Constitutional Law 1 Digests Part 2 3j1o3r

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019

VII. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 1. APPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS a. Aldaba vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010) CARPIO J.: FACTS: This case is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which creates a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A. violates the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before the age of the Act through House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986, Malolos City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007. House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the population of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010. Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representative in Congress. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 9591, “An act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan” is unconstitutional as petitioned. RULING: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000 population. In relation with this, Regional Director Miranda issued a Certification which is based on the demographic projections, was declared without legal effect because the Regional Director has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification based on the following statements ed by Section 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos, which provides: The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared official by the Nat’l Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated whether the document have been declared official by the NSCB. The certification can be issued only by the NSO or his designated certifying officer, in which case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is unauthorized. The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case, the Certification issued by Director Miranda was undated. It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if compounded, the Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010. It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of legislative reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power among districts.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 b. Aquino III v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 189793 April 7, 2010) Perez, J. FACTS: Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province. The said law originated from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district. Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716 violates the constitutional standards that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand ( 250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383. ISSUE: Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province. RULING: NO. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: “ Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.” There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a province is entitled to at least a representative, there is nothing mentioned about the population. Meanwhile, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 c. Mariano vs COMELEC (G.R. No 118577, March 7, 1995) Puno, J. FACTS: The petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7854 which is entitled “An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati.” Suing as taxpayers, the first petition assails Sec. 2, 51 and 52 of RA 7854 as unconstitutional on the three grounds namely: 1) delineated the land area of the proposed City of Makati in violation of Art. X, Sec. 10 of the Constitution, in relation to Sec. 7 and 450 of LGC wherein area of local government unit should be made by metes and bounds with technical descriptions (Sec. 2); 2) attempts to alter or restart the “3 consecutive term” limit for local elective officials since the city shall acquire a new corporate existence is in violation of Art. X, Sec. 8 and Art. VI, Sec. 7 of the Constitution (Sec. 51); and 3a) reapportionment cannot be made by a special law; 3b) the addition of a legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and 3c) Makati’s population, as per 1990 census, stands only at 450,000 (Sec. 52). ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7854 is unconstitutional. RULING: Yes, petition is dismissed for lack of merit in petitions. Sec. 2 did not add, subtract, divide or multiply the established land area of Makati. It was expressly stated that the city’s land area “shall comprise the present territory of the municipality.” Furthermore, the legitimate reason why the land area was not defined by metes and bounds with technical descriptions was because of the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio. Out of respect, they did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. Petitioners have far complied with the requirements in challenging the constitutionality of a law. They merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (exception Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise the issue. Also, they raised the issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction. In Tobias v. Abalos ruling, it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject. Makati has met the minimum population requirement. In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than 250,000 shall be entitled to at least 1 congressional representative.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 d. Tobias vs Abalos (G.R. No. L-114783, December 8, 1994) BIDIN, J. FACTS: Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, filed a petition questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Before the enactment of the law, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to the same legislative district. The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of three provisions of the constitution. First, it violates the one subject one bill rule. The bill provides for the conversion of Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the division of congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into two separate district. Second, it also violate Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty , unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts increased the of the House of Representative beyond that provided by the Constitution. Third, Section 5 of Article VI also provides that within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in Section 5. Petitioners stated that the division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the minimum population requirement was attained. ISSUE: (1) Does RA 7675 violate the one subject one bill rule? (2) Does it violate Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the limit of number of rep? (3) Is the inexistence of mention of census in the law show a lack of constitutional requirement? RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of merit. With regards to the first contention of one subject one bill rule, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a separate and distinct subject from its conversion into a HUC but is a natural and logical consequence. In addition, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. The second contention that the law violates the present limit of the number of representatives, the provision of the section itself show that the 250 limit is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 , "unless otherwise provided by law”. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional. With regards, to the third contention that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, unless otherwise proved that the requirements were not met, the said Act enjoys the presumption of having ed through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative district The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 e. Montejo vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 118702, March 16, 1995) PUNO, J. FACTS: Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo, representative of the first district of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates the principle of equality of representation. The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of 5 districts. The 3rd district is composed of: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, Tabango and Villaba. Biliran, located in the 3rd district of Leyte, was made its subprovince by virtue of Republic Act No. 2141 Section 1 enacted on 1959. Said section spelled out the municipalities comprising the subprovince: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the territories comprised therein. On 1992, the Local Government Code took effect and the subprovince of Biliran became a regular province. (The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite.) As a consequence of the conversion, eight municipalities of the 3rd district composed the new province of Biliran. A further consequence was to reduce the 3rd district to five municipalities (underlined above) with a total population of 146,067 as per the 1990 census. To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the province of Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent representatives of the province and other interested parties and on December 29, 1994, it promulgated the assailed resolution where, among others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the 2nd district and the municipality of Palompon of the 4th district to the 3rd district of Leyte. ISSUE: Whether the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting and reapportionment is valid or not. RULING: No. Respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated Section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736 transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte. While concededly the conversion of Biliran into a regular province brought about an imbalance in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the 5 districts of Leyte, the issue involves reapportionment of legislative districts, and petitioner’s remedy lies with Congress. This Court cannot itself make the reapportionment as petitioner would want. Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the ordinance appended to the 1987 constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. Said ordinance states that “The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments to the reapportionment herein made.” However, Minor adjustments does not involve change in the allocations per district. Examples include error in the correct name of a particular municipality or when a municipality in between which is still in the territory of one assigned district is forgotten. And consistent with the limits of its power to

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 make minor adjustments, section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The power granted by section 3 to the respondent is to adjust the number of (not municipalities.)

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 f. Sema vs Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008) Carpio, J. FACTS: The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of Maguindanao but it is not part of ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1st legislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities. A law (RA 9054) was ed amending ARMM’s Organic Act and vesting it with power to create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City. For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now only made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo should be retained; however, just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City – this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as to Cotabato’s status as a legislative district (or part of any). Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning – in fact he won). She contended that under the Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City – so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the HOR. COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs. RULING: No. Congress cannot validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts, nothing in Sec. 20, Article X of the Constitution, authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts. Accordingly, Sec. 19, Art. VI of R.A. 9054, granting the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Sec. 5, Art. VI, and Sec. 20, Art. X, as well as Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays was delegated by Congress to the ARMM Regional Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. However, pursuant to the Constitution, the power to create a province is with Congress and may not be validly delegated. Section 19 is, therefore, unconstitutional. MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void. The creation of Shariff Kabunsuan is invalid. Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable hip in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable hip of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law ed by Congress. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the hip of the superior legislative body. "The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power… except on the following matters: (k) National elections…”. Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected in national elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law creating a legislative district, the first representative is always elected in the "next national elections" from the effectivity of the law. Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official. It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a selfevident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can never create a national office. To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to operate outside the ARMM's territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional Assembly's legislative powers "[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction…”

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 2. QUALIFICATIONS a. Marcos vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995) KAPUNAN, J. FACTS: Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Paul’s College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was ed there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she ed as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and ed as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months. ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1 year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte. RULING: Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion ing petitioner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons: 1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte; 2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue. 3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium. 4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brother’s house, an act, which s the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones. WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 b. AQUINO vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995) KAPUNAN, J. FACTS: On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district for 10 months. Faced with a petition for disqualification, he amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections dismissed the petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on a motion for reconsideration of the above dismissal, the Commission on Election later issued an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence. ISSUE: Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district. RULING: No. The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a ed voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. Aquino’s connection to the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 c. Coquilla vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 151914, July 31, 2002) MENDOZA, J. FACTS: Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after ing the US Navy. In 1998, he came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the United States. Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar which was approved in 2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years. Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel Coquilla’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the two year residency in Oras was a material misrepresentation as he only resided therein for 6 months after his oath as a citizen. Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and Coquilla was proclaimed the winner. On July 19, 2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez’ petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. ISSUE: Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least one year before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as what he represented in his COC. RULING: No. The petitioner had not been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar, for at least one year prior to the May 14, 2001 elections. Although Oras was his domicile of origin, petitioner lost the same when he became a US citizen after enlisting in the US Navy. From then on, until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship through repatriation, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines. In Caasi v. Comelec, infra., it was held that immigration to the US by virtue of the acquisition of a “green card” constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" of "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is "the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain. A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child's parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of a new domicile.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 3. PARTY-LIST SYSTEM (REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7941) a. Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 203766 : April 2, 2013) CARPIO, J. FACTS: 52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the Supreme Court (SC) in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race. The Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November and December of 2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed to represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector, their nominees do not come from a marginalized and underrepresented sector, and/or some of the organizations or groups are not truly representative of the sector they intend to represent in Congress. Petitioners argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations; andsecond, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down inAng Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections(BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion RULING: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases. Political Law- Party-list system Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation." Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system "For as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution." Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act is the law that implements the party-list system prescribed in the Constitution. Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a "political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government. "On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. "R.A. No. 7941 provides different

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other. Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens. Political Law- parameters in qualifying party- lists The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters: 1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. 2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. 3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they under the partylist system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition. 4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "welldefined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth. 5. A majority of the of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the of sectoral

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide of such parties or organizations. 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified. This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 b. Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 190529, April 29, 2010) BRION, J. FACTS: Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of ed national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system through its resolution, denying also the latter’s motion for reconsideration, in accordance with Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, which provides: Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds: x x x x (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has ed.[Emphasis supplied.] Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the resolution citing among others the misapplication in the ruling of MINERO v. COMELEC, but was denied for lack of merit. Petitioner elevated the matter to SC showing the excerpts from the records of Senate Bill No. 1913 before it became the law in question. ISSUES: WON COMELEC erred in delisting PGBI. RULINGS: Yes. Petition is granted. The law is clear that the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it a) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has ed. The word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. The disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood, in light of the Banat ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has ed. This, we declare, is how Section 6 (8) of RA 7941 should be understood and applied. We do so under our authority to state what the law is, and as an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBI’s delisting from the roster of ed national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system. First, the law is in the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law which provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBI’s cited congressional deliberations clearly show. MINERO therefore simply cannot stand.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 c. ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC (G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010) DEL CASTILLO, J. FACTS: Petitioner is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBT’s). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006 as a party-list organization under Republic Act 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial hip base. In 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a petition for registration with the COMELEC upon which it was dismissed on moral grounds. Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration but the COMELEC upheld its First Resolution, stating that “the party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nation’s. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that.” That “the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.” COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941. Thus Ladlad filed this petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner should be accredited as a party-list organization under RA 7941. RULING: The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the resolutions of the COMELEC. It also directed the COMELEC to grant petitioner’s application for party-list accreditation. The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941. Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our nonestablishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors. The principle of non-discrimination requires the laws of general application relating to elections be applied to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 d. ANAD v. COMELEC (GR No. 206987, September 10, 2013) PEREZ, J. FACTS: On November 7, 2012, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution cancelling the Certificate of Registration and/or Accreditation of petitioner Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD) on the following grounds: a) ANAD does not belong to, or come within the ambit of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors enumerated in Sec. 5 of RA 7941; b) The Certificate of Nomination submitted by the party only contained 3 nominees instead of 5, which is a failure to comply with the procedural requirement set forth in Sec. 4, Rule 3 of Resolution No. 9366; and c) ANAD failed to submit its statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the 2007 National and Local Elections as required by Sec. 14 of RA 7166 ANAD challenged the above-mentioned resolution. The Court remanded the case to the COMELEC for re-evaluation. In the assailed Resolution dated May 11, 2013, the COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of petitioner’s Certificate of Registration and/or Accreditation and disqualified them from participating in the 2013 Elections for violation of election laws and regulations. Hence, this petition ISSUE: WON the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in promulgating the assailed Resolution without the benefit of a summary evidentiary hearing mandated by the due process clause. RULING: NO. ANAD was already given the opportunity to prove its qualifications during the summary hearing of August 23, 2012, during which ANAD submitted documents and other pieces of evidence to establish said qualifications. The COMELEC need not have called another summary hearing as they could readily resort to the documents and other piece of evidence previously submitted by petitioners in re-appraising ANAD’s qualifications. The COMELEC, being a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country, its factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered on matters falling within its competence shall not be interfered with by this Court in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law. As empowered by law, the COMELEC may cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any party-list organization if it violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections Compliance with Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 is essential as the said provision is a safeguard against arbitrariness. Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 rids a party-list organization of the prerogative to substitute and replace its nominees, or even to switch the order of the nominees, after submission of the list to the COMELEC. The COMELEC will only determine whether the nominees all the requirements prescribed by the law and whether or not the nominees possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Thereafter, the names of the nominees will be published in newspapers of general circulation. Although the people vote for the party-list organization itself in a party-list system of election, not for the individual nominees, they still have the right to know who the nominees of any particular party-list organization are. The publication of the list of the party-list nominees in newspapers of general circulation serves that right of the people, enabling the voters to make intelligent and informed choice.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 e. Abang Lingkod Party-list vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 206952, October 22, 2013) REYES, J. FACTS: Abang Lingkod Party-list is a sectoral organization that represents the interest of peasant farmers and fisherfolk. On May 31, 2012, the party manifested its intent to participate in the May 2013 elections. The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513 which required previously ed party-list groups that have filed their respective Manifestations of Intent to undergo summary evidentiary hearing for purposes of determining their continuing compliance with the requirements under RA 7941. The party complied with the needed documents and after due proceedings, the COMELEC en banc cancelled their registration as a party-list group. They pointed out that Abang Lingkod (1) failed to establish its track record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented; (2) it merely offered photographs of some alleged activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections; and (3) failed to show that nominees are themselves marginalized and underrepresented or that they have been involved in activities aimed at improving the plight of the sectors it claims to represent. Abang Lingkod then filed a petition alleging COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling its registration under the party-list system. This was consolidated with 51 other separate petitions whose registration were cancelled or who were denied registration. On April 2, 2013, the Court laid down new parameters to be observed by the COMELEC in screening parties, organizations or associations seeking registration and/or accreditation under the party-list system. The Court then remanded to COMELEC the cases of previously ed partylist groups, including that of Abang Lingkod, to determine whether they are qualified pursuant to the new parameters and, in the affirmative, be allowed to participate in the May 2013 party-list elections. On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued a Resolution affirming the cancellation of Abang Lingkod’s registration. The party sought for reconsideration, however, withdrew it and filed instead this petition, claiming that the former gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed the cancellation of its registration when it should have allowed it to present evidence to prove its qualification as a party-list group pursuant to the Atong Paglaum ruling. On the other hand, the COMELEC asserts that the petition should be dismissed for lack of merit. ISSUE: WON COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in canceling the party’s registration under the party-list system. RULING: YES. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it insisted on requiring ABANG LINGKOD to prove its track record notwithstanding that a group's track record is no longer required pursuant to the Court's pronouncement in Atong Paglaum. Abang Lingkod's registration must be cancelled due to its misrepresentation is a conclusion derived from a simplistic reading of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 and the import of the Court's disposition in Atong Paglaum. Not every misrepresentation committed by national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations would merit the denial or cancellation of their registration under the party-list system. The misrepresentation must relate to their qualification as a party-list group. Under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, groups intending to under the party-list system are not required to submit evidence of their track record; they are merely required to attach to their verified petitions their "constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of officers, coalition agreement, and other relevant information as may be required by the COMELEC."

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 Sectoral parties or organizations are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e., proof of activities that they have undertaken to further the cause of the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that the ideals represented by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the sector/s, which they represent. If at all, evidence showing a track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented sectors is only required from nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented who do not factually belong to the sector represented by their party or organization. Also, a declaration of an untruthful statement in a petition for registration under Section 6 (6) of R.A. No. 7941, in order to be a ground for the refusal and/or cancellation of registration under the party-list system, must pertain to the qualification of the party, organization or coalition under the party-list system. In order to justify the cancellation or refusal of registration of a group, there must be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact, which would otherwise render the group disqualified from participating in the party-list elections. There was no necessity for the COMELEC to conduct further summary evidentiary hearing to assess the qualification of Abang Lingkod pursuant to Atong Paglaum. It was only remanded to the them so that they may reassess, based on the evidence already submitted, whether the party qualifies to participate in the party-list system. The records also disclose that Abang Lingkod was able to file with the COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 10, 2013, negating its claim that it was denied due process. As it has been held, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given a chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 f. COCOFED v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 207026, August 6, 2013) BRION, J. FACTS: Petitioner COCOFED-Philippine Coconut Producers Federation Inc. is an organization and dectoral party whose hip comes from the peasant sector, particularly the coconut farmers and producers. On May 29, 2012, it manifested with the COMELEC its intent to participate in the party-list elections of May 13, 2013 and submitted only 2 nominees - Atty. Emerito Calderon and Atty. Domingo Espina. Pursuant to Res. No. 9513, the COMELEC conducted a summary hearing to determine whether COCOFED, among several party-list groups, had continuously complied with the legal requirements. In its November 7, 2012 resolution, the COMELEC cancelled petitioner’s registration and accreditation as a partylist organization. On Dec. 4, the party submitted the names of Charles Avila in substitution of Atty. Espina and Efren Villaseñor as its third nominee. Pursuant to the Atong Paglaum ruling, the Court remanded all the petitions to the COMELEC to determine their compliance with the new parameters set by the Court in that case. On May 10, 2013, COMELEC issued its assailed resolution, maintaining its earlier ruling for the party’s failure to comply with the requirement of Sec. 8 of RA 7941 to submit a list of not less than 5 nominees. COCOFED moved for reconsideration only to withdraw its motion later and instead, filed a Manifestation with Urgent Request to it Additional Nominees with the COMELEC, namely: Felino Gutierrez and Rodolfo de Asis. On May 24, 2013, the COMELEC issued a resolution declaring the cancellation final and executory. COCOFED argues that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed resolution on the following grounds: a) COMELEC violated its right to due process; b) Failure to submit the required number of nominees was based on the good faith belief that its submission was sufficient for purposes of the elections, that it could still be remedied, and the number of nominees becomes significant only when a party-list organization is able to attain a sufficient number of votes which would qualify it for a seat in the House of Representatives; and c)COMELEC violated its right to equal protection of the laws since at least 2 other party-list groups (ACT-CIS and MTM Phils.) which failed to submit 5 nominees were included in the official list of party-list groups. ISSUE: WON Comelec gravely abused its discretion on issuing assailed Resolution RULING: No. COCOFED’s failure to submit a list of 5 nominees, despite ample opportunity to do so before the elections, is a violation imputable to the party under Section 6 (5) of RA 7941. Under Section 6 (5) of RA No. 7941, violation of or failure to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections is a ground for the cancellation of registration. However, not every kind of violation automatically warrants the cancellation of a party-list group's registration. Since a reading of the entire Section 6 shows that all the grounds for cancellation actually pertain to the party itself, then the laws, rules and regulations violated to warrant cancellation under Section 6 (5) must be one that is primarily imputable to the party itself and not one that is chiefly confined to an individual member or its nominee. The language of Sec. 8 of RA 7941 does not only use the word ‘shall’ in connection with the requirement of submitting a list of nominees; it uses this mandatory term in conjunction with the number of names to be submitted that is couched negatively, i.e., “not less than five.”

