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TORTS AND DAMAGES – CASE DOCTRINES II. COVERAGE AND CLASSIFICATION 1. INTENTIONAL TORTS Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Article 1822. Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of the partnership or with the authority of his co-partners, loss or injury is caused to any person, not being a partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred, the partnership is liable therefor to the same extent as the partner so acting or omitting to act. (n) Article 1823. The partnership is bound to make good the loss: (1) Where one partner acting within the scope of his apparent authority receives money or property of a third person and misapplies it; and (2) Where the partnership in the course of its business receives money or property of a third person and the money or property so received is misapplied by any partner while it is in the custody of the partnership. (n) Article 1824. All partners are liable solidarily with the partnership for everything chargeable to the partnership under articles 1822 and 1823. (n) Article 1911. Even when the agent has exceeded his authority, the principal is solidarily liable with the agent if the former allowed the latter to act as though he had full powers. (n) Article 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. (n) #01 PATROCINIA RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA, Petitioners, vs. MARY ANN P. VILLA ABRILLE, for herself and in behalf of INGRID D'LYN P. VILLA ABRILLE, INGREMARK D'WIGHT VILLA ABRILLE, INGRESOLL DIELS VILLA ABRILLE AND INGRELYN DYAN VILLA ABRILLE, Respondents. G.R. No. 160708, October 16, 2009 Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine that: "Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." When a right is exercised in a manner that does not conform with such norms and results in damages to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrong Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines Page 1 of 16
doer must be held responsible. Similarly, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages caused. It is patent in this case that petitioners’ alleged acts fall short of these established civil law standards. #02 CONRADO BUNAG, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and ZENAIDA B. CIRILO, respondents. G.R. No. 101749, July 10, 1992 It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-‐honored rule that an action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof. However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages. Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes. Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-‐one days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code. #03 ALFREDO M. VELAYO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ASSIGNEE OF THE INSOLVENT COMMERCIAL AM LINES, INC. (CALI), PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, vs. SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, LTD., DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE, ALFONSO SYCIP, YEK HUA TRADING CORPORATION, PAUL SYCIP AND MABASA & CO., INTERVENORS. G.R. No. L-‐7817, October 31, 1956 The Code Commission commenting on this article (19 vis-‐à-‐vis 21), says the following:
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Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved (as it was approved), would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. But, it may be asked would this proposed article obliterate the boundary line between morality and law? The answer is that, in the last analysis, every good law draws its breath of life from morals, from those principles which are written with words of fire in the conscience of man. If this premises is itted, then the proposed rule is a prudent earnest of justice in the face of the impossibility of enumerating, one by one, all wrongs which cause damages. When it is reflected that while codes of law and statutes have changed from age to age, the conscience of man has remained fixed to its ancient moorings, one can not but feel that it is safe and salutary to transmute, as far as may be, moral norms into legal rules, thus imparting to every legal system that enduring quality which ought to be one of its superlative attributes. Furthermore, there is no belief of more baneful consequence upon the social order than that a person may with impunity cause damage to his fellow-‐men so long as he does not break any law of the State, though he may be defying the most sacred postulates of morality. What is more, the victim loses faith in the ability of the government to afford him protection or relief. #04 ERNESTO RAMAS UYPITCHING and RAMAS UYPITCHING SONS, INC., petitioners, vs. ERNESTO QUIAMCO, respondent. G.R. No. 146322, December 6, 2006 Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right," prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability. It seeks to preclude the use of, or the tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach. 2. NEGLIGENCE Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply. If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. (1104a)
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Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a) Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a) Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. (1905) Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable. (n) Article 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines Page 4 of 16
firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business. (n) Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. (n) Family Code Art. 218. The school, its s and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody. Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a) Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable. The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances. All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n) Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. (2180(2)a and (4)a ) #01 PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL, petitioners, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO, respondents. G.R. No. L-‐65295, March 10, 1987 We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code of the Philippines). Petitioner Carbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part of his employer Phoenix in supervising its employees properly and adequately. The respondent appellate court in effect found, correctly in our opinion, that Phoenix was not able to overcome this presumption of negligence. The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its truck driver to bring the Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines Page 5 of 16
dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be done early the following morning, when coupled with the failure to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked when away from company premises, is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix. #02 AIR , petitioner, vs. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. G.R. No. L-‐21438, September 28, 1966 The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. The contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier’s employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages. engers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a enger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-‐delict. Damages are proper. #03.1 PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC., Petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA, Respondents. G.R. No. 126297, February 2, 2010 In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent physicians-‐consultants allowed to practice in its premises. There is, however, an exception to this principle. The hospital may be liable if the physician is the "ostensible" agent of the hospital. Where an employment relationship exists, the hospital may be held vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code or the principle of respondeat superior. Even when no employment relationship exists but it is shown that the hospital holds out to the patient that the doctor is its agent, the hospital may still be vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation to Article 1431 and Article 1869 of the Civil Code or the principle of apparent authority. Moreover, regardless of its relationship with the doctor, the hospital may be held directly liable to the patient for its own negligence or failure to follow established standard of conduct to which it should conform as a corporation. Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines Page 6 of 16
#03.2 MARITER MENDOZA, Petitioner, vs. ADRIANO CASUMPANG, JENNIFER ADRIANE and JOHN ANDRE, all surnamed CASUMPANG, Respondents. G.R. No. 197987, March 19, 2012 A surgical operation is the responsibility of the surgeon performing it. He must personally ascertain that the counts of instruments and materials used before the surgery and prior to sewing the patient up have been correctly done. To provide an example to the medical profession and to stress the need for constant vigilance in attending to a patient’s health, the award of exemplary damages in this case is in order. #04 LOASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES, INC., Petitioner, vs. GLODEL BROKERAGE CORPORATION and R&B INSURANCE CORPORATION, Respondents. G.R. No. 179446, January 10, 2011 Loasters and Glodel, being both common carriers, are mandated from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, to observe the extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them according to all the circumstances of such case, as required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code. In case of loss of the goods, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. This presumption of fault or negligence, however, may be rebutted by proof that the common carrier has observed extraordinary diligence over the goods. Premises considered, the Court is of the view that both Loasters and Glodel are tly and severally liable to R & B Insurance for the loss of the subject cargo. Under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code, "the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-‐delict is solidary." A liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. In the present case, Phoenix and McGee are not suing for damages for injuries arising from the breach of the contract of service but from the alleged negligent manner by which Mindanao Terminal handled the cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce. Despite the absence of contractual relationship between Del Monte Produce and Mindanao Terminal, the allegation of negligence on the part of the defendant should be sufficient to establish a cause of action arising from quasi-‐delict. Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-‐delict committed by its employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. In this regard, Loasters failed. Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines Page 7 of 16
#05 ALFREDO P. PACIS and CLEOPATRA D. PACIS, Petitioners, vs. JEROME JOVANNE MORALES, Respondent. G.R. No. 169467, February 25, 2010 Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, the liability of the employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a person’s own negligence. Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of a family, much less the degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would exempt him from liability in this case. #06 FILIPINAS SYNTHETIC FIBER CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. WILFREDO DE LOS SANTOS, BENITO JOSE DE LOS SANTOS, MARIA ELENA DE LOS SANTOS and CARMINA VDA. DE LOS SANTOS, Respondents. G.R. No. 152033, March 16, 2011 In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of employees, the employer must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that was incumbent on them. In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption. #07 DR. RUBI LI, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES REYNALDO and LINA SOLIMAN, as parents/heirs of deceased Angelica Soliman, Respondents. G.R. No. 165279, June 7, 2011 The type of lawsuit which has been called medical malpractice or, more appropriately, medical negligence, is that type of claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional which has caused bodily harm. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that a health care provider, in most cases a physician, either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that that failure or action caused injury to the patient. Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines Page 8 of 16
