitioner with the same crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition( Criminal Case No. 11987). The case was likewise raffled to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC. This prompted the prosecutor to file a Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw the Information, stating that the case is within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the ground that his continued prosecution for the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition — for which he had been arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11542, and which had been dismissed despite his opposition — would violate his right not to be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial court denied the motion to quash; hence, petitioner raised the issue to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, dismissed the same on the ground that the petitioner could not have been convicted under the first information as the same was defective. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the Provincial prosecutor of Angeles City had the authority to file the information of the offense charged as provided by law. RULING: The court ruled that it is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of Angeles City had no authority to file the first information, the offense having been committed in the Municipality of Mabalacat, which is beyond his jurisdiction.

Presidential Decree No. 1275, in relation to Section 9 of the istrative Code of 1987, pertinently provides that: ―Section 11. The provincial or the city fiscal shall: x x x

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b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of all penal laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made against the persons accused. In the conduct of such investigations he or his assistants shall receive the sworn statements or take oral evidence of witnesses summoned by subpoena for the purpose. x x x x x x x x x.‖ It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should prepare informations for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles City. An information, when required to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another. It must be exhibited or presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by law. If not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction. In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient because it was so defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first information would not be a bar to petitioner’s subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution. In light of the foregoing principles, there is thus no breach of the constitutional prohibition against twice putting an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense for the simple reason that the absence of authority of the City Prosecutor to file the first information meant that petitioner could never have been convicted on the strength thereof. As the first information was fatally defective for lack of authority of the officer filing it, the instant petition must fail for failure to comply with all the requisites necessary to invoke double jeopardy. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 24958 is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 115132-34 August 9, 1995 IMELDA R. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.: FACTS: Petitioner, former First Lady and widow of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, is the defendant in several criminal cases for violations of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) pending before the Sandiganbayan and in the regular courts. In two of these cases, petitioner was found guilty and was sentenced imprisonment. After conviction she filed a "Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad" to seek diagnostic tests and treatment by practitioners of oriental medicine in China allegedly because of "a serious and life threatening medical condition" which was denied. Then she again filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Permission to Travel Abroad" to undergo diagnosis and treatment in China. This was ed by several medical reports that were prepared by her doctor Roberto Anastacio. Again another Motion to leave was filed by Mrs. Marcos to US and Europe for treatment of several Heart diseases alleging that the tests were not available here. The presiding justice, Garchitorena, ed Dr. Gregorio B. Patacsil, Officerin-Charge of the Philippine Heart Center, and later wrote him a letter, asking for "expert opinion on coronary medicine". The court still found no merit to allow the petitioners motion to leave and denied all of the motions. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a "Motion to it Clinical Summary and to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration." Petitioner also filed a "Motion to it Recognizance in of, and to Resolve Soonest, the Motion for Reconsideration to Travel Abroad . Attached to the motion were letters of Vice President Joseph E. Estrada offering to be guarantor for the return of petitioner and those of twenty four of the House of Representatives requesting the court to allow petitioner to travel abroad. This was also denied by the Court also stating their express disapproval of the involvement of the VP and the Cabinet so as to influence the resolutions, decisions or orders or any judicial action of respondent court. Hence, this petition for certioarari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the granting of the motion to travel abroad is a matter of right of the accused or a matter of discretion by the court. RULING:

The granting of such motion is based on the discretion of the court.

The court ruled that the findings and recommendations of petitioner's physicians, petitioner failed to prove the necessity for a trip abroad. It should be emphasized that considering the fact that she is facing charges before the courts in several cases, in two of which she was convicted although the decision is still pending reconsideration, petitioner did not have an absolute right to leave the country and the burden was on her to prove that because of danger to health if not to her life there was necessity to seek medical treatment in foreign countries. In summary, the evidence submitted do not confirm the allegation that Mrs. Marcos is in the high risk group for sudden cardiac death. Considering the foregoing , the court said that respondent court trifled with petitioner's constitutionally guaranteed right to life, health and liberty. What petitioner denounces as the "unusual and unorthodox conduct of the trial" by the court's Presiding Justice owed more, it would seem, from the latter's robust and rather active personality rather than to any ill motive or hostility he entertained toward petitioner, the latter's counsel or her witnesses. It is matter of record that on three different occasions, petitioner had been permitted to travel abroad. But her later conviction in two cases dictated the need for greater caution. To be sure, conviction is not yet final view of a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. But a person's right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reason is a matter of the court's sound discretion. WHEREFORE, the petitioner is DISMISSED without prejudice to the filling of another motion for leave to travel abroad, should petitioner still desire, based on her heart condition. In such an event the determination of her medical condition should be made by t of medical specialists recommended by both the accused and the prosecution. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 132081. November 26, 2002] JOEL M. SANVICENTE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: FACTS: Petitioner was charged with homicide for the killing of Dennis Wong. At his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Petitioner begged leave to file a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the trial court. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion To Dismiss (On Demurrer to Evidence), based on the following grounds: (1) the lack of positive identification of the accused is a fatal omission warranting dismissal; (2) prosecution’s evidence are totally hearsay/incompetent. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case together with the civil aspect for insufficiency of evidence. The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals but to no avail. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution may appeal the trial court’s resolution granting demurrer to evidence and acquitting him of all the charges against him without violating the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.