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 While COCOFED’s failure to submit a complete list of requirements may not have been among the grounds cited by the COMELEC in earlier cancelling its registration, this is not sufficient to a finding of grave abuse of discretion. The fact that a party-list group is entitled to no more than three seats in Congress, regardless of the number of votes it may garner, 24 does not render Section 8 of RA No. 7941 permissive in nature. The Court cannot discern any valid reason why a party-list group cannot comply with the statutory requirement. A party is not allowed to simply refuse to submit a list containing "not less than five nominees" and consider the deficiency as a waiver on its part. A party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees fail to qualify, even if party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. The Court in no way authorized a party-list group's inexcusable failure, if not outright refusal, to comply with the clear letter of the law on the submission of at least five nominees.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 g. AMORES v HRET (G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010) CARPIO MORALES, J. FACTS: Petition for certiorari challenging the assumption of office of one Emmanuel Joel Villanueva as representative of CIBAC in the HoR. Petitioner argues that Villanueva was 31 at the time of filing of nomination, beyond the age limit of 30 which was the limit imposed by RA 7941 for "youth sector" and his change of affiliation from Youth Sector to OFW and families not affected six months prior to elections. ISSUE: Whether the requirement for youth sector representatives apply to respondent Villanueva RULING: The law is clear that representative of youth sector should be between 25 to 30 and sectoral representation should be changed 6 months prior to elections. Villanueva is ineligible to hold office as a member of HoR representing CIBAC because he violated both requirements. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 h. Bantay Republic Act. v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 177271, May 4, 2007) GARCIA, J. FACTS: Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007. A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and subsequently were accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent Petition seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2 letters to the Director of the Comelec’s Law Department requesting a list of that groups’ nominees. Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees’ names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales’ basic disclosure request. According to COMELEC, there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the names of nominees, and that party list elections must not be personality oriented according to Chairman Abalos. In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR assail the Comelec resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list elections without simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to. In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution dated April 3, 2007. While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have the additional prayers that the 33 private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections and that the Comelec be ened from allowing respondent groups from participating in the elections. ISSUE: WON respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution. RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to release the names of said candidates based on the right to information. That the right to information is being sought after in the context of the electoral climate and the controversial PartyList system under Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act highlights the uniqueness of these cases. The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 to the absolute is to read into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the "Certified List" the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941 It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. Hence the need for voters to be informed about matters that have a bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot be achieved in a system of blind voting, as veritably advocated in the assailed resolution of the Comelec. The Court, since the 1914 case of Gardiner v. Romulo, 21 has consistently made it clear that it frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election. 22 So it must be here for still other reasons articulated earlier. In all, we agree with the petitioners that respondent Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 i. BANAT v COMELEC (G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009) CARPIO, J. FACTS: In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007. In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules: 1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution); 2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat; 3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC. 4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case). The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not ed by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution. BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest). On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties. ISSUES: I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house? II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling. III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid. IV. How are party-list seats allocated? V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections. VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 RULING: I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250 of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the hip of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list representatives. How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula: (Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List Representatives Hence, (220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55 II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of partylist representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled. III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained: To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present. It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.” IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat. But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats. In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation). The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives. How is this done? Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed. Example: In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900). Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional seat Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79 Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a twopercenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats. Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections. Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word “party” was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution – and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-list system.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 4. ELECTION, SALARIES, PRIVILEGES a. LOZADA V. COMELEC (G.R. No. L-59068. JANUARY 27, 1983) DE CASTRO, J. FACTS: Lozada together with Igot filed a petition for mandamus compelling the COMELEC to hold an election to fill the vacancies in the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP). They anchor their contention on Sec 5 (2), Art 8 of the 1973 Constitution which provides: “In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular election, the Commission on Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term.” COMELEC opposes the petition alleging, substantially, that 1) petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the action; 2) this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution does not apply to the Interim Batasan Pambansa. ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court can compel COMELEC to hold a special election to fill vacancies in the legislature. RULING: No. The SC’s jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latter’s decision, orders or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section 11 of the New Constitution which reads: “Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof.” There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is sought to be reviewed by this Court under its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the aforequoted provision, which is the only known provision conferring jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme Court over the COMELEC. It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional districts where vacancies exist, would entail huge expenditure of money. Only the Batasang Pambansa (BP) can make the necessary appropriation for the purpose, and this power of the BP may neither be subject to mandamus by the courts much less may COMELEC compel the BP to exercise its power of appropriation. From the role BP has to play in the holding of special elections, which is to appropriate the funds for the expenses thereof, it would seem that the initiative on the matter must come from the BP, not the COMELEC, even when the vacancies would occur in the regular not IBP. The power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive prerogative of the legislative body, the exercise of which may not be compelled through a petition for mandamus. What is more, the provision of Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution was intended to apply to vacancies in the regular National Assembly, now BP, not to the IBP.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 b. PHILCONSA v. Mathay (G.R. No. L-25554. OCTOBER 4, 1966) REYES, J.B.L., J. FACTS: Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and the Auditor of the Congress ofthe Philippines seeking to permanently en them from authorizing or ing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969. The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and of the House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution. The reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the of the House who participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965 ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective. RULING: No. In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to “all of the Senate and the House of Representatives” in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the “expiration of the full term” of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word “term” in the singular, when combined with the following phrase “all the of the Senate and the House,” underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration is that the of office of all of the Legislature that enacted the measure must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative. The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all of the Senate and House that approved it will have expired.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 c. LIGOT V. MATHAY (G.R. No. L-34676. APRIL 30, 1974) TEEHANKEE, J. FACTS: Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for three consecutive four-year covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969. During his second term in office (1961-1965), RA 4134 “fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government” was enacted into law and under section 7 thereof took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of of Congress (senators and congressman) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that said increases “shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.” Ligot’s term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by RA 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein provided “in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law.” HOR granted his petition however, Velasco, the then Congress Auditor refused to so issue certification. The Auditor General then, Mathay, also disallowed the same. The thrust of Ligot’s appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for of Congress (which was not applied to him during his incumbency which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would become operative only for of Congress elected to serve therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased salary for of Congress “as provided by law” (under Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum. ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit. RULING: No. To allow petitioner a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of achieving indirectly what he could not obtain directly. Ligot’s claim cannot be sustained as far as he and other of Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and “other emoluments” to their salary as provided by law. To grant retirement gratuity to of Congress whose expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-General in his decision in the similar case of petitioner’s colleague, ex-Congressman Singson, “(S)uch a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result by enabling istrative authorities to do indirectly what cannot be done directly.”

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 d. PEOPLE V. JALOSJOS (G.R. No. 132875. FEBRUARY 3, 2000) YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. FACTS: Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. Jalosjos, filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge his duties of a Congressman including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having convicted in the first instance including of a non-bailable offense. Jalosjos argument is the mandate of sovereign will which he states that he was re-elected as Congressman of Firs District of Zamboanga del Norte by his constituents in order that their voices will be heard and since the accused-appellant is treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate. ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos, be allowed to discharge his mandate as member of the House of Representatives. RULING: No. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators or of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution and shows that this privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. It is true, that election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, the rights and privileges from being elected as public official may be restricted by law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position, the higher the rank the greater the requirement of obedience rather that exemption. The accused-appellant Romeo Jalosjos has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Section 11 Article VI of the Constitution. The of Congress cannot compel absent to attend sessions if the reason for the abuse is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman with a crime punishable imprisonment by more than six (6) months is not merely authorized by law, has constitutional foundations. Allowing Jalosjos to attend in Congressional sessions and meetings for five (5) days in a week which will make him a free man with all the privileges and would make his status to that of a special class, it also would be a making of the purpose of the correction system.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 e. TRILLANES IV V. PIMENTEL (G.R. No. 179817. JUNE 27, 2008) CARPIO-MORALES, J. FACTS: Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for coup d’etat in relation to the “Oakwood Incident.” In the 2007 elections, he won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007. Petitioner now asks the Court that he be allowed to attend all official functions of the Senate, alleging mainly that his case is distinct from that of Jalosjos as his case is still pending resolution whereas that in the Jalosjos case, there was already conviction. Antonio Trillanes won a seat in the Senate while being under detention for staging an alleged coup d’etat. Before the commencement of his term, his fellow opposition Senators filed a motion to allow him to attend Senate sessions and perform his duties as senator. It was argued that there is a world of difference between his case and that of Jalosjos respecting the type of offense involved, the stage of filing of the motion, and other circumstances which demonstrate the inapplicability of Jalosjos. Trillanes posits that his election provides the legal justification to allow him to serve his mandate, after the people, in their sovereign capacity, elected him as Senator. He argues that denying his Omnibus Motion is tantamount to removing him from office, depriving the people of proper representation, denying the people’s will, repudiating the people’s choice, and overruling the mandate of the people. Moreover, he pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention prisoners who have also been charged with non-bailable offenses, like former President Joseph Estrada and former Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend “social functions.” ISSUE: Whether or not valid classification between petitioner and Jalosjos exists RULING: No. The petition is bereft of merit. In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly points out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted, albeit his conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a motion similar to petitioner's Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere detention prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor. Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude, i.e., two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for coup d'etat which is regarded as a "political offense." Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in expressing legitimate grievances against the rampant and institutionalized practice of graft and corruption in the AFP. In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action." Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 f. OSMENA V. PENDATUN (G.R. No. L-17144. OCTOBER 28, 1960) BENGZON, J. FACTS: In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech entitled “A Message to Garcia”. In the said speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his istration. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was ed by the lower house in order to investigate the charges made by Osmeña during his speech and that if his allegations were found to be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house. Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmeña avers that the resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme Court has not jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to discipline its . ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated RULING: No. Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11), Art. VI of the Constitution provides that for any speech or debate in Congress, the Senators or of the House of Representatives shall not be questioned in any other place. The Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the President constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmena may be disciplined, the Court believes that the House of Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if the Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmena’s conduct constituted disorderly behavior, it would have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the government.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 g. JIMENEZ V. CABANGBANG (G.R. No. 15905. AUGUST 3, 1966) CONCEPCION, C.J. FACTS: Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup d’état to place him as the president. The “planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbang’s statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of the lower house, he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous. ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to of Congress. RULING: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senators and of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.” The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said communication is not absolutely privileged.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 5. DISQUALIFICATIONS AND OTHER INHIBITIONS a. ADAZA V. PACANA (G.R. No. 68159. MARCH 18, 1985) ESCOLIN, J. FACTS: Petitioner Homobono Adaza was elected Governor of Misamis Oriental during the 1980 elections. His Vice-Governor, herein respondent Fernando Pacana, Jr., was likewise qualified and assumed officed during their oath on March 3, 1980. Under the law, their respective of office would expire on March 3, 1986. Pacana and Adaza filed their certificates of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections on March 27, 1984 and April 27, 1984 respectively. Petitioner won and took his oath as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 9184 and respondent likewise took over the vacancy as Governor and took his oath of office on July 25, 1984. Petitioner contends Pacana’s unlawful occupancy of the Governor’s office, hence this petition for prohibition with a writ of parliamentary injunction and/or restraining order was filed before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Homobono Adaza can exercise and discharge his functions as Mambatas Pambansa and Provincial Governor simultaneously. RULING: No. Under Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, a Member of the National Assembly (now Batasan Pambansa) shall not hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet. Petitioner Adaza, being a public officer is subject to the regulations and conditions as the law may impose and cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one office. Upon taking his oath of office as an elected Mambabatas Pambansa, petitioner subsequently operated to vacate his former post and he can no longer continue to occupy the same, nor attempt to discharge its functions which makes respondent to reassume the position of Vice-Governor and later on take oath of office as Governor for the unexpired term in lawful accordance with the Local Government Code.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 b. LIBAN V. GORDON (G.R. No. 175352, JULY 15, 2009) CARPIO, J. FACTS: Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari (petitioners) filed with this Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate. Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors. During respondent's incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was elected Chairman of the PNRC during the 23 February 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors. Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution. Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC, which held that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation. Petitioners claim that in accepting and holding the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate, pursuant to Flores v. Drilon, which held that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts upon their appointment to another government office. ISSUE: Whether Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution applies to the case of respondent who is Chairman of the PNRC and at the same time a Member of the Senate. RULING: No. PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions. The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely, effective, and comionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation. To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC cannot be owned or controlled by the government. Indeed, the Philippine government does not own the PNRC. The PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress. The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors. The PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional Proscription against the Creation of Private Corporations by Special Law. The Constitution recognizes two classes of corporations. The first refers to private corporations created under a general law. The second refers to government-owned or controlled corporations created by special charters. The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private corporations except by general law applicable to all citizens. The purpose of this constitutional provision is to ban private corporations created by special charters, which historically gave certain individuals, families or groups special privileges denied to other citizens. In short, Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special charter. Such legislation would be unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under a general law. If the corporation is private, it must necessarily exist under a general law. Stated differently, only corporations created under a general law can qualify as private corporations. Under existing laws, the general law is the Corporation Code, except that the Cooperative Code governs the incorporation of cooperatives. In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. However, since the PNRC Charter is void insofar as it creates the PNRC

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 as a private corporation, the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporate.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 c. LIBAN V. GORDON (G.R. No. 175352. JANUARY 18, 2011) LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. FACTS: Respondent filed a motion for partial recommendation on a Supreme Court decision which ruled that being chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) did not disqualify him from being a Senator, and that the charter creating PNRC is unconstitutional as the PNRC is a private corporation and the Congress is precluded by the Constitution to create such.The Court then ordered the PNRC to incorporate itself with the SEC as a private corporation. Respondent takes exception to the second part of the ruling, which addressed the constitutionality of the statute creating the PNRC as a private corporation. Respondent avers that the issue of constitutionality was only touched upon in the issue of locus standi. It is a rule that the constitutionality will not be touched upon if it is not the lis mota of the case. ISSUE: Whether or not it was proper for the Court to have ruled on the constitutionality of the PNRC statute. RULING: No. In the case at bar, the constitutionality of the PNRC statute was raised in the issue of standing. As such, the Court should not have declared certain provisions of such as unconstitutional. On the substantive issue, the PNRC is sui generis. It is unlike the private corporations that the Constitution wants to prevent Congress from creating. First, the PNRC is not organized for profit. It is an organization dedicated to assist victims of war and ister relief to those who have been devastated by calamities, among others. It is entirely devoted to public service. It is not covered by the prohibition since the Constitution aims to eliminate abuse by the Congress, which tend to favor personal gain. Secondly, the PNRC was created in order to participate in the mitigation of the effects of war, as embodied in the Geneva Convention. The creation of the PNRC is compliance with international treaty obligations. Lastly, the PNRC is a National Society, an auxiliary of the government. It is not like government instrumentalities and GOCC. The PNRC is regulated directly by international humanitarian law, as opposed to local law regulating the other mentioned entities. As such, it was improper for the Court to have declared certain portions of the PNRC statute as unconstitutional. However, it is the stand of Justice Carpio that there is no mandate for the Government to create a National Society to this effect. He also raises the fact that the PNRC is not sui generis in being a private corporation organized for public needs. Justice Abad is of the opinion that the PNRC is neither private or governmental, hence it was within the power of Congress to create.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 6. SESSIONS, OFFICERS, QUORUM, RULES OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISCIPLINE OF a. AVELINO v. CUENCO (G.R. No. L-2821, March 4, 1949) FACTS: On February 21, 1949, Sen. Tanada filed with the Senate Secretary charges against Senate President Avelino. Sen. Tanada requested to give a privilege speech during the session. Sen. Tanada’s motions were continuously denied of the common courtesy and ruling Sen. Sanidad and Tanada “out of order!”. Senator Avelino along with other Senators, walked-out of the session hall. Senate President Pro-Tempore Arranz issued Resolution No. 67 and 68 declaring the vacancy of the position of Senate President and installing Hon. Cuenco as Acting Senate President. These resolutions were voted and unanimously approved. Thus, Avelino filed a petition before the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court with a vote of 6 out of the 10 Justices present, decided to deny the petition stating that the Court has no jurisdiction on the case. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The SC with a majority vote of seven, granted the motion and took cognizance over the case. ISSUE: WON the 12 Senators who installed Cuenco as the Acting President of the Senate constituted a quorum? RULING: YES. Supreme Court held that there is a quorum that the 12 senators being the majority of 23 Senators. Resolution Nos. 67 and 68 are valid. Sen. Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate President. PETITION DISMISSED. If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? In other words, was there the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the Senate. Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because the minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twelve three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House: does not mean "all" the . Even a majority of all the constitute "the House". (Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a difference between a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes furthermore than even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent ; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 b. Arroyo v. De Venecia (G.R. No. 127255, June 26, 1998) MENDOZA, J. FACTS: The petitioners are challenging the validity of R.A. 8420 (amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing “Sin Taxes”) by filing a petition for for certiorari and/or prohibition. They claim that respondents violated the rules of the House which are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution when the Chair of the Committee (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) allegedly ignored a privileged question raised by Rep. Arroyo during the committee report for the approval of R.A. 8420. Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of the transcript of this portion of Rep. Arroyo's interpellation: (1)the transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall (2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 21, 1996 (3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 28, 1996 (4) the published version Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. This contention was invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from interference by courts. In this case, petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review. ISSUE: Whether or not the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240 affects its validity? RULING: No. The petition was dismissed. According to the findings of the court, the alleged violations are merely internal rules of procedures rather than what petitioners claim to be constitutional requirements for enacting laws. In this case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. There is no rule of the House concerned that quorum shall be determined by viva voce or nominal voting. The Constitution does not require that the yeas and nays of the be taken every time a House has to vote, except only on the following instances – upon the last and the third readings of the bill, at the request of 1/5 of the present and in reing a bill over the veto of the President. Second, there is obviousness on the part of the petitioner to delay the business of the House, thus eliminating the alleged skullduggery on part of the accused. Third, the enrolled bill doctrine states that enrolled bills are in itself conclusive thus legally binding provided it is in harmony with the constitution. Lastly, the court upheld principle of separation of powers, which herein, is applicable for the legislative branch for it has exercised its power without grave abuse of discretion resulting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 c. Pacete v Commission on Appointments (G.R. No. L-25895, July 23, 1971) FERNANDO, J. FACTS: Petitioner Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was appointed by the then President of the Philippines on August 31, 1964 as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato. He assumed office on September 11, 1964 and discharged his duties as such. As his appointment, was made during the recess of Congress, it was submitted to the Commission on Appointments at its next session in 1965. On February 7, 1966, the then Secretary of Justice, whom he likewise included in his petition, through the Judicial Superintendent, advised petitioner to vacate his position as municipal judge, the ground being that his appointment had been by-ed. Senator Rodolfo Ganzon, wrote to its Chairman stating that he was filing a motion for the reconsideration of the confirmation of the appointment of petitioner as municipal judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato, in view of derogatory information which he had received. Respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments thus was led to notify the then Secretary of Justice accordingly, following what he considered to be the prevailing practice of such body that the mere presentation of such letter "automatically vacated the confirmation of the appointment in question . . ." Respondent Secretary of Justice through the Judicial Superintendent then advised petitioner that he should vacate his position as municipal judge, as he had not been duly confirmed. The Disbursing Officer of the Department of Justice was likewise named respondent as he had, as a consequence, withheld petitioner's salaries. ISSUE: WoN petitioner’s appointment must be confirmed. RULING: For respondents to argue that the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration did suffice to set it aside, even in the absence of any further action, is, as stressed by petitioner, to lose sight of what is provided in the Constitution. That would be moreover tantamount to imparting to a move of a single member of a collective body a decisive weight. It is bad enough if the minority were to prevail. A oneman rule, which is the effect of what respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments contends, is infinitely worse. It is indefensible in principle and pernicious in operation. It can find no shelter in the constitutional prescription. In view of confirmation In petitioner's memorandum submitted on August 1, 1966, it was contended that his confirmation became final and irrevocable upon the adjournment of the fourth regular session of the Fifth Congress on May 21, 1965. In view of construction As was noted, the controlling principle is supplied by Altarejos v. Molo, which interpreted Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments, which reads: "Resolution of the Commission on any appointment may be reconsidered on motion by a member presented not more than one (1) day after their approval. If a majority of the present concur to grant a reconsideration, the appointment shall be reopened and submitted anew to the Commission. Any

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 motion to reconsider the vote on any appointment may be laid on the table, this shall be a final disposition of such a motion." In Altarejos v. Molo this Court gave full attention to the argument that the motion for reconsideration of Congressman Aldeguer on May 19, 1965 had the effect of recalling the confirmation of petitioner's appointment and that, accordingly, it should be considered non-existent. His opinion continued: "Pursuant to this provision, the vote of a majority of the present in favor of the motion for reconsideration is necessary to 'reopen' the appointment — and, hence, to 'recall' its confirmation — and to require a resubmission of the appointment for confirmation." The other provision is worded thus: "The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress." That would be moreover tantamount to imparting to a move of a single member of a collective body a decisive weight. It is bad enough if the minority were to prevail. A one-man rule, which is the effect of what respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments contends, is infinitely worse. WHEREFORE, petitioner is entitled to the writ of mandamus and the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments is commanded to issue the certificate of confirmation prayed for by petitioner. The right of petitioner to perform his functions as municipal judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato is in accordance with law, his confirmation having been duly confirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 d. Osmeña v. Pendatun (G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960) BENGZON, J. FACTS: Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr., herein petitioner, delivered his privilege speech before the House making serious imputations of bribery against the President of the Philippines. Because of this, a Resolution was issued authorizing the creation of special House Committee to investigate the truth of the charges made against the President, to summon petitioner to substantiate his charges, and in case petitioner fails to do so, to require petitioner to show cause why he should not be punished by the House. Petitioner then resorted to the Court seeking for the annulment of said resolution on the ground that it infringes his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House. Meanwhile, the Special Committee continued with its proceeding, and after giving petitioner a chance to defend himself, found the latter guilty of seriously disorderly behavior. A House resolution was issued and petitioner was suspended from office for 15 months. Thereafter, respondents filed their answer challenging the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, and defended the power of Congress to discipline its with suspension. ISSUE: Whether the House Resolution violated petitioner’s constitutionally granted parliamentary immunity for speeches RULING: NO. Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate” in Congress, the Senators or of the House of Representative “shall not be questioned in any other place.” This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that “they shall not be questioned in any other place” than Congress. Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for “it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.” It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be discipline, We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which cannot be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 e. Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001) VITUG, J. FACTS: In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID), approved the application for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter against Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is also a violation of Executive Order No. 324 which prohibits the legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Francis Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant of arrest against Santiago. Santiago petitioned for provisional liberty since she was just recovering from a car accident which was approved. In 1995, a motion was filed with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator by then. The Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days. ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate without violating the Constitution. RULING: Yes. it is true that the Constitution provides that each “… house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its , suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.” But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides: Suspension and loss of benefits. – any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime istrative proceedings have been filed against him. In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the Lower House, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the Senate. Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order. But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can she still be suspended as a senator?