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages. There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based upon the doctrine of informed consent: "(1) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to treatment she otherwise would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment." The gravamen in an informed consent case requires the plaintiff to "point to significant undisclosed information relating to the treatment which would have altered her decision to undergo it. #08 EQUITABLE PCI BANK, Petitioner, vs. ARCELITO B. TAN, Respondent. G.R. No. 165339, August 23, 2010 Evidently, the bank's negligence was the result of lack of due care required of its managers and employees in handling the s of its clients. Petitioner was negligent in the selection and supervision of its employees. In Citibank, N.A. v. Cabamongan, the Court ruled: Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of pesos. By the very nature of their works the degree of responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of their employees and officials is far greater than those of ordinary clerks and employees. Banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. #09 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES CHEAH CHEE CHONG and OFELIA CAMACHO CHEAH, Respondents. G.R. No. 170865, April 25, 2012 It bears stressing that "the diligence required of banks is more than that of a Roman pater familias or a good father of a family. The highest degree of diligence is expected." PNB miserably failed to do its duty of exercising extraordinary diligence and reasonable business prudence. The disregard of its own banking policy amounts to gross negligence, which the law defines as "negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected." In any case, the complaint against the spouses Cheah could not be dismissed. As PNB’s client, Ofelia was the one who dealt with PNB and negotiated the check such that its value was credited in her and her husband’s . Being the ones in privity with PNB, the spouses Cheah are therefore the persons who should return to PNB the money released to them. All told, the Court concurs with the findings of the CA that PNB and the spouses Cheah are equally Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines Page 9 of 16
negligent and should therefore equally suffer the loss. The two must both bear the consequences of their mistakes. #10 MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION and ROLANDO J. DEL ROSARIO, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES RICHARD HUANG and CARMEN HUANG, and STEPHEN HUANG, respondents. G.R. No. 172122, June 22, 2007 Employer’s liability under Art. 2180 is direct or immediate and also t and solidary with the employee. It is not conditioned on a prior recourse against the negligent employee, or a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. To be relieved, petitioner should show that it exercised diligence of a good father of a family both in the selection of the employee and supervision of the performance of the latter’s duties. Mercury Drug failed to exercised due diligence on the supervision and discipline over its employees. In fact, on the day of the accident, Del Rosario was driving without a license. He testified that he reported the incident on his prior apprehension to his superior, but nothing was done about it. He was not suspended or reprimanded and no disciplinary action was taken against him. #11 PAULITA "EDITH" SERRA, Petitioner, vs. NELFA T. MUMAR, Respondent. G.R. No. 193861, March 14, 2012 Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are liable for the damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption that the employer failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of the family in the selection or supervision of its employees. The liability of the employer is direct or immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. Moreover, under Article 2184 of the Civil Code, if the causative factor was the driver’s negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. #12 FILCAR TRANSPORT SERVICES, Petitioner, vs. JOSE A. ESPINAS, Respondent. G.R. No. 174156, June 20, 2012 Under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code, an action predicated on an employee’s act or omission may be instituted against the employer who is held liable for the negligent act or omission committed by his employee. Whether the driver of the motor vehicle, Floresca, is an employee of Filcar is irrelevant in arriving at Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines Page 10 of 16
the conclusion that Filcar is primarily and directly liable for the damages sustained by Espinas. While Republic Act No. 4136 or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code does not contain any provision on the liability of ed owners in case of motor vehicle mishaps, Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code imposes an obligation upon Filcar, as ed owner, to answer for the damages caused to Espinas’ car. This interpretation is consistent with the strong public policy of maintaining road safety, thereby reinforcing the aim of the State to promote the responsible operation of motor vehicles by its citizens. This does not mean, however, that Filcar is left without any recourse against the actual employer of the driver and the driver himself. Under the civil law principle of unjust enrichment, the ed owner of the motor vehicle has a right to be indemnified by the actual employer of the driver of the amount that he may be required to pay as damages for the injury caused to another. 3. STRICT LIABILITY TORT Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. (1905) Article 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same. (1910) #01 PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and AGUSTIN VESTIL, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DAVID UY and TERESITA UY, respondents. G.R. No. 74431 November 6, 1989 Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damages should come from force majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that, as the petitioners also contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal. According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines Page 11 of 16
animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause. #02 JOSE DINGCONG, recurrente-‐apelante, vs. HALIM KANAAN, NASRI KANAAN, y MICHAEL KANAAN, dedicados al comercio bajo la razon social de "American Bazar," recurridos-‐apelados. G.R. No. L-‐47033, April 25, 1941 As Jose Dingcong is a t tenant and manager of the hotel, with full possession of the top floor, he must then answer for damages caused by things that were thrown or fell from it (Article 1910 Civil Code). Francisco Echevarria, a guest of the hotel, was the one who directly by his neglect, left open the tap, let the water pipe pull back on the ground and seep into the lower floors, dripping onto the articles and goods of the plaintiffs and is thus liable. Dingcong Jose, on the other hand, did not practice the diligence of a good father to prevent this damage, because he knew the pipes were broken and did not repair the pipes, Echavarria could use the tap if he was provided some container to catch the drip by Jose. #03 MARGARITA AFIALDA, plaintiff-‐appellant, vs. BASILIO HISOLE and FRANCISCO HISOLE, defendants-‐appellees. G.R. No. L-‐2075, November 29, 1949 The owner of an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable only if he had been negligent or at fault under article 1902 of the same code. In the present case, the animal was in custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences. 4. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS Article 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compensation for the death of or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other employees, even though the event may have been purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if the death or personal injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. The employer is also liable for compensation if the employee contracts any illness or disease caused by such employment or as the result of the nature of the employment. If the mishap was due to the employee's own notorious negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not be liable for compensation. When the employee's lack of due care contributed to his death or injury, the compensation shall be equitably reduced. Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines Page 12 of 16
Article 1712. If the death or injury is due to the negligence of a fellow worker, the latter and the employer shall be solidarily liable for compensation. If a fellow worker's intentional or malicious act is the only cause of the death or injury, the employer shall not be answerable, unless it should be shown that the latter did not exercise due diligence in the selection or supervision of the plaintiff's fellow worker. 5. NUISANCE Article 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which: (1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or (2) Annoys or offends the senses; or (3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or (4) Obstructs or interferes with the free age of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) Hinders or impairs the use of property. Article 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal. A private nuisance is one that is not included in the foregoing definition. Article 696. Every successive owner or possessor of property who fails or refuses to abate a nuisance in that property started by a former owner or possessor is liable therefor in the same manner as the one who created it. Article 697. The abatement of a nuisance does not preclude the right of any person injured to recover damages for its past existence. Article 698. Lapse of time cannot legalize any nuisance, whether public or private. Article 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are: (1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance: or (2) A civil action; or (3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings. Article 700. The district health officer shall take care that one or all of the remedies against a public nuisance are availed of. Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines Page 13 of 16
Article 701. If a civil action is brought by reason of the maintenance of a public nuisance, such action shall be commenced by the city or municipal mayor. Article 702. The district health officer shall determine whether or not abatement, without judicial proceedings, is the best remedy against a public nuisance. Article 703. A private person may file an action on of a public nuisance, if it is specially injurious to himself. Article 704. Any private person may abate a public nuisance which is specially injurious to him by removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the same, without committing a breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary injury. But it is necessary: (1) That demand be first made upon the owner or possessor of the property to abate the nuisance; (2) That such demand has been rejected; (3) That the abatement be approved by the district health officer and executed with the assistance of the local police; and (4) That the value of the destruction does not exceed three thousand pesos. Article 705. The remedies against a private nuisance are: (1) A civil action; or (2) Abatement, without judicial proceedings. Article 706. Any person injured by a private nuisance may abate it by removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the nuisance, without committing a breach of the peace or doing unnecessary injury. However, it is indispensable that the procedure for extrajudicial abatement of a public nuisance by a private person be followed. Article 707. A private person or a public official extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be liable for damages: (1) If he causes unnecessary injury; or (2) If an alleged nuisance is later declared by the courts to be not a real nuisance. IV. PARTIES IN TORTS CASES Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article. (29a) Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines Page 14 of 16
Article 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb. (30a) Article 1822. Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of the partnership or with the authority of his co-partners, loss or injury is caused to any person, not being a partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred, the partnership is liable therefor to the same extent as the partner so acting or omitting to act. (n) Article 1823. The partnership is bound to make good the loss: (1) Where one partner acting within the scope of his apparent authority receives money or property of a third person and misapplies it; and (2) Where the partnership in the course of its business receives money or property of a third person and the money or property so received is misapplied by any partner while it is in the custody of the partnership. (n) Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. (n) Article 1911. Even when the agent has exceeded his authority, the principal is solidarily liable with the agent if the former allowed the latter to act as though he had full powers. (n) #01 ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents. G.R. No. L-‐16439, July 20, 1961 Since an action for pecuniary damages on of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-‐natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb. This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis. Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines Page 15 of 16
“That in all things, God may be glorified!”
