Philosophical Analysis Of Memento 5uz

Adam Brewer PHIL 100.2 26 May 2005 Memento raises many interesting questions for the philosopher. Issues of personal identity are central to the plot, but if they are interpreted in the way the film seems to suggest then the plot becomes open to problems arisen from a certain faith and the effects of such a faith on Leonard. Let us explore how these issues arise and can be interpreted in the film. If we apply the memory theory of personal identity to Leonard’s case a strange conundrum arises. According to the theory, a person who has a memory of himself/herself having a previous experience is self same with the person who actually had that experience. In other words, if one can their own past then they maintain an identity now (as ing) with themselves then (as experiencing). Let us examine the implications of such a theory for Leonard. We will call the pre-condition Leonard – before he was injured – Leonard1. Now let us also look at Leonard from two different times in his post-condition life: say, at the end of the movie when Leonard kills James ‘Jimmy’ Grantz – we will refer to him at this time as Leonard 2 – and also at the opening of the movie when Leonard kills John ‘Teddy’ Gammell – at this time we will refer to him as Leonard 3. Because of the nature of his condition Leonard cannot form new memories, but he can recall memories formed prior to his condition. This means that both Leonard 2 and Leonard3 can being Leonard1, but Leonard3 cannot Leonard2. According to the memory continuity theory of personal identity: (a) Leonard2 is the same person as Leonard1 because he has memories of being Leonard1, (b) Leonard3 is also the same person as Leonard1 because he has memories of being Leonard1, and (c) Leonard3 cannot be the same person as Leonard2 because Leonard3 has no memories at all of ever having been Leonard2. From this perspective it would seem that every several minutes, when his short term memory resets and erases all recent data, Leonard becomes a different person because he cannot who he just (recently) was. The movie is highly suggestive of this interpretation. It seems that Leonard

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Adam Brewer PHIL 100.2 26 May 2005 always has to reacquaint himself with the ‘person’ who he was a moment ago. He does this through his mementos; notes, photos, and tattoos all serve to tell him the story of who he just was. But these mementos are of such a type that it is as if he is leaving them for someone else entirely. If I wanted to something, say, to pick up a gallon of milk on my way home, I would probably jot down ‘milk’ on scrap of paper and place it somewhere where I would notice it. I would not need to write, ‘Go to the store on your way home and pick up milk as there is none left in the refrigerator there,’ because I would not require that level of detail to jog my memory. Leonard, on the other hand, has to spell out instructions and keep records of what he has done, detailed enough that someone with no previous knowledge of his situation (i.e. himself after his memory resets) could interpret and understand what is meant by the mementos. So it would seem that he is disseminating this information not to himself, but to someone else who will pick up the story where he left off and continue it for him. So we see that whatever the current incarnation of Leonard is he must allow himself to be defined by the mementos left for him by, what he assumes is, his previous self. He says that he trusts these ‘facts’ specifically because they are not memories. He claims that memories are weak forms of evidence to base ones decisions on because they can easily be mistaken and manipulated; but isn’t this also true of his mementos (i.e. his ‘facts’)? We know that factual evidence – even the kind collected by the police or insurance investigators, which Leonard seems to trust so much – can be tampered with, planted, or mistakenly identified in connection with a particular incident. So what makes these ‘facts’ so trustworthy? Because of Leonard’s inability to the recent past false evidence could be easily be planted or tampered with by virtually anyone and Leonard would have no way of knowing, except by means of that very evidence. Leonard has no reason to accept his ‘facts’ as any more real than memories except that he has decided that they are more real somehow. He seems to do this in the same way that

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Adam Brewer PHIL 100.2 26 May 2005 you or I trust our memories so readily. We do not often ask for further proof that something is the case if we have what we consider to be a decent memory of it. For example, if I that yesterday I baked some cookies, ate all of them, and cleaned up any mess I had made, I don’t usually need further proof of such a thing, I accept it on memory. I would not be inclined to say that because there are no cookies left or no dirty pans that I did not bake any cookies, I believe it based solely on memory and not on any other factual data. This, presumably, is because I have a memory system that I use often and believe is trustworthy: whether or not it actually is does not usually come under investigation in my dayto-day life. Similarly, Leonard has a system that he often uses to record events – his collected ‘facts’ recorded as mementos – which he also believes to be trustworthy. Leonard has no more reason to trust his mementos than I have to trust my memory. We simply have a sort of blind faith in the system we use most regularly to understand the world. Should we so readily embrace such a faith? I wish to point out how Memento illustrates, by way of Leonard’s actions, why such a faith in one’s system of understanding can open up a philosophical can of worms. Leonard bases his current actions on his mementos because he trusts those predefined ‘facts’ as being reliable. However, as pointed out before, such facts can be manipulated by others as well as by himself, and thus, Leonard’s actions can be manipulated. If we adhere to the memory theory of personal identity and our earlier interpretation of Leonard2 and Leonard3 as different people then we can see that Leonard3 is capable of being manipulated by Leonard2 without his knowledge. Thus Leonard2 can create for Leonard3 any set of defining characteristics he wants and dictate the actions of Leonard3. This is precisely what happens throughout the movie, but it is particularly apparent at the end of the movie when Leonard2 has just killed Jimmy and then he records Teddy’s license plate number as being that of the person he should kill. By doing this he has predetermined that Leonard3 will kill Teddy.

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Adam Brewer PHIL 100.2 26 May 2005 This is quite odd and can be viewed as either an asset or a liability to Leonard 3. On the one hand, it would appear that Leonard’s system works quite well. It enables him to continue his projects from moment to moment with some level of continuity. This is due entirely to the overwhelming trust he has in his mementos. So Leonard’s faith in ‘facts’ can be of great value to him by enabling him to have some sort of continuity, though it fails to be a continuity of personal identity according to our memory theory, it is at least a continuity of personal projects which may be the best Leonard can get. On the other hand, by his trust in his mementos Leonard seems to surrender a certain amount of freedom. He allows himself to be defined by, and act almost completely on, sets of data that he – that is to say, the current incarnation of Leonard, e.g. Leonard3 – neither experienced nor authored. So, in the case of Leonard3 – and, in fact, all post-condition Leonards – he is completely determined and a slave to his mementos because of his absolute trust in them. Furthermore, is it ethical that Leonard2, or anyone, be the determiner of someone else’s actions? What gives him the right to do such a thing over someone else? If Leonard2 was essentially the cause of Leonard3 killing Teddy then who is culpable for the murder Leonard2 or Leonard3? Why shouldn’t the individual doing the action be the one determining it? It seems we could continue with these questions ad infinitum, so what does this mean? It would seem that a strongly held belief in one’s own system of understanding the world, be it memory or fact-based, can beg a plethora of questions about freedom, responsibility, and morality. So perhaps Memento offers us a cautionary tale about the implications of our beliefs and we should be wary of the amount of weight we give to them in making decisions.

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