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word “office” would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands accused. Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be suspended? The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records another evidence before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 7. RECORDS AND BOOKS OF S; LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL AND CONGRESSIONAL RECORD a. Mabanag v. Vito (G.R. No. L-1123, March 5, 1947) Tuason, J. FACTS: Three senators and eight representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote of the Commission on Elections as having been elected senators and representatives in the elections held on 23 April 1946. The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first session of Congress following the elections, on of alleged irregularities in their election. The eight representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not been formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House of Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the petition for prohibition was filed. As a consequence, these three senators and eight representatives did not take part in the age of the congressional resolution, designated "Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto," nor was their hip reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. The petition for prohibition sought to prevent the enforcement of said congressional resolution, as it is allegedly contrary to the Constitution. The of the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General, and the Director of the Bureau of Printing are made defendants. Eight senators, 17 representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party. ISSUE: Whether the Court may inquire upon the irregularities in the approval of the resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution. RULING: It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provision. This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too well known to require elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the political departments of the government. If a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect. If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory process as provided in section I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in dependent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal then into that of ratification.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 b. Arroyo v De Venecia (G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997) Mendoza, J. FACTS: Petitioners are of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally ed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996. ISSUE: Whether Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion when R.A. No. 8240 was ed in violation of the rules of the House. RULING: No. The Court, after considering the arguments of the parties, found no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. The Court was of the opinion that what was violated were merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law. In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of have agreed to a particular measure.'" Accordingly, the case was dismissed.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 c. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez (G.R. No. L-17931, February 28, 1963) Concepcion, J. FACTS: Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea and formaldehyde which were both being imported from abroad. Pursuant to a Central Bank circular, Casco paid the required margin fee for its imported urea and formaldehyde. Casco however paid in protest as it maintained that urea and formaldehyde are tax exempt transactions. The Central Bank agreed and it issued vouchers for refund. The said vouchers were submitted to Pedro Gimenez, the Auditor General, who denied the tax refund. Gimenez maintained that urea and formaldehyde, as two separate and distinct components were not tax exempt; that what was tax exempt is urea formaldehyde (the synthetic resin formed by combining urea and formaldehyde). Gimenez cited the provision of Sec. 2, par 18 of Republic Act No. 2609 which provides that the margin established by the Monetary Board shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-s. Casco however averred that the term “urea formaldehyde” appearing in this provision should be construed as “urea and formaldehyde”. It further contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction “and” between the “urea” and, “formaldehyde”, and that the of Congress intended to exempt “urea” and “formaldehyde” separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called “urea formaldehyde”, not the latter a finished product, citing in of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by thereof. The enrolled bill however used the term “urea formaldehyde” ISSUE: Whether or not the term “urea formaldehyde” should be construed as “urea and formaldehyde”. RULING: No. Urea formaldehyde was not a chemical solution. It was the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. “Urea formaldehyde” was clearly a finished product, which was patently distinct and different from “urea” and “formaldehyde”, as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as “urea formaldehyde”. The opinions or statements of any member of Congress during the deliberation of the said law/bill do not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. The enrolled bill — which uses the term “urea formaldehyde” instead of “urea and formaldehyde” — was conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure ed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which the SC cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy was by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 d. Astorga v. Villegas (G.R. No. L-23475, April 30, 1974) Makalintal, C.J. FACTS: In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act No. 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five of the city police force who had been assigned to then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga (assigned under authority of RA 4065). Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition for “Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction” to compel Villegas et al and the of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065 (filed with the SC). In his defense, Villegas denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila) because the said law was considered to have never been enacted. When the this said “law” ed the 3rd reading in the lower house as House Bill No. 9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to the Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by then Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the bill was referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant amendments which were subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent back to the lower house and was thereafter approved by the latter. The bill was sent to the President for approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found out however that the copy signed by the Senate President, sent to the lower house for approval and sent to the President for g was the wrong version. It was in fact the version that had no amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended by Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and the President of the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said law. Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding and that the withdrawal of the concerned signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted. RULING: No. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. The SC is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the same text ed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. As done by both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made into law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 e. Morales v. Subido (G.R. No. L-29658, November 29, 1968) Castro, J. FACTS: Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years but does not possess a bachelor’s degree. Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of the former Chief, Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of Civil Service, approved the designation of Morales as acting chief but rejected his appointment for “failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position.” Instead, Subido certified other persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section provides for the minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency that no person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher. Nowhere in the above provision was it provided that a person “who has served the police department of a city …” can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the said act was being deliberated upon, the approved version was actually that no person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher. Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase “or has served as chief of police with exemplary record.” Morales went on to his case by producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the journals, to look searchingly into the matter. RULING: No. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 8. ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS a. TAÑADA V. CUENCO (G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1957) CONCEPCION, J. FACTS: In the 1955 elections, the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) was dominantly occupied by five (5) senators, from the Nacionalista Party and only one (1) opposing senator from the Citizens Party, one of the petitioners, Lorenzo Tañada. The other petitioner, Diosdado Macapagal, ran for office at Senate and subsequently lost and therefore contested to court contesting that SET was dominated with of Nacionalista Party which would make his election with no chance of winning. It was provided that SET should be composed of: three (3) justices of the Supreme Court, three (3) senators from the majority party, and three (3) senators from the minority party. ISSUE: Whether or not the composition of five (5) Nacionalista Party on a SET is constitutional? RULING: No, it was clearly provided that there should be three (3) senators each for both the majority and minority party in SET as provided in the previously Article VI, Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution. The most vital feature of the Electoral Tribunals in the equal representation of said parties therein, and the resulting equilibrium to be maintained by the Justices of the Supreme Court as of said Tribunals. The framers of the Constitution intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority parties therein, with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are of said Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 b. BONDOC V. PINEDA (G.R. No. 97710, September 26, 1991) GRIÑO-AQUINO, J. FACTS: In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga. On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time, Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which is composed of nine (9) , three of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court and the remaining six are of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations ed under the party-list system represented therein. Petitioner, Bondoc then filed a protest in HRET and won over respondent, Pineda. Thereafter, the Chairman of the Tribunal, Justice Ameurfina M. Herrera, received a letter from the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives, informing the Tribunal decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal as Congressman Camasura allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP in Davao Del Sur to said political party. ISSUE: Whether or not the House of Representatives can interfere with the protest in the HRET by removing one of its . RULING: No, the resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc as provided in Article VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore, the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of tenure. of the HRET, as "sole judge" of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution. Therefore, hip in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally d with another political group. As the records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a ed member of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure. This serves as HRET as a non-partisan group and clearly independent of the House of Representatives.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 c. ABBAS V. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (G.R. No. 83767, October 27, 1988) GANCAYCO, J. FACTS: The petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an election contest docketed as SET Case against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 1987 congressional elections by the Commission on Elections. The respondent Tribunal was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators. Thereafter, the Abbas and some of the petitioners filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators- thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case, as respondents therein. The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought and that the doctrine of necessity which they perceive to be the foundation of the questioned Resolutions does not rule out a solution both practicable and constitutionally unobjectionable, such as the amendment of the respondent Tribunal's Rules of procedure so as to permit the contest being decided by only three of the Tribunal. The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24) — requiring the concurrence of five (5) for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature — is a proviso that where more than four (4) are disqualified, the remaining shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions ISSUE: Whether or not, the proposed amendment to the Tribunal Rules may be appreciated, especially with regards to the disqualification of ? RULING: No, the proposed amendments obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought. We do not agree with petitioners' thesis that the suggested device is neither unfeasible nor repugnant to the Constitution. We opine that in fact the most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain and intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers. Furthermore, the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire hip of Senators. To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law. Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such; absent its entire hip of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices- alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 d. PIMENTEL V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (G.R. No. 141489, November 29, 2002) CARPIO, J. FACTS: On March 3, 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. Petitioners were among the partylist representatives who were proclaimed winners during the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioners assailed the composition of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on Appointments (CA). In accordance with the Party-List System Act, national elections were held which included, for the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees would become of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives from 13 organizations. Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one representative each. Also elected were district representatives belonging to various political parties. As of the date of filing of the instant petitions, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the different political parties. The Petitioners prayed for the reorganization of the of the HRET and the CA to be inclined with the Section 17 and 18 of Article VI of the Constitution and the Party-List System Act, Republic Act No. 7941. ISSUE: Whether or not the of HRET and CA violates the Constitution RULING: No, Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution, party-list representatives must first show to the House that they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek recourse to this Court under its power of judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring the instant case to the court. Consequently, petitioners' direct recourse to this Court is premature.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 e. SAMPAYAN V DAZA (G.R. No. 103903, September 11, 1992) ROMERO, J. FACTS: On February 18, 1992, petitioners, filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking to disqualify respondent RaulDaza, then incumbent congressman, from continuing to exercise the functions of his office, on the ground that the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of the United States since October 16, 1974.Petitioners allege that Mr.Daza has not renounced his status as permanent resident.Petitioners manifested that on April 2, 1992, they filed a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify respondent Daza from running in the recent May 11, 1992 elections on the basis of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and that the instant petition is concerned with the unlawful assumption of office by respondent Daza from June 30, 1987 until June 30, 1992. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member of the House of Representatives for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code RULING: No. The prohibition case should be dismissed because this case is already moot and academic for the reason that petitioners seek to unseat respondent from his position forthe duration of his term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992. Moreover the jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal and a writ of prohibition can no longer be issued against respondent since his term has already expired. Furthermore as a de facto public officer, respondent cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office becaus e his acts are as valid as those of a dejure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 f. AQUINO V COMELEC (G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995) KAPUNAN, J. FACTS: On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. He provided in his certificate that he has resided for 10 months in Makati. Move Makati, a duly ed political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD--UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for Congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution which requires: should be for a period not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections. On May 8, 1995, the elections were held and the petitioner, Agapito Aquino, garnered 38,547 votes against another candidate, Agusto Syjuco, who obtained 35,910 votes. However, his victory was suspended by COMELEC due to the case. On June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution reversing the resolution of the Second Division dated May 6, 1995 and declared Aquino ineligible and thus disqualified as a candidate for the Office of Representative of the Second Legislative District of Makati City. The petitioner claims that COMELEC lost its jurisdiction on May 8, 1995, election day, and that the original jurisdiction is in the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET), therefore COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion. ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC’s finding of noncompliance with the residency requirement of one year against the petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence. RULING: No. COMELEC assumes jurisdiction in all contests relative to the election returns and qualification of the candidates and the HRET only becomes applicable when the said candidate becomes a member of Senate or HOR. Thus, a candidate that was still not proclaimed is still not a member of HOR in compliance to Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution. Also, under Sec 6 of RA 6646, COMELEC has the power to proclaim a candidate to be suspended and thus has the capacity to not count the votes. The basis of this is RA 6646, Section 6: Effect of Disqualification Case: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. Furthermore, it also shows how the trial will not be terminated just because the candidate won the election giving then COMELEC jurisdiction outside election. The words “evidence of guilt is strong” in Sec. 6 of RA 6646 does not preclude the power of COMELEC to disqualification cases only but a further reading of Omnibus Election Code Sec 7 of RA 6646 also involve cases of ineligibility.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 g. VINZONS-CHATO V COMELEC (G.R. No. 172131, April 2, 2007) CALLEJO, SR., J. FACTS: Petitioner Chato and respondent Renato J. Unico were among the candidates for the lone congressional district of Camarines Norte during the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. On May 14, 2004, at 11:30 a.m., the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) proclaimed respondent Unico as representative-elect of the lone congressional district of Camarines Norte. On July 2, 2004, the COMELEC (First Division) ordered the suspension of the effects of the proclamation of respondent Unico. On July 23, 2004, it lifted the said order on the ground that respondent Unico’s proclamation and taking of oath of office had not only divested the Commission of any jurisdiction to upon his election, returns, and qualifications, but also automatically conferred jurisdiction to another electoral tribunal. Subsequently, the COMELEC (First Division) issued the Resolution dated April 13, 2005, dismissing the petition for lack of merit. It stated preliminarily that the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) is precluded from entertaining pre-proclamation controversies on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody, and appreciation of the election returns or certificates of canvass involving the positions of President, Vice-President, Senators, and of the House of Representatives and Party-List. The COMELEC (First Division) also held that the MBC or PBC had no discretion on matters pertaining to the proclamation of the winning candidates because they were simply performing a ministerial function. Absent a lawful order from the COMELEC to suspend or annul a proclamation, the PBC of Camarines Norte, in particular, was mandated to comply with its duties and functions including the proclamation of respondent Unico as the winning candidate for the lone congressional district of Camarines Norte. His petition was dismissed for utter lack of merit. Aggrieved, petitioner Chato filed a motion for reconsideration thereof which was elevated to the COMELEC en banc for resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of jurisdiction. RULING: No. In the assailed Resolution dated March 17, 2006, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner Chato’s motion for reconsideration ruling that the Commission already lost jurisdiction over the case since respondent Unico had already taken his oath as a Member of the Thirteenth (13th) Congress. It reasoned, thus: In Pangilinan vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 105278, November 18, 1993), the Supreme Court made a categorical pronouncement that: The Senate and the House of Representatives now have their respective Electoral Tribunals which are the “sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective , thereby divesting the Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973 Constitution over election cases pertaining to the election of the of the Batasang Pambansa (Congress). It follows that the COMELEC is now bereft of jurisdiction to hear and decide the preproclamation controversies against of the House of Representatives as well as of the Senate.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019

The Honorable Court reiterated the aforequoted ruling in the recent case of Aggabao vs. COMELEC, et al. (G.R. No. 163756, January 26, 2005), where it held that: The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns, and qualifications of of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. Considering that private respondent Renato Unico had already taken his oath and assumed office as member of the 13th Congress, the Commission had already lost jurisdiction over the case.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 h. BELLO V COMELEC (G.R. No. 191998, December 7, 2010) BRION, J. FACTS: AGPP filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the May 10, 2010 elections. Subsequently, It filed its Certificate of Nomination together with the Certificates of Acceptance of its nominees wherein the first nominee is Mike Arroyo. Several petitions for disqualification of Arroyo emerged but have been dismissed both by Comelec Second division and comelec en banc. In the interim, AGPP obtained in the May 10, 2010 elections the required percentage of votes sufficient to secure a single seat. This entitled Arroyo, as AGPP’s first nominee, to sit in the House of Representatives. He was proclaimed as AGPP’s dulyelected party-list representative in the House of Representatives. On the same day, Arroyo took his oath of office, as AGPP’s Representative. And, his name was, thereafter, entered in the Roll of of the House of Representatives.38 Thereafter two (2) separate petitions for quo warranto were filed with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) questioning Arroyo’s eligibility as AGPP’s representative in the House of Representatives. The HRET took cognizance of the petitions by issuing a Summons directing Arroyo to file his Answer to the two petitions. ISSUE: Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction over the question of Arroyo’s qualifications as AGPP’s nominee after his proclamation and assumption to office as a member of the House of Representatives. RULING: The consistent judicial holding is that the HRET has jurisdiction to upon the qualifications of party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of office; they are, for all intents and purposes, "elected " of the House of Representatives although the entity directly voted upon was their party. Hence, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. Since Arroyo, AGPP’s first nominee, has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the House of Representatives, Thus, following the lead of Abayon and Perez, we hold that the Court has no jurisdiction over the present petitions and that the HRET now has the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and rule upon Arroyo’s qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 i. VILANDO V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (G.R. No. 192147 & 192149. AUGUST 23, 2011) MENDOZA, J. FACTS: The petitioner Renald F. Vilando, as taxpayer, filed petitions for Quo Warranto, challenging the eligibility of Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong, who won the position of Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental. They contended that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and was ineligible for office, and that she was born to a father whose naturalization had not attained finality, and a mother whose citizenship has changed when she married. Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural born citizen, the naturalization of her father had already attained status of res judicata (a matter that has been adjudicated by a competent court and may not be pursued further by the same parties). HRET dismissed the petition on May 17, 2010. The petitioner contended that The petition for Quo Warranto is not a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father of Limkaichong because her father’s certificate of naturalization is of no force and effect; Limkaichong cannot derive her citizenship from her mother because of her marriage to her father; and as HRET has the plenary, absolute and exclusive jurisdiction over questions of eligibility of of the House of Representatives, the HRET can look into the eligibility of Limkaichong, and as incident thereto, look into the validity of her father’s certificate for naturalization. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition has merit. RULING: No, the expiration of Limkaichong’s term renders the question of her eligibility moot and academic. However, as citizenship is a continuing requirement for of the House of Representatives, the Court deems it appropriate to resolve the petition. Vilando’s contention which requires the Court to look into the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization of Limkaichong’sfather is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father, which can only be done through a direct action. It is true that HRET has complete and exclusive jurisdiction over such cases but it does carry the authority to delve into the legality of the grant of naturalization. Pursuant to par.1, Sec. 1, Article IV of governing law of 1935 Constitution, records disclosed that Limkaichong was born in Dumagete City to naturalizaed Filipino father, as a result, Limkaichong is a Filipino citizen. In the petitioner’s contention that her mother is no longer a Filipino when she married is without merit as her mother is natural born citizen and LImkaichong, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship, falling under par. 1, Sec. 1, Art. VI of the 1935 Constitution. Also, under par. 3, Sec. 1 of Article VI of the present Constitution, those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority are Filipino citizens. LImkaichong was deemed to elected Filipino citizenship informally when she participated in barangay elections as a young voter, and when she ran and won as Mayor of Negros Oriental.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 j. ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION (G.R. No. L-45081, JULY 15, 1936) LAUREL, J. FACTS: Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly ed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution. On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935. Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion. ISSUE: Whether or not the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly. RULING: No, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly. The Court denied the petition. The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe. The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a general power is conferred or duty ened, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 k. PEÑA V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (G.R. No. 123037, March 21, 1997) TORRES, JR., J. FACTS: Assailed herein is the October 12, 1995 Resolution1 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) dismissing the Petition Ad Cautelam of the Petitioner Teodoro Q. Peña in HRET Case No. 95-014. Petitioner questioned the election of the private respondent Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr. as Member of the House of Representatives representing the Second District of the province of Palawan. Petitioner and the private respondent were contenders for the said Congressional Office in the May 8, 1995 elections. On May 12, 1995, upon canvassing the votes cast, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Palawan proclaimed the private respondent as the winner. On May 22, Pena filed a petition AD CAUTELAM with the HRET, claiming that the elections in the 2nd district of Palawan were tainted with massive fraud, widespread vote buying, intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities committed before, during and after the voting, and during the counting of votes and the preparation of election returns and certificates of canvass which affected the results of the election. Because of these irregularities, Pena stated that he lost the election by almost 7k votes. He then assailed Abueg’s proclamation. Abueg filed an answer and a motion to dismiss on June 23, averring that the HRET has not acquired jurisdiction over the petition, the same being insufficient in form and substance. In essence, the motion to dismiss anchors its challenge on the fact that the petition failed to allege the precincts where the massive fraud and disenfranchisement of voters occurred, nor did it point out how many votes would be gained by the protestant as a result of the same. Pena later submitted a list of specific contested precincts on July 10, or 17 days after Abueg’s answer. In October, the HRET ruled that while it had jurisdiction over the petition, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election returns and qualifications of the of the House of Representatives, the said petition, however, fails to state a cause of action, and is therefore, insufficient in form and substance, meriting its dismissal. Pena filed a petition for certiorari with the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the HRET committed great abuse of discretion in dismissing Pena’s petition ad cuatelam for lack of substance. RULING: No, A perusal of the petition reveals that petitioner makes no specific mention of the precincts where widespread election, fraud and irregularities occurred. This is a fatal omission, as it goes into the very substance of the protest. The prescription that the petition must be sufficient in form and substance means that the petition must be more than merely rhetorical. If the allegations contained therein are uned by even the faintest whisper of authority in fact and law, then there is no other course than to dismiss the petition, otherwise, the assumption of an elected public official may, and will always be held up by petitions of this sort by the losing candidate. The defect in the instant case arises from the failure to allege the contested precincts. Only a bare allegation of “massive fraud, widespread intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities,” without specification and substantiation of where and how these occurrences took place, appears in the petition.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 We cannot allow an election protest based on such flimsy averments to prosper, otherwise, the whole election process will deteriorate into an endless stream of crabs pulling at each other, racing to disembark from the water.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 9. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS a. Daza v. Singson (G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989) CRUZ, J. FACTS: After the congressional elections, House of Representatives proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments among the several political parties. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party. Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives. Twenty four of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party and ed the LDP, reducing their former party to only 17 . The petitioner challenged his removal from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. ISSUE: Whether or not the realignment will validly change the composition of the Commission on Appointments. RULING: Yes. In Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution: Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations ed under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the . The authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its hip. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another. The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 b. Coseteng v. Mitra (G.R. No. 86649, July 12, 1990) GRIÑO-AQUINO, J. FACTS: The congressional elections resulted in the election to the House of Representatives of the candidates of diverse political parties such as the PDP-Laban, Lakas ng Bansa (LB), Liberal Party (LP), NP-Unido, Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan (KBL), Panaghiusa, Kababaihan Para sa Inang Bayan (KAIBA), and some independents. Petitioner Anna Dominique M.L. Coseteng was the only candidate elected under the banner of KAIBA. A year later the "Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino" (LDP, for brevity) was organized as a political party. As 158 out of 202 of the House of Representatives formally affliated with the LDP, the House committees, including the House representation in the Commission on Appointments, had to be reorganized. The House of Representatives revised the House majority hip in the Commission on Appointments to conform with the new political alignments. Coseteng and her party, the KAIBA, filed this Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs to declare as null and void the election of respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan, Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and Singson, as of the Commission on Appointments, to en them from acting as such and to en also the other respondents from recognizing them as of the Commission on Appointments on the theory that their election to that Commission violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation. ISSUE: Whether the of the House in the Commission on Appointments were chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. RULING: Yes. The revision of the House representation in the Commission on Appointments is based on proportional representation of the political. parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution The composition of the House hip in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties in the House. There are 160 of the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House hip (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 in the Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 , which may be rounded out to ten (10) from the LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House hip in the Commission on Appointments was done "on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein."

