Remedial Law Digests Up To June 2001 Copy 104o35

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REMEDIAL LAW DIGESTS CENTRAL BAR OPERATIONS 2002

Table of Contents Jurisdiction Summary Procedure Criminal Procedure Civil Procedure Evidence Special Procedure

1-3 3-4 4 - 12 12 - 29 30 - 40 40 - 42

JURISDICTION BARANGAY CONCILIATION Vda. DE VILLANUEVA, et. al. V. CA 01 Feb 2001 Facts: P filed an action against D for recovery of ownership of a parcel of land. D questioned P’s failure to submit the issue to barangay conciliation. Issue: Is there a need to submit to barangay conciliation? Held: No. The action for recovery was filed in 1991. The Local Government Code requiring conciliation took effect only in 1992. Besides, P and D are not even residents of the same province. No lupon has jurisdiction over cases where the parties are not actual residents of the same city or municipality. SANDIGANBAYAN ABBOT V. MAPAYO 335 SCRA 265 (July 2000) Facts: A was charged before the Sandiganbayan. The case was transferred to RTC by virtue of R.A. 7975. The RTC denied A’s omnibus motion so he filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The Solicitor General opined that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the petition and not the CA. Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari. Held: Yes. In § 4 (c) of RA 7975, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was expanded to include petitions for issuance of writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. SOLLER V. SANDIGANBAYAN 9 May 2001 Facts: A complaint was filed against A, a municipal mayor, with the Office of the Ombudsman charging him of giving false and fabricated information in the autopsy report to mislead the law enforcement agency and prevent the apprehension of the offender. The Office of the Ombudsman recommended the filing of an information with the Sandiganbayan. Issue: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over the case? Held: For an offense to fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the offense must have been committed by the officials enunciated in paragraph (a) “in relation to their office,” i.e. it should be intimately connected with the office of the offender, and should have been perpetrated while the offender was in the performance of his official functions. Moreover, these requisites must be alleged in the information. In this case,

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there was no allegation that the offense charged was done in the performance of official function. JURISDICTION OVER OF THE ARMED FORCES PEOPLE V. REPIROGA 17 May 2001 Facts: A was a member of the Philippine Army. A complaint was filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor charging A with murder. The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor conducted a preliminary investigation and later recommended the filing of an information. Issues: Should the preliminary investigation be conducted by an authorized military officer before any information could be filed against AFP ? Does the authority to file charges against him lies within the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman? Held: No. There is nothing in Art. 71 of CA 408 that exclusively vests the authority on a military officer to conduct preliminary investigation in cases involving of the AFP. It simply mentions an “investigating officer” who shall examine available witnesses requested by the accused, without reference to his being a military officer. Given the foregoing, the contention of A that the authority to file charges against him lies within the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman cannot be upheld. Under AO 8, the power of the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation over a military case may be exercised together with any provincial or city prosecutor or his assistants since all prosecutors are now deputized Ombudsman prosecutors. It is only in the prosecution of cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan where the Ombudsman enjoys exclusive control and supervision. RTC JURISDICTION VILLEGAS V. CA 1 Feb. 2001 Facts: In a case for the reconstitution of an original TCT, the posting of the notice of the petition in the provincial or municipal building of the city or municipality where the subject property is located was not proven. Issue: Did the court have jurisdiction over the petition? Held: No. The proceeding being in rem, the court acquires jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for the reconstitution of the owner’s title upon compliance with the required posting of notices and publication in the Official Gazette. These requirements and procedure are mandatory and must be strictly complied with, otherwise, the proceedings are utterly void, which is why the petitioner is required to submit proof of the publication and posting of the notice. TALUSAN V. TAYAG 04 Apr. 2001 Facts: The RTC, acting as a land registration court, ruled on the validity of the auction sale of the subject parcel of land. X believes the RTC has no jurisdiction to resolve this issue and instituted a separate action to annul the auction sale. Issue: Does the RTC, acting as a land registration court, have jurisdiction to resolve the said issue? Held: Yes. Land registration courts, as such, can now hear and decide even controversial and contentious cases, as well as those invoking substantial issues. The court now has the authority to act not only on applications for original registration, but also on all petitions filed after the original registration of title. Coupled with this authority 2

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is the power to hear and determine all questions arion such applications or petitions. PEOPLE V. OBINA 20 Apr. 2001 Facts: A was charged in the RTC of Las Pinas for rape. The evidence introduced by the prosecution, however, points to Nasugbu, Batangas as being the scene of the offense. Issue: Should the RTC of Las Pinas dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction? Held: Yes. The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike civil cases, is jurisdictional. The filing of a criminal case with the wrong court can oust the court from trying the case. For lack of jurisdiction, the case should have been dismissed by the court a quo. APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER DECISIONS OF THE OMBUDSMAN IN ISTRATIVE CASES BARATA V. ABALOS, et. al. 6 June 2001 Facts: X filed an istrative disciplinary case against A before the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman absolved A of the charge. X filed a petition for review with the SC. Issue: Which court has appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the Ombudsman in istrative cases? Held: The Court of Appeals under Rule 43. The last paragraph of Section 27 which provides that in all istrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the SC was rendered invalid and of no effect in the case of Fabian vs. Desierto which laid down the rule that said Section 27 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in istrative disciplinary cases without violating the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and concurrence. Thus, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in istrative disciplinary cases should be brought to the CA under the provisions of Rule 43. (The only provision affected by the Fabian ruling is the designation of the CA as the proper forum and of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court as the proper mode of appeal; all other matters included in said Section 27, including the finality or non-finality of decisions, are not affected and still stand)

SUMMARY PROCEDURE CATUNGAL V. HAO 22 March 2001 Facts: D was the lessee of X. Later, P bought the property from X. P filed an action for ejectment against D. TC ordered D to vacate. Because P disagreed with the TC’s ruling as to the rent, P sought reconsideration of the order while D filed a notice of appeal. Instead of resolving the Motion for Reconsideration, the TC issued an order elevating the case to the RTC which in turn modified the decision in favor of C. CA ruled in D’s favor. According to the CA, the motion filed by P before the TC was a prohibited pleading under the Rules of Summary Procedure. In short, such motion did not produce any legal effect. Issue: Does the RTC have jurisdiction to dispose of the issue of Motion for Reconsideration?

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Held: Yes. A reading of the order issued by the TC will show that the said court elevated the issue on the amount of rentals raised by P to the RTC because the appeal of respondent had already been perfected. D could have opposed such irregularity in the proceeding but D failed to do so. Even if the motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading, D is precluded by estoppel from questioning it. The argument of D that the proceeding was a summary one is incorrect. Considering the amount of rentals and damages claimed by P, said case was not governed by the Summary Rules as the unpaid rentals exceed P20, 000. Thus the filing of Motion for Reconsideration is allowed.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SERVICE OF ORDERS & RESOLUTIONS IN PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION TAM WING TAK V. MAKASIAR 350 SCRA 475 (Jan. 2001) Facts: P filed an affidavit-complaint with the prosecutor’s office charging D with violation of BP 22. The prosecutor dismissed the affidavit-complaint and a copy of the resolution was sent by ed mail to P himself. P received it on April 9. P’s counsel received a copy on June 27 so counsel filed a motion for reconsideration on July 7. Motion was denied for being filed out of time because the prosecutor counted the 15-day period from April 9. P argued that following Rule 13 § 2, if a party appears by counsel, then service can only be validly made upon counsel and service upon the party himself becomes invalid and without effect. Issue: Whether the period should be counted from P’s receipt of the prosecutor’s resolution Held: Yes. The Rules were meant to govern court procedures and pleadings. A preliminary investigation is not a court proceeding. The rule on service provided for in the Rules of Court cannot be made to apply to the service of resolutions by public prosecutors especially as the agency concerned (in this case, the Department of Justice) has its own procedural rules governing said service. DOJ Order 223 § 2 provides that in preliminary investigations, service of resolutions of public prosecutors could be made upon either the party or his counsel. DOUBLE JEOPARDY MANANTAN V. CA 350 SCRA 387 (Jan. 2001) Facts: A was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. A was acquitted. Complainant appealed the civil aspect of the judgment. CA found A civilly liable. A contended that this amounted to double jeopardy. Issue: Whether A was placed in double jeopardy. Held: No. For double jeopardy to exist, the ff. elements must be established: (a) a 1st jeopardy must have attached prior to the 2nd; (2) the 1st jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the 2nd jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first. In this case, what was elevated to the CA was the civil aspect of the criminal case. A was not charged anew with a 2nd offense identical to the 1st. There was no 2nd jeopardy to speak of; A’s claim of having been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect. TIME OF COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE PEOPLE V. ELPEDES 350 SCRA 716 (Jan. 2001)

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Facts: A was found guilty of rape. A argued that he cannot be convicted of rape committed on Feb. 11 ’97 because the victim testified that she was raped on Aug. 11 ’97. He pointed out that the victim never testified that she was raped on the date alleged in the information. Issue: Whether A should be acquitted since the evidence showed that rape was committed on a date other than indicated in the information. Held: No. The remedy against an indictment that fails to allege the time of commission of the offense with sufficient definiteness is a motion for bill of particulars (Rule 116 § 10). A did not ask for a bill of particulars. The failure to move or specification or the quashal of the information on any of the grounds provided for in the Rules deprives the accused of the right to object to evidence which could be lawfully introduced and itted under an information of more or less general but which sufficiently charges the accused with a definite crime. Besides, the exact date of the commission of the crime is not an essential element of the crime. INFORMATION PEOPLE V. SANTIAGO 03 Apr. 2001 Facts: An information was filed, charging A with the twin killings of 2 brothers. A failed to question the duplicitous complaint. He was later convicted for the offense charged in the Information Issue: On appeal, can A question the defectively crafted information? Held: No. True, an indictment of multiple offenses in a single complaint or information transgresses Rule 110, § 13. A, however, has failed to timely question the above defect and he may thus be deemed to have waived this objection. NAMES OF WITNESSES IN THE INFORMATION PEOPLE V. DELA CRUZ 349 SCRA 124 (Jan. 2001) Facts: A was found guilty of murder. W testified that he saw A shoot the victim. A argued that W’s name was not mentioned during the preliminary investigation so W should not have been presented as a witness. Issue: Whether the prosecution was precluded from presenting W as a witness during the trial. Held: No. The non-inclusion of some of the names of the eyewitnesses in the information does not preclude the prosecutor from presenting them during trial. There is thus no basis for the allegation that this fact indicated that W’s presentation as an eyewitness was a mere “afterthought.” AMENDMENTS TO THE INFORMATION GABIONZA V. CA 30 March 2001 Facts: G was charged of violating RA 1161 (SSS Law). He pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. About 4 years after he was arraigned, the public prosecutor filed a motion for leave of court to amend the information in order to change the dates therein. The TC granted the motion. Issue: Was the grant proper?

