The María Clara Doctrine 375c63

The María Clara doctrine, also known as the Woman's Honor doctrine, is a legal doctrine applied by Philippine courts regarding cases that concerns abuse against women.

Etymology The doctrine was named after María Clara from José Rizal's novel Noli Me Tángere. Clara is characterized as reserved and shy and was later considered an "ideal" role model for women in Philippine culture.[1]

Legal history The doctrine became a part of the Supreme Court of the Philippines' jurisprudence sometime in 1960 following the People v. Taño case. The high court through Justice Alejo Labrador has asserted a "well known fact" that women, especially Filipinos "would not it that they have been abused unless that abuse had actually happened."[1] The court said that women's natural instict is to protect their honor.[2]The case involved three armed robbers who the court found liable for taking turns in raping a woman.[3]

About 58 years later since the doctrine entered the high court's jurisprudence, the Third Division of the Supreme Court reverse a ruling on January 17, 2018 by a Davao court on two people convicted of rape.[1] The 2018 decision was released in late-February.[4] The case involves an alleged rape that happened in 2009 and the two accused were sentenced of reclusión perpetua, or forty years of imprisonment, in 2012. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in 2016. [5]

The court described the doctrine as causing a "travesty of justice" by putting the accused at an "unfair disadvantage"[1], criticizing the doctrine for assuming that no Filipina woman of "decent repute" would falsely claim that she was abused. It urged for the acceptance of the "realities of a woman’s dynamic role" in Philippine society today so one can "evaluate the testimony of a private complainant of rape without gender bias or cultural misconception". It also stated that the discrepancies in the alleged victim's testimonies has casted doubt if the rape incident did happen or not.[3]

This has led to concerns and speculations that the high court has abandoned the doctrine.[1] The Gabriela Women's Party condemned the decision which it viewed made the Maria Clara doctrine invalid saying the ruling reversal will empower rapists and disagreed with the court's assessment of the societal status of women.[4]

On February 21, 2018, Supreme Court's spokesperson, Theodore Te has clarified that it was not the case since the high court can only abandon a doctrine only during a full session.[1]

[ GR No. L-11991, Oct 31, 1960 ] PEOPLE v. PORFIRIO TAÑO 109 Phil. 912

LABRADOR, J.:

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Hon. Hilarion Y. Jarencio, presiding, finding Porfirio Taño, Guillermo Camina and Roman Caldito guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery in Band with Rape, and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify tly and severally the offended parties in the amount of P210.00, and also finding Dionisio Cantong and Maximino Calico guilty of the crime of simple robbery in band and sentencing them also for said offense. Porfirio Tano and Dionisio Cantong appealed from the judgment, but while the case was pending in this Court, the latter withdrew his appeal. The present appeal, therefore, refers to that of Porfirio Taño. It is not disputed by the appellant, as found in the decision appealed from, that on July 25, 1955, at 8:00 in the evening, some persons called at the house of the spouses Leodegario Domingo and Herminigilda Domingo in barrio Talacuan, municipality of Loon, province of Iloilo, informing the inmates of the house that there was a letter for Leodegario. As soon as Leodegario reached the ground, carrying a lamp with him, Camina struck his hand holding the lamp and the lamp fell down and the light was put out. Then Taño pointed a rifle at Leodegario, while Camina tied his hands at the back. After giving a blow on the face of Leodegario, Taño ordered his companions to take Leodegario to the river bank 40 meters away. Then Taño, Camina and Caldito went up the house, each carrying with him a firearm. They searched the house, and upon seeing a trunk forced it open and took away some pieces of men's and women's apparel and an envelope containing P210.00.

The evidence shows that after the money had been taken away Taño dragged Herminigilda, pushing her down the floor. Taño then placed himself on top of Herminigilda, while his companions held her legs apart. He gave a blow at her left thigh and tore her "panty" away and then had intercourse with her. After this Camina also had access to her, while his companions held her down. Caldito also did this. After raping her, they went down the house and, thereafter, all of them ran away.

Counsel for appellant Taño argues that there is no sufficient evidence to sustain the finding that appellant had access to the offended party, for the reason that the physician who examined her made no examination of her private parts. That no such examination was made is true; the physician who examined Herminigilda found a contusion on the face of her left thigh (Exhibit "M"), but made no mention of having examined her private parts or having found evidence involving intercourse forced on her.

We have, however, carefully examined the evidence in this respect and we found that Herminigilda testified that when Taño placed himself on top of her, she scratched his face, but Camina came and took hold of, and then stretched her legs apart to aid Taño; that Taño hit her on the lap and tore away her "panty"; that her "panty" had a coloration at the lower part caused by the semen of Taño while on top of her (t.s.n. pp. 16-18). Her testimony is corroborated by the finding of a contusion on her left thigh and of a coloration of her "panty" which was produced to the court. Besides, the offended party expressly declared that Taño was able to have carnal knowledge of her (Id, pp. JS-19). It is a well-known fact that women, especially Filipinos, would not it that they have been abused unless that abuse had actually happened. This is due to their natural instinct to protect their honor. We can not believe that the offended party would have positively stated that intercourse took place unless it did actually take place.

Another circumstance which s the claim that rape was committed is the fact that following the day of the commission of the crime of rape, the offended party stated in her affidavit that the three accused, including appellant Taño, had taken turns in committing the crime of rape on her. The imputation of rape is not, therefore, the prpduct of fabrication, because no appreciable time had elapsed between the commission of the rape and the execution of tile affidavit.

Lastly, the trial judge who heard the offended party testify believed her testimony and found that rape was actually committed. We find nothing to indicate that the court's findings in this respect are not correct. We are, therefore, forced to the conclusion that the claim of appellant Taño that the rape imputed to him was not sufficiently proved, is without merit.

We also agree with the trial court that four aggravating circumstances, namely, commission by a band, taking advantage of nighttime and dwelling, and use of superior strength attended the commission of the offense. There being no mitigating circumstance in appellant's favor, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum degree.

The judgment of conviction appealed from should, therefore, be as it hereby affirmed. With costs against appellant.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angela, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, and Paredes, JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed.

SC: 'Maria Clara' doctrine alone not sufficient for rape conviction Ina Reformina, ABS-CBN News Posted at Feb 20 2018 09:57 PM | Updated as of Feb 21 2018 06:26 AM

Save Facebook Twitter GPlus LinkedIn Gone were the days when a rape victim's testimony is sufficient to convict the alleged rapist, solely because of the belief that a typical Filipina, a "Maria Clara," would not testify that she had been raped if it did not actually happen.

The Supreme Court (SC), in a decision on January 17 penned by Associate Justice Samuel Martires, acquitted two men previously convicted of rape by a trial court, and affirmed by the appellate court, because the testimony of alleged victim, alias "AAA," a housemaid, proved incredible.

The so-called ‘Maria Clara’ or “women’s honor” doctrine became part of Philippine jurisprudence in the 1960’s in the case involving the conviction of three armed robbers who toork turns raping Herminigilda Domingo.

The high court then "hinged on the impression that no young Filipina of decent repute would publicly it that she has been sexually abused, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor."

In the recent case involving an appeal by Juvy D. Amarela and Junard G. Racho, where the two allegedly raped "AAA" in two separate instances, one after the other, in Davao City in February 2009, the high court said "today, we simply cannot be stuck to the Maria Clara stereotype of a demure and reserved Filipino woman" so as to "evaluate the testimony of a private complainant of rape without gender bias or cultural misconception."

The high court explained that the times have changed, and with it the Filipina.

"We, should stay away from such mindset and accept the realities of a woman's dynamic role in society today; she who has over the years transformed into a strong and confidently intelligent and beautiful person, willing to fight for her rights.

"It is important to weed out these unnecessary notions because an accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided of course, that the testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things," the high court said in its decision, as it stressed that for a conviction of rape to rise, the victim's narration and testimony must be believable beyond reasonable doubt," the SC said.

VICTIM'S TESTIMONY NOT CREDIBLE

In the case of "AAA," the high court ruled that her testimony cast a doubt on its very credibility and she was not telling the truth in her narration. The following circumstances were pointed out in the decision: (1) AAA's version of the story in her complaint-affidavit differed materially from her testimony in court; (2) "AAA" could not have easily identified Amarela because the crime scene was dark and she only saw him for the first time; (3) her testimony lacked material details on how she was brought under the stage against her will; and (4) the medical findings did not corroborate physical injuries and are inconclusive of any signs of forced entry.

AAA's complaint-affidavit indicated that Amarela pulled her away from the beauty contest stage to the daycare center, where the rape occurred. However, in court, "AAA" testified that Amarela grabbed her when she was on the way to the comfort room.

"[T]he version in AAA's affidavit-complaint is remotely different from her court testimony. At the first instance, AAA claims that she was pulled away from the vicinity of the stage; later, in court, she says that she was on her way to the restroom when she was grabbed. By this alone, we are hesitant to believe AAA's retraction because it goes into whether it was even possible for Amarela to abduct AAA against her will," the SC said.

As for Racho, the high court said that "[s]ince we doubt AAA's on how she was raped by Amarela, we have to consider her testimony against Racho under the same light."

Racho was instructed by his mother to accompany "AAA," after the supposed rape by Amarela, to her aunt's house against his will. "AAA" alleged that instead of performing the task, Racho took her to a shanty and raped her.

The high court said it was inclined to believe Racho's narration that he and "AAA" parted ways when she insisted she wanted to go home instead of going to her aunt's house, since her home was in another town.

"To begin with, Racho did not even want to bring 'AAA' to her aunt's house nearby. If he had the intention to have sex with 'AAA,' Racho would not have declined her mother's instruction. His reason for leaving 'AAA' to go home alone is ed by the fact that he was able to immediately come home right after he left with 'AAA,'" the SC said.

Further, the high court noted that 'AAA's' lacerations were only at the 9 o'clock and 3 o'clock positions of the hymen, and not in various directions which could have established non-consensual sex, according to studies.

"Considering the locality of these lacerations ('AAA's' case), we cannot completely rule out the probability that 'AAA' voluntarily had sex that night. Moreover, the absence o f bruises on AAA's thighs - when she said she was punched there twice-reinforces the theory that 'AAA' may have had consensual intercourse," the SC said.

Rape is essentially a crime committed through force or intimidation, against the victim's will, the high court stressed.

The high court pointed out that it was the prosecution's duty to properly evaluate the evidence against Amarela or Racho, and what actually happened could not be ascertained based on the testimony alone of "AAA."

A DIVISION of the Supreme Court (SC) has issued a ruling that set aside the 58-year-old “woman’s honor” doctrine in resolving rape cases.

In a 20-page decision issued on January 17, 2017, and penned by Associate Justice Samuel Martires, the Court’s Third Division held that the doctrine which suggests a woman who is a victim of sexual abuse would not it she had been abused, unless the incident is true, out of a “natural instinct to protect her honor” is a “misconception” in this present time.

The Court, in the said ruling, reversed the guilty verdict issued by a Davao court in 2012 against Juvy Amarela and Junard Racho in a rape that supposedly took place in 2009.

The two were earlier meted to suffer reclusion perpetua, or up to 40 years imprisonment, by the trial court with the decision also being affirmed by the Court of Appeals in 2016.

In setting aside Amarela and Racho’s conviction, the Court held that the doctrine has put accused in rape cases at an unfair disadvantage and creates a “travesty of justice.”

The woman’s honor doctrine surfaced in the Court’s jurisprudence sometime in 1960 in the case of People v. Tana.

In the said case the Court affirmed the conviction of three armed robbers who took turns raping a woman.

The Court, speaking through Justice Alejo Labrador, said: “It is a well-known fact that women, especially Filipinos, would not it that they have been abused unless that abuse had actually happened.”

It added that it is due to women’s natural instinct to protect their honor.

But the new SC ruling said the doctrine is no longer applicable today and that the Court cannot be stuck to the “Maria Clara” stereotype of a demure and reserved Filipina.

“More often than not, where the alleged victim survives to tell her story of sexual depredation, rape cases are solely decided based on the credibility of the testimony of the private complainant. In doing so, we have hinged on the impression that no young Filipina of decent repute would publicly it that she was

sexually abused, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor,” the High Court stated.

“We, should stay away from such mind-set and accept the realities of a woman’s dynamic role in society today; she who has over the years transformed into a strong and confidently intelligent and beautiful person, willing to fight for her rights. In this way, we can evaluate the testimony of a private complainant of rape without gender bias or cultural misconception,” the Court added.

The SC said that for the Court to affirm a conviction of rape it should be based on credible, natural, convincing testimony of the victim which should also be consistent with human nature and not merely rely on the women’s honor doctrine.

In the case of Amarela and Racho, the Court said the prosecution “miserably failed to present a clear story of what transpired and that whether the victim’s story is true or not.

The Third Division said it found circumstances that cast doubt on the credibility of the testimony of the victim, including the gaps in her testimony, differences between her affidavit-complaint and court testimony, a supposed inability for her to have identified one of her assailants because the crime scene was ark and she allegedly saw him for the first time, a lack of material details on some events in the alleged rape incident, to medico-legal findings that raised questions on whether she had consented to sex after all.

“Although we put a on the factual findings of the trial court, especially when they are affirmed by the appellate court, this rule is not absolute and its exceptions, such as when some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended and misinterpreted,” the SC declared.