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 c. Guingona v. Gonzales (G.R. No. 106971, October 20, 1992) CAMPOS, JR., J. FACTS: After elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKASNUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) / Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 for LDP, 2.5 for NPC, 1.5 for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Guingona, filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prohibit the respondent Senate President Neptali Gonzales, as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission on Appointments, from recognizing the hip of Senators Alberto Romulo as the eighth senator elected by the LDP, and Wigberto L. Tañada, as the lone member representing the LP-PDP-LABAN, in the Commission on Appointments, on the ground that the proposed compromise of Senator Tolentino was violative of the rule of proportional representation, and that it is the right of the minority political parties in the Senate, consistent with the Constitution, to combine their fractional representation in the Commission on Appointments to complete one seat therein, and to decide who, among the senators in their ranks, shall be additionally nominated and elected thereto. ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a party’s representation in the CoA. RULING: No. The political parties represented in the Senate is as follows: LDP- 7.5, LP-PDP-LABAN .5, NPC - 2.5, and LAKAS-NUCD - 1.5. Based on Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution question is the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. Converting a fractional half hip into a whole hip of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 is a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that hip in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political parties. In so doing one other party's fractional hip was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter's representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 d. Drilon v. De Venecia and Madrigal v. Villar (G.R. No. 180055, July 31, 2009) CARPIO MORALES, J. FACTS: Drilon et al. went to respondent then Speaker Jose de Venecia to ask for one seat for theLiberal Party in the CA. Speaker Jose de Venecia merely said that he would study their demand. During the session of the House of Representatives, Tañada requested from the House leadership one seat in the CA for the Liberal Party. Respondents filed for dismissal of the petition. In the meantime, Senator Madrigal sent letters to Villar and Nograles claiming that the composition of the Senate and House in the CoA violated the constitutional requirement of proportional representation. She requested for the reorganization of the hip of CoA. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is the proper party concerned. RULING: No. The first petition has been rendered moot with the designation of a Liberal Party as member of the House contingent. Senator Madrigal failed to show that she sustained a direct injury as a result of the act complained of. Her petition does not allege that she (or her political party) was deprived of a seat in the CoA, or that she or her party possess personal and substantial interest to confer with her locus standi.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 VIII. POWERS OF CONGRESS 1. CONCEPT a. Gonzales v. Hechanova (G.R. No. L-21897, October 22 1963) CONCEPCION, J. FACTS: During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the National Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals or rice. Hence, the then Executive Secretary, Rufino Hechanova, authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Ramon Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction”, because Republic Act 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by “the Rice and Corn istration or any other government agency. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by Macapagal. RULING: Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only its, but, also, insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up. As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in “All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question”. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 2. ONE SUBJECT RULE a. TIO v. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY COMMISSION (G.R. No. L-75697, June 18, 1987) MELENCIO-HERRERA, J. FACTS: Petitioner Valentin Tio assails the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Broad” with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. He attacks the constitutionality of the decree on the ground that ‘Sec. 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local government is a rider and the same is not germane to the subject matter thereof.’ ISSUE: WON the tax provision of PD 1987 is a ‘rider’. RULING: NO. The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the decree, which is the regulation of the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation, it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the decree. The title of the decree, which is the creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the decree.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 b. PHILCONSA V. GIMENEZ (G.R. No. L-23326, December 18, 1965) REGALA, J. FACTS: Petitioner Philippine Constitution Association Inc. (PHILCONSA) filed this petition to restrain the Auditor General of the Philippines and the disbursing officers of both Houses of Congress from "ing in audit the vouchers, and from counterg the checks or treasury warrants for the payment to any former Senator or former Member of the House of Representatives of retirement and vacation gratuities pursuant to Republic Act No. 3836; and likewise restraining the respondent disbursing officers of the House and Senate, respectively, and their successors in office from paying the said retirement and vacation gratuities." One of petitioner’s arguments is that the provision for the retirement of the and certain officers of Congress is not expressed in the title of the bill, in violation of Section 21 (1) of Art. VI of the Constitution. The title gives no inkling or notice whatsoever to the public regarding the retirement gratuities and commutable vacation and sick leave privileges to the of Congress. Title of RA 3836: "AN ACT AMENDING SUBSECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX” ISSUE: WON the title of RA 3836 is germane to the subject matter expressed in the act. RULING: NO. The succeeding paragraph of Republic Act No. 3836 refers to of Congress and to elective officers thereof who are not of the Government Service Insurance System. To provide retirement benefits, therefore, for these officials, would relate to subject matter, not germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186. In the light of the history and analysis of RA 3836, the Court concludes that the title of said law is void as it is not germane to the subject matter and is a violation of the aforementioned paragraph 1, section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 c. LIDASAN V. COMELEC (G.R. No. L-28089, October 25, 1967) SANCHEZ, J. FACTS: Petitioner Bara Lidasan, resident and tax payer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections prays that RA 4790, which is entitled “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur” be declared unconstitutional and that COMELEC resolutions implementing the same for electoral purposes be nullified. RA 4790 transferred twelve barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato to the province of Lanao del Sur. ISSUE: WON RA 4790 is constitutional. RULING: NO. Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political divisions, which legislative purpose is not expressed in the title, were likewise declared unconstitutional. Suggestion was made to salvage said law since the limited title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in the province of Lanao del Sur, however, the totality of 21 barrios was in the mind of the proponent thereof, and the Court may not now say that Congress intended to create Dianaton with only nine out of twenty-one barrios, with a seat of government still left to be conjectured, for this unduly stretches judicial interpretation of congressional intent beyond credibility point, and to do so indeed, is to the line which circumscribes the judiciary and tread on legislative premises. RA 4790 is inseparable and it is accordingly null and void in its totality.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 d. CHIONGBIAN V. ORBOS (G.R. No. 96754, June 22, 1995) MENDOZA, J. FACTS: These suits challenge the validity of a Art. XIX, Sec. 13 of the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (R.A. No. 6734), authorizing the President of the Philippines to "merge" by istrative determination the regions remaining after the establishment of the Autonomous Region, and the EO 429 issued by the President Corazon Aquino pursuant to such authority, "Providing for the Reorganization of istrative Regions in Mindanao." ISSUE: WON the power granted to the President is not expressed in the title of the RA 6734. RULING: YES. The reorganization of the remaining istrative regions is germane to the general subject of R.A. No. 6734, which is the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The constitutional requirement that "every bill ed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" has always been given a practical rather than a technical construction. The title is not required to be an index of the content of the bill. It is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all provisions are germane to that subject.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 e. MARIANO V. COMELEC (G.R. No. L-118577, March 7, 1995) PUNO, J. FACTS: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7854 - “An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati.” One of the arguments of the petitioners is that Sec. 52 of said RA increases the legislative district of Makati, which was not expressed in the title of the bill. ISSUE: W/N RA 7854 failed to comply with the one subject rule. RULING: NO. The policy of the Court favors the liberal construction of the one title-one subject rules so as not to impede legislation. The Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. It should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject. There is compliance to the one title-one subject rule if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 f. TATAD V. SECRETARY OF ENERGY (G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997 PUNO, J. FACTS: Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of RA 8180 - An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes. The law imposes tariff duty on imported crude oil at the rate of 3% and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of 7%. One of the arguments of the petitioners is that the inclusion of the tariff provision violates Sec. 26 (1) of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its title. It argues that such provision is foreign to the subject of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. ISSUE: W/N such provision failed to comply with the one subject rule. RULING: NO. This Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one title-one subject rule. The title need not mirror, fully index, or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general method and means of carrying the general subject. Providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of RA 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 g. LACSON V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999) MARTINEZ, J. FACTS: 11 persons believed to be of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, and organized crime syndicated involved in bank robberies in Manila, were slain along Commonwealth Avenue by the AntiBank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). An information came that what transpired is actually is a summary execution and not a shoot our. Panfilo Lacson, petitioner, was among those charged as principal in 11 informations for murder before the Sandiganbayan. After reinvestigation, 11 amended informations were filed, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory. The accused now question the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as it is limited only to cases where one or more of the principal accused are government officials with SG 27 or higher, or PNP officials with a rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. During the pendency of the resolution, a law (RA 8249) was ed defining or expanding the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan deleting the word “principal” from the “principal accused.” Hence, the Sandiganbayan itted the Amended Informations. Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of RA 8249, an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.One of the arguments is that the title of the law is misleading, which actually expands rather than define the old Sandiganbayan law, thereby violating the one title-one subject requirement for the age of statutes. ISSUE: W/N RA 8249 failed to comply with the one subject rule. RULING: NO. The challenged law does not violate the one title-one subject provision of the Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the law that it “defines” the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to “expand” is jurisdiction. The expansion in the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary consequence of the amendments.The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 h. FARINAS V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003) CALLEJO, SR., J. FACTS: Petitioners question the constitutionality of Sec. 14 of RA 9006 - The Fair Election Act (An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful, and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices). According to petitioner, the inclusion of Sec. 14 repealing Sec. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code constitutes a proscribed rider. They point out the dissimilarity in the 2 statutes. RA 9006 deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while the OEC imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned upon filing of COC. The repeal is thus not embraced in the title nor germane to the subject matter of RA 9006. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 14 of RA 9006 is a proscribed rider insofar as it was not included in the title of the statute. RULING: NO. The proscription provided in the Constitution is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious and unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title. To determine whether there has been compliance, it is sufficient that the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth.The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of the OEC within its contemplation. This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions no matter how diverse so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 i. CAWALING V. COMELEC (G.R. No. 146319, October 26, 2001) SANDOVAL, J. FACTS: Petitioner Benjamin Cawaling assails R.A. No. 8806 entitled “An Act Creating the City of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor” since it contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule of the Constitution. Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 8806 actually embraces two principal subjects which are: (1) the creation of the City of Sorsogon, and (2) the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. While the title of the Act sufficiently informs the public about the creation of Sorsogon City, petitioner claims that no such information has been provided on the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. ISSUE: WON RA 8806 is constitutional. RULING: YES. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, there is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable consequence of the merger. Otherwise put, it is the necessary means by which the City of Sorsogon was created. Hence, the title of the law, "An Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by Merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon, and Appropriating Funds Therefor," cannot be said to exclude the incidental effect of abolishing the two municipalities, nor can it be considered to have deprived the public of fair information on this consequence.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 j. GIRON V. COMELEC (G.R. No. 188179, January 22, 2013) SERENO, CJ. FACTS: Petitioner Henry Giron assails the constitutionality of Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing Clause) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9006, otherwise known as the Fair Election Act. Giron asserts that the insertion of both sections in the Fair Election Act violates the Art. VI, Sec. 26 (1) of the 1987 Constitution. ” Petitioner avers that these provisions are unrelated to the main subject of the Fair Election Act: the lifting of the political ad ban. Section 12 refers to the treatment of the votes cast for substituted candidates after the official ballots have been printed, while Section 14 pertains to the repeal of Section 67 (Candidates holding elective office) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code. Section 67 of this law concerns the ipso facto resignation of elective officials immediately after they file their respective certificates of candidacy for an office other than that which they are currently holding in a permanent capacity. ISSUE: WON the inclusion of the sections violates the “one subject-one title” rule. RULING: NO. Petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention were unable to present a compelling reason that would sur the strong presumption of validity and constitutionality in favor of the Fair Election Act. They have not put forward any gripping justification to reverse our ruling in Fariñas, in which we have already ruled that the title and the objectives of R.A. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include subjects other than the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda. Moreover, the Congress consciously looked for a more generic title in order to express the thrust of the law. Such can be construed in the Bicameral Conference Committee deliberations (the case has an excerpt of the discussion). The Congress did not limit the law to the lifting of the political ad ban. After combing through various laws, they found other election practices that they considered inequitable. Some of these practices included the appreciation of the votes cast in case of a late substitution of candidates and the ipso facto resignation of certain elective officials upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy. Thus, to "level the playing field," Congress fashioned a law that would address what they determined were unfair election practices; hence, the birth of the Fair Election Act. After a careful analysis of the foregoing, the Court finds that the assailed sections are indeed germane to the subject expressed in the title of RA 9006: R.A. 9006: An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices. The title was worded broadly enough to include the measures embodied in the assailed sections.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 k. IMBONG V. OCHOA (G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014) MENDOZA, J. FACTS: The RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide information on the full range of modern family planning methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception, women's health and population control. The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. One of the many arguments against it is that it violates the one subject-one bill rule provision of the Constitution. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent — to act as a population control measure. ISSUE: W/N the law violates the one subject-one bill rule provision. RULING: NO, the law does not violate the one subject-one bill rule provision. A textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act." Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its , the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 3. ORIGIN OF BILLS; THREE READINGS a. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance (G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994) MENDOZA, J. FACTS: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its istration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds. One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not 3 readings as required by the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution RULING: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not 3 readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is ed by the weight of legislative practice.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 b. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance (G.R. No. 115455, October 30, 1995) MENDOZA, J. FACTS: The present case involves motions seeking reconsideration of the Court’s decision dismissing the petitions for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. The motions, of which there are 10 in all, have been filed by the several petitioners. The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI) contends that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred, “even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional”, citing in of the case of Murdock v. Pennsylvania. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Invc., (CREBA), on the other hand, asserts that R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts, (2) classifies transactions as covered or exempt without reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule that taxes should be uniform and equitable and that Congress shall “evolve a progressive system of taxation”. Further, the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP), argues that legislature was to adopt a definite policy of granting tax exemption to cooperatives that the present Constitution embodies provisions on cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT would, therefore, be to infringe a constitutional policy. ISSUE: Whether or not, based on the aforementioned grounds of the petitioners, the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law should be declared unconstitutional. RULING: No. With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the law granted the press a privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. The reason is simple: by granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax burden to which other businesses have long ago been subject. The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the law does not discriminate against the press because “even nondiscriminatory taxation on constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional.” The Court was speaking in that case (Murdock v. Pennsylvania) of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right. The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution. Anent the first contention of CREBA, it has been held in an early case that even though such taxation may affect particular contracts, as it may increase the debt of one person and lessen the security of another, or may impose additional burdens upon one class and release the burdens of

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 another, still the tax must be paid unless prohibited by the Constitution, nor can it be said that it impairs the obligation of any existing contract in its true legal sense. It is next pointed out that while Section 4 of R.A. No. 7716 exempts such transactions as the sale of agricultural products, food items, petroleum, and medical and veterinary services, it grants no exemption on the sale of real property which is equally essential. The sale of food items, petroleum, medical and veterinary services, etc., which are essential goods and services was already exempt under Section 103, pars. (b) (d) (1) of the NIRC before the enactment of R.A. No. 7716. Petitioner is in error in claiming that R.A. No. 7716 granted exemption to these transactions while subjecting those of petitioner to the payment of the VAT. Finally, it is contended that R.A. No. 7716 also violates Art. VI, Section 28(1) which provides that “The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation”. Nevertheless, equality and uniformity of taxation mean that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation. To satisfy this requirement it is enough that the statute or ordinance applies equally to all persons, firms, and corporations placed in similar situation. Furthermore, the Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like the VAT, are regressive. What it simply provides is that Congress shall “evolve a progressive system of taxation.” The constitutional provision has been interpreted to mean simply that “direct taxes are . . . to be preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect taxes should be minimized.” The mandate to Congress is not to prescribe, but to evolve, a progressive tax system.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 c. Alvarez v. Guingona (G.R. No. 118303, January 31, 1996) HERMOSISIMA, JR., J. FACTS: In April 1993, House Bill 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago) was ed in the House of Representatives. In May 1993, a Senate Bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that of HB 8817 was introduced in the Senate. In January 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February 1994, the Senate conducted a public hearing on SB 1243. In March 1994, the Senate Committee on Local Government rolled out its recommendation for approval of HB 8817 as it was totally the same with SB 1243. Eventually, HB 8817 became a law (RA 7720). Now Senator Heherson Alvarez et al are assailing the constitutionality of the said law on the ground that the bill creating the law did not originate from the lower house and that City of Santiago was not able to comply with the income of at least P20M per annum in order for it to be a city. That in the computation of the reported average income of P20,974,581.97, the IRA was included which should not be. ISSUE: Whether or not considering that the Senate ed SB 1243, its own version of HB 8817, RA 7720 can be said to have originated in the House of Representatives RULING: Yes. Bills of local application are required to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. Petitioners contend that since a bill of the same import was ed in the Senate, it cannot be said to have originated in the House of Representatives. Such is untenable because it cannot be denied that the HB was filed first (18 Apr 1993). The SB was filed 19 May. The HB was approved on third reading 17 Dec, and was transmitted to the Senate 28 Jan 1994. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House of Representatives, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Court said that what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 that, elected as they are from the districts, the of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 d. Arroyo v. De Venecia (G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997) MENDOZA, J. FACTS: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionallymandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was ed in violation of the rules of the House RULING: Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved. In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court. The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 e. Arroyo v. De Venecia (G.R. No. 127255, June 26, 1998) MENDOZA, J. FACTS: The petitioners are challenging the validity of R.A. 8420 (amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing “Sin Taxes”) by filing a petition for for certiorari and/or prohibition. They claim that respondents violated the rules of the House which are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution when the Chair of the Committee (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) allegedly ignored a privileged question raised by Rep. Arroyo during the committee report for the approval of R.A. 8420. Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of the transcript of this portion of Rep. Arroyo's interpellation: (1)the transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall (2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 21, 1996 (3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 28, 1996 (4) the published version Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. This contention was invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from interference by courts. In this case, petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review. ISSUE: Whether or not the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240 affects its validity? RULING: The petition was dismissed. According to the findings of the court, the alleged violations are merely internal rules of procedures rather than what petitioners claim to be constitutional requirements for enacting laws. In this case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 4. APPROVAL OF BILLS; VETO a. BOLINAO ELECTRONICS v. VALENCIA (G.R. No. L-20740, June 30, 1964) BARRERA, J. FACTS: This is an original petition for prohibition, mandatory injunction with preliminary injunction filed by the Bolinao Electronics Corporation, Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc., and Monserrat Broadcasting System, Inc., owners and operators of radio and television stations enumerated therein, against respondents Secretary of Public Works and Communications and Acting Chief of the Radio Control Division. Later the Republic of the Philippines, as operator of the Philippine Broadcasting Service, sought and was allowed to intervene in this case, said interveners having been granted a construction permit to install and operate a television station in Manila. Petitioners applications for renewal of their station licenses were denied because it should be filed two month before the expiration of the license. Pursuant to Section 3 of Act 3846, as amended by Republic Act 584, on the powers and duties of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications (formerly Commerce And Communications), he may approve or disapprove any application for renewal of station or operator license, provided, however, That no application for renewal shall bed is approved without giving the licensee a hearing. Thus the notices of hearing were sent by respondents to petitioners. Clearly, the intention of the investigation is to find out whether there is ground to disapprove the applications for renewal. According to petitioner however, the violation has ceased to exist when the act of late filing was condoned or pardoned by respondents by the issuance of the circular dated July 24, 1962.The lone reason given for the investigation of petitioners' applications, i.e., late filing thereof, is therefore no longer tenable. The violation, in legal effect, ceased to exist and, hence, there is no reason nor need for the present investigation. They were summoned by Valencia, then Secretary of Communications, for operating even after their permit has expired. Valencia claimed that because of CBN’s continued operation sans license and their continuing operation had caused damage to his department. ISSUE: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages. RULING: In the case at bar, the issuance of the said circular, the lone reason given for the investigation of petitioners' applications, i.e., late filing thereof, is therefore no longer tenable. The violation, in legal effect, ceased to exist and, hence, there is no reason nor need for the present investigation. There was no express agreement there was abandonment or renunciation by the Chronicle Broadcasting Network (CBN) of channel 9 in favor of PBS. The only basis of the contention of the respondents that there was such renunciation is the statement "Channel 10 assigned in lieu of Channel 9", appearing in the construction permit to transfer television station DZXL-TV from Quezon City to Baguio City, issued to petitioner. This statement alone, however, does not establish any agreement between the radio control authority and the station operator, on the switch or change of operations of CBN from Channel 9 to Channel 10.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any right of his has been violated by the refusal of Chronicle Broadcasting Network to cease operation. Further, the Supreme Court noted that as the records show, the appropriation to operate the Philippine Broadcasting Service as approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the Republic of the Philippines does not allow appropriations for TV stations particularly in Luzon. Hence, since there was no appropriation allotted then there can be no damage; and if there are expenditures made by Valencia’s department they are in fact in violation of the law and they cannot claim damages therefrom. And even if it is shown that the then President vetoed this provision of the Budget Act, this gives rise to the question of whether the President may legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill. The executive's veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever, and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains. Any expenditure made by the intervener PBS, for the purpose of installing or operating a television station in Manila, where there are already television stations in operation, would be in violation of the express condition for the release of the appropriation and, consequently, null and void. It is not difficult to see that even if it were able to prove its right to operate on Channel 9, said intervener would not have been entitled to reimbursement of its illegal expenditures.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 b. Gonzales v. Macaraig (G.R. No 87636, November 19, 1990 Melencio–Herrera, J. FACTS: Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Cory’s veto of Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY ’89, and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY ’90). Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the President’s line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) which are provision; (2) when the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power. ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to veto `provisions’ of an Appropriations Bill. RULING: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as “item,” which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and rules that even assuming arguendo that “provisions” are beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) were not “provisions” in the budgetary sense of the term, they are “inappropriate provisions” that should be treated as “items” for the purpose of the President’s veto power. Article 6 Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution has 2 parts, a.) President generally can veto the entire bill as exercise of her power and b.) president shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue of tariff bill but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object. Court ruled the constitutionality of the presidential veto and the petition was DISMISSED.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 c. BENGZON v. DRILON (G.R. 103524, April 15, 1992) Gutierrez, J. FACTS: In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were “repealed” during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and of the constitutional commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize retirement benefits among government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not give preferential treatment to certain or select government officials. Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court asking the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was one of those unpublished PDs which were subject of the case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions. Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992, Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the allotment in the following manner: Congress made an item entitled: “General Fund Adjustment”; included therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations in different branches of the government; among such obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary. However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the retired justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297. This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President was represented by then Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon. ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional. RULING: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws. The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary ot its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Pursuant to constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices on the ground that there should be no grant of distinct privileges or “preferential treatment” to retired