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Held: Yes. After the accused enters a plea, amendments to the information may be allowed as to matters of form, provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment is when a defense under the complaint or information would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended. Jurisprudence allows amendments to information so long as: a. it does not deprive the accused of the right to invoke prescription b. it does not affect or alter the nature of the offense originally charged c. it does not involve a change in the basic theory of the prosecution so as to require the accused to undergo any material charge or modification in his defense d. it does not expose the accused to a charge which would call for a higher penalty e. it does not cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment. In this case, the questioned amendment is one of form only. The allegation of time when an offense is committed is a matter of form, unless time is a material ingredient of the offense. PLEA OF GUILTY PEOPLE V. GALAS 20 March 2001 Facts: A was charged with 3 counts of rape of his 15-year old daughter. A pleaded not guilty when arraigned. Later, A manifested through counsel his desire to change his plea to guilty. During the searching inquiry, the TC judge asked A whether he is aware that he may be convicted of reclusion perpetua to death. A said yes, and was therefore sentenced to death. He now cries improvident plea of guilty. Issue: Was the plea of guilty improvidently made? Held: Yes. Nowhere in the proceedings was it explained to the accused that the penalty imposable is death even if he pleads guilty. It is not enough to inquire as to the voluntariness of the plea. The court must explain fully to the accused that once convicted, he could be meted out the death penalty. One cannot dispel the possibility that the accused may have been led to believe that due to his voluntary plea of guilty, he may be imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua and not death. PEOPLE V. ALBORIDA 25 June 2001 Facts: A raped his minor daughter. At trial, A withdrew an earlier plea of not guilty and substituted the same with a plea of guilty. The prosecution presented evidence and thereafter A was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. Issue: Whether the trial court followed the proper procedure. Held: No. The trial court failed to abide by the strict safeguards intended to guarantee a provident plea of guilt. Rule 116 § 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure mandates 3 things upon the trial court in cases where a positive plea is entered by accused: (1) conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the accused’s comprehension of the consequences thereof; (2) require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) ask the accused if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. The questions propounded by the trial court do not constitute a “searching inquiry” within the contemplation of the rule. PEOPLE V. LATUPAN

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28 June 2001 Facts: A pleaded guilty to the single offense of multiple murder with multiple frustrated murder. The trial court found A guilty of the complex offense of Double Murder and physical injuries. Issue: Whether the court erred in convicting A. Held: No. Although SC has set aside convictions based on plea of guilty in capital offenses because of improvidence thereof and when such plea is the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment, the circumstances of this case merit a different result. “Where the trial court receives evidence to determine precisely whether or not the accused erred in itting his guilt, the manner in which the plea of guilty is made (improvidently or not) loses legal significance, for the simple reason that the conviction is based on the evidence proving the commission by the accused of the offense charged." SEPARATE TRIALS PEOPLE V. ELLASOS and OBILLO 6 June 2001 Facts: A and B were accused of killing V. The judge ordered the separate trial of the case against the 2 and transferred the trial of B to Muntinlupa RTC. Still, the judge convicted both A and B. Issue: Whether the judge correctly convicted the 2 accused. Held: No. The trial judge gravely erred in rendering a judgment of conviction against both accused. Since the trial of B did not take place, the trial court should have rendered a decision only against A. WHEN APPEAL OF ONE BENEFITS ALL PEOPLE V. ESCAÑO 349 SCRA 674 (Jan. 2001) Facts: A, B, and C were convicted. All of them appealed but A later withdrew his appeal. B and C were acquitted on appeal. A prayed that he should also be acquitted sine the appeal interposed by his co-accused is applicable and favorable to him. Issue: Whether A should also be acquitted. Held: Yes. This is in accordance with § 11 (a) Rule 122 of the New Rules of Criminal Procedure. The acquittal of the 2 other accused based on reasonable doubt should benefit A notwithstanding the fact that he withdrew his appeal. JURISDICTION OVER PRIVATE OFFENSES PEOPLE V. YPARRAGUIRE 335 SCRA 69 (July 2000) Facts: A was convicted of rape. A contended that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the case because the complaint was signed and filed by the chief of police and not by the complainant. Issue: Whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the case. Held: Yes. The complaint required in Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code is but a condition precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties. The complaint simply starts the prosecutory proceeding but does not confer jurisdiction in the court to try the case. Art. 344 is not determinative of the

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jurisdiction of courts over private offenses because the same is governed by the Judiciary Law and not the Revised Penal Code. SEARCH WARRANT GARAYGAY V. PEOPLE 335 SCRA 272 (July 2000) Facts: Manila RTC issued a search warrant authorizing the search of A’s house located in Lapu-Lapu City. The raid was conducted and prohibited paraphernalia were confiscated. An information charging A was filed Before the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City. A filed a motion to quash the search warrant with the Lapu-Lapu City RTC. Issue: Which court should resolve the motion to quash the search warrant? Held: Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the criminal action based on the results of the search is afterwards commenced in another court, a motion to quash the warrant/to retrieve things thereunder seized may be filed for the first time in either the issuing court or that in which the criminal action is pending. However, the remedy is alternative, not cumulative. Thus, the motion to quash the warrant was properly filed with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City. PEOPLE V. KO 19 Apr. 2001 Facts: A search warrant was issued to search D’s premises for “undetermined quantity of Shabu and Drug Paraphernalia” in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. D contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense because possession or use of Shabu and possession of drug paraphernalia are punished under two different provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Issue: Was the warrant issued for more than one specific offense and hence invalid? Held: No. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into “prohibited” and “regulated” drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. WARRANTLESS ARRESTS LACSON V. SEC. PEREZ 10 May 2001 Facts: After the anti-Arroyo crowd in Mendiola had been dispersed, President Arroyo declared a “state of rebellion” in Metro Manila. Pursuant to the proclamation, several key leaders (Enrile, Maceda) of the opposition were ordered arrested without warrants. The warrantless arrests were justified on the theory that a person committing rebellion, which is a continuing crime, may be arrested without a warrant at any time so long as the rebellion persists. Issue: Were the arrests made legal? Held: No. To justify a warrantless arrest, there must be a showing that the person arrested or to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit the offense of rebellion. In other words, there must be an overt act constitutive of rebellion taking place in the presence of the arresting officer. This requirement was not complied with in the arrests of Enrile, Maceda et al. A declaration of a state of rebellion does not relieve the State of its burden of proving probable cause. The declaration does not constitute a substitute for proof.

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ALLEGATION OF AGE IN THE INFORMATION PEOPLE V. BANIGUID 340 SCRA 92 (Sept. 2000) Facts: A was accused of rape. It was stated in the information that he had carnal knowledge of hi “minor daughter.” Issue: May death penalty be imposed on the accused? Held: No. Death penalty is imposed for the crime of rape if the “victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent of the victim.” For this purpose, the special qualifying circumstances of the victim’s minority and her relationship with the offender must be alleged and proved. The information must state the exact age of the victim at the time of the commission of the crime. PEOPLE V. DE VILLA Feb. 1, 2001 Facts: A was charged with raping V who was at the time 12 years and 10 months old. A was V’s uncle but such fact was not alleged in the information. He was found guilty and sentenced to death pursuant to RA 7659. Issue: Can the death sentence be sustained? Held: No. Under the amendatory provisions of RA 7659 § 11, the attendance of facts that would mandate the imposition of the single indivisible penalty of death are in the nature of qualifying circumstances which should be alleged in the information and proved at the trial. The New Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect on Dec. 1, 2000, now specifically require that both qualifying and aggravating circumstances to be alleged in the information. In the case at bar, the prosecution alleged only the minority of V; it failed to allege that A is her relative by consanguinity or affinity within the 3rd civil degree of relationship. Hence, A cannot be convicted of qualified rape. ARRAIGNMENT PEOPLE V. ASOY June 29, 2001 Facts: RTC convicted A for rape and imposed upon him the death penalty. The Certificate of Arraignment of A dated March 4, 1997 states: "That in open court and in the presence of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor X, the accused A, assisted by his PUBLIC ATTORNEY P, of Cariaga, Leyte, was called and having been informed of the nature of the charge against him by reading the INFORMATION and in answer of the question of the Court, he pleaded, GUILTY of the crime charged." Issue: Whether the court properly complied with Rule 116 §§ 1 and 3. Held: No. The mandatory and stringent procedural requirements concerning the arraignment and plea of an accused are set by §§ 1 and 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended. As shown in the Certificate of Arraignment, the appellant was "informed of the nature of the charge against him" by merely "reading the Information". The Information is written in the English language of which A, a probinsiyano, is obviously unfamiliar with. The trial court, during the arraignment of the appellant, failed to comply with the requirements of § 1 (a) of Rule 116 when it did not furnish the accused with a copy of the Information and read the same in the language or dialect known to him. And, after A entered a plea of guilty to the capital offense charged, the trial court also violated § 3 of Rule 116 by not conducting a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea.

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BAIL YAP V. CA and the PEOPLE June 6, 2001 Facts: A was found guilty of estafa and was sentenced to imprisonment for 20 years. A appealed and applied for bail pending appeal. CA allowed bail for “humanitarian reasons.” However, because of the perceived high risk of flight (A itted that he left the country several times during the pendency of the case) the CA deemed it necessary to peg the amount of bail at P5.5 M. A argued that the bail required was excessive. Issue: Whether the bail imposed was excessive. Held: Yes. The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the Constitution. The obvious rationale is that imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. The court has wide latitude in fixing the amount of bail. Where it fears that the accused may jump bail, it is certainly not precluded from installing devices to ensure against the same. Options may include increasing the bail bond to an appropriate level, or requiring the person to report periodically to the court and to make an ing of his movements. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, the SC found that the setting of the amount at P5.5M is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of A’s right to bail. The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which A is charged (in this case, P5.5M) is to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this cannot be allowed because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court. YAP V. CA and the PEOPLE June 6, 2001 Facts: The SC found that the bail amounting to P5.5 M recommended by the appellate court was excessive. A, the accused, argued that bail should be set at P40T based on the 1996 Bail Bond Guide. (The current Bail Bond Guide, issued on August 29, 2000, maintains recommended bail at P40T for estafa where the amount of fraud is P142T or over and the imposable penalty 20 years of reclusion temporal). Issue: Whether the Bail Bond Guide is controlling at all times. Held: No. True, the Court has held that the Bail Bond Guide, a circular of the Department of Justice for the guidance of state prosecutors, although technically not binding upon the courts, “merits attention, being in a sense an expression of policy of the Executive Branch, through the DOJ, in the enforcement of criminal laws.” Thus, courts are advised that they must not only be aware but should also consider the Bail Bond Guide due to its significance in the istration of criminal justice. This notwithstanding, the Court is not precluded from imposing in A’s case an amount higher than P40T (based on the Bail Bond Guide) where it perceives that an appropriate increase is dictated by the circumstances. PEOPLE V. SINGH, et. al. June 29, 2001 Facts: A was charged with a non-bailable offense. A filed an application for ission to bail. Issue: Who has the burden of proof in hearings for bail application?