Prepared By: Paul Vincent T. Cunanan Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines Page 16 of 16
doer must be held responsible. Similarly, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages caused. It is patent in this case that petitioners’ alleged acts fall short of these established civil law standards. #02 CONRADO BUNAG, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and ZENAIDA B. CIRILO, respondents. G.R. No. 101749, July 10, 1992 It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-‐honored rule that an action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof. However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages. Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes. Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-‐one days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code. #03 ALFREDO M. VELAYO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ASSIGNEE OF THE INSOLVENT COMMERCIAL AM LINES, INC. (CALI), PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, vs. SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, LTD., DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE, ALFONSO SYCIP, YEK HUA TRADING CORPORATION, PAUL SYCIP AND MABASA & CO., INTERVENORS. G.R. No. L-‐7817, October 31, 1956 The Code Commission commenting on this article (19 vis-‐à-‐vis 21), says the following:
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Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved (as it was approved), would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. But, it may be asked would this proposed article obliterate the boundary line between morality and law? The answer is that, in the last analysis, every good law draws its breath of life from morals, from those principles which are written with words of fire in the conscience of man. If this premises is itted, then the proposed rule is a prudent earnest of justice in the face of the impossibility of enumerating, one by one, all wrongs which cause damages. When it is reflected that while codes of law and statutes have changed from age to age, the conscience of man has remained fixed to its ancient moorings, one can not but feel that it is safe and salutary to transmute, as far as may be, moral norms into legal rules, thus imparting to every legal system that enduring quality which ought to be one of its superlative attributes. Furthermore, there is no belief of more baneful consequence upon the social order than that a person may with impunity cause damage to his fellow-‐men so long as he does not break any law of the State, though he may be defying the most sacred postulates of morality. What is more, the victim loses faith in the ability of the government to afford him protection or relief. #04 ERNESTO RAMAS UYPITCHING and RAMAS UYPITCHING SONS, INC., petitioners, vs. ERNESTO QUIAMCO, respondent. G.R. No. 146322, December 6, 2006 Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right," prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability. It seeks to preclude the use of, or the tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach. 2. NEGLIGENCE Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply. If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. (1104a)
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Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a) Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a) Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. (1905) Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable. (n) Article 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines Page 4 of 16
firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business. (n) Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. (n) Family Code Art. 218. The school, its s and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody. Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a) Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable. The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances. All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n) Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. (2180(2)a and (4)a ) #01 PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL, petitioners, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO, respondents. G.R. No. L-‐65295, March 10, 1987 We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code of the Philippines). Petitioner Carbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part of his employer Phoenix in supervising its employees properly and adequately. The respondent appellate court in effect found, correctly in our opinion, that Phoenix was not able to overcome this presumption of negligence. The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its truck driver to bring the Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines Page 5 of 16
dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be done early the following morning, when coupled with the failure to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked when away from company premises, is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix. #02 AIR , petitioner, vs. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. G.R. No. L-‐21438, September 28, 1966 The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. The contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier’s employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages. engers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a enger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-‐delict. Damages are proper. #03.1 PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC., Petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA, Respondents. G.R. No. 126297, February 2, 2010 In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent physicians-‐consultants allowed to practice in its premises. There is, however, an exception to this principle. The hospital may be liable if the physician is the "ostensible" agent of the hospital. Where an employment relationship exists, the hospital may be held vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code or the principle of respondeat superior. Even when no employment relationship exists but it is shown that the hospital holds out to the patient that the doctor is its agent, the hospital may still be vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation to Article 1431 and Article 1869 of the Civil Code or the principle of apparent authority. Moreover, regardless of its relationship with the doctor, the hospital may be held directly liable to the patient for its own negligence or failure to follow established standard of conduct to which it should conform as a corporation. Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines Page 6 of 16