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution and in effect asks that these Constitutional provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be repealed. The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It appears that in the same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the others. This cannot be done. The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this case, the president did not veto the entire line item of the general adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the portion which pertained to the pensions of the justices but did not veto the other items covering obligations to the other departments of the government. The petition is granted and the questioned veto is illegal and the provisions of 1992 GAA are declared valid and subsisting.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 d. PHILCONSA v. ENRIQUEZ (G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994) QUIASON, J. FACTS: This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the president involving the General Appropriations Bill of 1994 as well as the constitutionality of the pork barrel. The Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said that Congress can only allocate funds but they cannot specify the items as to which those funds would be applied for since that is already the function of the executive. In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAB of 1994, neither house of congress took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Wigberto Tañada and Alberto Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona et al. Tañada et al contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAB of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU’s, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA). ISSUE: Whether or not the President’s veto is valid. RULING: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power and that the CDF is constitutional. In the Tañada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the others. Veto on special provisions The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs Macaraig. The president particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994 commenting that the scheme is already taken cared of by other legislation and may be more properly addressed by revising the debt policy. He, however did not delete the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Tañada et al averred that the president cannot validly veto that provision w/o vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The veto of the president herein is sustained for the vetoed provision is considered “inappropriate”; in fact the Sc found that such provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act making the legislation as a log-rolling legislation. Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s), the President vetoed special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds was likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there were already funds allotted for the same in the National expenditure Program. Tañada et al claimed this as unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is valid for it is in compliant to the “One Fund Policy” – it avoided double funding and redundancy.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 Veto of provision on 70% (istrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a breach of contractual obligations. The funds if allotted may result to abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled that this Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended – 70% by istrative and 30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as they are “appropriate” in the budgetary sense. The veto herein is then not valid. Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, “shall effectively alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment deemed necessary to modernize the AFP”. The SC affirmed the veto. Any provision blocking an istrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being “inappropriate” provisions. Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered by direct appropriations specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The SC retained the veto per reasons provided by the president. Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU’s Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU’s including the payment of separation benefits. The President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to the item on the CAFGU’s shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. The SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided by the president. Further, if this provision is allowed the it would only lead to the repeal of said existing laws. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc In his veto message: “The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction prescribed under Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitutional which states that ‘no elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation unless specifically authorized by law.’ I am, therefore, confident that the heads of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the well-established principle on compensation standardization. Tañada et al claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated the independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In the first place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect compensation can only be given pursuant to law. In

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 the second place, such statements are mere reminders that the disbursements of appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities. Pork Barrel Constitutional The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The Congressmen, being representatives of their local districts know more about the problems in their constituents areas than the national government or the president for that matter. Hence, with that knowledge, the Congressmen are in a better position to recommend as to where funds should be allocated.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 5. APPROPRIATION a. TESDA v. COA (G.R. No. 196148, February 10, 2015) Bersamin, J. FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari 1 with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to annul Decision No. 2012-210 2 of the Commission on Audit (COA). The COA disallowed payments of EME by the TESDA to its officials. The audit team disallowed the payment of EME amounting to P5,498,706.60 for being in excess of the amount allowed in the 2004-2007 GAAs. It was further discovered that EME were disbursed to TESDA officials whose positions were not of equivalent ranks as authorized by the Department of Budget and Management. TESDA, through Director-General Augusto Boboy Syjuco, Jr., appealed and argued that the 2004-2007 GAAs and the Government ing and Auditing Manual allowed the grant of EME from both the General Fund and the TESDP Fund provided the legal ceiling was not exceeded for each fund. TESDA argued further that the General Fund and the TESDP Fund are distinct from each other, and TESDA officials designated as project officers concurrently with their regular functions were entitled to separate EME from both funds. The COA denied the appeal for lack of merit prompting TESDA, through its Director-General to file a petition for review with COA. The same was denied. The COA ruled that failure of TESDA officials to conform to the 2004-2007 GAAs negated their claim of good faith. Hence this petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to annul COA decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the COA properly disallow the payment of excessive EME by TESDA. RULING: Yes. COA did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it disallowed the disbursement of EME to TESDA officials for being excessive and unauthorized by law. Provisions in the GAA are clear in stating that the EME shall not exceed the amount fixed therein. Those entitled to claim EME not exceeding the amount provided in the GAA are as follows: (1) the officials named in the GAA, (2) the officers of equivalent rank as may be authorized by the DBM, (3) and the offices under them. However, TESDA had a different interpretation of the law. It contends that there was no prohibition under the 2004-2007 GAAs regarding the additional EME chargeable against TESDP Fund. This argument deserves scant consideration. It is worth noting that TESDA, an instrumentality of the government established under the TESDA Act of 1994, is accorded with budget for its implementation which is included in its annual GAA. The TESDP Fund, which is being sourced from the Treasury, belongs to the government. The Constitution provides that, o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.No law was pointed out by TESDA authorizing it to grant additional reimbursement for EME from the TESDP Fund, contrary to the explicit requirement in the Constitution and the law. The Director-General blatant violation of the clear provisions of the Constitution, the 20042007 GAAs and the COA circulars is equivalent to gross negligence amounting to bad faith. Hence, he is required to refund the EME he received from the TESDP Fund for himself. TESDA officials, on

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 the other hand, who had no participation in the approval of the excessive EME acted in good faith and they need not refund the excess EME they received.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 b. COMELEC v. Quijano-Padilla (G.R. No. 151991, September 18, 2002) SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. FACTS: Pursuant to Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the "Voter's Registration Act of 1996," providing for the modernization and computerization of the voters' registration list and the appropriation of funds therefor "in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters," the COMELEC issued invitations to pre-qualify and bid for the supply and installations of information technology equipment and ancillary services for its VRIS Project. Private respondent Photokina Marketing Corporation (PHOTOKINA) pre-qualified and was allowed to participate as one of the bidders. After the public bidding was conducted, PHOTOKINA's bid in the amount of P6.588 Billion Pesos garnered the highest total weighted score and was declared the winning bidder. However, under Republic Act No. 8760, the budget appropriated by Congress for the COMELEC's modernization project was only One (1) Billion Pesos and that the actual available funds under the Certificate of Availability of Funds (CAF) issued by the Chief ant of the COMELEC was only P1.2 Billion Pesos. Then COMELEC Chairman Harriet O. Demetriou issued a memorandum to the COMELEC en banc expressing her objections to the contract. On February 2, 2001, the term of former Chairman Demetriou and those of Commissioners Julio F. Desamito and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores expired. Appointed as their successors were petitioners Alfredo L. Benipayo as Chairman and Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. as Commissioners. Chairman Benipayo, through various press releases and public statements, announced that the VRIS Project has been "scrapped, dropped, junked, or set aside," He further announced his plan to "re-engineer" the entire modernization program of the COMELEC, emphasizing his intention to replace the VRIS Project with his own version, the "Triple E Vision." Unsatisfied with the adverse turn of events, PHOTOKINA filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 215, Quezon City a petition for mandamus, prohibition and damages against the COMELEC and all its Commissioners. On December 19, 2001, respondent Judge Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla issued the first assailed Resolution granting PHOTOKINA's application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction. On February 8, 2002, respondent judge issued the second assailed Resolution denying the COMELEC's Omnibus Motion and, this time, granting PHOTOKINA's application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in behalf of then COMELEC Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo and Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. ISSUE: WON the Commission On Elections is justified in refusing to formalize the contract; prudence dictated the commission not to enter into a contract not backed up by sufficient appropriation and available funds. RULING: Yes. Petitioners are justified in refusing to formalize the contract with PHOTOKINA. Prudence dictated them not to enter into a contract not backed up by sufficient appropriation and available funds. Definitely, to act otherwise would be a futile exercise for the contract would inevitably suffer the vice of nullity. Verily, the contract, as expressly declared by law, is inexistent and void ab initio.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 This is to say that the proposed contract is without force and effect from the very beginning or from its incipiency, as if it had never been entered into, and hence, cannot be validated either by lapse of time or ratification.||| While this is not the proceeding to determine where the culpability lies, however, the constitutional mandate cited above constrains us to remind all public officers that public office is a public trust and all public officers must at all times be able to the people. The authority of public officers to enter into government contracts is circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. In the exercise of their contracting prerogative, they should be the first judges of the legality, propriety and wisdom of the contract they entered into. They must exercise a high degree of caution so that the Government may not be the victim of ill-advised or improvident action. In fine, we rule that PHOTOKINA, though the winning bidder, cannot compel the COMELEC to formalize the contract. Since PHOTOKINA's bid is beyond the amount appropriated by Congress for the VRIS Project, the proposed contract is not binding upon the COMELEC and is considered void; and that in issuing the questioned preliminary writs of mandatory and prohibitory injunction and in not dismissing Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405, respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court set aside the assailed orders of the trial court. The Court ruled that mandamus does not lie to enforce the performance of contractual obligations. In the case at bar, the alleged contract relied upon by PHOTOKINA as source of its rights which it seeks to be protected, is being disputed, not only on the ground that it was not perfected but also because it was illegal and against public policy. The Court also ruled that petitioners were justified in refusing to formalize the contract with PHOTOKINA. Prudence dictated them not to enter into a contract not backed up by sufficient appropriation and available funds. Definitely, to act otherwise would be a futile exercise for the contract would inevitably suffer the vice of nullity. There is no way that the COMELEC could enter into a contract with PHOTOKINA whose accepted bid was way beyond the amount appropriated by law for the project. That being the case, the Bid Awards Committee should have rejected the bid for being excessive or should have withdrawn the Notice of Award on the ground that in the eyes of the law, the same is null and void.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 c. Araullo v. Aquino (G.R. No. 209187, July 1, 2014) BERSAMIN, J. FACTS: Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) which was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court). Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA. Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators. This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded. This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was: DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively). ISSUE: Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution). RULING: No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP. There is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 But, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies. Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis. The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25 (5),supra,must be made upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices; (2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective offices; and (3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices. On the issue of what are “savings” These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as “savings” by the Executive particularly by the DBM.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 d. Belgica v. Ochoa (G.R. No. 208566, November 11, 2013) PERLAS-BERNABE, J. FACTS: The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned. Presidential Pork Barrel. The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983. Pork Barrel Scam Controversy. Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al. Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system. ISSUES: I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional. II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional. RULING: I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates the following principles: a. Separation of Powers, b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power, c. Principle of Checks and Balances, d. Local Autonomy. The 2013 PDAF Article congers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, which violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation. This is lodged in the Congress (Sec. 29 par. 1 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution). The individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate how much from such fund would go to a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. The constitution does not allow this. II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid. The Supreme Court ruled that PD 910,which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit: (i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees,among others, collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource development and for other purposes which the President may direct; (ii)PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.These are sufficient laws which met the