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Held: In hearing the petition for bail, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong pursuant to § 8 Rule 114. In bail proceedings, the prosecution must be given ample opportunity to show that the evidence of guilt is strong. While the proceeding is conducted as a regular trial, it must be limited to the determination of the bailability of the accused. It should be brief and speedy, lest the purpose for which it is available is rendered nugatory. AUTOMATIC REVIEW PEOPLE V. FRANCISCO 15 Mar. 2001 Facts: A was charged with rape and acts of lasciviousness by his 11-year old daughter. The TC found the accused guilty of both crimes. Issue: Whether the automatic review of the death sentence includes the automatic appeal of his conviction for the less serious crime of acts of lasciviousness. Held: No. In the case of People v. Panganiban, we ruled that an automatic review of the death penalty imposed by the TC was deemed to include an appeal of the less serious crime not so punished by death, “but arising out of the same occurrence or committed by the accused on the same occasion, as that giving rise to the more serious offense.” In the instant case, however, it cannot be said that the acts of lasciviousness arose out of the same occurrence or committed by the accused on the same occasion. The two cases involve distinct offenses committed at an interval of 2 months in point of time. In both cases, A was animated by separate criminal intent. Moreover, the evidence presented by the prosecution in the rape case was not the same evidence they offered to prove the acts of lasciviousness case. PEOPLE V. BARCUMA 07 May 2001 Facts: A was charged with murder. A escaped from jail and since then has been at large. The court rendered a decision finding A guilty and sentencing him to death. Issue: May the automatic review of the RTC’s decision proceed despite the absence of the accused? Held: Yes. There is no good reason to withhold judgment pending the re-arrest of accused-appellant after reviewing the decision of the trail court. Rule 122 § 10 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure in fact provides for automatic review and judgment. OMBUDSMAN’S PROSECUTORY FUNCTION UY V. SANDIGANBAYAN 20 March 2001 Facts: A motion for further clarification was filed by Ombudsman Desierto to the SC’s ruling that the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extends only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and that the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts. Issue: Can the Ombudsman prosecute only cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan? Held: No. We held that the Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute all criminal cases involving public officers and employees, not only those within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the regular courts as well. § 15 of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) does not make any distinction. “Any illegal act or omission of any public official” is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee. Such grant of

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primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and employees cognizable by the other courts. ROXAS V. VASQUEZ 19 June 2001 Facts: A and B were charged with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Ombudsman approved the recommendation for the dismissal of the complaints against A and B. Upon reinvestigation however, without notice to or participation of A and B, the two were indicted. They argue that there has been a procedural infirmity because the Rules of Procedure require that a motion for reconsideration or a reinvestigation must be filed within 15 days from notice of an approved resolution. This was not done here. Issue: Whether the Ombudsman erred. Held: No. In criminal prosecutions, a reinvestigation, like an appeal, renders the entire case open for review, regardless of whether a motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation was sought. The Ombudsman should not be limited in its review. It is clear from R. A. 6770 that the Ombudsman may motu propio conduct a reinvestigation.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CAUSE OF ACTION CHU V. BENELDA ESTATE DEVELOPMENT 01 Mar. 2001 Facts: P and D entered into a contract of sale with assumption of mortgage involving several parcels of land. The agreement was for D to mortgage the property after the purchase to pay the remaining balance. She failed to comply and instead sold the 2 lots to X. P instituted a complaint for annulment of title. The defense filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action as P failed to allege that the purchaser was aware of the defect in the title (i.e., that X was not an innocent purchaser for value). Issue: Should the complaint be dismissed? Held: Yes. In a case for annulment of title, the complaint must allege that the purchaser was aware of the defect in the title so that the cause of action against him will be sufficient. Failure to do so, as in the case at bar, is fatal for the reason that the court cannot render a valid judgment against the purchaser who is presumed to be in good faith in acquiring the property. Therefore, the tile of respondent, being that of an innocent purchaser for value, remains valid. PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES BARITUA V. MERCADER 350 SCRA 86 (Jan. 2001) Facts: P filed a complaint against D in 1984. D contended that since P did not pay the correct amounts of docket and other lawful fees, then the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, following the ruling in the case of Manchester Development Corporation v. CA. Issue: Whether the Manchester ruling applies. Held: No. The statute in force at the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of a court. Once the jurisdiction of a court attaches, it cannot be ousted therefrom by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character that would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. The Manchester ruling, which 12

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became final in 1987, has no retroactive application and cannot be invoked in the subject complaint filed in 1984. COUNTERCLAIMS Vda. DE VILLANUEVA, et. al. V. CA 01 Feb. 2001 Facts: P filed a forcible entry case against D. D filed an answer/counterclaim, arguing that P’s certificate of title is invalid since the land is a “swamp land” and D had a Fisheries Leases Agreement over that land. Issue: Can the validity of the certificate of title be assailed in a counterclaim? Held: No. A collateral attack is made when, in another action to obtain a different relief, the certificate of title is assailed as an incident in said action. D raised the issue of invalidity as a defense in an answer/counterclaim to P’s action for recovery of ownership. This partakes of the nature of a collateral attack and is an indirect challenge to the final judgment and decree of registration which resulted in the issuance of the titles. The Property Registration Decree requires no less than a direct action for reconveyance duly filed within the period provided by law; a collateral attack is not allowed. Plus, there is also a presumption that the lots could be ed and that titles were regularly issued and valid since they were issued as a result of a decision rendered by a competent land registration court. COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIMS FINANCIAL BUILDING CORPORATION V. FORBES PARK 338 SCRA 346 (Aug. 2000) Facts: P filed an injunction suit to stop D from suspending all permit’s of entry for P’s personnel in the construction site. D filed a motion to dismiss. The case was eventually dismissed with finality. D subsequently filed a complaint for damages against P for alleged violation of certain deed restrictions. Issue: Whether D’s separate suit should be given due course. Held: No. D should have set it up as a compulsory counterclaim in the first case. The prior case and the instant case arose from the same occurrence and the issues of fact and law in both cases are identical. Since D filed a motion to dismiss in the previous case, his compulsory counterclaim that should have been filed at that time is now barred. The filing of a motion to dismiss and the setting up of a compulsory counterclaim are incompatible remedies. If the dismissal of the main action results in the dismissal of the counterclaim already filed, it stands to reason that the filing of a motion to dismiss the complaint is an implied waiver of the compulsory counterclaim. ALDAY V. FGU INSURANCE 350 SCRA 113 (Jan. 2001) Facts: P filed a case against insurance agent D. D filed an answer and by way of counterclaim, asserted her right to be paid commission and prayed for damages. P moved to dismiss D’s counterclaim for being merely permissive in nature and D failed to pay the required docket fees. Issue: Whether D’s counterclaim is merely permissive in nature. Held: Yes. The criteria or tests that may be used in determining whether a counterclaim is permissive or compulsory is as follows: 1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely the same?

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2.

Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? 3. Will substantially the same evidence or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as defendant’s counterclaim? 4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counter claim? Another test is the “compelling test of compulsoriness,” which requires a “logical relationship between the claim and the counterclaim, that is, where conducting separate trials of the parties’ respective claims would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court.” Tested against these standards, D’s counterclaim is merely permissive. Only her claims for damages allegedly suffered as a result of P’s filing of the complaint are compulsory. In order for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over her permissive counterclaim, D is bound to pay the prescribed docket fee. SERVICE OF SUMMONS IN CASES OF COMPLAINTS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION OR TRO GONZALES V. STATE PROPERTIES 350 SCRA 311 (Jan. 2001) Facts: P filed a case against D for recovery of property against D and his brothers and sisters. P’s complaint was accompanied by an application for preliminary injunction and/or TRO. The case was raffled but D requested that another raffle be held because the other defendants did not receive notice of the raffle. Summons was served by publication on all defendants (except D) because their residences could not be ascertained despite diligent inquiry. Again, D opposed the holding of a raffle on the ground that the other defendants were not duly notified. Issue: Whether the notice requirement prior to raffle was properly complied with. Held: Yes. § 4 (c) Rule 58 states that the prerequisites for conducting a raffle when there is a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction/TRO are (1) notice to and (2) presence of the adverse party or person to be ened. This rule also provides that the notice shall be preceded or accompanied by a service of summons to the adverse party/person to be ened. The 2nd paragraph of the rule states that the required prior or contemporaneous service of summons in the ff. instances: (a) when summons cannot be served personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts (b) when the adverse party is a resident of the Phils. temporarily absent therefrom, or (c) when such party is a nonresident. In such event, the notice of raffle and the presence of the adverse party must also be dispensed with. In this case, the situation in par. (a) applies so the raffle may therefore proceed even without notice to and the presence of the parties. SERVICE OF PROCESSES TCL SALES V. TENG 349 SCRA 35 (Jan. 2001) Facts: D received a copy of the decision of the SEC en banc on June 14. D filed a motion for reconsideration on June 23 (13th day). D received the order denying this motion on Aug. 6. D filed a petition for review with the CA on Sept. 25. CA held that D should have filed the petition not later that Aug. 21 or 15 days after Aug. 6. Issue: Whether the period should be counted from D’s receipt of the order. Held: No. Where a party is represented by counsel, service of process must be made on counsel and not on the party. This rule applies to proceedings before the SEC as the Rules of Court apply suppletorily thereto. FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS MC ENGINEERING, INC. & HANIL DEVELOPMENT V. NLRC 28 June 2001 14

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Facts: A copy of the pleading was not personally served to P and there was no explanation given as to why personal service was not made. Issue: What is the effect if service of pleadings is not done personally and no explanation is given therefor? Held: Service and filing of pleadings and other papers must, whenever practicable, be done personally. If they are made through other modes, the party concerned must provide a written explanation as to why the service or filing was not done personally. To underscore the mandatory nature of this rule requiring personal service whenever practicable, § 11 of Rule 13 gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first place. SPECIFIC DENIAL UNITED AIRLINES V. CA 20 Apr. 2001 Facts: P filed a case against D. In the Complaint, P alleged that, at 9:45 a.m., P checked in at D’s designated counter. In his Answer, D denies that P checked in at 9:45 a.m., for “lack of knowledge or information at this point in time as to the truth thereof.” Issue: Is such denial contained in the Answer allowed by the Rules? Held: No. The rule authorizing an answer that the defendant has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment and giving such answer the effect of a denial, does not apply where the fact as to which want of knowledge is asserted is so plainly and necessarily within the defendant’s knowledge that his averment of ignorance must be palpably untrue. Whether or not P checked in at D’s designated counter at 9:45 a.m. must necessarily be within P’s knowledge. PRE-TRIAL DE GUIA V. DE GUIA 04 Apr. 2001 Facts: A notice of pre-trial was served only on the counsel, without expressly directing the counsel to inform the client of the date, the time and the place of the pretrial conference. Issue: What is the effect of the absence of such notice? Held: The absence of such notice renders the proceedings void and the judgment rendered therein cannot acquire finality and may be attacked directly or collaterally. EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT DE JESUS V. OBNAMIA 340 SCRA 1 (Sept. 2000) Facts: P won an ejectment suit against D. The decision became final and executory and the judge issued the writ of execution. It appeared that the CA modified the order of execution. Because D refused to vacate, P filed a motion for an alias writ of execution. The motion was set for hearing on April 6 but D’s counsel only received a copy of the motion on that date so D was not represented during the hearing of the motion. The alias writ of execution was granted. Issue: Whether the 3-day notice rule for motions must be followed.