#03.2 MARITER MENDOZA, Petitioner, vs. ADRIANO CASUMPANG, JENNIFER ADRIANE and JOHN ANDRE, all surnamed CASUMPANG, Respondents. G.R. No. 197987, March 19, 2012 A surgical operation is the responsibility of the surgeon performing it. He must personally ascertain that the counts of instruments and materials used before the surgery and prior to sewing the patient up have been correctly done. To provide an example to the medical profession and to stress the need for constant vigilance in attending to a patient’s health, the award of exemplary damages in this case is in order. #04 LOASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES, INC., Petitioner, vs. GLODEL BROKERAGE CORPORATION and R&B INSURANCE CORPORATION, Respondents. G.R. No. 179446, January 10, 2011 Loasters and Glodel, being both common carriers, are mandated from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, to observe the extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them according to all the circumstances of such case, as required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code. In case of loss of the goods, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. This presumption of fault or negligence, however, may be rebutted by proof that the common carrier has observed extraordinary diligence over the goods. Premises considered, the Court is of the view that both Loasters and Glodel are tly and severally liable to R & B Insurance for the loss of the subject cargo. Under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code, "the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-‐delict is solidary." A liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. In the present case, Phoenix and McGee are not suing for damages for injuries arising from the breach of the contract of service but from the alleged negligent manner by which Mindanao Terminal handled the cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce. Despite the absence of contractual relationship between Del Monte Produce and Mindanao Terminal, the allegation of negligence on the part of the defendant should be sufficient to establish a cause of action arising from quasi-‐delict. Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-‐delict committed by its employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. In this regard, Loasters failed. Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines Page 7 of 16
#05 ALFREDO P. PACIS and CLEOPATRA D. PACIS, Petitioners, vs. JEROME JOVANNE MORALES, Respondent. G.R. No. 169467, February 25, 2010 Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, the liability of the employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a person’s own negligence. Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of a family, much less the degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would exempt him from liability in this case. #06 FILIPINAS SYNTHETIC FIBER CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. WILFREDO DE LOS SANTOS, BENITO JOSE DE LOS SANTOS, MARIA ELENA DE LOS SANTOS and CARMINA VDA. DE LOS SANTOS, Respondents. G.R. No. 152033, March 16, 2011 In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of employees, the employer must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that was incumbent on them. In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption. #07 DR. RUBI LI, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES REYNALDO and LINA SOLIMAN, as parents/heirs of deceased Angelica Soliman, Respondents. G.R. No. 165279, June 7, 2011 The type of lawsuit which has been called medical malpractice or, more appropriately, medical negligence, is that type of claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional which has caused bodily harm. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that a health care provider, in most cases a physician, either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that that failure or action caused injury to the patient. Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines Page 8 of 16
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages. There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based upon the doctrine of informed consent: "(1) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to treatment she otherwise would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment." The gravamen in an informed consent case requires the plaintiff to "point to significant undisclosed information relating to the treatment which would have altered her decision to undergo it. #08 EQUITABLE PCI BANK, Petitioner, vs. ARCELITO B. TAN, Respondent. G.R. No. 165339, August 23, 2010 Evidently, the bank's negligence was the result of lack of due care required of its managers and employees in handling the s of its clients. Petitioner was negligent in the selection and supervision of its employees. In Citibank, N.A. v. Cabamongan, the Court ruled: Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of pesos. By the very nature of their works the degree of responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of their employees and officials is far greater than those of ordinary clerks and employees. Banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. #09 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES CHEAH CHEE CHONG and OFELIA CAMACHO CHEAH, Respondents. G.R. No. 170865, April 25, 2012 It bears stressing that "the diligence required of banks is more than that of a Roman pater familias or a good father of a family. The highest degree of diligence is expected." PNB miserably failed to do its duty of exercising extraordinary diligence and reasonable business prudence. The disregard of its own banking policy amounts to gross negligence, which the law defines as "negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected." In any case, the complaint against the spouses Cheah could not be dismissed. As PNB’s client, Ofelia was the one who dealt with PNB and negotiated the check such that its value was credited in her and her husband’s . Being the ones in privity with PNB, the spouses Cheah are therefore the persons who should return to PNB the money released to them. All told, the Court concurs with the findings of the CA that PNB and the spouses Cheah are equally Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines Page 9 of 16