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869. The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested observers when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. The conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with postenactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. The concept of post-enactment authorization violates Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits of Congress to intervene in any matter before any office of the Government, because it renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office. The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 e. Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications (G.R. No. L-10405, December 29, 1960) CONCEPCION, J. FACTS: In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was ed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 “for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement Pasig feeder road terminals”. Petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, then governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He claimed that the appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for the terminals sought to be improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said Subdivision is owned by Senator Jose Zulueta who was a member of the same Senate that ed and approved the same RA. Pascual claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns those terminals and that his property would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of the taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld. Pascual then prayed that the Secretary of Public Works and Communications be restrained from releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an afterthought, donated the said property to the City of Pasig. Respondents moved to dismiss the petition, however the lower court dismissed such. ISSUE: WON said item of appropriation should be declared null and void. RULING: YES. Decision appealed from is reversed, and the records remanded to the lower court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision. The appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a private purpose. The subsequent donation of the property to the government to make the property public does not cure the constitutional defect. The fact that the law was ed when the said property was still a private property cannot be ignored. “In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals.” Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void. Where the land on which projected feeder roads are to be constructed belongs to a private person, an appropriation made by Congress for that purpose is null and void, and a donation to the Government, made over five (5) months after the approval and effectivity of the Act for the purpose of giving a "semblance of legality" to the appropriation, does not cure the basic defect. Consequently, a judicial nullification of said donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of said appropriation.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 f. Guingona v. Carague (G.R. No. 94571, April 22, 1991) GANCAYCO, J. FACTS: The 1990 budget consists of PHP 98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with PHP 86.8 Billion for debt service) and PHP 155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act (PHP 233.5 Billion in total); while the appropriations for DepEd, Culture and Sports amount to PHP 27.017 Billion. Petitioners seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of PD 81, Sec. 31 of PD 1177 and PD 1967 which authorizes the automatic appropriation for debt service and restrain its disbursement. They argue that (1) upon the expiration of the one-man legislature in the person of Pres. Marcos, the legislative power was restored to the Congress when the Constitution was ratified by the people; (2) that there is a need for a new legislation by Congress providing for automatic appropriation, but Congress, up to the present, has not approved any such law; (3) and said PHP 86.8 Billion automatic appropriation is an istrative act that rests on no law, and thus, cannot be enforced. Moreover, petitioners contend that assuming arguendo that such decrees did not expire, it is still inoperative under Art. XVIII, Sec. 3 which states that those inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked. They also point out that it is inconsistent with Art. VI, Sec. 24 whereby bills have to be approved by the President, then a law must be ed by Congress to authorize said automatic appropriation. Further, they state that said decrees violates Art. VI, Sec. 29 (1), asserting that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation, otherwise, it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in advance the amount appropriated for the debt service. ISSUE: WON the decrees are in violation of the Constitution. RULING: NO. An examination of the PDs show the clear intent that the amounts needed to cover the payment of the principal and interest on all foreign loans including those guaranteed by the national government, should be made available when they shall become due precisely without the necessity of periodic enactments of separate laws appropriating funds therefor, since both the periods and necessities are incapable of determination in advance. The automatic appropriation provides the flexibility for the effective execution of debt management policies. The argument of petitioners that said decrees are inconsistent with the Constitution is untenable. The framers of the Constitution did not contemplate that existing laws in the statute books including existing presidential decrees appropriating public money are reduced to mere "bills" that must again go through the legislative mill. The only reasonable interpretation of said provisions of the Constitution which refer to "bills" is that they mean appropriation measures still to be ed by Congress. Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid, necessitated by the very nature of the problem being, addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 g. Garcia v. Mata (GR No. L-33713, Jul 30, 1975) CASTRO, J. FACTS: Petitioner Eusebio Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty with the Armed Forces of the Philippines. He held the rank of Captain with a monthly emolument of PHP 478.00. Pursuant to RA 2334, which provided that reserve officers with at least 2 years of active duty shall be reverted to inactive status within 3 years from the approval of the act, he was reverted to inactive status and since then has neither received emoluments from AFP nor employed in the government in any capacity. He filed the necessary petitions to the concerned offices, but received reply only from the Chief of Staff through the AFP Adjutant General. Thus, he filed a petition in court to reinstate him, readjust his rank and pay all emoluments and allowances due to him from the time of his reversion. Garcia argues that his reversion was in violation of RA 1600 (Appropriation Act for Fiscal Year 1956-1957) Par. 11 of the Special Provisions for the Armed Forces of the Philippines which prohibits the reversion to inactive status of reserve officers on active duty with at least ten years of accumulated active commissioned service. When RA 1600 took effect, he had already had accumulated service of 10 years, 5 months and 5 days in the AFP. The trial court dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition for review. ISSUE: WON Par. 11 of RA 1600 is invalid, unconstitutional and inoperative. RULING: YES. While RA 1600 appropriated money for the operation of the Government for the fiscal year 1956-1957, said paragraph refers to the fundamental governmental policy matters of the calling to active duty and the reversion to inactive status of reserve officers in the AFP. The incongruity and irrelevancy continue throughout the entire paragraph. It was a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure in violation of the constitutional inhibition against ‘riders’ to the ‘general appropriation act.’ Being unconstitutional, it confers no right and affords no protection. In legal contemplation, it is as though it has never been ed. Petitioner cannot compel the respondents to reinstate him, promote or readjust his rank, much less pay him back the emoluments and allowances.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 h. Araullo v. Aquino (G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015) BERSAMIN, J. FACTS: In this case, the respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the decision promulgated on July 1, 2014 and the petitioners, a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. The respondents maintain the the issues in these consolidated cases were mischaracterized and unnecessarily constitutionalized; that the Court's interpretation of ‘savings’ can be overturned by legislation considering that ‘savings’ is defined in the General Appropriations Act (GAA), hence making it a statutory issue; that the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations constitute savings and may be used for augmentation; and that the Court should apply legally recognized norms and principles, most especially the presumption of good faith, in resolving their motion. The petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the Court failed to declare as unconstitutional and illegal all moneys under the DAP used for alleged augmentation of appropriation items that did not have actual deficiencies. They submit that augmentation of items beyond the maximum amounts recommended by the President for the programs, activities and projects (PAPs) contained in the budget submitted to Congress should be declared unconstitutional. ISSUE: WON DAP is in violation of the Constitution. RULING: YES, HOWEVER, the Court finds merit in the respondent’s argument regarding the DAPfunded projects that there is no constitutional requirement for Congress to create allotment classes within an item. Indeed, Section 25 (5) of the 1987 Constitution mentions of the term item that may be the object of augmentation by the President, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House, the Chief Justice, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions. In Belgica v. Ochoa , we said that an item that is the distinct and several part of the appropriation bill, in line with the item-veto power of the President, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not be only general provisions. Accordingly, the item referred to by Section 25 (5) of the Constitution is the last and indivisible purpose of a program in the appropriation law, which is distinct from the expense category or allotment class. There is no specificity, indeed, either in the Constitution or in the relevant GAAs that the object of augmentation should be the expense category or allotment class. In the same vein, the President cannot exercise his veto power over an expense category; he may only veto the item to which that expense category belongs to.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 i. Aglipay v. Ruiz (G.R. No. 45459, March 13, 1937) LAUREL, J. FACTS: The Director of Posts declared that he will order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. Petition, the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prevent the Director of Post from issuing and selling the said postage stamps. The said act of the Director of Posts is pursuant to the appropriation act appropriating P60,000 for the cost of plates and printing of postage stamps, and authorizing the Director of Posts to dispose of the amount as may be deemed advantageous to the Government. ISSUE: W/N issuing and selling said postage stamps is violative of Sec. 13 Art. VI of the Constitution (now Sec. 29 Par. 2). RULING: NO. The issuance of the postage stamps in question was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that Church. The only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was to the Philippines and attract more tourists to this country. The officials merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance to give publicity to the Philippines and its people. In the stamp, what is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itslf but Manila as the seat of that congress. While the issuance and sale of the stamps may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda received by the Roman Catholic Church was not the aim and purpose of the Government. The Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 j. Garces v. Estenzo (G.R. No. L-53487, May 25, 1981) AQUINO, J. FACTS: The Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City, issued resolutions regarding the acquisition of the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebration of his annual feast day. Included in the resolution is the provision that the custody of the image shall be with the chairman of the fiesta and would remain in his residence for one year until the election of his successor. The image was obtained from Cebu City using private funds from cash donations and solicitations of the barangay residents and neighboring places. The image was displayed in the Roman Catholic Church during the day of the mass. However, the parish priest refused to return the same, claiming that it belongs to the Catholic church. After series of disagreements, a petition was filed questioning the constitutionality of the resolutions. Petitioners contend that the resolutions contravene the constitutional provision that no public money shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or used for the benefit of any religion. ISSUE: WON the resolutions violate such constitutional provision. RULING: NO. The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. It is entirely a secular matter. Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and wh has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provision banning the use of public money or property.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 k. Manosca v. CA (G.R. No. 106440, January 29, 1996) VITUG, J. FACTS: Petitioners inherited a piece of land, which is being claimed by the Government pursuant to its eminent domain / expropriation function. The said piece of land was ascertained by the National Historical Institute to have been the birthsite of Felix Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. NHI ed a resolution declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. Respondents filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate possession of the property. Petitioners move to dismiss the petition on the thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and the act would constitute and application of public funds for the use, benefit, of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity. ISSUE: WON the expropriation is in violation of Sec. 29 Par. 2 Art. VI. RULING: NO. What should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the INC. The benefit that may be derived by of INC are merely incidental and secondary in nature.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 6. TAXATION a. Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (G.R. No. L-19201 June 16, 1965) PAREDES, J. FACTS: In 1957, the M.B. Estate, Inc. in Bacolod City donated P10,000 in case to Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz, the then parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental and the predecessor of Rev. Fr. Casimiro Lladoc, for the construction of a new Catholic Church. The total amount was actually spent for the purpose intended. On March 1958, M.B. Estate filed a donor’s gift tax return. Subsequently, on April 1960, the CIR issued an assessment for donee’s gift tax in the amount of P1,370 including surcharges, interest of 1% monthly from May 1958 to June 1960 and the compromise for the late filing of the return against the Catholic Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental of which Lladoc was a priest. Lladoc protested and moved to reconsider but it was denied. He then appealed to the CTA, in his petition for review, he claimed that at the time of the donation, he was not the parish priest, thus, he is not liable. Moreover, he asserted that the assessment of the gift tax, even against the Roman Catholic Church, would not be valid, for such would be a clear violation of the Constitution. The CTA ruled in favor of the CIR. Hence, the present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be liable for assessed donee’s gift tax donated. RULING: Yes, imposition of gift tax is valid. Section 22 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, exempts from taxation, cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents, appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious purposes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as property taxes, as contra distinguished from excise taxes. In the present case, what the Collector assessed was a donee's gift tax; the assessment was not on the properties themselves. It did not rest upon general ownership; it was an excise upon the use made of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties. Manifestly, gift tax is not within the exempting provisions of the section just mentioned. A gift tax is not a property tax, but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos, the imposition of which on property used exclusively for religious purposes, does not constitute an impairment of Constitution. The exempt from taxation as employed in the Constitution should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. And there being no clear, positive or express grant of such privilege by law, in favor of petitioner, the exemption herein must be denied. However, the Court noted the merit of Lladoc’s claim, and held as liable the Head of Diocese for being the real party in interest instead of Lladoc who was held to be not personally liable; the former manifested that it was submitting himself to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court and he presented Lladoc’s brief, by reference, as his own and for all purposes.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 b. Province of Abra v. Hernando (G.R. No. L-49336, August 31, 1981) FERNANDO, C.J. FACTS: The Province of Abra sought to tax the properties of The Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. Desirous of being exempted from a real estate tax, the latter filed a petition for declaratory relief on the ground that other than being exempted from payment of real estate taxes, its properties are also "being actually, directly and exclusively used for religious or charitable purposes as sources of for the bishop, the parish priest and his helpers.” After conducting a summary hearing, respondent Judge Hernando granted the exemption & without hearing the side of petitioner. The petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss but the same was denied. Hence, this present petition for certiorari and mandamus alleging denial of procedural due process. ISSUE: Whether or not the properties of the Church in this case is exempt from taxes. RULING: No, the properties of the Church are not exempted for tax. It is true that the Constitution provides that "charitable institutions, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries” are required that for the exemption of "lands, buildings, and improvements,” they should not only be "exclusively but also "actually and "directly used for religious or charitable purposes. There must be proof therefore of the actual and direct use of the lands, buildings, and improvements for religious or charitable purposes to be exempt from taxation. It has been the constant and uniform holding that the exemption from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. Affirmatively put, the law frowns on exemption from taxation; hence, an exempting provision should be construed strictissimijuris. However, in this case, there is no showing that the said properties are actually and directly used for religious or charitable uses. The respondent judge would not have erred so grievously had he merely compared the provisions of the present Constitution and with that appearing in the 1935 Charter on the tax exemption of “lands, buildings, and improvements.” There is a marked difference. Under the 1935 Constitution: “Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.” The present Constitution added “charitable institutions, mosques, and nonprofit cemeteries” and required that for the exemption of “lands, buildings, and improvements,” they should not only be “exclusively” but also “actually” and “directly” used for religious or charitable purposes. The Constitution is worded differently. The change should not be ignored. It clearly appears, therefore, that in failing to accord a hearing to petitioner Province of Abra and deciding the case immediately in favor of private respondent, respondent judge failed to abide by the constitutional command of procedural due process. The petition was granted. Respondent judge, or whoever as acting on his behalf, was ordered to hear the case on the merit.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 c. Abra Valley College v. Aquino (G.R. No. L-39086, June 15, 1988) PARAS, J. FACTS: Abra Valley College, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly incorporated with the SEC filed a complaint to annul and declare void the “Notice of Seizure” and the “Notice of Sale” of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and penalties. Paterno Millare filed through counsel a motion to dismiss the complaint. The provincial fiscal filed a memorandum for the government wherein they opined that based on the evidence, the laws applicable, court decisions and jurisprudence, the school building and the school lot used for educational purposes of the Abra Valley College is exempted from payment of taxes. Nonetheless, the trial court disagreed because of the use of the second floor by the Director of the said school for residential purpose. He thus ruled for the government and rendered the assailed decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building in question are used exclusively for educational purposes. RULING: NO. It must be stressed that while the court allows a more liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase “exclusively used for educational purposes” as provided for in the Article VI, Section 22, Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, reasonable emphasis has always been made that exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purpose. Otherwise stated, the use of the school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. Thus, while the use of the second floor of the main building in the case at bar for residential purposes of the Director and his family, may find justification under the concept of incidental use, which is complementary to the main or primary purpose – educational, the lease of the first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purposes of education. Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the conclusion that the school building as well as the lot where it is built should be taxed, not because the second floor of the same is being used by the director and his family for residential purposes, but because the first floor thereof is being used for commercial purposes. However, since only a portion is used for purposes of commerce, it is only fair that half of the assessed tax be return to the school involved.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 7. LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION AND QUESTION HOUR a. In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio v. Gordon (G.R. No. L-19201, June 16, 1965) PAREDES, J. FACTS: On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455 “directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.” Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Senator Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting tly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or istrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.” Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG’s unhampered performance of its task. Gordon’s Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 constitutes a limitation on the power of legislative inquiry. RULING: It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate”. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. Article III, Section 7: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable them to exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective implementation.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 b. Philcomsat Holdings v. Senate (G.R. No. 180308, June 19, 2012) PERLAS-BERNABE, J. FACTS: Petitioners Enrique L. Locsin (Locsin) and Manuel D. Andal (Andal) are nominees of the government to the board of directors of Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) and Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC). Both Locsin and Andal are also directors and corporate officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC). By virtue of its interest in both PHILCOMSAT and POTC, the government has also substantial interest in PHC. The government, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), received cash dividends from POTC. However, POTC suffered losses because of its huge operating expenses. In view of the losses and to protect the government’s interest in POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Proposed Senate Resolution No. 455 directing the conduct of an inquiry, in aid of legislation, on the losses incurred by POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC and the mismanagement committed by their respective board of directors. PSR No. 455 was referred to Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises (Senate Committee), which conducted hearings. Locsin and Andal were invited to attend these hearings as resource persons. The Senate Committee found an overwhelming mismanagement by the PCGG over POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, and that PCGG was negligent in performing its mandate to preserve the government’s interest in the said corporations. Committee Report No. 312 recommended the privatization and transfer of the jurisdiction over the shares of the government in POTC and PHILCOMSAT to the Privatization Management Office (PMO) under the Department of Finance (DOF) and the replacement of government nominees as directors of POTC and PHILCOMSAT. Locsin and Andal filed a petition before the Supreme Court questioning the hasty approval of the Senate of the Committee Report No. 312. ISSUE: Whether or not Senate committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving Committee Resolution No. 312. RULING: The Senate Committees’ power of inquiry relative to PSR No. 455 has been ed upon and upheld in the consolidated cases of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio which cited Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution, as follows: “The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.” The Court explained that such conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in this case, the respondents Senate Committees, must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge. On this score, the Senate Committee cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it submitted Committee Resolution No. 312, given its constitutional mandate to conduct legislative inquiries. Nor can the Senate Committee be faulted for doing so on the very same day that the assailed resolution was submitted. The wide latitude given to Congress with respect to these legislative inquiries has long been settled, otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 would be rendered pointless.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 c. Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon (G.R. No. 89914, November 20, 1991) PADILLA, J. FACTS: By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to look into the transactions, an investigation was conducted by the Senate Blue-ribbon Committee. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the alleged acquisition of the Lopa Group of the properties of Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez which is a subject of sequestration by the PCGG and citing probable violations of Republic Act. 3019 Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 5. Ricardo Lopa declined to and Petitioner Jose F.S. Bengzon,Jr. likewise refused to testify involving his constitutional right to due process, and averring that the publicity generated by respondents Committee’s inquiry could adversely affect his rights as well as those of the other petitioners who are his co-defendants in Civil Case. Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and required their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damages, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief. ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry has valid legislative purpose and done in aid of legislation. RULING: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.” In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is not really “in aid of legislation” because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 d. Arnault v. Nazareno (G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950) OZAETA, J. FACTS: The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land, known as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. A question that the Senate sought to resolve was the obvious irregularity of the government’s payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before. The Senate sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the government. Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions, was one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the investigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the amount of Php440, 000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt. Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers the questions. He thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of his detention. ISSUES: 1. Whether the Senate has the power to punish petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000. 2. Whether the petitioner can rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination? RULING: 1. Yes, the Senate has the power to punish the petitioner. The Constitution (1935) did not contain an express provision empowering either of the two Houses of Congress to punish non- for contempt. But the power of inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. Once an inquiry is itted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject to his constitutional right against selfincrimination. The Court found that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate was pertinent to the matter under inquiry. If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment. 2. No, the petitioner may not exercise his right against self-incrimination in this case. As against witness's inconsistent and unjustified claim to a constitutional right, is his clear duty as a citizen to give frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent authority. The ground upon which the witness' claim is based is too shaky, in firm, and slippery to afford him safety. Due to his inconsistent and evasive answers, the Courts believed that his answers were false, and that his insistent claim that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he knew the name. Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable. Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter's verbal instruction, we find no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 e. Arnault v. Balagtas (G.R. No. L-6749, July 30, 1955) LABRADOR, J. FACTS: Petitioner-appellee was an attorney in-fact or Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Government of the #Philippines. The price paid for both estates was Php 5,000,000. On February 27, 1950, the Senate of the Philippines adopted Resolution No. 8 whereby it created a Special Committee to determine “whether the said purchase was honest, valid and proper, and whether the price involved in the deal was fair and just, the parties responsible therefor, any other facts the Committee may deem proper in the premises.” In the investigation conducted by the Committee in pursuance of said Resolution, petitioner-appellee was asked to whom a part of the purchase price, Php 440,000 was delivered. Petitioner-appellee refused to answer this question, whereupon the Committee resolved on May 15, 1950 to order his commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at-arms of the Philippines Senate and imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison in Rizal until such time when he shall reveal to the Senate or to the Special Committee the name F$ the person who received Php 440,000 and to answer questions pertinent thereto. While still in confinement in Bilibid, petitioner-appellee executed an affidavit wherein he gives in detail the history of his life, the events surrounding acquisition of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates by Gen. Burt, the supposed circumstances under which he met one by the name of Jess D. Santos. The Committee did not believe this. The Committee adopted Resolution No. 114 which reads as follows: “RESOLUTION APPROVING THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE BUENAVISTA AND TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL AND ORDERING THE DIRECTOR OF PRISON TO CONTINUE HOLDING JEAN L. ARNAULT IN HIS CUSTODY AND IN CONFINEMENT AND DETENTION AT THE NEW BILIBID PRISON AT MUNTINLUPA, RIZAL, UNTIL THE SAID ARNAULT SHALL HAVE PURGED HIMSELF OF CONTEMPT OF THE SENATE.” ISSUE: Whether or not the continued confinement and detention of the petitioner-appellee, as ordered in Senate Resolution of November 8, 1952 valid. RULING: Yes, the principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is sounded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? The process by which a contumacious witness is dealt with by the legislature in order to enable it to exercise its legislative power or authority must be distinguished from the judicial process by which offenders are brought to courts of justice for the meting out of the punishment which the criminal law imposes upon them. The former falls exclusively within the legislative authority, the latter within the domain of the courts; because the former is a necessary concomitant of the legislative power or process, while the latter has to do with the enforcement and application of the criminal law. Also, the contempt is related to the exercise of the legislative power and is committed in the course of the legislative process, the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious witness should be supreme, and unless there is a manifest and absolute

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of constitutional limitations the exercise of the authority is not subject to judicial interference.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 f. Senate v. Ermita (G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006) CARPIO MORALES, J. FACTS: This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam. The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Senate President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to “afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation.” Senate refused the request. On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among others, mandated that “all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.” Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec. Ermita communicated to the Senate that the executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the meeting since the President has not yet given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both faced court marshal for such attendance. Hence, these petitions. ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order 464 is constitutional. RULING: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the1987 Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information, which is not infrequently true, recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also,in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 appearance of executive officials under Section21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is 'in aid of legislation' under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 g. Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks (G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007) NACHURA, J. FACTS: Before February 1, 2005, Senator Enrile introduced P.S. Resolution No. 166. On February 1, 2005, Senator Enrile delivered a privilege speech denouncing SCB- Philippines for selling uned foreign securities in violation of the Securities Regulation Code (R.A. No. 8799) and urging the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent similar fraudulent activity. The aforementioned Senate Committee, acting through Senator Angara, set the initial hearing on February 28, 2005. Then, SCB- Philippines submitted to the Senate Committee a letter dated February 24, 2005, stressing that there were cases pending in court allegedly involving the same issues, challenging the jurisdiction of Committee to continue with the inquiry. Senator enrile moved that subpoenas be issued to those who did not attend the hearing. SCB – Philippines also brought to the attention of the Senate Committee the lack of proper authorization from affected clients for the bank to make the public disclosures of their s and the lack of copies of accusing documents mentioned in Senator Enriles’s privilege speech, and reiterated that there were pending court cases regarding the alleged sale in the Philippines by SCBPhilippines of uned foreign securities. The petitioners were later served with subpoena ad testificandum and duces tecum to compel them to attend and testify at a hearing set on March 15, 2005. As such, this Petition for Prohibition was filed by the petitioners. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Committee, by aid of legislation, would encroach upon the judicial powers vested solely in the courts who took cognizance of the foregoing cases. RULING: The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the resolution, as initiated in the privileged speech of Senate President Enrile, was simply "to denounce the illegal practices committed by a foreign bank in selling uned foreign securities xxx", and at the conclusion of the said speech "to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent in the future." The mere filing of a criminal or istrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislation. The exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an istrative investigation. The intent of legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or may not be enacted into law. Except only when it exercises the power to punish for contempt, the committees of the Senate or the House of Representatives cannot penalize violators even there is overwhelmingly evidence of criminal culpability. Other than proposing or initiating amendatory or remedial legislation, respondent Committee can only recommend measures to address or remedy whatever irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although it may include in its Report a recommendation for criminal indictment of persons who may appear liable. At best, the recommendation, along with the evidence, contained in such Report would only be persuasive, but it is still up to the prosecutorial agencies and the courts to determine the liabilities of the offender.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 h. Neri v. Senate Committee on ability (G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008) LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China. The Senate ed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he itted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions that petitioner Neri refused to answer were covered by executive privilege. RULING: Yes, Citing the case of United States vs. Nixon (418 U.S. 683), the Court laid out the three elements needed to be complied with in order for the claim to executive privilege to be valid. These are: 1.) the protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power; 2.) it must be authored, solicited, and received by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President; and, 3.) it may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence,” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. In the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita claimed executive privilege on the argument that the communications elicited by the three questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process,” and that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” It is clear then that the basis of the claim is a matter related to the quintessential and non-delegable presidential power of diplomacy or foreign relations.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 As to the second element, the communications were received by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner Neri can be considered a close advisor, being a member of the President’s Cabinet. And as to the third element, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. Presidential communications are presumptive privilege and that the presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to such conversations. In the present case, respondent Committees failed to show a compelling or critical need for the answers to the three questions in the enactment of any law under Sec. 21, Art. VI. Instead, the questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight function under Sec. 22, Art. VI. As ruled in Senate vs. Ermita, “the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.” Neri’s refusal to answer based on the claim of executive privilege does not violate the people’s right to information on matters of public concern simply because Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution itself provides that this right is “subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.”

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 8. BOARD OF CANVASSERS IN ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT/VICE-PRESIDENT a. Lopez v. Senate (G.R. No. 163556, June 08, 2004) FACTS: A petition for prohibition and mandamus was filed by Congressman Lopez seeking the nullification of Section 13, Rule VIII of the Rules of the t Public Session of Congress creating a t Committee in charge of the preliminary canvassing of votes of the candidates for President and Vice-President in the May 2004 election. ISSUE: Whether or not Congress committed grave abuse of discretion in the creation of a t Committee for the purpose of the preliminary canvassing of the votes for the 2004 Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections. RULING: The Court en banc upheld the constitutionality of the t Committee created by Congress; “to promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.” The creation of the t Committee does not constitute grave abuse of discretion for Congress may validly delegate the initial determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass to a t Congressional Committee. The Court reiterated that “Congress may validly delegate the initial determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass to a t Congressional Committee, composed of of the House of Representatives and of the Senate.” The petition was therefore dismissed on the ground of the petitioner failed to establish that Congress gravely abused its discretion in the creation of such t Committee.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 b. Pimentel v. t Committee of Congress (G.R. No. 163783, June 22, 2004) FACTS: A petition for prohibition was filed by Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., seeking for the declaration of the Court of the nullity and void continued existence of the t Committee of Congress created to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the 2004 elections following the adjournment of Congress sine die on June 11, 2004 on the ground of that said adjournment “terminated and expired on the said day and the said Twelfth Congress serving the term 2001 to 2004 ed out of legal existence. "Henceforth, petitioner goes on, "all pending matters and proceedings terminate upon the expiration of ... Congress." Petitioner relied in Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution to further his claim. ISSUE: Whether or not the term of the regular session of both Houses of the Twelfth Congress terminated and expired upon its adjournment. RULING: The Court ruled that the term of the Twelfth Congress did not terminate and expire upon the adjournment sine die of the regular session of both Houses on June 11, 2004. It further reiterated that Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution “does not pertain to the term of Congress, but to its regular annual legislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess before the opening of its next regular session”. The final adjournment of the regular sessions of the Twelfth Congress does not terminate the task of Congress in tasks of authenticating and canvassing the certificates of canvass since it’s a non-legislative function.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 IX. THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 1. THE PRESIDENT a. Macalintal v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003) Austria-Martinez, J. FACTS: A petition was filed by Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 entitled, "An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes" as unconstitutional. Alongside such questioned provisions sought to be declared as unconstitutional by the petitioner is Section 18.5 which provides Respondent Commission on Elections the power to proclaim the winning candidates for national offices and party list representatives including the President and the Vice-President. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 18.5 or Republic Act No. 9189 is unconstitutional for being violative of Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution. RULING: The Court ruled that Section 18.5 of Republic Act No. 9189 is repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the Commission on Elections “is empowered to order the proclamation of winning candidates”. Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution dictates that Congress has the power to canvass votes and proclaim the winners for the Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections. In allowing Respondent COMELEC to be empowered under Section 18.5 or said R.A. encroaches the power of Congress vested by the Constitution, to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions. It partially upheld Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 with respect only to the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for Senators and party-list representatives but not as to the power to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and VicePresident which is lodged with Congress.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 b. Lopez v. Senate (G.R. No. 163556, June 08, 2004) FACTS: A petition for prohibition and mandamus was filed by Congressman Lopez seeking the nullification of Section 13, Rule VIII of the Rules of the t Public Session of Congress creating a t Committee in charge of the preliminary canvassing of votes of the candidates for President and Vice-President in the May 2004 election. ISSUE: Whether or not Congress committed grave abuse of discretion in the creation of a t Committee for the purpose of the preliminary canvassing of the votes for the 2004 Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections. RULING: The Court en banc upheld the constitutionality of the t Committee created by Congress; voting 14-0, ruled that Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution expressly empowers Congress “to promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.” The Court ruled that it had no power to review the internal proceedings of Congress, unless there is a clear violation of the Constitution. The creation of the t Committee does not constitute grave abuse of discretion for Congress may validly delegate the initial determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass to a t Congressional Committee. The petition was therefore dismissed on the ground of the petitioner failed to establish that Congress gravely abused its discretion in the creation of such t Committee.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 c. Brillantes v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004) Callejo Sr., J. FACTS: A petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court led by Atty. Sixto S. Brillantes, seeking to nullify, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, Resolution No. 6712. On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act 8436 which authorizes the COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing or consolidating the results of the national and local elections. This AES system has 3 phases mainly; the biometrics system of registration, the computerized voting and counting of votes and lastly, the electronic transmission of result; Senate President Franklin Drilon questioned the constitutionality of the proposed electronic transmission of results for the positions of the President and the Vice-President. COMELEC issued a resolution 6712, declaring that it adopts the policy that the precinct election results of each city and municipality shall be immediately transmitted electronically in advance to the COMELEC, Manila. For the purpose, respondent COMELEC established a National Consolidation Center, Electronic Transmission Centers for every city and municipality. In relation to this, the electronically transmitted results shall be made available via the Internet, text messaging and electronic billboards. Interested parties may print the result published in the COMELEC website. ISSUE: Whether or not Res. No. 6712 is violative of Section 4 Article VII of the Constitution. RULING: The Court ruled that Res. No. 6712 under the guise of an “unofficial” tabulation of election results based on a copy of the election returns, the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-President. If the COMELEC is proscribed from conducting an official canvass of the votes cast for the President and Vice-President, the COMELEC is, with more reason, prohibited from making an “unofficial” canvass of said votes. The Court further pointed out that there is no constitutional and statutory basis for COMELEC to undertake a separate and an unofficial tabulation of results, whether manually or electronically, for in conducting such unofficial tabulation of the results of the election. In allowing so, Respondent COMELEC descends to the level of a private organization and spends public funds for the purpose.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 d. Pimentel v. t Committee of Congress (G.R. No. 163783, June 22, 2004) FACTS: A petition for prohibition was filed by Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., seeking for the declaration of the Court of the nullity and void continued existence of the t Committee of Congress created to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the 2004 elections following the adjournment of Congress sine die on June 11, 2004 on the ground of that said adjournment “terminated and expired on the said day and the said Twelfth Congress serving the term 2001 to 2004 ed out of legal existence. "Henceforth, petitioner goes on, "all pending matters and proceedings terminate upon the expiration of ... Congress." Petitioner relied in Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution to further his claim. ISSUE: Whether or not the continued canvassing of t Committee created by Congress even after the final adjournment of the regular sessions of the Twelfth Congress is unconstitutional. RULING: The Court ruled that in favor of the constitutionality of act of the t Committee created by Congress. “Senate shall convene in t session during any voluntary or compulsory recess to canvass during any voluntary or compulsory recess to canvass the votes for President and VicePresident not later than thirty days after the day of the elections” as expressly provided in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. Regardless of the adjournment sine die of both Houses of Congress, the Constitution clearly directs the Congress to canvass the votes and proclaim the elected President and Vice-President. Thus, upon the fulfillment of said constitutionally mandated tasks, only then can the said t Committee sine die adjourn. The Court, therefore, finds that “there is no legal impediment to the t Committee completing the tasks assigned to it and transmitting its report for the approval of the t public session of both Houses of Congress, which may reconvene without need of call by the President to a special session.”