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Held: Yes. Generally, no notice or even prior hearing of such motion for execution is required before a writ of execution is issued when a decision has become final. However, there are circumstances in this case which make a hearing and the requisite 3-day notice of the same to the adverse party necessary. The execution of the decision is a contentious matter as there was an issue concerning the modification of the writ. BUSTOS V. CA 350 SCRA 155 (Jan. 2001) Facts: P won in an unlawful detainer case against D. The trial court issued writs of execution and demolition, but these were stayed when D filed a petition for certiorari and injunction. D subsequently became the owner of the land. In another case for accion reivindicatoria, the CA affirmed D’s ownership over the land. Issue: Whether D could be ejected from what is now his own land. Held: No. ittedly, the decision in the ejectment case is final and executory. However the ministerial duty of the court to order execution of a final and executory judgment its of exceptions: as in special and exceptional cases where it becomes imperative in the higher degree of justice to direct suspension of its execution; whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice; or when certain facts and circumstances transpired after the judgment became final that would render the execution of the judgment unjust. In this case, the stay of execution is warranted by the fact that D is now the legal owner of the land. Allowing the execution of judgment would result to grave injustice and the issue of possession was already rendered moot when the court adjudicated ownership to D. SANTOS V. SILVA 349 SCRA 426 (Jan. 2001) Facts: Writs of execution and demolition were issued in favor of P. The structures were demolished pursuant to the writ. D complained that the clerk of court illegally expanded the coverage of the demolition order. Issue: Whether the clerk of court could validly amend the writ on his own initiative. Held: No. By expanding the coverage of the writ, the clerk of court illegally arrogated unto himself the exercise of judicial discretion. Before he or she can amend the writ, the court’s order granting the issuance should first be amended. Indeed, the preparation of a writ of execution is the duty of the clerk of court. But the performance of such duty is under the supervision and control of the judge and the clerk of court cannot amend the writ on his own initiative. RES JUDICATA Vda. DE VILLANUEVA, et. al. V. CA 01 Feb. 2001 Facts: P bought 2 parcels of land from X but no decree of registration had yet been issued. P filed a forcible entry case against D. 3 months later, a decree of registration was issued in favor of P. D claimed that the land was “swamp land” and that he had a Fisheries Lease Agreement. The trial court dismissed the complaint. P filed another action to assert ownership over the property. Issue: Is the present action barred by res judicata? Held: No. The earlier action filed by P was for forcible entry which involved only the issue of physical possession and not ownership. Meanwhile, the instant case is an accion reinvindicatoria or a suit to recover possession of a parcel of land as an element of ownership. A judgment rendered in a forcible entry case will not bar an action 16

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between the same parties respecting title or ownership because there is no identity of causes of action. MOTIONS FAJARDO V. CA 20 Mar. 2001 Facts: B sued F for collection of attorney’s fees. After the presentation of evidence, the TC rendered a decision in favor of B. F, alleging that she received a copy of the decision on Jan. 19, filed a notice of appeal on Feb. 3. On the same day, the TC denied the notice of appeal for being premature as there was a pending motion for correction of judgment. After granting the motion for correction, the TC granted the motion for issuance of a writ of execution. Issue: Whether the court erred in issuing a writ of execution. Held: Yes. The motion for correction was defective, as it did not have a proper notice of hearing. Such defect reduced the motion to a mere scrap of paper which may not be taken cognizance of by the court. This is required under §§ 4 and 5 of Rule 15. The rationale behind the rule is plain: unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing, the court will be unable to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ABRAHAM V. NLRC 6 Mar 2001 Facts: P filed a complaint for constructive dismissal against D. Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of P. NLRC at first upheld the decision but reversed later upon motion for reconsideration by D. P immediately went to CA via Rule 65 certiorari. CA dismissed the petition on the ground that she failed to file a motion for reconsideration (MFR). Issue: Was the CA correct in dismissing the petition? Held: No. Generally, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is filed before the respondent tribunal to allow it an opportunity to correct its imputed errors. However, this is subject to exceptions, among which are: where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and ed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and ed upon in the lower court; and, where the MFR would be useless. In the present case, NLRC was clearly given the opportunity to review its ruling and correct itself when D filed its MFR. In fact, it granted the MFR filed by the D. Thus, the NLRC had more than one opportunity to resolve the issues of the case and in fact reversed itself upon reconsideration. It is highly improbable that the NLRC would reverse itself again. APPEAL FAJARDO V. CA 20 Mar 2001 Facts: F lost in the case filed against him. F received the copy of the decision on Dec. 15. F’s counsel received a copy only on Jan. 19. F filed a notice of appeal on Feb. 3. Issue: Whether the appeal was timely filed. Held: Yes. While the copy was received by F on Dec. 15, the copy of the decision was received by F’s counsel only on Jan. 19. The 15-day period for filing the appeal should be counted from the date when petitioner’s counsel received a copy of said judgment.

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When a party is represented by counsel, service of process must be made on counsel, not on the party. (§ 2, Rule 13) METROPOLITAN BANK V. CA 17 Apr. 2001 Facts: D was declared in default. The RTC rendered a Decision ordering him to pay P a sum of money. The Decision became final and executory. After executing on the various properties owned by D, the RTC directed the sheriff to sell at a public auction the Club Filipino share owned by D. A Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of P as purchaser of that share. P then filed a Motion to hold in abeyance the delivery of the Certificate. The RTC issued an Order denying the Motion. P then filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Issue: Can D appeal from the denial of the Motion to hold in abeyance the delivery of the Certificate of Sale and to declare the sale void? Held: Yes. As provided in § 2, Rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court, one who has been declared in default may appeal, without need of an order lifting the default. The denial of the Motion being final in character, and not merely interlocutory, he is allowed by the Rules to appeal therefrom. The test to ascertain whether an order is interlocutory or final is: “Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. APPEAL—UNASSIGNED ERRORS LUDO AND LUYM V. CA 01 Feb 2001 Facts: P sued D because D’s ship allegedly rammed and destroyed P’s fender pile clusters used for docking at the wharf. The trial court ruled in favor of P and ordered D to pay damages. The CA reversed. P argued that D did not assign as an error the eyewitness’ incompetence to testify on the negligence of the ship’s officers and crew so that matter should not have been disturbed by the CA. Issue: Did the CA go beyond the issues raised? Held: No. The SC noted that while the witness’ incompetence was not one of the assigned errors in D’s brief, the latter raised it in connection with the issue of their negligence. The CA, therefore, did not err in addressing the matter because an appellate court can consider an unassigned error on which depends the determination of the question in the properly assigned error. The issue of negligence of the ship’s officers and crew depends significantly on the determination of whether the witness is competent to testify on the maneuvering of a docking vessel. APPELLANT’S BRIEF DBP V. CA et. al. 06 June 2001 Facts: P, a government financial institution, lost in a case against D. P filed a notice of appeal and requested for an extension to file appellant’s brief. The appellate court granted a number of extensions. P failed to filed its appellant’s brief within the last extended period accorded to it by the appellate court Issue: What is the difference between the failure to file a notice of appeal within the reglementary period and the failure to file a brief within the period granted by the appellate court? Held: Failure to file a notice of appeal results in the failure of the appellate court to acquire jurisdiction over the appealed decision, resulting in its becoming final and 18

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executory upon failure of the appellant to move for reconsideration. Failure to file a brief within the period granted simply results in the abandonment of the appeal which could lead to its dismissal upon failure to move for its reconsideration, in which case the appealed decision would also become final and executory, but prior thereto, the appellate court shall have obtained jurisdiction of the appealed decision. There is more leeway to exempt a case from the strictures of procedural rules when the appellate court has already obtained jurisdiction over the appealed case. EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE PLEADINGS DBP V. CA et. al. 06 June 2001 Facts: P appealed to the CA. P filed a motion for extension to file the appellant’s brief. Issue: When may extensions to file pleadings be granted? Held: An extension will only be granted if there is good and sufficient cause, and if the motion asking for the same is filed before the expiration of the time sought to be extended. The granting of an extension, including the duration thereof, lies within the sound discretion of the court, to be exercised in accordance with the attendant circumstances of each case. However, the movant is not justified in assuming that the extension sought will be granted, or that it will be granted for the length of time sought. Thus, it is the duty of the movant for extension to exercise due diligence and inform himself as soon as possible of the appellate court’s action on his motion. CERTIORARI ESTATE OF SALUD JIMENEZ V. PHIL. EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE 349 SCRA 240 (Jan. 2001) Facts: PEZA received the unfavorable order of the trial court on Aug. 11. It filed a motion for reconsideration on the 15th day. PEZA received the order denying the motion on Nov. 23. On Nov. 27, PEZA filed a petition for certiorari. D argued that the petition for certiorari filed by PEZA was actually a substitute for lost appeal that should not be entertained. According to D, the rule that a petition for certiorari can be availed of despite the fact that the proper remedy is an appeal only applies in cases where the petition is filed within the reglementary period for appeal (as in the cases of Aguilar v. Tan and Bautista v. Sarmiento). Issue: Whether the petition for certiorari should be allowed to prosper. Held: Yes. There was grave abuse of discretion in this case and appeal was not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy so the petition for certiorari was proper. The SC found D’s interpretation to be too restrictive. The said cases do not set as a condition sine qua non the filing of a petition for certiorari within the 15-day period to appeal in order for the said petition to be entertained by the court. To espouse D’s contention would render inutile the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. PCGG V. DESIERTO 349 SCRA 767 (Jan. 2001) Facts: The PCGG received a copy of the assailed resolution on 8 April. It filed a motion for reconsideration on 12 April. On 6 August, it received a copy of the order denying its motion. PCGG filed a petition for certiorari on 5 October. Issue: Whether the petition was timely filed. Held: Yes. Indeed, pursuant to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition should have been filed on 2 October so the petition should have been dismissed for late filing. However, during the pendency of the case, SC promulgated A.M. No. 00-2-

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03-SC (effective 1 Sept. 2000) which provided: “In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the 60-day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.” In view of the retroactive application of procedural laws, the petition should be considered timely filed. UNITY FISHING V. CA 02 Feb. 2001 Facts: The NLRC-Resolution denying P’s motion for reconsideration was received by P on Oct. 6. P filed a petition for certiorari on Dec. 6. Issue: Was the petition for certiorari filed within the reglementary period? Held: Yes. Under A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, amending § 4, Rule 65, the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari is reckoned from the receipt of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. Applying the amendment, the last day for filing the petition for certiorari should have been Dec. 5. Dec. 5 being a Sunday, the time shall not run until the next working day pursuant to Rule 22. INDIANA V. CHED 04 Apr. 2001 Facts: The Indiana Aerospace University filed a complaint for damages against the Commission on Higher Education (“CHED”) before the RTC. The RTC denied CHED’s motion to dismiss. Without filing a motion for reconsideration, CHED filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. Issue: Does CHED’s Petition for Certiorari require a prior resort to a motion for reconsideration? Held: No. The general rule is that, in order to give the lower court the opportunity to correct itself, a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to certiorari. This rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions such as: (1) the issues raised are purely legal in nature; (2) public interest is involved; (3) extreme urgency is obvious; or (4) special circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action. It is patently clear that the regulation or istration of educational institutions, especially on the tertiary level, is invested with public interest. Thus CHED’s Petition for Certiorari did not require prior resort to a motion for reconsideration. DEPOSITIONS REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN 30 May 2001 Facts: Before the defendants have filed their answers, the prosecution moved to take the deposition of X. The prosecution alleges that X, who has been out of the country, would give vital testimony but would not return to the country because he fears for his safety. Issue: Is there a valid reason for the court to allow the taking of X’s deposition? Held: None. The general rule is that a plaintiff may not be permitted to take depositions before answer is served. However, deposition is allowed to be taken before service of answer where conditions point to the necessity of presenting a strong case for allowance of the motion. In this case, no proof, much less any allegation, has been presented to show there exists a real threat to X’s life once he returns to the Philippines and that adequate security cannot be provided for such a vital witness. ATTACHMENT

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CHUIDIAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN 349 SCRA 745 (Jan. 2001) Facts: The government filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint against several individuals, including D, for restitution of ill-gotten wealth. The government asked for the issuance of a writ of attachment and this was granted. D assailed the propriety of the issuance of the writ. Issue: Whether the issuance of the writ was proper. Held: Yes. In order to quash a writ of attachment, a party may file a counterbond (Rule 57 § 12) or to quash the attachment on the ground that it was irregularly or improvidently issued (Rule 57 § 13). The grounds cited by D have nothing to do with the issuance of the writ. His grounds were facts that took place after the writ had already been implemented. Supervening events, which may or may not justify the discharge of the writ, are not within the purview of Rule 57 § 13. LITIS PENDENTIA SHANGRI-LA INTERNATIONAL HOTEL V. CA 21 June 2001 Facts: A case for the cancellation of a mark with the Bureau of Legal Affairs, Intellectual Property Office was filed by P. D filed a subsequent action for infringement against P with the regular courts in connection with the same ed mark. Issue: Whether the istrative case for cancellation barred the filing of an infringement case with the court. Held: No. The earlier case for cancellation of a mark cannot effectively bar the subsequent filing of an infringement case by the registrant of such mark. The certificate of registration still subsists and is prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration, as such a corresponding infringement suit may be filed against the party who infringes on the rights of the registrant. BANGKO SILANGAN DEVELOPMENT BANK V. CA 29 June 2001 Facts: There was an existing case involving P and D. D sought the dismissal of the present case on the ground of litis pendentia. Issue: What are the requisites of litis pendentia? Held: Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to a situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action and that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It must conform to the following requisites: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity with respect to the two (2) preceding particulars in the two (2) cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case. RULE 45 PENGSON V. OCAMPO, et. al. 29 June 2001 Facts: P filed an ejectment case against D before the MTC. D averred that she is a coowner of such land being a compulsory heir of its original owners. MTC ruled in favor of D, holding that she is a legitimate daughter of the original owners. RTC affirmed. CA