negligent and should therefore equally suffer the loss. The two must both bear the consequences of their mistakes. #10 MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION and ROLANDO J. DEL ROSARIO, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES RICHARD HUANG and CARMEN HUANG, and STEPHEN HUANG, respondents. G.R. No. 172122, June 22, 2007 Employer’s liability under Art. 2180 is direct or immediate and also t and solidary with the employee. It is not conditioned on a prior recourse against the negligent employee, or a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. To be relieved, petitioner should show that it exercised diligence of a good father of a family both in the selection of the employee and supervision of the performance of the latter’s duties. Mercury Drug failed to exercised due diligence on the supervision and discipline over its employees. In fact, on the day of the accident, Del Rosario was driving without a license. He testified that he reported the incident on his prior apprehension to his superior, but nothing was done about it. He was not suspended or reprimanded and no disciplinary action was taken against him. #11 PAULITA "EDITH" SERRA, Petitioner, vs. NELFA T. MUMAR, Respondent. G.R. No. 193861, March 14, 2012 Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are liable for the damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption that the employer failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of the family in the selection or supervision of its employees. The liability of the employer is direct or immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. Moreover, under Article 2184 of the Civil Code, if the causative factor was the driver’s negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. #12 FILCAR TRANSPORT SERVICES, Petitioner, vs. JOSE A. ESPINAS, Respondent. G.R. No. 174156, June 20, 2012 Under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code, an action predicated on an employee’s act or omission may be instituted against the employer who is held liable for the negligent act or omission committed by his employee. Whether the driver of the motor vehicle, Floresca, is an employee of Filcar is irrelevant in arriving at Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines Page 10 of 16
the conclusion that Filcar is primarily and directly liable for the damages sustained by Espinas. While Republic Act No. 4136 or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code does not contain any provision on the liability of ed owners in case of motor vehicle mishaps, Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code imposes an obligation upon Filcar, as ed owner, to answer for the damages caused to Espinas’ car. This interpretation is consistent with the strong public policy of maintaining road safety, thereby reinforcing the aim of the State to promote the responsible operation of motor vehicles by its citizens. This does not mean, however, that Filcar is left without any recourse against the actual employer of the driver and the driver himself. Under the civil law principle of unjust enrichment, the ed owner of the motor vehicle has a right to be indemnified by the actual employer of the driver of the amount that he may be required to pay as damages for the injury caused to another. 3. STRICT LIABILITY TORT Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. (1905) Article 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same. (1910) #01 PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and AGUSTIN VESTIL, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DAVID UY and TERESITA UY, respondents. G.R. No. 74431 November 6, 1989 Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damages should come from force majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that, as the petitioners also contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal. According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines Page 11 of 16
animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause. #02 JOSE DINGCONG, recurrente-‐apelante, vs. HALIM KANAAN, NASRI KANAAN, y MICHAEL KANAAN, dedicados al comercio bajo la razon social de "American Bazar," recurridos-‐apelados. G.R. No. L-‐47033, April 25, 1941 As Jose Dingcong is a t tenant and manager of the hotel, with full possession of the top floor, he must then answer for damages caused by things that were thrown or fell from it (Article 1910 Civil Code). Francisco Echevarria, a guest of the hotel, was the one who directly by his neglect, left open the tap, let the water pipe pull back on the ground and seep into the lower floors, dripping onto the articles and goods of the plaintiffs and is thus liable. Dingcong Jose, on the other hand, did not practice the diligence of a good father to prevent this damage, because he knew the pipes were broken and did not repair the pipes, Echavarria could use the tap if he was provided some container to catch the drip by Jose. #03 MARGARITA AFIALDA, plaintiff-‐appellant, vs. BASILIO HISOLE and FRANCISCO HISOLE, defendants-‐appellees. G.R. No. L-‐2075, November 29, 1949 The owner of an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable only if he had been negligent or at fault under article 1902 of the same code. In the present case, the animal was in custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences. 4. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS Article 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compensation for the death of or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other employees, even though the event may have been purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if the death or personal injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. The employer is also liable for compensation if the employee contracts any illness or disease caused by such employment or as the result of the nature of the employment. If the mishap was due to the employee's own notorious negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not be liable for compensation. When the employee's lack of due care contributed to his death or injury, the compensation shall be equitably reduced. Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines Page 12 of 16
Article 1712. If the death or injury is due to the negligence of a fellow worker, the latter and the employer shall be solidarily liable for compensation. If a fellow worker's intentional or malicious act is the only cause of the death or injury, the employer shall not be answerable, unless it should be shown that the latter did not exercise due diligence in the selection or supervision of the plaintiff's fellow worker. 5. NUISANCE Article 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which: (1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or (2) Annoys or offends the senses; or (3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or (4) Obstructs or interferes with the free age of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) Hinders or impairs the use of property. Article 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal. A private nuisance is one that is not included in the foregoing definition. Article 696. Every successive owner or possessor of property who fails or refuses to abate a nuisance in that property started by a former owner or possessor is liable therefor in the same manner as the one who created it. Article 697. The abatement of a nuisance does not preclude the right of any person injured to recover damages for its past existence. Article 698. Lapse of time cannot legalize any nuisance, whether public or private. Article 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are: (1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance: or (2) A civil action; or (3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings. Article 700. The district health officer shall take care that one or all of the remedies against a public nuisance are availed of. Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines Page 13 of 16
Article 701. If a civil action is brought by reason of the maintenance of a public nuisance, such action shall be commenced by the city or municipal mayor. Article 702. The district health officer shall determine whether or not abatement, without judicial proceedings, is the best remedy against a public nuisance. Article 703. A private person may file an action on of a public nuisance, if it is specially injurious to himself. Article 704. Any private person may abate a public nuisance which is specially injurious to him by removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the same, without committing a breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary injury. But it is necessary: (1) That demand be first made upon the owner or possessor of the property to abate the nuisance; (2) That such demand has been rejected; (3) That the abatement be approved by the district health officer and executed with the assistance of the local police; and (4) That the value of the destruction does not exceed three thousand pesos. Article 705. The remedies against a private nuisance are: (1) A civil action; or (2) Abatement, without judicial proceedings. Article 706. Any person injured by a private nuisance may abate it by removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the nuisance, without committing a breach of the peace or doing unnecessary injury. However, it is indispensable that the procedure for extrajudicial abatement of a public nuisance by a private person be followed. Article 707. A private person or a public official extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be liable for damages: (1) If he causes unnecessary injury; or (2) If an alleged nuisance is later declared by the courts to be not a real nuisance. IV. PARTIES IN TORTS CASES Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article. (29a) Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines Page 14 of 16
Article 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb. (30a) Article 1822. Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of the partnership or with the authority of his co-partners, loss or injury is caused to any person, not being a partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred, the partnership is liable therefor to the same extent as the partner so acting or omitting to act. (n) Article 1823. The partnership is bound to make good the loss: (1) Where one partner acting within the scope of his apparent authority receives money or property of a third person and misapplies it; and (2) Where the partnership in the course of its business receives money or property of a third person and the money or property so received is misapplied by any partner while it is in the custody of the partnership. (n) Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. (n) Article 1911. Even when the agent has exceeded his authority, the principal is solidarily liable with the agent if the former allowed the latter to act as though he had full powers. (n) #01 ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents. G.R. No. L-‐16439, July 20, 1961 Since an action for pecuniary damages on of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-‐natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb. This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis. Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines Page 15 of 16
“That in all things, God may be glorified!”
Prepared By: Paul Vincent T. Cunanan Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines Page 16 of 16
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