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 e. Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 221697, March 8,2016) Perez, J. FACTS: A petition for certiorari was filed by Grace Poe-Llamanzares against Respondent Commision on Elections for disqualifying her certificate of candidacy for Presidency for the May 2016 elections. Petitioner was disqualified by Respondent on the ground of false material representation by indicating on such COC that she at that time, has been residing in the Philippines for 10 years and 11 months prior to the day of the 2016 elections but on the contrary, stated on her previous COC for the 2013 Senatorial elections that she has been a resident of the Philippines for 6 years and 6 months before the said election; thus, making her unable to satisfy the requirement of 10-year residency in the country. There were two other significant issues raised in the case at bar. The question of whether she is a natural-born citizen and of whether such citizenship was reacquired upon repatriation. ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in disqualifying the certificate of candidacy of Petitioner. RULING: The Court ruled that Respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for disqualifying the Certificate of Candidacy of Poe-Llamanzares for Presidency. Section 3 Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides for the qualifications of a President and a VicePresident and reads: “No person may be elected to the office of the President or Vice-President unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter, forty years of age or over, and has been a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding the election.” Respondent COMELEC does not have the power to determine the qualifications of a candidate. It is the Presidential Electoral Tribunal that is granted power by the Constitution to determine the qualifications of a candidate as stated in Section 4 Article VII of the Constitution. The Certificate of Candidacy of the Petitioner therefore cannot be cancelled by COMELEC at it is not a competent body which holds the power to decide whether such candidate lacks or is unable to satisfy the requirements.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 2. TERM OF OFFICE; PRIVILEGES a. Osmeña v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 100318, July 30, 1991) PARAS, J. FACTS: The petition at bar for a determination of the validity and constitutionality of Republic Act 7056, "An Act Providing for the National and Local Elections in 1992, Pave the Way for Synchronized and Simultaneous Elections Beginning 1995, and Authorizing Appropriations Therefor," Such provisions in the said RA that were deemed by the petitioners unconstitutional were: • •

•

•

•

Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the holding of synchronized national and local elections on the second Monday of May 1992. Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3 thereof, providing that all incumbent provincial, city and municipal officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified violates Section 2, Article XVIII (Transitory Provision) of the Constitution. The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in effect, shortens the term or tenure of office of local officials to be elected on the 2nd Monday of November, 1992 violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign periods for Presidential, VicePresidential and Senatorial elections, violates the provision of Section 9, Article IX under the title "Commission on Elections" of the Constitution. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned in Republic Act 7056 to synchronized national and local elections set by the Constitution on the second Monday of May, 1992, are not sufficient, much less, valid justification for postponing the local elections to the second Monday of November 1992, and in the process violating the Constitution itself. If, at all, Congress can devise ways and means, within the parameters of the Constitution, to eliminate or at least minimize these problems and if this, still, is not feasible, resort can be made to the self-correcting mechanism built in the Constitution for its amendment or revision.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the RA 7056 is unconstitutional. RULING: Yes. Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution which provides for the synchronization of national and local elections. However, RA 7056 provides for the desynchronization of election by mandating that there be two separate elections in 1992. It also violated Sec. 8, Art. X of 1987 Constitution which fixed the term of office of all elective local officials, except barangay officials, to three (3) years. If the local election will be held on the second Monday of November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be elected will be serving for only two years and seven months, that is, from November 30, 1992 to June 30, 1995, not three years. The law was also held violative of Sec. 9, Article IX of the Constitution by changing the campaign period. RA 7056 provides for a different campaign period. b. Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco (G.R. No. 6157, July 30, 1910)

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 JOHNSON, J. FACTS: An original action commenced in this court to secure a writ of prohibition against the Hon. A.S. Crossfield, as one of the judges of the Court of first Instance of the city of Manila, to prohibit him from taking or continuing jurisdiction in a certain case commenced and pending before him, in which Chuoco Tiaco (alias Choa Tea) (respondent herein) is plaintiff, and W. Cameron forbes, J.E. Harding, and C.R. Trowbridge (petitioners herein) are defendants. The plaintiffs are W. Cameron Forbes is the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and Chief of Police J. E. Harding and Chief of the Secret Service of the city of Manila C. R. Trowbridge. Defendant A. S. Crossfield is one of the judges of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. Defendant Chuoco Tiaco is a foreigner of Chinese nationality and a resident of the Philippine Islands for the last 35 years having a family in the country and some properties. Chuoco Tiaco filed a case for DAMAGES (monetary) alleging that defendants forcibly deported the plaintiff to China and forcibly prevented his return for some months in violation of the right of the said plaintiff herein to be and to remain in the Philippine Islands as established by law. Crossfield issued an inhibition against Forbes et al from spelling or deporting or threatening to expel or deport Chuoco Tiaco. Forbes, Harding, and Trowbridge sued for writs of prohibition against the judge and the respective plaintiffs, alleging that the expulsion was carried out in the public interest and at the request of the proper representative of the Chinese government in the Philippines, and was immediately reported to the Secretary of War. The complaints were demurred to, but the Supreme Court overruled the demurrers, granted the prohibition, and ordered the actions dismissed. The judge, having declined to in the applications for writs of error, was made a respondent, and the cases are here on the ground that the plaintiffs have been deprived of liberty without due process of law. ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor General, as Chief Executive, can be sued in a civil action. RULING: No. No one can be held legally responsible in damages, or otherwise, for doing in a legal manner what he had authority under the law to do. The Governor-General had authority, under the law, to deport or expel the defendants, and the circumstance justifying the deportation and the method of carrying it out are left to him. He can not, therefore, be held liable in damages for the exercise of such power.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 c. In Re: Bermudez (G.R. No. 76180, October 24, 1986) MELENCIO-HERRERA, J. FACTS: Petitioner quoted the first paragraph of Section 5 of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in full as follows: "Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992." "The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992." Bermudez claims that the said provision “is not clear” as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court “to declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice President Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to as the “incumbent president”. ISSUE: Whether or not said provision is ambiguous. RULING: No. The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction and for lack of cause of action. Prescinding from petitioner's lack of personality to sue or to bring this action (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677). It is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. More importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent Presidents of the Republic. President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure. The petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioner's allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purpose of synchronization of elections. Hence the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 d. Soliven v. Makasiar (G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988) GUTIERREZ, JR., J. FACTS: The petitioners in this case was charged for libel by the president. Cory Aquino herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself to be placed under the court’s jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt. ISSUE: Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit. RULING: Yes. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention. But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused. Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 e. Estrada v. Desierto (G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001) PUNO, J. FACTS: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice- President. He was accused of receiving P220 million in jueteng money from Governor Singson. He was also charged that he took from Governor Singson 70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. There was an outcry for his resignation. The impeachment trial began on 7 December 2000, with 21 senator-judges presided over by Chief Justice Hilario Davide. At a point when 11 senator-judges ruled against opening a second envelope of evidence showing the president’s P3.3 billion bank under the name “Jose Velarde”, the public prosecutors resigned and a mass demonstration at EDSA began. On 20 January 2001, the president negotiated with representatives of the vice-president. News broke out that Chief Justice Hilario Davide would ister the oath of presidency to the vice president at EDSA Shrine. Estrada issued two statements - one stating reservations on the constitutionality of Arroyo’s presidency, and another stating that he is incapable of dispensing his responsibilities as president, thus allowing Arroyo to be the acting president. The Arroyo istration was met with acceptance by the different branches of government, by majority of the public, and by the international community. The impeachment trial was closed, despite sentiments such as those of Senator Defensor- Santiago that the impeachment court had failed to resolve the case, leaving open questions regarding Estrada’s qualifications to run for other elected posts. The Office of the Ombudsman proceeded to file a series of cases regarding the corruption of Estrada. Estrada filed a motion compelling the Ombudsman to refrain from further proceedings until his term as president was over. He also filed a petition to be confirmed as the lawful and incumbent president, temporarily unable to fulfill his duties, thus making Arroyo an acting president only. The Supreme Court ruled a) to inform the parties that they did not declare the Office of the President vacant on 20 January 2001, b) to prohibit either party from discussing in public the merits of the case while in its pendency, c) to en the Ombudsman from resolving pending criminal cases against Estrada for 30 days. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President (2) Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity RULING: (1) Yes. The court ruled that that the resignation of the Estrada cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up, and (5) he called on this ers to him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. (2) No. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption . By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other treser.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 f. Gloria v. CA (G.R. No. 119903, August 15, 2000) PURISIMA, J. FACTS: Respondent filed a petition for prohibition to restrain petitioners from reasg him from incumbent Schools Division Superintendent of Quezon City to Vocational Schools Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology (MIST). The Court of Appeals, in its decision, prohibited the petitioners from implementing the respondent's reassignment as it is violative of his right to security of tenure. No period was fixed for private respondent's reassignment, nor was there any indication that the reassignment was only temporary. ISSUE: Whether the reassignment of private respondent from School Division Superintendent of Quezon City to Vocational School Superintendent of MIST is violative of his security of tenure. RULING: Yes. the Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that the reassignment of petitioner to MIST "appears to be indefinite." The same can be inferred from the Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the reassignment of private respondent will "best fit his qualifications and experience" being "an expert in vocational and technical education." It can thus be gleaned that subject reassignment is more than temporary as the private respondent has been described as fit for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in the field. Besides, there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the reassignment of private respondent is temporary or would only last until a permanent replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact evinces an intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private respondent with no definite period or duration. Such feature of the reassignment in question is definitely violative of the security of tenure of the private respondent.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 g. Senate v. Ermita (G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006) CARPIO MORALES, J. FACTS: The cases at bar are petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused such power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005, praying for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional. EO 464 prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the president’s approval. EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws. ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional. RULING: EO 464 is constitutional in part. Only Section 1 and Section 2a are valid and the rest are invalid. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 h. Neri v. Senate Committee on ability and Public Officers and Investigations (G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008) LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. FACTS: At bar is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the show cause Letter dated November 22, 2007 and contempt Order dated January 30, 2008 concurrently issued by respondent Senate Committees on ability of Public Officers and Investigations, Trade and Commerce, and National Defense and Security against petitioner Romulo L. Neri, former Director General of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA). On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhing Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People's Republic of China. Petitioner testified before respondent Committees for eleven (11) hours. He disclosed that then Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege". In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate cited him for contempt. ISSUE: Whether or not the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege. RULING: Yes. Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions "fall under conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials" necessary in "her executive and policy decision-making process" and, that "the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People's Republic of China." Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations. Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable power" of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are "received" by a close advisor of the President. Under the "operational proximity" test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo's cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. 3. PROHIBITIONS/INHIBITIONS

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 a. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003) CORONA, J. FACTS: One of the foremost concerns of the Aquino Government in February 1986 was the recovery of the unexplained or ill-gotten wealth reputedly amassed by former President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, their relatives, friends and business associates. Thus, the very first Executive Order (EO) issued by then President Corazon Aquino upon her assumption to office after the ouster of the Marcoses was EO No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986. It created the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and charged it with the task of assisting the President in the "recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them during his istration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship." In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This Court prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to the Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should now be relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost two decades have ed since the government initiated its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the ownership of these funds and other assets be finally determined and resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying technicalities and annoying procedural sidetracks. ISSUE: Whether or not President Marcos committed prohibited and inhibited acts as a president during his term of office. RULING: Yes. It is settled that judicial issions may be made: (a) in the pleadings filed by the parties; (b) in the course of the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in other stages of judicial proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the case.[82] Thus, facts pleaded in the petition and answer, as in the case at bar, are deemed issions of petitioner and respondents, respectively, who are not permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent with such issions.[83] The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of respondents since they did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from which their net worth could be determined. Besides, under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive any other emolument from the Government or any of its subdivisions and instrumentalities.[84] Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive during his tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source.[85] In fact, his management of businesses, like the istration of foundations to accumulate funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973 Constitution:

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 Article VII, Sec. 4(2) The President and the Vice-President shall not, during their tenure, hold any other office except when otherwise provided in this Constitution, nor may they practice any profession, participate directly or indirectly in the management of any business, or be financially interested directly or indirectly in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government or any other subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government owned or controlled corporation. Article VII, Sec. 11 No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any court inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, x x x. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof including any government owned or controlled corporation during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit. Article IX, Sec. 7 The Prime Minister and of the Cabinet shall be subject to the provision of Section 11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear as counsel before any court or istrative body, or manage any business, or practice any profession, and shall also be subject to such other disqualification as may be provided by law. Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairly serve as basis for determining the existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss funds. Respondents argue that petitioner was not able to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss funds since it failed to prove the essential elements under Section 3, paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of RA 1379. As the Act is a penal statute, its provisions are mandatory and should thus be construed strictly against the petitioner and liberally in favor of respondent Marcoses. We hold that it was not for petitioner to establish the Marcoses other lawful income or income from legitimately acquired property for the presumption to apply because, as between petitioner and respondents, the latter were in a better position to know if there were such other sources of lawful income. And if indeed there was such other lawful income, respondents should have specifically stated the same in their answer. Insofar as petitioner Republic was concerned, it was enough to specify the known lawful income of respondents. Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations provides that, in determining prima facie evidence of ill-gotten wealth, the value of the accumulated assets, properties and other material possessions of those covered by Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2 must be out of proportion to the known lawful income of such persons. The respondent Marcos couple did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL) from which their net worth could be determined. Their failure to file their SAL was in itself a violation of law and to allow them to successfully assail the Republic for not presenting their SAL would reward them for their violation of the law.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 b. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (G.R. No. 83815, February 22, 1991) FERNAN, C.J. FACTS: In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides: “Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.” CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8. ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional. RULING: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof. In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet , undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 c. Funa vs. Ermita (G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010) VILLARAMA, JR., J. FACTS: On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), vice Agustin R. Bengzon. Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport of the department under Special Order No. 2006-171 dated October 23, 2006. On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the , MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary. On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment. On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista was appointed of the MARINA vice Vicente T. Suazo, Jr. and she assumed her duties and responsibilities as such on February 2, 2009. ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed, violated the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The designation of respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the , Maritime Industry Authority, in a concurrent capacity with her position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and therefore, NULL and VOID. Finally, the Court similarly finds respondents’ theory that being just a “designation,” and temporary at that, respondent Bautista was never really “appointed” as OIC of MARINA, untenable. In Binamira v. Garrucho, Jr., we distinguished between the appointment and designation, as follows: Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature. Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named. Clearly, respondents’ reliance on the foregoing definitions is misplaced considering that the above-cited case addressed the issue of whether petitioner therein acquired valid title to the disputed position and so had the right to security of tenure. It must be stressed though that while the designation was in the nature of an acting and temporary capacity, the words “hold the office” were employed. Such holding of office pertains to both appointment and designation because the appointee or designate performs the duties and functions of the office. The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature of the appointment or designation, words which were not even found in Section 13, Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IXB. To “hold” an office means to “possess or occupy” the same, or “to be in possession and istration,” which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 d. Funa vs Agra (G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013) BERSAMIN, J. FACTS: The petitioner alleges that on March 1, 2010, President Gloria M. Macapagal Arroyo appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following the resignation of Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera in order to vie for a congressional seat in Quezon Province; that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity; that on April 7, 2010, the petitioner, in his capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer, commenced this suit to challenge the constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointments or designations, claiming it to be prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution; that during the pendency of the suit, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed Atty. Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor General; and that Cadiz assumed as the Solicitor General and commenced his duties as such on August 5, 2010. Agra renders a different version of the antecedents. He represents that on January 12, 2010, he was then the Government Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo designated him as the Acting Solicitor General in place of Solicitor General Devanadera who had been appointed as the Secretary of Justice; that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated him also as the Acting Secretary of Justice vice Secretary Devanadera who had meanwhile tendered her resignation in order to run for Congress representing a district in Quezon Province in the May 2010 elections; that he then relinquished his position as the Government Corporate Counsel; and that pending the appointment of his successor, Agra continued to perform his duties as the Acting Solicitor General. Notwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact that Agra has itted to holding the two offices concurrently in acting capacities is settled, which is sufficient for purposes of resolving the constitutional question that petitioner raises herein. ISSUE: Whether or not Agra’s holding of concurrent position is unconstitutional. RULING: Yes. At the center of the controversy is the correct application of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, viz: Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. A relevant and complementing provision is Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, to wit: Section 7. x x x Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII, supra, whose text and spirit were too clear to be differently read. Hence, Agra could not validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not otherwise so provided. It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. The text of Section 13, supra, plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the of his Cabinet in so far as holding other offices or employments in the Government or in government-owned or government controlled-corporations was concerned. In this regard, to hold an office means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in possession and istration of the office, which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office. Indeed, in the language of Section 13 itself, supra, the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the appointment or designation. The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, for it is without question that the avowed objective of Section 13, supra, is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. To construe differently is to “open the veritable floodgates of circumvention of an important constitutional disqualification of officials in the Executive Department and of limitations on the Presidents power of appointment in the guise of temporary designations of Cabinet , undersecretaries and assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of government agencies, instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporations. It is not amiss to observe, lastly, that assuming that Agra, as the Acting Solicitor General, was not covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, supra, due to such position being merely vested with a cabinet rank under Section 3, Republic Act No. 9417, he nonetheless remained covered by the general prohibition under Section 7, supra. Hence, his concurrent designations were still subject to the conditions under the latter constitutional provision. In this regard, the Court aptly pointed out in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma: The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits an appointive official to hold more than one office only if “allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position.” In the case of Quimson v. Ozaeta, this Court ruled that, “[t]here is no legal objection to a government official occupying two government offices and performing the functions of both as long as there is no incompatibility.” The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists between two offices was laid out in People v. Green – whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one office has the right to interfere with the other.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 e. National Amnesty Commission vs. COA (G. R. No. 156982, September 8, 2004) CORONA, J. FACTS: Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created in 1994 by then President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is tasked to receive, process and review amnesty applications. It is composed of 7 : a Chairperson, three regular appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local Government as ex officio . After personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio turned over said responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria. However, in 1997, NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to these representatives pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-038. Meanwhile, in 1999, the NAC ed istrative Order No. 2 (the new Implementing Rules and Regulations of Proclamation No. 347), which was approved by then President Joseph Estrada. Section 1, Rule II thereof provides that ex officio may designate their representatives to the Commission. Said Representatives shall be entitled to per diems, allowances, bonuses and other benefits as may be authorized by law. Petitioner invoked istrative Order No. 2 in assailing before the COA the rulings of the resident auditor and the National Government Audit Office disallowing payment of honoraria to the ex officio ' representatives, to no avail. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion in implementing COA Memorandum No. 97-038 without the required notice and publication under Article 2 of the Civil Code 2. Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion disallowing the payment of honoraria on the ground of lack of authority of representatives to attend the NAC meetings in behalf of the ex officio 3. Whether or not the representatives de facto officers and as such are entitled to allowances RULING: 1. No. COA Memorandum No. 97-038 does not need, for validity and effectivity, the publication required by Article 2 of the Civil Code: Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. We clarified this publication requirement in Taada vs. Tuvera: [A]ll statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. istrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the istrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by istrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. COA Memorandum No. 97-038 is merely an internal and interpretative regulation or letter of instruction which does not need publication to be effective and valid. It is not an implementing rule or regulation of a statute but a directive issued by the COA to its auditors to enforce the self-executing prohibition imposed by Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution on the President and his official family, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives from holding multiple offices and receiving double compensation. 2. No. The COA is correct that there is no legal basis to grant per diem, honoraria or any allowance whatsoever to the NAC ex officio ' official representatives. The representatives in fact assumed their responsibilities not by virtue of a new appointment but by mere designation from the ex officio who were themselves also designated as such. There is a considerable difference between an appointment and designation. An appointment is the selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the powers and functions of a given office; a designation merely connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment. Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the right to claim the salary attached to the position. Without an appointment, a designation does not entitle the officer to receive the salary of the position. The legal basis of an employee's right to claim the salary attached thereto is a duly issued and approved appointment to the position, and not a mere designation. In Civil Liberties Union, we held that cabinet secretaries, including their deputies and assistants, who hold positions in ex officio capacities, are proscribed from receiving additional compensation because their services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to their principal offices. Thus, in the attendance of the NAC meetings, the ex officio were not entitled to, and were in fact prohibited from, collecting extra compensation, whether it was called per diem, honorarium, allowance or some other euphemism. Such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution. Furthermore, in de la Cruz vs. COA and Bitonio vs. COA, we upheld COA's disallowance of the payment of honoraria and per diems to the officers concerned who sat as ex officio or alternates. The agent, alternate or representative cannot have a better right than his principal, the ex officio member. The laws, rules, prohibitions or restrictions that cover the ex officio member apply