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reversed. Hence, this certiorari proceeding under Rule 45. Issue: Whether a petition for review under Rule 45 is proper. Held: No. The jurisdiction of SC in cases brought before it from the CA via Rule 45 is limited to reviewing errors or questions of law. It is the burden of the party seeking review of a decision of the CA or other lower tribunals to distinctly set forth in his petition for review, not only the existence of questions of law fairly and logically arising therefrom, but also questions substantial enough to merit consideration, or show that there are special and important reasons warranting the review that he seeks. If these are not shown prima facie in the petition, the Court will be justified in summarily spurning the petition as lacking in merit. APPEAL/PETITION FOR REVIEW/CERTIORARI—DOCUMENTS THAT SHOULD BE ATTACHED CUSI-HERNANDEZ V. DIAZ 336 SCRA 113 (July 2000) Facts: P filed a case of accion publiciana against D. They had a contract to sell but P rescinded this because D failed to fulfill his obligation. D refused to vacate the premises. The MTC ruled in favor of P but RTC reversed. The CA denied due course to P’s appeal because of her failure to attach a certified true copy of the contract to sell. Issue: Whether there was a need to attach the contract to sell. Held: No. Attached to the petition for review were original duplicate copies of the RTC and MTC decisions. The SC found that the MTC decision reproduced verbatim the contract to sell, which is central to the dispute. There was substantial compliance with § 2 Rule 42. In Caydona v. CA, it was held that “we do not construe § 2 (d) of Rule 42 as imposing the requirement that all ing papers accompanying the petition should be certified as true copies.” ATILLO V. BOMBAY 07 Feb. 2001 Facts: D entered into a Lease Agreement with P, alleged owner of Alto Commercial Building. D failed to pay her rentals so P filed an action for ejectment which the MTC dismissed. RTC reversed; CA dismissed on D’s failure to attach pleadings and other material portions of the record of the case in violation of Rule 42 § 2(d). Issue: Is § 2(d) of Rule 42 mandatory, or merely directory? Held: Mandatory, and therefore non-compliance with the § 2(d) is a ground for the dismissal of a petition based on § 3 of the same rule. The phrase “of the pleadings and other material portions of the record” in § 2(d) is followed by the phrase “as would the allegations of the petition.” This contemplates the exercise of discretion on the part of the petitioner in the selection of documents that are deemed to be relevant to the petition. However, while it is true that it is petitioner who initially exercises the discretion in selecting the relevant ing documents that will be appended to the petition, it is the CA that will ultimately determine if the ing documents are sufficient to even make out a prima facie case. PARAS V. BALDADO 08 Mar. 2001 Facts: In an estate proceeding, petitioners moved to inhibit the respondent judge on the ground of bias. The judge refused to do so. Certiorari with CA. CA dismissed on the ground of failure to attach a certified true copy of impugned order as required by § 1 of Rule 65 as what was attached was a mere plain xerox copy of the order. Issue: Was the CA correct in dismissing the petition?

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Held: No. The filing of original actions for certiorari in the CA is governed by § 3, Rule 46 which mandates a certified true copy of the impugned order as a jurisdictional requirement. In this case, the CA was correct in disregarding the copies of the RTC orders even if these were certified by a notary public. However, the records reveal that duplicate original copies were in fact attached to one of the seven copies of the petition filed with the CA, moreover, copies of the same orders, this time accomplished by the clerk of court, were submitted by petitioners in their Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, the Court finds that there was substantial compliance with the requirement and the CA should have given the petition due course. VERIFICATION UY V. LANDBANK 336 SCRA 419 (July 2000) Facts: P filed an unlawful detainer case against D. It reached the SC. D filed a petition for review with the SC. On 15 Feb. the SC denied the petition for (1) lack of certification against forum shopping and (2) lack of verification. Before D’s counsel received the Resolution denying the petition, he filed a Motion for ission of Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping on 4 March. Issue: Whether the (1) lack of verification and (2) certification against forum shopping may be cured by the submission thereof after the filing of the petition. Held: (1) Yes. The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleading, the non-compliance of which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of imagination or speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. (2) Generally, no. Rule 45 § 5 provides that failure of petitioner to submit the required documents that should accompany the petition, including the certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. But the SC may find special circumstances or compelling reasons for the reinstatement of the petition as what occurred in this case. CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING LOQUIAS V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN 338 SCRA 62 (Aug. 2000) Facts: A sworn complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman charging A, B, C, and D with the violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Ombudsman found probable cause and recommended the filing of the information. The accused filed a petition for certiorari. The Ombudsman argued that the petition did not comply with Rule 7 § 5 because the verification against forum shopping was signed only by B and not by all petitioners. Issue: Whether there was substantial compliance with § 5 Rule 7. Held: No. The petition is defective. There was no showing that B was authorized by his co-petitioners to represent them and to sign the certification. It cannot be presumed that B knew, to the best of his knowledge, whether his co-petitioners had the same or similar actions or claims filed or pending. The attestation contained in the certification on nonforum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. Petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. DAR V. ALONZO-LEGASTO 339 SCRA 306 (Aug. 2000)

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Facts: Spouses X and Y in an unlawful detainer case filed by P. They were sued as “Mr. and Mrs.” They filed a petition for review with the C. This petition was dismissed for failure to comply with the rule on Certification of Non-Forum Shopping since it was signed by X only. Issue: Whether there was substantial compliance with the Rule on Certification against Forum Shopping. Held: Yes. With respect to the contents of the certification which the pleader may prepare, the rule of substantial compliance may be availed of. While the rule requires that it be strictly complied with, it merely underscores its mandatory nature in that it cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded but it does not prevent substantial compliance on the aspect of its provisions under justifiable circumstances. In this case, it should be noted that X and Y were sued tly as spouses over a property in which they have a common interest. The g of one of them in the certification substantially complies with the rule. SOLLER V. COMELEC 339 SCRA 685 (Sept. 2000) Facts: P filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of the proclamation of D as mayor. He also filed with the RTC an election protest against D. D moved to dismiss the protest on the ground of forum shopping. P argued that he did not need to disclose in his election protest that he earlier filed a petition for annulment of proclamation because he deemed the COMELEC petition abandoned upon the filing of the protest. Issue: Whether P should comply with the certification of non-forum shopping. Held: Yes. Before the COMELEC dismissed P’s petition for annulment of proclamation, this was legally still pending resolution and he should have disclosed the existence of such action in his election protest. The fact that P’s protest was not based on the same cause of action as his pre-proclamation case is not a valid excuse for not complying with the rule. The requirement to file a certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory. The rule applies to any complaint, petition, application, or other initiatory pleading, regardless of whether the party filing it has actually committed forum shopping. DOCENA V. LAPESURA 28 March 2001 Facts: P filed a complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land against his lessees, spouses H and W. TC ruled in favor of P. CA dismissed the petition on the ground that only one of the petitioners signed the certification of non-forum shopping. Issue: Was the dismissal correct? Held: No. It has been the Court’s previous ruling that all the petitioners should sign the certificate of non-forum shopping or plaintiffs in a case and that the g by only one of them is insufficient. In the case at bar, however, we hold that there is substantial compliance. There are only 2 petitioners in this case and they are husband and wife. The certification was signed stating that “he and his wife…” The property subject of the original action for recovery is conjugal. Under the Family Code, management or istration belongs to the husband and the wife tly. However, each spouse may validly exercise full power of management alone, subject only to the intervention of the Court. Thus, such omission is not a fatal defect. EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL UY V. SANTIAGO 336 SCRA 680 (July 2000)

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Facts: MTC ruled in favor of P in an ejectment case. D appealed to the RTC. The RTC affirmed the MTC ruling in toto. P filed a motion for issuance of writ of execution pending appeal to which D filed his opposition. Meanwhile, D filed a petition for review with the CA assailing the RTC decision in the ejectment case. RTC judge denied execution pending appeal because D perfected his appeal, filed a supersedeas bond and gave periodic deposits of the rentals falling due during the pendency of the appeal. Issue: Whether the decision of the RTC in the appealed ejectment case is immediately executory pending appeal. Held: Yes. It is only execution of the MTC judgment pending appeal with the RTC, which may be stayed by a compliance with the requisites, provided in Rule 79 § 19. On the other hand, once the RTC has rendered a decision in its appellate jurisdiction, such decision shall under Rule 70 § 21, be immediately executory, without prejudice to an appeal via a petition for review with the CA and/or SC. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT BASCO V. CA 337 SCRA 472 (Aug. 2000) Facts: A was convicted of illegal possession of firearm. On the last day of filing an appeal, A’s counsel submitted a motion fro reconsideration without the required notice of hearing. 8 days later, counsel submitted a notification and manifestation in an attempt to rectify the error. RTC denied both the motion for reconsideration and the notification and manifestation. A filed a petition for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 38, which was also denied for lack of merit. A then appealed the order of denial to the CA. Issue: Whether an order denying a petition for relief is appealable. Held: No. Under the old Rules of Court, a judgment or order denying relief under Rule 38 is final and appealable. However, under the 1997 Amended Rules of Procedure, an order denying a petition for relief is no longer subject to appeal. The aggrieved party’s recourse is to file the appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. DAP MINING ASSOCIATION V. CA, et. al. 6 June 2001 Facts: P failed to file an appeal of the decision of the Director of Mines within the 5-day reglementary period prescribed by Sec. 50 of P.D. 463. P filed a petition for relief from judgment but it was not accompanied by affidavits of merit. Issue: Whether the petition for relief should be allowed to prosper. Held: No. A petition for relief is a special remedy designed to give a party a last chance to defend his right or protect his interest. It is a relief that can only be availed of in exceptional cases. Being an act of grace, so designed as it were to give the aggrieved party a second opportunity, the extraordinary period fixed therefor must be considered non-extendible and not subject to condition or contingency. In this case, the petition for relief failed to be accompanied by affidavits of merit, showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense. These affidavits of merit would serve as the indispensable basis for a court to be called upon to entertain a petition for relief. ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT TRINIDAD V. CA 6 June 2001 Facts: P sought to annul the final judgment rendered against his interest.

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Issue: Whether the petition to annul judgment was timely filed. Held: No. The petition to annul the judgment of the trial court was filed more than 6 months after the judgment had become final and executory. The action to annul the compromise judgment should even be deemed barred under Rule 38 § 3 providing that the judgment could only be set aside if the action were brought within 60 days after petitioners’ knowledge of the judgment but in no case later than six months after its entry. INJUNCTION CANSON V. HIDALGO 337 SCRA 293 (Aug. 2000) Facts: CAPCOM Regional Director ordered the re-assignment of P, a police officer. Instead of complying with the directive, P filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with the RTC to en the enforcement of the directive. RTC granted preliminary injunction. Issue: Whether the court may en the assignment/re-assignment of a police officer. Held: No. The court has no supervisory power over the officers and men of the national police, unless the acts of the latter are plainly done in grave abuse of discretion or beyond the competence of the functions or jurisdiction of their office. In this case, there was no showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CAPCOM Regional Director. Courts cannot by injunction review, overrule or otherwise interfere with the valid acts of police officials. IDOLOR V. CA 07 Feb. 2001 Facts: X, whose mortgaged property was foreclosed and sold in a public auction, failed to exercise her right of redemption within the proper period. X then filed a complaint for annulment of sheriff’s sale against the buyers with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Issue: Should the writ of preliminary injunction be issued? Held: No. X failed to show sufficient interest or title in the property sought to be protected as her right of redemption had already expired two days before the filing of the complaint. It is always a ground for denying injunction that the party seeking it has insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and no claim to the ultimate relief sought. URBANES V. CA 28 March 2001 Facts: X agency participated in a public bidding to secure a contract providing security services to the SSS. However, the contract was awarded to Y. Claiming that irregularities and anomalies attended the public bidding, X filed an action for injunction to prevent the awarding of the contract to Y. X asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction as well. TC issued the writ. CA set it aside and also dismissed the main action. Issue: Did the CA gravely abuse its discretion? Held: Yes. The CA overstepped its boundaries when it dismissed the main action. The issue to be resolved was only in respect to the writ of preliminary injunction. The main action of injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction which is distinct from the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction.

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SPOUSES CRYSTAL V. CEBU INT’L SCHOOL 04 Apr. 2001 Facts: X was not able to pay the required school fees on time. Thus, X was not enrolled in Y school. X filed a complaint against Y school, praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction. Issue: Should the writ be issued? Held: No. X failed to show that he has a clear and unmistakable right that has been violated. The right to enroll in a private school is not absolute; it is subject to “fair, reasonable and equitable requirements.” X has no right or standing to pray for the issuance of an injunctive writ, because he failed to pay the required school fees on time. Moreover, X has not shown any urgent and permanent necessity for it, considering that X is already enrolled in another school. MOTION FOR CLARIFICATORY JUDGMENT VIRGILIO V. PATRICIA 340 SCRA 525 (Sept. 2000) Facts: P won in an unlawful detainer case against D. On appeal, RTC reversed and ruled in favor of D. P filed a motion for clarificatory judgment. Without waiting for the resolution of the motion, P filed a petition for review with the CA. D argued that the petition for review was premature. For D, because of the pendency of P’s motion, there was no final judgment or decision that could be the subject of a petition for review. Issue: Was the petition for review premature because of the pendency of the motion for clarificatory judgment? Held: No. A motion for clarificatory judgment, not being in the character of a motion for reconsideration, does not toll the reglementary period for filing a petition for review. Its filing will not bar the judgment from attaining finality, nor will its resolution amen the decision to be reviewed. DECLARATORY RELIEF SPS. MIRASOL V. CA 01 Feb. 2001 Facts: Spouses H and W entered into a crop loaning financing scheme with PNB. PNB was empowered as the spouses attorney-in-fact and could sell their sugar in order to apply the proceeds to the payment of obligation. The spouses wanted an ing of the proceeds of the sale of their export sugar but PNB ignored their requests. Come time to settle their obligations, it was found that H and W owed PNB around 15.9 million pesos. The spouses claimed that had PNB made the ing, it would have found out that the proceeds were enough to cover the obligation. They then filed a suit for ing, specific performance and damages against the latter. Issue: Should the Sol Gen be notified in respect to actions for declaratory relief? Held: Yes. Rule 63 § 3 of the Rules of Court require notice to the Solicitor General. The mandatory notice requirement is not limited to actions for declaratory relief but in fact extends to “any action” contrary to the spouses’ contention that said rule applies only to actions for declaratory relief and not to the present action which is only for ing, specific performance and damages. SPOUSES LIM V. CRUZ 04 Apr. 2001

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Facts: A complaint for quieting of title was filed by P against D. P caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of the TCT covering the said subject land. A motion to cancel notice of lis pendens was filed by D, on the ground that a notice of lis pendens cannot be granted on the basis of an uned deed of sale. Issue: Can a notice of lis pendens be granted, even on the basis of an uned deed of sale? Held: Yes. For purposes of annotating a notice of lis pendens, there is nothing in the rules which requires the party seeking annotation to show that the land belongs to him. In fact, there is no requirement that the party applying for the annotation of the notice must prove his right or interest over the property sought to be annotated. Hence, even on the basis of an uned deed of sale, a notice of lis pendens may be annotated on the title. SPOUSES LIM V. CRUZ 04 Apr. 2001 Facts: A complaint for quieting of title was filed by P against D. P caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of the TCT covering the said subject land. A motion to cancel notice of lis pendens was filed by D. The judge issued an order canceling the notice of lis pendens annotated at the back of a party’s TCT upon D’s posting of an indemnity bond. Issue: Can the court allow D to file a bond in substitution of the notice of lis pendens? Held: No. The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reasons of public policy and necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. This purpose would be rendered meaningless if D is allowed to file a bond, regardless of the amount, in substitution of the notice. OMNIBUS MOTION MEDISERV V. CHINA BANKING 17 Apr. 2001 Facts: D was declared in default. D filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to lift Order of Default; and (b) dismiss the Complaint with Prejudice. The Omnibus Motion was not under oath, and the Affidavit of Merit failed to aver any fact which constitutes movant’s good and substantial defense nor allege circumstances constituting D’s mistake or excusable negligence. Issue: Should the Omnibus Motion be granted? Held: No. The Omnibus Motion was not under oath as required in Rule 9, Sec. 3 (b), and the Affidavit of Merit is defective for failing to aver any fact which constitutes movant’s good and substantial defense nor allege circumstances constituting D’s mistake or excusable negligence. SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVADEL V. SPOUSES SORIANO 20 Apr. 2001 Facts: P filed against D an action to recover ownership over real property. P seeks to recover a certain portion of land with a total area of 2,450 square meters from D which portion was allegedly in excess of the total area of the property actually sold by them to the latter. In his Answer, D itted the existence and due execution of the Contract to sell which contained the specific description of the property it bought from P.

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Issue: Is there a genuine issue as to any material fact? Held: No. There is no genuine issue of fact as to ownership of the subject property because the issions made by D in its Answer are tantamount to an ission that P owned the property in question. Thus, the court may summarily resolve the issue of ownership of the subject property. PERSONS BOUND BY JUDGMENT IN AN EJECTMENT SUIT EQUITABLE PCI BANK V. KU 26 March 2001 Facts: P mortgaged property to D. However, due to default in the payment of the loan, D instituted extrajudicial foreclosure and was issued a new certificate of title in his name. D then filed an action for ejectment against P’s father. The order directing the father to vacate became final. P appealed claiming that she was deprived of due process, as she was not made a party to the ejectment suit. Issue: Should P have been impleaded in the ejectment suit? Held: No. Generally, no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court. Nevertheless, a judgment in an ejectment suit is binding not only upon the defendants in the suit but also those not made parties if they are tresers, squatters or agents of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; guests or other occupants with defendant’s permission; transferees pendente lite; sub-lessees; colessees; of the family, relatives and other privies of the defendant. P, being the daughter, is bound. EXHAUSTION OF ISTRATIVE REMEDIES GARCIA V. CA et. al. 6 June 2001 Facts: An istrative case was filed against A before the PCA. A filed a case with the CA arguing that there was violation of istrative due process. The CA refused to take cognizance of the case for A’s failure to exhaust istrative remedies. Issue: Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of istrative remedies applies. Held: Yes. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of istrative remedies, recourse through court action cannot prosper until after all such istrative remedies would have first been exhausted. The rule is an element of petitioner's right of action, and it is too significant a mandate to be just waylaid by the courts. This traditional attitude of the courts is based not only on convenience but likewise on respect: convenience of the party litigants and respect for a coequal office in the government. If a remedy is available within the istrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to (the) courts. Even comity dictates that unless the available istrative remedies have been resorted to and appropriate authorities given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the istrative forum, judicial recourse must be held to be inappropriate and impermissible. A argued that his case should have been viewed as an exception from the principle of exhaustion of istrative remedies. A cannot deny that he has been able to effectively, if not deliberately, delayed the resolution of the istrative case against him due to his repeated requests for extension of time to file answer and his inexcusable refusal to attend the scheduled hearings thereon despite due notice. A's invocation that his failure to exhaust istrative remedies should be EXCEPTED by the fact that irreparable damage would ensue upon his overdue suspension and illegal ouster from office cannot be countenanced.

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EVIDENCE IMPEACHMENT BY BIAS PEOPLE V. PERALTA 350 SCRA 198 (Jan. 2001) Facts: A was found guilty of murder. A attempted to impeach the credibility of 3 prosecution witnesses, especially witness W. A pointed out that W testified that as the victim’s fraternity brother, he would do “anything and everything” for the victim. Issue: Whether A was able to properly impeach the witnesses on of bias. Held: No. A witness may be said to biased when his relation to the cause or to the parties is such that he has an incentive to exaggerate or give false color or pervert the truth, or to state what is false. To impeach a biased witness, the counsel must lay the proper foundation of the bias by asking the witness facts constituting the bias. In this case, there was no proper impeachment by bias of the 3 prosecution witnesses. W’s testimony that he would do anything for his fellow brothers was too broad and general so as to constitute a motive to lie before the court. PEOPLE V. MACANDOG et. al. 6 June 2001 Facts: A was accused of the murder of V. E, a witness of the prosecution, testified that A was among those present at the crime scene. A argued that E’s testimony should not have been given credence because she was biased, as she was the sister of the deceased. Issue: Whether E is a biased witness. Held: No. The fact that E is the sister of deceased does not per se make her a biased witness. Mere relationship of the victim to a witness does not automatically impair her credibility and render her testimony less worthy of credence where no improper motive can be ascribed. Such relationship lends more credence to the testimony considering her natural interest to see the guilty punished. It would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating the crime to accuse anyone other than the real culprit. CHILD WITNESS PEOPLE V. RAMA 350 SCRA 266 (Jan. 2001) Facts: A was found guilty of kidnapping a baby. W, the 5-year old cousin of the victim, identified A as the one who took the victim. A contended that W’s testimony, coming from the mouth of a 5-year old, does not deserve credit because she could not answer many questions and appeared to have been coached by her grandmother. Issue: Whether W is disqualified as a witness. Held: No. The requirements of a child’s competency as a witness are the: (a) capacity of observation, (b) capacity of recollection and (c) capacity of communication. Professor Wigmore said that no rule defines any particular age as conclusive of incapacity. In this case, while the 5-year old witness was not able to answer some questions, she was straightforward in identifying A as the culprit. This is in accord with the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (became effective Dec. 15, 2000), which provides in § 6 (a) that the age of the child by itself is not a sufficient basis for a competency examination.

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PROOF OF PREVIOUS CONVICTION PEOPLE V. FELWA 20 Apr. 2001 Facts: A was charged with kidnapping and serious illegal detention. In the course of the trial, the prosecution attempted to bring out A’s former conviction of another crime. Issue: Can the proof of A’s past conviction be used to prove his guilt of the crime charged? Held: No. A previous decision or judgment, while issible in evidence, may only prove that an accused was previously convicted of a crime. It may not be used to prove that the accused is guilty of a crime charged in a subsequent case. OPINION RULE PEOPLE V. DURANAN 349 SCRA 180 (Jan. 2001) Facts: A was found guilty of rape. The victim’s mother testified as to the mental condition of her daughter. The victim was considered retarded and A was sentenced accordingly. A contended that since the victim’s mental age was not proven, he cannot be convicted of rape of a mental retardate. Issue: Whether the testimony of the victim’s mother was sufficient to establish the mental condition of the victim. Held: Yes. The mother of an offended party in a case of rape, though not a psychiatrist, if she knows the physical and mental condition of the party, how she was born, what she is suffering from, and what her attainments are, is competent to testify on these matters. This is in accordance with the exception to the opinion rule provided in Rule 130 § 50. HEARSAY PEOPLE V. GARCIA 335 SCRA 208 (July 2000) Facts: A was convicted of murder. The police officer who prepared the information testified that he was informed by X and Y of the identity of the assailant. However, X and Y did not actually see the assailants but merely heard the news from others. Issue: Whether the police officer’s testimony as to the identity of the assailants is issible. Held: No. The information given by X and Y to the police officer was hearsay. The police officer’s testimony is even multiple hearsay, since it is based upon “third hand” information related to the witness by someone who heard it from others. GO V. CA 5 Feb. 2001 Facts: The prosecution sought to establish the fact that a certain checkbook was delivered personally to Mr. A by presenting the testimony of X, who testified that Y told her that he left the checkbook on top of Mr. A’s table. Issue: Is X’s testimony issible? Held: No. X’s testimony is hearsay. It does not appear that X has first-hand knowledge that the checkbook was indeed delivered to Mr. A. 31

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ESTRADA V. ANIANO DESIERTO 03 Apr. 2001 Facts: The Supreme Court, in a prior decision, used the Angara Diary (“AD”) to establish Estrada’s intent to resign. Issue: Does the use of the AD violate the rule against the ission of hearsay evidence? Held: No. 1. The AD is not an out of court statement. The AD is part of the pleadings in the cases at bar. Estrada (E) cannot complain he was not furnished a copy of the AD. Nor can he feign surprise on its use. To be sure, the said diary was frequently referred to by the parties in their pleadings. E had all the opportunity to contest the use of the diary but unfortunately failed to do so. 2. Even assuming arguendo that the AD was an out of court statement, still its use is not covered by the hearsay rule. The rules of exclusion do not cover issions of a party and the AD belongs to this class. Although the AD is not the diary of E, E is bound by it, in accordance with the doctrine of adoptive ission. Sec. Angara acted for and in behalf of E in the crucial days before Pres. Arroyo took her oath as President. issions of an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on the principal (E). 3. Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently relevant statements. The AD contains statements of E which reflect his state of mind and are circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign. SEVILLANA V. I.T. CORP 16 Apr. 2001 Facts: In a labor case, the NLRC considered P’s complaint-affidavit as mere hearsay evidence since P was not cross-examined. Issue: Should the complaint-affidavit be considered hearsay evidence? Held: No. Labor laws mandate the speedy disposition of cases, with the least attention to technicalities but without sacrificing the fundamental requisites of due process. In this light, the NLRC, like the labor arbiter is authorized to decide cases based on the position papers and other documents submitted, without resorting to technical rules of evidence. D.M. CONSUNJI V. CA 20 Apr. 2001 Facts: A police officer investigated the death of P and filed a police report. P’s widow filed in the RTC a complaint for damages against P’s employer, D. The police report was itted in evidence and the police officer who prepared the same testified during trial. Issue: Was the police report hearsay and, therefore, inissible? Held: The report was inissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the statements contained in the report but issible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of the officer who executed the report. In any case, the Court held that portions of the report which were of the personal knowledge of the police officer suffice to prove the cause of death of P. CITY GOV’T V. MONTEVERDE 21 May 2001 Facts: A witness gave hearsay testimony. It was not objected to. Issue: Does the testimony have probative value? 32

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Held: No. Hearsay evidence has no probative value, whether objected to or not. MOLLANEDA V. UMACOB 6 June 2001 Facts: An istrative case was filed against A. Complainant sought A’s dismissal as Schools Division Superintendent. Complainant offered in evidence the testimony of witnesses who heard the complainant’s grievance against A. A contended that such testimony is hearsay. Issue: Whether the testimonies of the witnesses constitute hearsay. Held: No. The testimonies were not presented to prove the truth of complainant’s accusations against A, but only to establish the fact that complainant narrated to them what transpired between her and A. While it is true that the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when the fact that it has been made is relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be shown. Evidence as to the making of the statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. DYING DECLARATIONS PEOPLE V. PRECIADOS 349 SCRA 1 (Jan. 2001) Facts: The prosecution called X to testify on Y’s “dying declaration.” Y, however, was alive and later even testified in court. Issue: Is X’s testimony issible as dying declaration? Held: No. One of the requisites—that the declarant dies—is missing. PEOPLE V. MACANDOG et. al. 6 June 2001 Facts: V, the victim, was able to tell E the names of his assailants before he died. A, the accused, questioned the issibility of V’s statement as a dying declaration. Issue: Whether V’s statement is issible as a dying declaration. Held: Yes. For a dying declaration to be valid and issible in evidence, the following requisites must concur: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case in which the declarant is the victim. The positive declaration of the deceased as to the identity of his assailants, given the consciousness that death is imminent is undoubtedly entitled to great weight considering the seriousness of his wounds and his very weak physical condition as shown by the fact that death supervened 30 minutes after his disclosure to E.

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RES GESTAE PEOPLE V. MANSUETO 336 SCRA 715 (July 2000) Facts: A and B were accused of killing V. The prosecution presented W, the daughter of V, during trial. W identified A as the culprit. A attempted to impeach W’s credibility. A argued that W’s failure to mention A as the driver of the getaway vehicle when she reported the shooting incident to the police immediately after it occurred should form part of the res gestae. A contended that the omission, as part of the res gestae, should have been afforded evidentiary weight. Issue: Whether res gestae applies. Held: No. Since W herself testified, there is absolutely no room for the application of the rule on res gestae. Also, subject matters not mentioned or are outside the statements or explanations given by the declarant do not form part of the res gestae. PEOPLE V. PALMONES 336 SCRA 80 (July 2000) Facts: A was charged with the crime of murder. Before the victim died, he was able to talk with his nephew W. He told W the names of the assailants. A contended that the declaration was hearsay—it was not a dying declaration or a statement constituting part of the res gestae. Issue: Whether the declaration is issible. Held: No. A was correct. The following factors have generally been considered in determining whether statements offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have been made spontaneously: (1) the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the statement; (2) the place where the statement was made; (3) the condition of the declarant when he made the statement; (4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and (5) the nature and circumstances of the statement itself. In this case, the declaration did not meet the test of spontaneity because: (a) an appreciable amount of time had elapsed before the statement was made; (b) he made the statement at the hospital and not at the scene of the crime; and (c) there was an intervening event (trip to the hospital) that could have afforded the victim opportunity for deliberation. PEOPLE V. PRECIADOS 349 SCRA 1 (Jan. 2001) Facts: A poisoning incident occurred. X took Y’s ante-mortem statement 39 hours after the incident. Issue: Is Y’s statement issible as part of the res gestae? Held: No. The element of spontaneity is lacking in the alleged ante-mortem statement. 39 hours is too long a time to be considered “subsequent immediately to the startling occurrence.” TESTIMONY OR DEPOSITION AT A FORMER PROCEEDING CARIAGA V. CA et. al. 6 June 2001 Facts: Prosecution subpoenaed witness W but he failed to appear. Thus, the prosecution offered W’s testimony given out of court and this was itted. A argued that his right to meet the witness against him face to face was violated.

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Issue: Was A’s constitutional right violated when the court itted W’s out-of-court testimony? Held: Yes. The preconditions set forth in § 47 Rule 130 for the ission of testimony given by a witness out of court must be strictly complied with and there is more reason to adopt such a strict rule in the case of § 1(f) of Rule 115, for apart from being a rule of evidence with additional specific requisites to those prescribed by § 47, more importantly, said provision is an implementing translation of the constitutional right of an accused person “to meet the witnesses (against him) face to face” (Toledo, Jr. v. People) In Tan v. CA, it was ruled that ’unable to testify’ or for that matter ‘unavailability’, does not cover the case of witnesses who were subpoenaed but did not appear. This rule is strictly complied with in criminal cases, hence, “mere sending of subpoena and failure to appear is not sufficient to prove inability to testify. The Court must exercise its coercive power to arrest.” In this case, no efforts were exerted to have the witness arrested which is a remedy available to a party-litigant in instances where witnesses who are duly subpoenaed fail to appear. The sworn statement of W should not have been itted as evidence for the prosecution. PUBLIC DOCUMENTS LADIGNON V. CA 336 SCRA 42 (July 2000) Facts: P filed a complaint against D for recovery of possession of real property. P claimed that her signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged. D invoked the presumption of regularity of public documents. Issue: Whether P was able to present sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity of public documents. Held: No. As a public document, the Deed of Absolute Sale had in its favor the presumption of regularity, and to contradict the same, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant; otherwise the document should be upheld. P’s mere denial will not suffice to overcome the positive value of a notarized document. AUTHENTICATION PROPLE V. BANZALES 336 SCRA 64 (July 2000) Facts: A was charged with illegal recruitment. The POEA issued a certificate stating that A was an unlicensed illegal recruiter. A argued that the prosecution filed to establish 1 element of the offense considering that no representative of the POEA was presented in court to testify as to the authenticity of the certificate. Issue: Whether authenticity of the certificate needs to be proved. Held: No. A POEA certification is a public document issued by a public officer in the performance of an official duty; hence it is prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated (Rule 132 § 23). Public documents are entitled to a presumption of regularity; consequently, the burden of proof rests upon him who alleges the contrary. ESTRADA V. ANIANO DESIERTO 03 Apr. 2001 Facts: The Court, in a previous decision, relied not upon the original but only a copy of the Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer. Issue: Does the use of the AD violate the rule on authentication of private writings and best evidence?

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Held: No. 1. The Supreme Court, citing Wigmore, stated that: “ Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court’s discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring publication. 2. Estrada had an opportunity to object to the issibility of the AD when he filed his Memorandum, Supplemental Memorandum and Second Supplemental Memorandum, but he did not object to its issibility. He was not therefore denied due process. CROSS-EXAMINATION PEOPLE V. GIVERA 349 SCRA 573 (Jan. 2001) Facts: A was charged with murder. The prosecution formally offered the testimony of the medico-legal officer taken in the first case involving 3 other accused for the death of the same victim. Issue: Whether the said testimony is issible. Held: No. The defense did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the medico-legal officer so his testimony cannot be used in evidence against the accused. FORMAL OFFER PEOPLE V. ROBLES 349 SCRA 569 (Jan. 2001) Facts: A was charged with the murder of V. At the preliminary investigation stage, 1 eyewitness executed an affidavit corroborating the testimony of another witness. But this affidavit was not offered in evidence nor was the eyewitness presented during the trial. It was argued that the affidavit might be treated as evidence since it formed part of the records of the preliminary investigation. Issue: Whether the affidavit is issible. Held: No. It is merely hearsay. That the affidavit formed part of the record of the preliminary investigation does not justify its being treated as evidence because the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the records of the case in the RTC. To be considered part of the records of the case, the record of the preliminary investigation must be introduced as evidence during trial. EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION GUTANG V. PEOPLE 335 SCRA 479 (July 2000) Facts: A, B, C, and D were arrested in connection with the enforcement of a search warrant. The accused argued that the Receipts of Property Seized should not have been itted in evidence because these were obtained in violation of their constitutional rights. The accused were made to sign the receipts without the assistance of a lawyer. Issue: Whether the Receipts of Property Seized are issible. Held: No. The signature of the accused in the Receipts of Property Seized is inissible in evidence because it was obtained without the assistance of counsel. The signature of the accused on such a receipt is a declaration against his interest and a tacit ission of the crime charged for the reason that, in this case, mere unexplained possession of prohibited drugs is punishable by law. Therefore, the signatures of the

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accused on the receipts are not issible, being tantamount to an uncounselled extrajudicial confession. PEOPLE V. RAYOS 7 Feb. 2001 Facts: A was charged and convicted of the rape-slay of a 9-year old mental retardate. He executed an extrajudicial confession but claimed he was only forced to do so by the policemen. Issue: When is an extrajudicial confession issible? Held: a. b. c. d.

There are four fundamental conditions needed for issibility of a confession: must be voluntary must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel must be express must be in writing

PROVING MOTIVE PEOPLE V. GIGANTO 336 SCRA 294 (July 2000) Facts: A, B, C, and D were convicted of murder. The accused argued that the prosecution was not able to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The motive for killing the victim was also not adequately shown. Issue: Whether it was necessary to prove motive. Held: Yes. In this case, there was no evidence of the prosecution on which a judgment of conviction can be based. When the evidence of the prosecution is weak, it is necessary to prove motive; otherwise, the guilt of the accused becomes open to reasonable doubt, and the accused must be acquitted. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PEOPLE V. PEDIGERO 337 SCRA 274 (Aug. 2000) Facts: A was convicted of robbery with homicide. A claimed that the court erred in holding that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution sufficiently established his guilt. Issue: When is circumstantial evidence sufficient to convict? Held: Rule 133 § 4 enumerates the 3 elements that should be present in order for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for conviction. A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained only when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the culprit. The circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilt. PEOPLE V. RAYOS 7 Feb. 2001 Facts: A was charged and convicted of the rape-slay of a 9-year old mental retardate. He argued that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was not sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Issue: When is circumstantial evidence sufficient to convict?

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Held: When there are no eyewitnesses to a crime, resort to circumstantial evidence becomes almost certainly unavoidable. In rape with homicide, the evidence against the accused is basically circumstantial because of the nature of the crime. The circumstances must be consistent with each other from which the only rational hypothesis that can be drawn therefrom would be that the accused is guilty. The circumstances must create a solid chain of events, coherent and intrinsically believable, that pinpoints the accused, to the exclusion of others, as being the perpetrator of the crime and thereby sufficiently overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor. The circumstantial pieces of evidence in this case, taken in their entirety, unmistakably point to the guilt of A. PROVING AGE PEOPLE V. GERABAN 24 May 2001 Facts: In a qualified rape case, the prosecution relied on the testimony of the rape victim and her mother to prove the minority of the victim for the purpose of imposing the death penalty. Issue: May the corroborative testimony of the victim’s mother suffice to establish the minority of the victim in lieu of independent documentary evidence? Held: Yes. The same must, however, be received with caution. In this case, the mother is quite uncertain as to her daughter’s age. As a mother, she should have personal knowledge of the ages and birth of her children. She could have stated the exact age of her daughter or the date of her birth. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove with certainty the minority of the victim. RECANTATION PEOPLE V. NARDO 1 Mar. 2001 Facts: A was charged with rape by his 14-year old daughter. He was convicted by the TC and sentenced to death. A raised the defense that the victim desisted in pursuing the case against her father by showing two letters. However, these were not subscribed and sworn to by the victim. Issue: Should the letters be itted in order to acquit the accused? Held: No. A recantation of a testimony is exceedingly unreliable for there is always the probability that such recantation may later on be itself repudiated. Courts look with disfavor upon retractions because they can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary consideration. A retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration. Especially, recantations made after the conviction of the accused deserve only scant consideration. Even if sworn to, the victim’s recantation could hardly suffice to overturn the finding of guilt by the TC which was based on her own clear and convincing testimony given during a full-blown trial. An affidavit of recantation, being usually taken ex parte, would be considered inferior to the testimony given in open court. CREDIBILITY PEOPLE V. BUENAFLOR 27 June 2001 Facts: RTC found A guilty for raping 14-yr. old V who was asleep at the time of the commission of the crime. During the initial reception of evidence for the prosecution, V said she did not know A because it was her first time to see his face at the time the incident took place, but later on cross-examination, she itted that what she said was

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false because actually A is their neighbor. The TC thought that considering that the offended party is a very young girl of 15 years, it is not uncommon for the young girl to conceal the assaults because of the rapist's threats on her life. Issue: Whether V is a credible witness. Held: No. In a prosecution for rape, the complainant's credibility becomes the single most important issue. In this case, the testimony of the complainant is not credible because it is replete with inconsistencies, and narrations that are contrary to common experience, human nature and the natural course of things. ALIBI PEOPLE V. ABENDAN et. al. 28 June 2001 Facts: RTC found A et. al. guilty of murder. The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that there was treachery and conspiracy in the killing of the victim, who was asleep when he was fatally shot. A argued that the trial court erred in ignoring his alibi. Issue: Whether the trial court was correct in not giving weight to A’s alibi. Held: Yes. Positive identification, where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. Alibi becomes unworthy of credit when it is established mainly by the accused himself and his relative, and not by credible persons. MEDICAL/CHEMICAL EVIDENCE PEOPLE V. NUBLA 19 June 2001 Facts: A was convicted for the rape of V, committed by means of force and intimidation; in particular, by inducing V to drink iced tea laced with drugs causing the latter to lose consciousness. A denied that V was drugged and pointed to the absence of any medical or chemical evidence to her claim. Issue: Whether the fact that V was drugged was sufficiently proven. Held: Yes. While no chemical analysis was conducted on the blood of the complainant immediately after the incident, the physical manifestations (dizziness, bodily weakness, strong desire to sleep) were proved during the trial. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE MOLLANEDA V. UMACOB 6 June 2001 Facts: A, the Schools Division Superintendent, was criminally charged before the court. A was acquitted. Complainants filed an istrative case against A to dismiss him from the service. A argued that the dismissal of the criminal case against him meant that the istrative case cannot prosper. Issue: Whether A is correct. Held: No. The dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence against an accused who is a respondent in an istrative case does not foreclose the istrative proceeding against him or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. In

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dismissing the case, the court is simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of the respondent beyond reasonable doubt. In istrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence. A’s culpability has been proven by substantial evidence. The dismissal of the criminal case cannot bind this Court in the disposition of the instant istrative case. There was justifiable ground for A’s dismissal from the service.

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE VDA. DE MANALO V. CA 349 SCRA 135 (Jan. 2001) Facts: The surviving children of Manalo filed a petition for the judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father. The oppositors filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the case is actually an ordinary civil action involving of the same family. They argued that petitioners failed to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving the of the same family have been made prior to the filing of the petition but the same have failed (pursuant to Art. 222 of the Civil Code). Issue: Whether the petition should be treated as an ordinary civil action. Held: No. In the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in the complaint/petition shall be controlling. In this case, the petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for settlement of estate. Indeed, the petition contained certain averments that may be typical of an ordinary civil action and the oppositors took advantage of the said defect. But oppositors may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of an essentially valid petition by raising matters that are irrelevant and immaterial to said petition. The jurisdiction of a court as well as the concomitant nature of the action is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the answer. EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY V. FERNANDEZ et. al. 6 June 2001 Facts: P’s co-heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of estate without notifying P. The property was then expropriated by the government. Title to the property was issued to the government in 1982. In 1996, P filed an action for reconveyance of property alleging that he was unlawfully deprived by his co-heirs of his participation in the settlement of the estate. Issue: Whether P’s action should be allowed to prosper. Held: No. Persons unduly deprived of their lawful participation in a settlement may assert their claim only within the 2-year period after the settlement and distribution of the estate. This prescription period does not apply, however, to those who had no part in or had no notice of the settlement. § 4, Rule 74, is not meant to be a statute of limitations. An extrajudicial partition, being merely an ex parte proceeding, would not affect third persons who had no knowledge thereof. By its registration in the manner provided by law, a transaction may be known actually or constructively. P is deemed to have been constructively notified of the extrajudicial settlement by reason of its registration and annotation in the certificate of title over the subject lot. From the time of registration, P had 2 years, within which to file their objections or to demand the appropriate settlement of the estate. The only exception is when the title remains in the hands of the heirs who have fraudulently caused the partition of the subject property or in those of their transferees who cannot be considered innocent purchasers for value. The title to the property in the present case was no longer in the 40

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name of the allegedly fraudulent heirs, but already in that of an innocent purchaser for value – the government. The government is presumed to have acted in good faith in the acquisition of the lot, considering that title thereto was obtained through a Compromise Agreement judicially approved in proper expropriation proceedings. JURISDICTION OF THE PROBATE COURT HEIRS OF SANDEJAS V. LINA 05 Feb. 2001 Facts: During his lifetime, D, the decedent conveyed real property to X. In the proceeding for the settlement of D’s estate, X filed a motion to approve the deed of sale. The filed an opposition to the said motion. Issue: Does the probate court have jurisdiction to approve the deed of conditional sale? Held: Yes. Probate jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of a probate court’s recognized powers such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate. In this case, the Motion for Approval was meant to settle the decedent’s obligation to X; hence, that obligation clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the settlement court. To require X to file a separate action will unnecessarily prolong the settlement of the intestate estate of D. RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN SETTLEMENT PROCEEDINGS HEIRS OF SANDEJAS V. LINA 05 Feb. 2001 Facts: During his lifetime, D, the decedent conveyed real property to X. In the proceeding for the settlement of D’s estate, X filed a motion to approve the deed of sale. The filed an opposition to the said motion. Issue: Does X have the right to intervene? Held: Yes. Rule 89, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, deals with the conveyance of real property contracted by the decedent while still alive. In contrast with Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule, the said provision does not limit to the executor or the right to file the application for authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber realty under istration. The standing to pursue such course of action before the probate court inures to any person who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or to be entitled to the avails of the suit. CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE PNB V. CA, et. al. 29 June 2001 Facts: S was the special of the intestate estate of X. The court authorized S to obtain a loan from PNB to be secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land. For failure to pay the loan in full, PNB extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage. During the auction, PNB was the highest bidder but since there was still a deficiency, PNB filed an action with the RTC against S. RTC dismissed PNB’s complaint. CA affirmed. Issue: Whether the mortgagee can still recover the deficiency. Held: No. Rule 89 § 7 (f) provides that if the court grants authority to mortgage property of the estate, it shall be valid as if the deed had been executed by the deceased in his lifetime. Thus, Rule 86 § 7 also applies as to the remedies of the mortgagee. Case law now holds that this rule grants to the mortgagee 3 distinct, independent and mutually exclusive remedies that can be alternatively pursued by the mortgage creditor for the 41

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satisfaction of his credit in case the mortgagor dies, among them: (1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before it is barred by prescription without right to file a claim for any deficiency. The plain result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that the creditor waives his right to recover any deficiency from the estate. The 3rd mode includes extrajudicial foreclosure sales; the result of extrajudicial foreclosure is that the creditor waives any further deficiency claim. HABEAS CORPUS TUNG CHIN HUI V. RODRIGUEZ 02 Apr. 2001 Facts: P, a Taiwanese national, was charged and, in due course, found guilty by the BID Board of Commissioners of possessing a tampered port earlier cancelled by Taiwanese authorities. The BID Board of Commissioners issued a Summary Deportation Order. P filed before the RTC a Petition for Habeas Corpus. Issue: Should the Writ for Habeas Corpus be issued? Held: No. P’s confinement is in accord with § 37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, which reads as follows: “§ 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of another officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien: XXX (7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition under which he was itted as a non-immigrant.”

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