RULING: Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, the trial court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. In resolving accused’s demurrer to evidence, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or a verdict of guilt. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion. Significantly, once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. This constitutes an exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy. The finality-of-acquittal rule was stressed thus in People v. Velasco:[21]

The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into the ―humanity of the laws and in jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizens, when brought in unequal contest with the State xxx.‖ Thus Green expressed the concern that ―(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty.‖ In the instant case, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence after the prosecution adduced its evidence and rested its case. The trial court subsequently dismissed the case after finding that the evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to the charge against petitioner.

[G.R. No. 126170. August 27, 1998] PEOPLE OF THE vs. EMMA MAQUILAN, accused-appellant.

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

MENDOZA, J.: FACTS: Accused-appellant Emma Maquilan was found guilty of drug-pushing in violation of R.A. No. 6425 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant filed a notice of appeal as a result of which the records of the case were forwarded to this Court. However, before the Court could act on the appeal, accused-appellant moved to withdraw her appeal, as she was going to file a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to seek her release from confinement. The Solicitor General was ordered by the Supreme Court to comment on said withdrawal and required accused-appellant’s counsel, Atty. de Guzman to confer with her and to determine whether in filing the motion was done voluntarily. The Solicitor General stated he had no objection to the motion. Atty. de Guzman informed the Court that accused-appellant had been released from prison by virtue of an order of the Regional Trial Court issued in a habeas corpus case. Subsequently, the Court required Judge Laviña of the Regional Trial Court to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for granting the petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus , considering that the appeal in this case was still pending. ISSUE: . May an accused-appellant file for habeas corpus after withdrawal of their appeal but, without waiting for the resolution of their motion? RULING: The release of accused-appellant constitutes unlawful interference with the proceedings of this Court and is only somewhat mitigated by the fact that the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City appears to have been misled by accused-appellant as to the status of the decision in Criminal Case No. S-2191. The trial court’s order granting release on habeas corpus, based as it is on the erroneous assumption that the decision in the criminal case had become final, is void. The trial court had no jurisdiction to issue the order in question. This case is analogous to People v. Bacang. There accused-appellants moved for the withdrawal of their appeal but, without waiting for the resolution of their motion, they applied for and were granted pardon by the President and released from confinement. Quoting People v. Salle,Jr., this Court ruled: We now declare that the ―conviction by final judgment‖ limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court. Any application therefor, if one is made, should not be acted upon or the

process toward its grant should not be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities of the Government concerned must require proof from the accused that he has not appealed from his conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in the form of a certification issued by the trial court or the appellate court, as the case may be. The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible therefor istratively liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the release of the accused from confinement. Accordingly, the Court in that case denied the accused-appellants’ motion to withdraw their appeal and ordered their rearrest. Those responsible for their release were cited for contempt. What was said in Bacang applies mutatis mutandis to this case. The use of the high prerogative writ as a post-conviction remedy presupposes a final judgment by virue of which accused is detained for the service of his sentence. As a matter of fact, however, that is not the case here as accused-appellant’s appeal is still pending. WHEREFORE, the motion to withdraw appeal is DENIED and the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to effect the rearrest within sixty (60) days from notice of accused-appellant Emma Maquilan, utilizing for this purpose the assistance of the Philippine National Police and the National Bureau of Investigation, and her reconfinement thereafter at the Correctional Institute for Women in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and forthwith to submit a report to the Court. Further action on the appeal is held in abeyance pending the rearrest of accused-appellant Emma Maquilan. Accused-appellant Emma Maquilan, Atty. Editha C. Pio of the Public Attorney’s Office, and Rachel D. Ruelo, Superintendent IV of the Correctional Institute for Women are hereby REQUIRED to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from notice why they should not be held in contempt for misrepresenting to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (Branch 71) the status of Criminal Case No. S-2191. SO ORDERED.