Digest Persons c4f1o

GR No. 165300 Ferrer vs Diaz FACTS: Comandante, daughter of spouses Diaz’s represented the latter to obtain a loan to Ferrer. The loan was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage Contract. Petitioner claims that prior to said loan, Comandante executed an instrument in his favor entitled Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided). The Diaz’, however, reneged on their obligation as the checks issued by Comandante were dishonored upon presentment. Despite repeated demands, the respondents failed to settle the loan. Thus, petitioner filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money Secured by Real Estate Mortgage Contract against the Diaz’ and Comandante. ISSUE: Whether or not waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another by an heir for a future inheritance valid? HELD: No the waiver is not valid. Article 1347 of the Civil Code provides that no contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law. For the inheritance to be considered “future”, the succession must not have been opened at the time of the contract. A contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites concur: (1)That the succession has not yet been opened; 2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and (3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature. In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of Comandante’s Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest over a Real Property (Still Undivided), succession to either of her parent’s properties has not yet been opened since both of them are still living. With respect to the other two requisites, both are likewise present considering that the property subject matter of Comandante’s waiver concededly forms part of the properties that she expect to inherit from her parents upon their death and, such expectancy of a right, as shown by the facts, is undoubtedly purely hereditary in nature. From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered into a contract involving the former’s future inheritance as embodied in the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by her in petitioner’s favor. DECS vs. San Diego G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989 Facts: Respondent San Diego has flunked the NMAT (National Medical ission Test) three times. When he applied to take again, petitioner rejected his application based on the “three-flunk-rule”. He then filed a petition before the RTC on the ground of due process and equal protection and challenging the constitutionality of the order. The petition was granted by the RTC therefore this petition. Issue: Whether or not the NMAT “three-flunk-rule” order is valid and constitutional. Ruling: Yes. It is the right and responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution provides that “ every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable ission and academic requirements”. It is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution but one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. Petition was granted and the RTC ruling was reversed. G.R. No. L-63419. December 18, 1986

Lozano vs Martinez FACTS:This is a consolidated case, the petition arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under the BP 22 also known as Bouncing Check Law. The defendant in these case moved seasonably to quash the information on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial court, except in one case, which is the subject of G.R No. 75789, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected have come to the court for remedy. Those who question the constitutionality of the said statute insist the following ground: 1) It offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt; 2) it impairs freedom of contract; 3) it contravenes the equal protection clause; 4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and 5) its enactment is flawed in the sense that during its age the interim Batasan violated the constitutional provision prohibiting to a bill on Third Reading. ISSUE: Whether or not BP 22 or the Bouncing Check Law is unconstitutional.RULING: No, the enactment of the assailed statute is a valid exercise of Police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of debt ex contractu, but certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to prescribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power. The enactment of the said statute is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. People vs. Jabinal Facts: The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas finding the accused guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. The validity of the conviction was based upon a retroactive application of the Supreme Court’s ruling in People vs. Mapa.As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the accused itted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint was without the requisite license a permit. He however, contended that he was a SECRET AGENT appointed by the governor, and was likewise subsequently appended as Confidential Agent, which granted him the authority to possess fire arm in the performance of his official duties as peace officer. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero, the accused sought for his aquittal.Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the trial court nonetheless decided otherwise, citing that People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero were reversed and subsequently abandoned in people vs. mapa. Issue:Should appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in Macarandana and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the completer reversal of Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? Ruling:The judgment appealed was reversed, and the appellant was acquitted. Reason:The doctrine laid down in lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, at the time appellant was found in possession of fire arm in question and he was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a new one is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to partres who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

**FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF ART. 11-12 OF THE CIVIL CODE In The Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name “Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon…” etc. 92 SCRA 1 July 30, 1979 Melencio-Herrera, Facts: The surviving parters of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta filed a petition praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the name of their firm, the names of their partner who ed away. One of the petitioners’ arguments stated that no local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner’s name in a professional firm’s name in so far as Greater Manila Area is concerned. No custom exists which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily identifies the individual of the firm. They also stated that the continued use of a deceased partner’s name in the firm name of law partnerships has been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession of most countries in the world. Issue: Whether or not the law firm “Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes” is allowed to sustain the name of their deceased partner, Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, in the name of their firm. Held: NO. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association stated the following: “The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner whenpermissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use.” No local custom permits or allows the continued use of a deceased or former partner’s name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under Philippine custom, identify the more active or senior partners in a firm. Firm names in the Philippines change and evolve when partners die, leave or a new one is added. It is questionable to add the new name of a partner and sustain the name of the deceased one since they have never been, technically, partners in the first place. When it comes to the arguments of the petitioners stating that U.S. Courts grant the continued use of the deceased partner’s name, this is so because in the U.S., it is a sanctioned custom as stated in the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S 2d 733). This does not apply in the Philippines. The petition filed herein is denied and petitioner is advised to drop the name “OZAETA” from the firm name. National Marketing Corporation, plaintiff-appellant vs. Miguel Tecson, defendant-appellee Facts:December 21, 1965, National Marketing Corporation filed a complaint, docketed as civil case no. 63701 on the same court, as successor of the Price Stabilization Corporation, against the same defendant from 10 years ago (December 21, 1955, Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Tecson). Defendant Miguel Tecson moved to dismiss the said complaint upon the ground lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of that and prescription of action.More than ten years have ed a year is a period of 365 days (Art. 13, C). Plaintiff forgot that 1960 and 1964 were both leap years so that when this present case was filed it was filed two days too late.The lower court, then, issued an order of dismissal with regards the article 13 of the civil code. Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of our Civil Code, an action upon a judgment “must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues,” the issue thus confined to the date on which ten years from December 21, 1955 had expired.However, National Marketing Corporation insists that the same “is erroneous because a year means a calendar year. There is no question that when it is not a leap year, December 21 to December 21 of the following year is one year. The case reached its conclusion with the appellant’s theory that contravenes the explicit provision of Article 13 of the civil code.

Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife whom he divorced he had five legitimate children (Edward Bellis et al), by his second wife, who survived him, he had three legitimate children. He, however, also had three illegitimate children in the Philippines (Maria Cristina Bellis et al). Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, his illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they should be entitled, if Philippine law were to be applied. ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of the illegitimate children. HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that the said children, maria Kristina et al, are not entitled to their legitimes under the Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes. Diaz v. CA Facts: On 23 January 1991, Davao Light and Power Company, Inc. (DLPC) filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for the approval of the sound value appraisal of its property in service.The Asian Appraisal Company valued the property and equipment of DLPC as of 12 March 1990 at One Billion One Hundred Forty One Million Seven Hundred Seventy Four Thousand Pesos (P1,141,774,000.00). On 6 December 1992, ERB approved the application of DLPC after deducting Fourteen Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P14,800,000.00) worth of property and equipment which were not used by DLPC in its operation. On 6 July 1992, petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court assailing the decision of ERB on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.In our resolution of 8 September 1992, the Supreme Court referred the case for proper disposition to the Court of Appeals which subsequently dismissed the petition on the ground that (1) the filing of the petition for review with the Supreme Court was a wrong mode of appeal, and (2) the petition did not comply with the provisions of Supreme Court Circular 1-88 in that (a) it did not state the date when the petitioners received notice of the ERB decision, (b) it did not state the date when the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, and (c) it inconsistently alleged different dates when petitioners supposedly received the denial of their motion by ERB.On 18 December 1992, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that our resolution of 8 September 1992 was a directive for the Court of Appeals to disregard the above circular.In its resolution of 24 March 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Issu: whether or not E.O. No. 172 is violative of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution Held: Yes. Since Sec. 10 of E.O. No. 172 was enacted without the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court, this provision never became effective, with the result that it cannot be deemed to have amended the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Consequently, the authority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases from the Board of Energy, now ERB, remains.

Issues:Whether or not the term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365 days. Ruling: Yes. The term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365 days. However, it is said to be unrealistic and if public interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the revised istrative code, this may be done through legislative process and not by judicial decree.

Bellis vs Bellis

SEA COMMERCIAL COMPANY, INC., vs CA G.R. No. 122823. November 25, 1999 Facts:

In this petition for review by certiorari , SEA Commercial Company, Inc. (SEACOM), a corporation engaged in the business of selling and distributing agricultural machinery, products, and equipment, assails the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV NO. 31263 affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 5, in Civil Case No. 122391, in favor of Jamandre Industries, Inc. (JII) et al., SEACOM’s appointed exclusive dealer in the City and Province of Iloilo, as per dealership agreement entered by both on September 20, 1966. Tirso Jamandre, one of the respondents herein, executed a suretyship agreement binding himself tly and severally with JII to pay for all obligations of JII to SEACOM. The agreement was subsequently amended to include Capiz in the territorial coverage and to make the dealership agreement on a non-exclusive basis. In the course of the business relationship arising from the dealership agreement, JII allegedly incurred a balance of P18,843.85 for unpaid deliveries, and SEACOM brought action to recover said amount plus interest and attorney’s fees. JII filed an Answer denying the obligation and interposing a counterclaim for damages representing unrealized profits when JII sold to the Farm System Development Corporation (FSDC) twenty one (21) units of Mitsubishi power tillers. In the counterclaim, JII alleged that as a dealer in Capiz, JII contracted to sell in 1977 twenty-four (24) units of Mitsubishi power tillers to a group of farmers to be financed by said corporation, which fact JII allegedly made known to petitioner, but the latter taking advantage of said information and in bad faith, went directly to FSDC and dealt with it and sold twenty one (21) units of said tractors, thereby depriving JII of unrealized profit of eighty-five thousand four hundred fifteen and 61/100 pesos (P85,415.61). Both courts invoke, as basis for their decision, Article 19 of the Civil Code which reads as follows: "Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.” Issue: Whether or not SEACOM acted in bad faith when it competed with its own dealer as regards the sale of farm machineries to FSDC. Held: Yes. By appointing as a dealer of its agricultural equipment, SEACOM recognized the role and undertaking of JII to promote and sell said equipment. Under the dealership agreement, JII was to act as a middleman to sell SEACOM’s products, in its area of operations, i.e. Iloilo and Capiz provinces, to the exclusion of other places, to send its men to Manila for training on repair, servicing, and installation of the items to be handled by it, and to comply with other personnel and vehicle requirements intended for the benefit of the dealership. After being informed of the demonstrations JII had conducted to promote the sales of SEACOM equipment, including the operations at JII’s expense conducted for five months, and the approval of its facilities (service and parts) by FSDC, SEACOM participated in the bidding for the said equipment at a lower price, placing itself in direct competition with its own dealer. The actuations of SEACOM are tainted by bad faith. Baksh vs CA In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, Marilou Gonzales, then 21 years old, met Gashem Shookat Baksh, a 29 year old exchange student from Iran who was studying medicine in Dagupan. The two got really close and intimate. On Marilou’s , she said that Gashem later offered to marry her at the end of the semester. Marilou then introduced Gashem to her parents where they expressed their intention to get married. Marilou’s parents then started inviting sponsors and relatives to the wedding. They even started looking for animals to slaughter for the occasion. Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment where they had sexual intercourse. But in no time, their relationship went sour as Gashem began maltreating Marilou. Gashem eventually revoked his promise of marrying Marilou and he told her that he is already married to someone in Bacolod City. So Marilou went home and later sued Gashem for damages. The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in moral damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to Marilou and that he cannot be adjudged to have violated Filipino customs and traditions since he, being an Iranian, was not familiar with Filipino customs and traditions. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct. HELD: Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou not really because of his breach of promise to marry her but based on Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides:Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this case, it is the deceit and fraud employed by Gashem that constitutes a violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code. His promise of marrying Marilou was a deceitful scheme to lure her into sexual congress. As found by the trial court, Marilou was not a woman of loose morals. She was a virgin before she met Gashem. She would not have surrendered herself to Gashem had Gashem not promised to marry her. Gashem’s blatant disregard of Filipino traditions on marriage and on the reputation of Filipinas is contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy. As a foreigner who is enjoying the hospitality of our country and even taking advantage of the opportunity to study here he is expected to respect our traditions. Any act contrary will render him liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to expand the concepts of torts and quasi delict. It is meant to cover situations such as this case where the breach complained of is not strictly covered by existing laws. It was meant as a legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books – such as the absence of a law penalizing a the breach of promise to marry. The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if the promise to marry was made and there was carnal knowledge because of it, then moral damages may be recovered (presence of moral or criminal seduction), Except if there was mutual lust; or if expenses were made because of the promise (expenses for the wedding), then actual damages may be recovered. WASSMER vs.VELEZ G.R. No. L-20089 FACTS: On August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued. Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances. The bride-to-be's trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received. And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again. ISSUE: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong? HELD: Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code TITLE: Nikko Hotel Manila vs. Reyes CITATION: GR No. 154259, February 28, 2005 FACTS: Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila and Ruby Lim assailed the decision of the Court of Appeals in reversing the decision of RTC of Quezon City. CA held petitioner liable for damages to Roberto Reyes aka “Amang Bisaya”, an entertainment artist. There are two versions of the story:

Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of Nikko Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him to a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotel’s former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and carried a basket of fruits, the latter’s gift. He He lined up at the buffet table as soon as it was ready but to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotel’s Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by the people around them. He was asked to leave the party and a Makati policeman accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All these time, Dr Filart ignored him adding to his shame and humiliation. Ms. Ruby Lim: She itted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner claimed by the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr. Filart’s sister, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, if Dr. Filart did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr. Filart’s group. She wasn’t able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking over the phone and doesn’t want to interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave because the celebrant specifically ordered that the party should be intimate consisting only of those who part of the list. She even asked politely with the plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party. During the plaintiff’s cross-examination, he was asked how close was Ms. Lim when she approached him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered “very close because we nearly kissed each other”. Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lim’s intention to relay the request only be heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to know what happened. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. HELD: Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did all the necessary precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to leave the party. Considering almost 20 years of experience in the hotel industry, Ms. Lim is experienced enough to know how to handle such matters. Hence, petitioners will not be held liable for damages brought under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. GR NO 155550 Northwest Airlines vs Chiong Case digest-none Mendoza vs Casumpong A Surgical Operation Is The Responsibility Of The Surgeon Performing It. He Must Personally Ascertain That The Counts Of Instruments And Materials Used Before The Surgery And Prior To Sewing The Patient Up Have Been Correctly Done The Case:In February, 1993, Josephine underwent hysterectomy and myomectomy thru Dr. Mariter Mendoza at the Iloilo Doctors Hospital. However, after the operation, Josephin experienced recurring fever, nausea, and vomiting. Three months later, while taking a bath, she noticed a protruding object from her genital, and tried calling Dr. Mendoza, who was not available. When she went to see another physician (Dr. Edna Jamandre) the latter was able to extract a foul smelling, partially expelled rolled gauze from her cervix. This prompted her to file a civil case for damages against Dr. Mendoza. Josephine was substituted by her heirs when she died before trial’s end. After trial, the RTC initially ruled in favour of the respondents, but on motion for reconsideration by Dr. Mendoza, reversed itself. On appeal, the CA reinstated the original RTC decision, ruling that Dr. Mendoza committed a breach of her duty as a physician when a gauze remained in her patient’s body after surgery. The Issue: Whether or not Dr. Mendoza is liable for the death of Josephine. The Ruling: But she raises at this Court’s level a question of fact when parties may raise only questions of law before it in petitions for review on certiorari from the CA. With few exceptions, the factual findings of the latter court are generally binding. None of those exceptions applies to this case.1As the RTC pointed out, Josephine did not undergo any other surgical operation. And it would be much unlikely for her or for any woman to inject a roll of gauze into her cervix. As the Court held in Professional Services, Inc. v. Agana:2

An operation requiring the placing of sponges in the incision is not complete until the sponges are properly removed, and it is settled that the leaving of sponges or other foreign substances in the wound after the incision has been closed is at least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon. To put it simply, such act is considered so inconsistent with due care as to raise an inference of negligence. There are even legions of authorities to the effect that such act is negligence per se. The Court notes, however, that neither the CA nor the RTC awarded exemplary damages against Dr. Mendoza when, under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be awarded in cases of gross negligence.3 A surgical operation is the responsibility of the surgeon performing it. He must personally ascertain that the counts of instruments and materials used before the surgery and prior to sewing the patient up have been correctly done. To provide an example to the medical profession and to stress the need for constant vigilance in attending to a patient’s health, the award of exemplary damages in this case is in order.Further, in view of Josephine’s death resulting from petitioner’s negligence, civil indemnity under Article 22064 of the Civil Code should be given to respondents as heirs. The amount of P50,000.00 is fixed by prevailing jurisprudence for this kind.5 The Court also deems it just and equitable under Article 2208 of the Civil Code to increase the award of attorney’s fees from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00.WHEREFORE, the Court entirely AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 18, 2011 with the MODIFICATION ordering petitioner Mariter Mendoza to pay respondents Adriano, Jennifer Adriane and John Andre, all surnamed Casumpang, an additional P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, additional P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees and civil indemnity arising from death in the amount of P50,000.00. Hing vs. Choachuy Art 25&26 FACTS:Picture4 Sometime in April 2005, Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (owned by Choachuy’s) filed a case for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order against the Hing’s. The latter claimed that the Hing’s constructed a fence without a valid permit and that it would destroy the walls of their building. The court denied the application for lack of evidence. So in order to get evidences for the case, on June 2005, Choachuy illegally set-up two video surveillance cameras facing the Hing’s property. Their employees even took pictures of the said construction of the fence. The Hing’s then filed a case against the Choachuy’s for violating their right to privacy. On October 2005, the RTC issued a order granting the application of the Hing’s for TRO and directed the Choachuy’s to remove the two video surveillance cameras they installed. The Choachuy’s appealed the case to the Court of Appeals and the RTC’s decision was annulled and set aside. The Hing’s then raised the case to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the installation of two video surveillance cameras of Choachuy’s violated the Hing’s right to privacy. HELD:Such act of the Choachuy’s violated the right of privacy of the Hing’s under Article 26(1) prohibiting the “prying into the privacy of another’s residence.” Although it is a business office and not a residence, the owner has the right to exclude the public or deny them access.

PIMENTEL vs. PIMENTEL, G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010 Facts: Respondent, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel, filed an action for frustrated parricide against petitioner, Joselito R. Pimentel. The Information for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004 and was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004. The pre-trial and trial was set on 14 February 2005. She also filed on 5

November 2004, a petition, dated 4 November 2004, for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity Petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City on 7 February 2005, for the pretrial and trial of the Civil Case. He then filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question asserting that the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City. The RTC Quezon City held that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The Court of Appeals also denied the petition holding that the issue in the criminal case for frustrated parricide differs from the issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage. It ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. At the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting. Issue: Whether or not the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. Ruling: The elements of a prejudicial question under Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed, were not met. Civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action. There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide. However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent