Philosophy Study Material Ias e353t

Philosophy : Study Material (Logic, Ethics And Mimasa) Philosophy: Logic Part-I Logic The art of thinking and reasoning in strict accordance with the limitations and incapacities of the human misunderstanding. The basic of logic is the syllogism, consisting of a major and a minor premise and a conclusion Major Premise: Thirty men can do a piece of work thirty times as quickly as one man. Minor Premise: One man can dig a posthole in thirty seconds; therefore-Conclusion: Thirty men can dig a posthole in one second. Syllogisms are arguments that take several parts, typically with two statements which are assumed to be true (or premises) that lead to a conclusion. There are three major types of syllogism: Conditional syllogism: If A is true then B is true (If A then B). Categorical syllogism: If A is in C then B is in C. Disjunctive syllogism: If A is true, then B is false (A or B).

The Structure of Syllogism: A categorical syllogism is an argument consisting of exactly three categorical propositions (two premises and a conclusion) in which there appear a total of exactly three categorical , each of which is used exactly twice. One of those must be used as the subject term of the conclusion of the syllogism, and we call it the minor term of the syllogism as a whole. The major term of the syllogism is whatever is employed as the predicate term of its conclusion. The third term in the syllogism doesn't occur in the conclusion at all, but must be employed in somewhere in each of its premises; hence, we call it the middle term. Since one of the premises of the syllogism must be a categorical proposition that affirms some relation between its middle and major , we call that the major premise of the syllogism. The other premise, which links the middle and minor , we call the minor premise. Consider, for example, the categorical syllogism: No geese are felines. Some birds are geese. Therefore, Some birds are not felines. Clearly, "Some birds are not felines" is the conclusion of this syllogism. The major term of the syllogism is "felines" (the predicate term of its conclusion), so "No geese are felines" (the premise in which "felines" appears) is its major premise. Simlarly, the minor term of the syllogism is "birds," and "Some birds are geese" is its minor premise. "geese" is the middle term of the syllogism. Standard Form of A Syllogism - A categorical syllogism in standard form always begins with the premises, major first and then minor, and then finishes with the conclusion. The mood of a syllogism is simply a statement of which categorical propositions (A, E, I, or O) it comprises, listed in the order in which they appear in standard form. Thus, a syllogism with a mood of OAO has an O proposition as its major premise, an A proposition as its minor premise, and another O proposition as its conclusion; and EIO syllogism has an E major

premise,

and

I

minor

premise,

and

an

O

conclusion;

etc.

In addtion to mood, a syllogism is characterized by its figure which is solely determined by the position in which its middle term appears in the two premises: in a first-figure syllogism, the middle term is the subject term of the major premise and the predicate term of the minor premise; in second figure, the middle term is the predicate term of both premises; in third, the subject term of both premises; and in fourth figure, the middle term appears as the predicate term of the major premise and the subject term of the minor premise. There are exactly 256 distinct forms of syllogisms, out of which only 24 are valid. Form and Validity Validity of a categorical syllogism depends solely upon its logical form. The rules for deciding the validity of syllogism are: Rule 1: The middle term must be distributed at least once. Rule 2: If a term is distributed in the conclusion, then it must be distributed in a premise. Rule 3: Two negative premises are not allowed. Rule 4: A negative premise requires a negative conclusion, and a negative conclusion requires a negative premise Rule 5: If both premises are universal, the conclusion cannot be particular. Fallacies Fallacies arise when one of the rules are broken, for example, following fallacies arise when these rules are broken (and the explanation given in the brackets Rule 1: Undistributed middle (The middle term is what connects the major and the minor term. If the middle term is never distributed, then the major and minor might be related to different parts of the M class, thus giving no common ground to relate S and P.) Example - All sharks are fish, All dolphins are fish, Therefore All dolphins are sharks Rule 2: Illicit major and illicit minor (When a term is distributed in the conclusion, let’s say that P is distributed, then that term is saying something about every member of the P class. If that same term is NOT distributed in the major premise, then the major premise is saying something about only some of the P class. that the minor premise says nothing about the P class. Therefore, the conclusion contains information that is not contained in the premises, making the argument invalid.) example - All horses are animals, Some dogs are not horses, Therefore, Some dogs are not animals and, All tigers are mammalians, All mammalians are animals, Therefore All animals are tigers Rule 3: Exclusive premises (If the premises are both negative, then the relationship between S and P is denied. The conclusion cannot, therefore, say anything in a positive fashion. That information goes beyond what is contained in the premises.) example - No fish are mammals, Some dogs are not fish, Therefore Some dogs are not mammals Rule 4: Drawing an affirmative conclusion from a negative premise, or drawing a negative conclusion from an affirmative premise. (Two directions, here. Take a positive conclusion from one negative premise. The conclusion states that the S class is either wholly or partially contained in the P class. The only way that this can happen is if the S class is either partially or fully contained in the M class (, the middle term relates the two) and the M class fully contained in the P class. Negative statements cannot establish this relationship, so a valid conclusion cannot follow. Take a negative conclusion. It asserts that the S class is separated in whole or in part from the P class. If both premises are affirmative, no separation can be established, only connections. Thus, a negative conclusion cannot follow from positive premises.Note: These first four rules working together indicate that any syllogism with two particular

premises is invalid.) example - All parrots are birds, Some tigers are not parrots, Therefore Some tigers are birds Rule 5: Existential fallacy (On the Boolean model, Universal statements make no claims about existence while particular ones do. Thus, if the syllogism has universal premises, they necessarily say nothing about existence. Yet if the conclusion is particular, then it does say something about existence. In which case, the conclusion contains more information than the premises do, thereby making it invalid.) example - All mammals are animals, All tigers are mammals, Therefore Some tigers are animals. Philosophy: Ethics and Meta-Ethics Ethics is a normative discipline, not a descriptive discipline. The aim of ethical theory is to give a reasoned of how we ought to be or act, individually or communally. Ethics is not concerned with describing the sorts of moral views people in fact hold or how they came to hold them. Ethics is concerned with the justification of moral belief. Meta-ethics is concerned with the nature of morality in general. It is concerned with what justifies moral judgments. Two central meta-ethical issues are whether there are any moral truths and, if so, what makes moral truths true. The view that there are no ethical truths is moral anti-realism or subjectivism. With regard to what grounds ethical truth, if there are such truths, the view that there are ethical truths and their truth is independent of any person or group’s power or command is moral realism. The view that ethical truths are grounded in the power or say so of persons is called conventionalism. If there are moral truths, an of what makes moral truths true can be given in of a theory of value. Another way to put the fundamental meta-ethical issue is asking if there is value to be discovered. The ancient Greek philosophers Socrates, Plato and Aristotle would say all say yes. While these ancients differ in their positive views about the good, they would all agree that goodness exists and is independent of the command of men or gods. The modern empiricist Hume argues that there are no moral truths. Hume takes moral expressions to be expressions of sentiment or feeling. While the ancients were value realists and Hume was a value subjectivist, Nietzche offers a value conventionalist position according to which value is created by willing of great individuals. A society’s system of value is created by its great poets, artists, mystics or leaders. A meta-ethical theory, unlike a normative ethical theory, does not contain any ethical evaluations. The major meta-ethical views are commonly divided into realist and anti-realist views: Moral realism holds that there are objective values. Realists believe that evaluative statements are factual claims, which are either true or false, and that their truth or falsity does not depend on our beliefs, feelings, or other attitudes towards the things that are evaluated. Moral realism comes in two variants: Ethical intuitionism or ethical non-naturalism, which holds that there are objective, irreducible moral properties (such as the property of 'goodness'), and that we sometimes have intuitive awareness of moral properties or of moral truths. Ethical naturalism, which holds that there are objective moral properties but that these properties are reducible to entirely non-ethical properties. Most ethical naturalists hold that we have empirical knowledge of moral truths. Several have argued that moral knowledge can be gained by the same means as scientific knowledge. Moral anti-realism holds that there are no objective values. This view comes in three variants:

Ethical Subjectivism, which holds that moral statements are made true or false by the attitudes and/or conventions of observers. There are several different versions of subjectivism, including: Moral Relativism (sometimes called "cultural relativism"): This is the view that for a thing to be morally right is just for it to be approved of by society; this leads to the conclusion that different things are right for people in different societies. Though long out of favor among academic philosophers, this view has been popular among anthropologists, such as Ruth Benedict. The Divine Command Theory: Another subjectivist theory holds that for a thing to be right is for a unique being, God, to approve of it, and that what is right for non-God beings is obedience to the divine will. This view was criticized by Plato in the Euthyphro but retains some modern defenders (Robert Adams, Philip Quinn, and others). Individualist Subjectivism: Another view is that there are as many distinct scales of good and evil as there are subjects in the world. This view was put forward by Protagoras. The Ideal Observer Theory: Finally, some hold that what is right is determined by the attitudes that a hypothetical ideal observer would have. An ideal observer is usually characterized as a being who is perfectly rational, imaginative, and informed, among other things. Richard Brandt is bestknown for his defense of this view.

Philosophy: Purva Mimamsa (Part-I) The philosophy of two Mimamsas (Purva and Uttara) is an attempt to show that the revelations of sruti (Vedas) are in harmony with the conclusions of philosophy. The Purva Mimamsa being earlier of the two (in the logical sense at least) is ritualistic thematically, whereas the Uttara Mimamsa or Vedanta represents knowledge of the truth of things. In Vedanta the emphasis is on the Lord, and not on the Lordship. Purva Mimamsa is generally called the Mimamsa (meaning inquiry or interpretation), and in interpreting the Vedic text discusses the doctrine of the eternity of sound identified with Brahman. The entire Veda, excluding the Upanisads, is said to deal with dharma or acts of duty, of which the chief are sacrifices. Thus Purva Mimamsa is inquiry into or interpretation of the first or the Mantra portion of the Veda, and the Uttara Mimamsa is the inquiry into the later or the Upanisad portion. Note that the performance of sacred rites -- with which Purva Mimamsa deals -- is normally considered the prelude to the pursuit of wisdom leading to Moksa. The aim of the Purva Mimamsa is to examine the nature of dharma. Its interest is more practical than speculative, and therefore the philosophical speculations found in it are subordinate to the ritualistic purpose. It affirms the reality of the soul and regards it as a permanent being possessing a body, to whom the results of acts accrue. The Veda ens the acts of duty, specifying at the same time the beneficial results which follow from their performance. The authority for the character of these acts as dharma and for their capacity to produce beneficial results is the eternal Veda, which needs no other basis to rest on. The most important work in the Purva Mimamsa is the Mimamsa Sutra attributed to Jaimini (fourth century B.C.). Sources of Knowledge Jaimini accepts the three pramanas (proofs) of perception, inference and sabda (testimony). Some later authors, e.g. Prabhakara itting upmana (comparison) and arthapatti (implication), and Kumarila adding anupalabdhi (non-apprehension), extend these original three categories. Aitihya (rumor) and recollection (smrti) are excluded however as valid sources of knowledge, since the former cannot ensure certainty about the validity of the

resulting cognition in the absence of definite information about the source of rumor (whether trustworthy or not), and the latter can tell only about the things previously perceived. Perception (pratyaksa) is direct apprehension and it proceeds directly from sense-. Perception relates to object that exist, i.e. are perceptible by the senses. It cannot apprehend supersensuous objects. The Mimamsakas do not the theory of Yogic intuition, by which the Yogis are said to apprehend objects which are in past and future, or imperceptible and distant. Thus all those objects in which there is no sensory- (e.g. belonging in the past, future or distant) cannot produce cognition of them. Mental perception, by which there is the cognition of pleasure, pain, and the like, is itted by the Mimamsa. Inference depends on the knowledge of a certain fixed relation to subsist between two things. Thus if one of these things is perceived, by inference the idea about the other thing is cognized. Such a knowledge (cognition) is inferential. Inference is of two kinds: pratyaksa-to-drsta, where the invariable relation holds between two objects which are perceptible, as smoke and fire; and samanya-to-drsta, where the relation is not apprehended by the senses, but known only in the abstract, as in the case of the sun's motion and its changing position in the sky. Note that the relation must be unfailing, true and permanent, such as that which subsists between the cause and its effect, whole and part, substance and quality, class and individuals. Vedic Testimony is greatly emphasized according to the Mimamsa, the aim of which is to ascertain the nature of dharma. Dharma is not a physical existent, and so it cannot be apprehended through the senses. The other pramanas are of no use, since they all presuppose the work of perception. Perception, inference and such other sources of knowledge have nothing to say on the point that the performer of the Agnistoma sacrifice (or specific modes of action) will draw certain benefits. This knowledge is derived only from the Vedas. Though the pramana of the Veda is the only source of our knowledge of dharma, the others are considered, since it is necessary to show that they cannot give rise to a knowledge of dharma. They are also found useful in repudiating wrong views. Verbal cognition is defined as the cognition of something not present to the senses, produced by the knowledge of words. These words may be uttered by men or may belong to the Vedas. The formers are valid if there is certainty that their authors are not untrustworthy; and the latter are valid in themselves. The Mimamsakas protest against the view, which regards the Vedas as the work of God. They believe instead that the Vedic hymns deal with the eternal phenomena of nature, and attempt to prove that every part of the sacred text refers to acts of duty. The broad division of the Veda is into the Mantras and the Brahmanas (specifics). The contents of the Veda are also classified into (1) injunctions (vidhi), (2) hymns (mantras), (3) names (namadheya), (4) prohibitions (nisedha), and (5) explanatory ages (arthavada).

Philosophy: Purva Mimamsa (Part-II) The Self: The Mimamsakas think that the atman is one with consciousness. Therefore the self is regarded as distinct from the body, the senses and the understanding (buddhi). The self is present even when buddhi (intellect) is absent (non-functional), as in sleep. The self is also not the senses, since it persists even when the sense-organs are destroyed. The body is material, and in all cognitions we are aware of the cogniser as distinct from the body. The elements of the body are not intelligent, and a combination of them cannot give rise to consciousness. The body is a means to an end beyond itself, and so is said to serve the soul which directs it. The facts of memory prove the reality of self. It is itted that the soul suffers change, but through the changes the soul endures. Cognition, which is an activity (Kriya), belongs to the substance called the soul. It is no argument against the eternal character of the soul that it undergoes modifications. Nor is it a serious objection that, when we reap the results, we forget

the actions which bring them about. Note that the soul cannot be atomic, since it apprehends changes in different parts of the body. It is regarded as vibhu or all-pervading, and as able to connect itself with one body after another. The soul directs the body, with which it is connected, until release. The Mimamsakas adopt the theory of the plurality of selves to for the variety of experiences. Presence of the soul is inferred from the activity of the bodies, which are inexplicable without such a hypothesis. As one's actions are due to his soul, other activities are traced to other souls. The differences of dharma (right action) and adharma (wrong action), which are qualities of souls, require the existence of different souls. The analogy that as the one sun, reflected in different substances, becomes endowed with distinct properties, the one soul reflected in different bodies becomes endowed with different qualities, does not hold, since the qualities that appear different belong to the reflecting medium and not the sun. If the analogy were true, the diverse qualities appearing in connection with the souls would belong to the bodies and not the soul. But pleasure, pain, etc., are qualities of the soul and not of the body. What appears as the "I" is the self, free from all objective elements. The self is distinct from the body. The self is not perceptible in itself, but is always known as the agent (karta) of the cognition and not the object (karma). The act of cognition does not produce its result (svaphala) in the self, so that the self is never an object of perception, external or internal. There is no such thing as self-consciousness apart from object-consciousness. The self cannot be the subject as well as object of consciousness. It is the agent, the enjoyer, and is omnipresent, though non-conscious. It is thus entirely distinct from the body, senses and understanding, is manifested in all cognitions, and is eternal. Though it is omnipresent, it cannot experience what is going on another body, since it can experience only that which goes on in the bodily organism brought about by the past karma of the soul. There are many souls, one in each body. In its liberated state the soul continues to exist as a mere esse (sat), serving as the substratum of the collective cognition of all things taken together, but not feeling, since the properties of pleasure and pain cannot manifest themselves except in a body. It is imperishable, since it is not brought into existence by any cause. Note that the atman is consciousness itself, though the souls are many. Since all souls are of the nature of consciousness, the Upanisads speak of them as one. The atman is consciousness as well as the substrate of cognition, which is a product of the atman. The existence of the self is inferred through the notion of "I". The self is manifested by itself, though imperceptible to others. The Nature of Reality : The Mimamsaka theory of perception assumes the reality of objects, for perception arises only when there is with real objects. The universe is real and is independent of the mind, which perceives it. Thus the theory of the phenomenality of the world is not accepted. The real can be described in of eight categories: (1) substance (dravya), (2) quality (guna), (3) action (karma), (4) generality (samanya), (5) inherence (paratantrata), (6) force (sakti), (7) similarity (sadrsya), and (8) number (samkhya). Dharma: Dharma is the scheme of right living. Jaimini defines dharma as an ordinance or command. Dharma is what is ened, and it leads to happiness. Activities which result in loss or pain (anartha) are not dharma. Thus the lack of observing the commands leads not only to missing the happiness but becoming subject to suffering also. The Vedic injunctions lay down the details of dharma. Good action, according to the Mimamsaka, is what is prescribed by the Veda (including the Upanisads). The duties which have no scriptural sanction are explained on principles of utility. If any act is performed in response to one's response to natural

instincts, there is no virtue in it. These and other rules (aspects) of Mimamsa are used for the interpretation of the Hindu law, which is based on the rules of the Vedas or sruti (open equally to all, irrespective of the varna, caste or vocation). To gain salvation, the observing of nitya karmas (regular or daily duties) like sandhya, etc., and naimittika karmas (duties on a special occasion) are recommended. These are unconditional obligations, not fulfilling of which incurs sin (pratyavaya). To gain special ends, kamya (optional) karmas are performed. Keeping clear of kamya karmas, one frees himself from selfish ends, and if keeps up the unconditional (nitya and naimittika) duties attains salvation. Apurva: Acts are ened with a view to their fruits. There is a necessary connection between the act and its result. An act performed today cannot effect a result at some future date unless it gives rise before ing away to some unseen result. Jaimini assumes the existence of such an unseen force, which he calls apurva, which may be regarded either as the imperceptible antecedent of the fruit, or as the after-state of the act. Since sacrifices and the like are laid down for the purpose of definite results to follow after a long time, the deferred fruition of the action is not possible unless it is through the medium of apurva. Apurva is the metaphysical link between work and its result. The Mimamsakas are unwilling to trace the results of actions to God's will, since a uniform cause cannot for a variety of effects. Moksha: Liberation is defined as "the absolute cessation of the body (or cycle of birth), caused by the disappearance of all dharma and adharma." Liberation thus consists in the total disappearance of dharma and adharma, whose operation is the cause of rebirth. The individual, finding that in samsara (world) pleasures are mixed up with pain, turns his attention to liberation. He tries to avoid the forbidden acts as well as the prescribed ones which lead to some sort of happiness here or hereafter. He undergoes the necessary expiations for exhausting the previously accumulated karma, and gradually, by a true knowledge of the soul aided by contentment and self-control, gets rid of his bodily existence. Mere knowledge cannot give freedom from bondage, which can be attained only by the exhaustion of action. Knowledge prevents further accumulation of merit and demerit. Note that karma, in expectation of reward, leads to further birth. A person's likes and dislikes determine his future existence. He must break through the circle if he wants to attain release. Liberation is the cessation of pleasure as well as of pain. It is not a state of bliss, since the attributeless soul cannot have even bliss. Moksa is the natural form of the soul and represents the state of atman in itself, free from all pain.