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 with equal force to his representative. In short, since the ex officio member is prohibited from receiving additional compensation for a position held in an ex officio capacity, so is his representative likewise restricted. 3. No. The representatives cannot be considered de facto officers because they were not appointed but were merely designated to act as such. Furthermore, they are not entitled to something their own principals are prohibited from receiving.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 f. Bitonio vs COA (G.R. No. 147392, March 12, 2004) CALLEJO, SR., J. FACTS: Petitioner Bitonio was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the DOLE. DOLE Acting Secretary Brilliantes designated the Bitonio to be the DOLE representative to the Board of Directors of PEZA. As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA, Bitonio was receiving a per diem for every board meeting he attended during the years 1995 to 1997. After a post audit of the PEZA's disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed the payment of per diems to the petitioner pursuant to the ruling in Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary where Executive Order No. 284 allowing government officials to hold multiple positions in government was declared unconstitutional. Thus, Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries, and their Assistant Secretaries, are prohibited to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions and to receive compensation therefor, except in cases where the Constitution expressly provides. Bitonio filed an MR but the COA denied the same. Thus, he appealed to the SC. The petitioner maintains that he is entitled to the payment of per diems, as R.A. No. 7916 specifically and categorically provides for the payment of a per diem for the attendance of the of the Board of Directors at board meetings of PEZA. The petitioner contends that this law is presumed to be valid; unless and until the law is declared unconstitutional, it remains in effect and binding for all intents and purposes. Neither can this law be rendered nugatory on the basis of a mere memorandum circular COA Memorandum No. 97-038 issued by the COA. The petitioner stresses that R.A. No. 7916 is a statute more superior than an istrative directive and the former cannot just be repealed or amended by the latter. He also posits that R.A. No. 7916 was enacted four (4) years after the case of Civil Liberties Union was promulgated. It is, therefore, assumed that the legislature, before enacting a law, was aware of the prior holdings of the courts. Since the constitutionality or the validity of R.A. No. 7916 was never challenged, the provision on the payment of per diems remains in force notwithstanding the Civil Liberties Union case. Nonetheless, the petitioner's position as Director IV is not included in the enumeration of officials prohibited to receive additional compensation as clarified in the Resolution of the Court dated August 1, 1991; thus, he is still entitled to receive the per diems. ISSUE: Whether or not the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor. RULING: Yes. The Secretary of Labor, who sits in an ex officio capacity as member of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Export Processing Zone (PEZA), is prohibited from receiving any compensation for this additional office, because his services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. It follows that the petitioner, who sits in the PEZA Board merely as representative of the Secretary of Labor, is likewise prohibited from receiving any compensation therefor. Otherwise, the representative would have a better right than his principal, and the fact that the petitioner’s position as Director IV of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) is not covered by the ruling in the Civil Liberties Union case is of no moment. After all, the petitioner attended the board meetings by the authority given to him by the Secretary of Labor to sit

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 as his representative. If it were not for such designation, the petitioner would not have been in the Board at all. There is also no merit in the allegation that the legislature was certainly aware of the parameters set by the Court when it enacted R.A. No. 7916, four (4) years after the finality of the Civil Liberties Union case. The payment of per diems was clearly an express grant in favor of the of the Board of Directors which the petitioner is entitled to receive. It is a basic tenet that any legislative enactment must not be repugnant to the highest law of the land which is the Constitution. No law can render nugatory the Constitution because the Constitution is more superior to a statute. If a law happens to infringe upon or violate the fundamental law, courts of justice may step in to nullify its effectiveness. It is the task of the Court to see to it that the law must conform to the Constitution. The framers of R.A. No. 7916 must have realized the flaw in the law which is the reason why the law was later amended by R.A. No. 8748. Under the amended law, the of the Board of Directors was increased from 8 to 13, specifying therein that it is the undersecretaries of the different Departments who should sit as board of the PEZA. The option of designating his representative to the Board by the different Cabinet Secretaries was deleted. Likewise, the last paragraph as to the payment of per diems to the of the Board of Directors was also deleted, considering that such stipulation was clearly in conflict with the proscription set by the Constitution.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 4. SUCCESSION a. ESTRADA VS. ARROYO (G.R. No. 146738, MARCH 2, 2001) PUNO, J. FACTS: This involves petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic. A short outline of events that precipitated the case at bar thus follows: 1. Petitioner won in the May 1998 national elections as president, the respondent as vice president. 2. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson accused the petitioner and his family of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. Such expose ignited several reactions of rage. 3. There became a built up of a call for petitioner to resign from office and his officials one by one resigned withdrawing their . 4. In November 20 Impeachment Trial of the petitioner was opened, in December 7 Impeachment Trial began. 5. January 19 people lined up in EDSA showing a greater call for the resignation of the president. 6. January 20 was the day of petitioner's surrender. At 12:00 noon Chief Justice Hilario Davide istered oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 pm petitioner left Malacanang and issued a press statement and a letter transmitting the executive power upon him, the president to the vice president becoming the acting president 7. The Monday after the oath, Arroyo discharged powers of the President. 8. Criminal cases have been filed against the petitioner after he stepped down into presidency. ISSUE: 1. WON the cases at bar present a justiciable controversy / political question specifically in regard the legitimacy of the Arroyo istration 2. WON Estrada merely resigned as President 3. WON Estrada is only temporarily unable to act as President 4. WON Estrada enjoys immunity from suit 5. WON the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be ened due to prejudicial publicity RULING: FIRST: The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, and section 8 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section II of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been laid down that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . .”

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 The Court also distinguished between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. SECOND: Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner resigned as President. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time. The Angara diary shows that the President wanted only five-day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelop to clear his name. "If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday. "The President says. “Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don’t want any more of this – it’s too painful. I’m tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.) "I just want to clear my name, then I will go.” The SC held that this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he said “x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.” “ Ayoko na” are words of resignation. During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitioner was treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after transition period. His resignation was also confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of’ the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his ers to him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. THIRD: The petitioner is permanently unable to act as President.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 Section 11 of Article VII provides that “Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions.” Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. The House of Representative ed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. l75 which states: “RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OFTHE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS FOR HER ISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION’S GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.” The Senate also ed Senate Resolution No. 82 which states: “RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO’S NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES” Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability. Even if petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court. FOURTH: The petitioner does not enjoy immunity from suit. The Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. On February 7, 2001, the Senate ed Senate Resolution No. 83 “Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio.” Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea, if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. The debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him. The SC also ruled in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that “incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure” but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. Also, petitioner cannot cite any decision of the SC licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other treser. FIFTH: Petitioner was not denied the right to impartial trial.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable if change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 X. POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT 1. GENERAL a. National Electrification istration v. Commission on Audit (G. R. No. 143481, February 15, 2002) Carpio, J. FACTS: t Senate and House of Representatives Resolution No. 01, Series of 1994, raised the salaries of government employees. The new salary schedule shall be implemented within four (4) years beginning in 1994. On December 28, 1996, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 389 (EO 389) directing payment of the fourth and final salary increases authorized under t Resolution No. 01 in two tranches: one on January 1, 1997 and the other on November 1, 1997. On January 1, 1997 NEA, implemented and paid out fourth and final salary increases onetime tranche, lumpsum, instead of paying it in two tranches. As a result, COA issued a notice of disallowance which NEA appealed but was denied by the Commission on Audit en banc. NEA filed a petition for certiorari before Supreme Court to reverse and set aside COA’s denial. ISSUE: Whether or not Commission on Audit committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess jurisdiction in disallowing the single or lump sum payout of the fourth and final salary increases. RULING: No. NEAs accelerated implementation of the Salary Standardization Law II is not in accordance with law. There is no merit in NEAs contention that the DBM, upon its approval of NEAs proposed budget, had effectively stamped its imprimatur on the accelerated implementation of the salary increases starting January 1, 1997 because NEAs proposed budget for 1997 included funds for such accelerated implementation. This is not the approval contemplated by the Presidential Memorandum dated November 7, 1995, which requires compliance with specific and conditions. The DBMs approval of NEAs proposed budget cannot be deemed sufficient authority to execute the same in disregard of the relevant orders and circulars providing for its manner of execution. The budget process is a cycle of sequential and interrelated budget activities regularly recurring within a specific time frame (a twelve-month period called fiscal year). The presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends to all executive employees from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. The constitutional vesture of this power in the President is self-executing and does not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 b. Villena v. The Secretary of the Interior (G.R. No. L-46570, April 21, 1939) Laurel, J. FACTS: Jose D. Villena was mayor of Makati in the 1930s. After investigation, the Secretary of Interior recommended the suspension of Villena to the Office of the president that approved the same. The Secretary suspended Villena. Villena claimed that the Secretary has no jurisdiction over the matter and that power or jurisdiction was vested in the local government [the governor] pursuant to Sec. 2188 of the istrative Code. Further, even if the respondent Secretary of the Interior has the power of supervision over local governments, that power, according to the constitution, must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of law and the provisions of law governing trials of charges against elective municipal officials are those contained in Sec. 2188 of the istrative Code as amended. In other words, the Secretary of the Interior must exercise his supervision over local governments, if he has that power under existing law, in accordance with sec 2188 of the istrative Code, as amended, as the latter provisions govern the procedure to be followed in suspending and punishing elective local officials while sec 79 (C) of the istrative Code is the genera law which must yield to the special law. ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Interior can suspend an elected Local Government Official under investigation. RULING: Yes. There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears vested in the provincial governor by sec 2188 of the istrative Code which provides that “The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of malistration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude”. However, that power of the provincial governor of suspension, expressly granted by sec 2188 of the istrative Code, was not necessarily exclusive which will preclude the Secretary of the Interior from exercising the same power. For instance, Villena itted in the oral argument that the President of the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office by virtue of his greater power of removal (sec. 2191, as amended, istrative Code) to be exercised conformably to law. Indeed, if the President could, in the manner prescribed by law, remove a municipal official; it would be a legal incongruity if he were to be devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And the incongruity would be more patent if, possessed of the power both to suspend and to remove a provincial official (sec. 2078, istrative Code), the President were to be without the power to suspend a municipal official. The power to suspend a municipal official is not exclusive. Preventive suspension may be issued to give way for an impartial investigation.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 c. Planas v. Gil (G.R. No. L-46440, January 18, 1939) Laurel, J. FACTS: In November 1938, Carmen Planas, a municipal board member of Manila, published a statement criticizing the acts of certain government officials including Pres. Manuel Quezon in a newspaper. The following morning, she received a letter from Jorge Vargas (Secretary to the President) by order of the president directing her to report before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). She was directed to explain and prove her allegations. She appeared before the CSC but she questioned the jurisdiction of the CSC over the matter. She said that as an elective official, she was able for her political acts to her constituency alone, unless such acts constitute offenses punishable under our penal laws, and not to executive officials belonging to a party opposed to that to which petitioner was d. Further, she contended that her statement in the newspaper was made by her as a private citizen and in the exercise of her right to discuss freely political questions and cannot properly be the subject of an istrative investigation; that the issue was only cognizable by courts of justice in case the contents of said statement infringe any provision of the Penal Code. The CSC, acting through Commissioner Jose Gil, however took cognizance of the case hence Planas appealed to the Supreme Court. The Solicitor General replied for the CSC arguing that under the separation of powers marked by the Constitution, the court has no jurisdiction to review the orders of the Chief Executive which were of purely istrative in character. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction to review orders issued by the President. RULING: The acts of the Chief Executive performed within the limits of his jurisdiction were his official acts and courts will neither direct nor restrain executive action in such cases. The rule was noninterference. But from this legal premise, it does not necessarily follow that the SC was precluded from making an inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of his acts when these were properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The classical separation of governmental powers viewed in the light of political philosophy was a relative theory of government. There was more truism and actuality in interdependence than in independence and separation of powers. In the present case, the President was not a party to the proceeding. He was neither compelled nor restrained to act in a particular way. The CSC was the party respondent and the theory was advanced by the Sol-Gen that because an investigation undertaken by him was directed by authority of the President of the Philippines, the SC has no jurisdiction over the present proceedings instituted by Planas. The argument was farfetched. A mere plea that a subordinate officer of the government was acting under orders from the Chief Executive may be an important averment, but was neither decisive nor conclusive upon this court. Like the dignity of his high office, the relative immunity of the Chief Executive from judicial interference was not in the nature of a sovereign port for all the subordinate official and employees of the executive Department to the extent that at the mere invocation of the authority that it purported the jurisdiction of this court to inquire into the validity or legality of an executive order was necessarily abated or suspended.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 Nevertheless, SC ruled that the CSC can take cognizance of the case. Planas was not denied the right to voice out her opinion but since she made allegations against the istration it is but right for her to prove those allegations. The CSC has the right to elicit the truth.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 d. Lacson v. Roque (G.R. No. L-6225, January 10, 1953) Tuazon, J. FACTS: The mayor of Manila, Arsenio Lacson, broadcasted some allegedly defamatory and libelous utterances against a certain judge (Judge Montesa). Montesa then filed a libel case against Lacson. A special prosecutor was assigned to the case. The special prosecutor recommended the suspension of Lacson to the President. The President, through acting Executive Secretary Mariano Roque, issued a suspension order against Lacson. ISSUE: Whether or not the President can suspend a Mayor from his office. RULING: No. There was neither statutory nor constitutional provision granting the President sweeping authority to remove municipal officials. It is true that the President “shall . . . exercise general supervision over all local governments,” but supervision does not contemplate control. The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal officers was not well taken. Removal and suspension of public officers were always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper construction subject to constitutional limitations The power of the President to remove officials from office as provided for in section 64 (b) of the Revised istrative Code must be done “conformably to law;” and only for disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines he “may at any time remove a person from any position of trust or authority under the Government of the Philippines.” Again, this power of removal must be exercised conformably to law, in this case, the allege libelous act of Lacson cannot be considered as disloyalty.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 e. Mondano v. Silvosa (G.R. No. L-7708, May 30, 1955) Padilla, J. FACTS: Jose Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao. A complaint was filed against him for rape and concubinage. The information reached the Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered the governor to investigate the matter. Consequently, Governor Fernando Silvosa then summoned Mondano and the latter appeared before him. Thereafter Silvosa suspended Mondano. Mondano filed a petition for prohibition ening the governor from further proceeding. In his defense, Silvosa invoked the Revised istrative Code which provided that he, as part of the executive and by virtue of the order given by the Assistant Executive Secretary, was with “direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction . . .” and to that end “may order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his Department and in connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an official or person who shall conduct such investigations. ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor, as agent of the Executive, can exercise the power of control over a mayor. RULING: No. The Constitution provides: “The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the power of control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all local governments over which he has been granted only the power of general supervision as may be provided by law. The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c) of the Revised istrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which, as already stated, the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law. If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised istrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec 10, Article 7, of the 1935 Constitution.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 In istrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to “receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of malistration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude.” And if the charges are serious, “he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by ed mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question.” Sec 86 of the Revised istrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the istration of municipalities. In this case, the governor can only investigate Mondano for crimes relating to Mondano’s office. If the issue is not related to his office but involves a rime of moral turpitude (such as rape or concubinage as in this case), there must first be a final conviction before a suspension may be issued. The point is, the governor must suspend a mayor not because he’s acting as an agent of the Executive but because of the power granted him by the Revised istrative Code.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 f. Almario V. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 189028, July 16, 2013) Leonardo-De Castro, J. FACTS: The National Artists Awards Committee. and the NCCA decided to team up and tly ister the National Artists Award. There were three deliberations for determining the nominees and on the final deliberation, a final list of four names was agreed upon namely: Manuel Conde, Ramon Santos, Lazaro Francisco and Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz. They submitted this recommendation to the President. According to respondents, the aforementioned letter was referred by the Office of the President to the Committee on Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly received nominations from various sectors, cultural groups and individuals strongly endorsing private respondents. Acting on this recommendation, a series of Proclamations were issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz and private respondents, Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno, respectively, as National Artists. Hence, the petition. All of the petitioners claim that former President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused her discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and selection process for the Order of National Artists and in substituting her own choice for those of the Deliberation s. ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the President amounted to grave abuse of discretion with regards to the violation of the right to equal protection. RULING: Yes. It should be recalled that one of the respondents was disqualified to be nominated for being the Executive Director of the NCCA at that time while respondents Masa and Caparas did not make it to the preliminary shortlist and respondent Moreno was not included in the second shortlist. Yet, the four of them were treated differently and considered favorably when they were exempted from the rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the C and conferred the Order of National Artists. The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno fails to rational scrutiny. No real and substantial distinction between respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown that would justify deviating from the laws, guidelines and established procedures, and placing respondents in an exceptional position. In view of the foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abads right to equal protection, an interest that is substantial enough to confer him standing in this case.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 2. APPOINTMENT a. Valencia v. Peralta (GR. No. L-20864, August 23, 1963) Reyes, J.B.L., J. FACTS: Petitioner Elpidio Valencia was designated as Acting Chairman of the board of directors of then President Carlos P. Garcia on October 4, 1961. Allegedly, after Valencia was extended the ad interim appointment, he took an oath of office “to the position Chairman, ad interim, Board of Directors, National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA)” on October 25, 1961. Such appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments (CA) on April 27, 1962, declaring him as “Chairman of the Board… for a term expiring July 20, 1967.” On June 2, 1962, however, respondent Secretary of National Defense Macario Peralta Jr. was appointed ad interim to the same position by President Diosdado Macapagal. This prompted Valencia to institute a petition challenging the legality of Peralta’s appointment, claiming that the position is not vacant since he has not resigned nor been removed for cause, and his tenure is bound to expire only after a term of six years. ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of respondent Peralta is valid. RULING: YES. The argument of petitioner Valencia that his oath and confirmation imply a prior ad interim appointment cannot be considered as it has been held in jurisprudence (People v. Murray) that the better rule requires some kind of written memorial that could render his title to public office indubitable. There is on record only one written designation of Valencia, but as mere Acting Chairman, dated October 4, 1961. Such was not a permanent appointment, and therefore, was revocable at anytime by the Chief Executive, and actually revoked by his subsequent designation of Peralta. Therefore, the Court had no alternative but to declare that Valencia had failed to establish title to the office he claims.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 b. Binamira v. Garrucho (G.R. No. 92008, July 30, 1990) Cruz, J. FACTS: Petitioner Ramon Binamira was designated as General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) by the Minister of Tourism and Chairman of the PTA. Board, Jose Gonzales. His resignation was demanded by respondent Peter Garrucho. Two days after, President Corazon Aquino sent Garrucho a memorandum designating him as General Manager of the PTA for the reason that the present General Manager – Binamira – was not designated by the President as required by Presidential Decree (PD) No. 564, but only by the Secretary of Tourism, making such invalid. Garrucho having taken over the position, Binamira filed this petition of quo warranto to question his title and to seek reinstatement to the office from which he claims to have been removed without just cause in violation of his security of tenure. ISSUE: Whether or not Binamira has claim of security of tenure. RULING: NO. Binamira was merely designated by the Minister of Tourism, which the President had overturned as required by PD No. 564. Where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named. Thus, Binamira cannot sustain that he has been illegally removed.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 c. Matibag v. Benipayo (G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002) Reyes, J.B.L., J. FACTS: The COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner Angelina Matibag as "Acting Director IV" of the EID, which then Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou renewed in a "temporary" capacity. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Alfredo Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman together with other commissioners in an ad interim appointment. In his capacity as Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum reasg directors, including the reassignment of Matibag to the Law Department. The latter requested to reconsider such, citing Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7, reminding heads of government offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period beginning January 2 until June 13, 2001." Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300, exempting the COMELEC from the coverage of the said memo circular. Matibag appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. At the same time, she filed an istrative and criminal complaint with the Law Department against Benipayo. During the pendency of her complaint, she filed a petition to the Court questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. ISSUE: Whether or not the ad interim appointments of the COMELEC officers were valid. RULING: YES. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact is it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. Pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, an ad interim appointment is permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress pursuant. Thus, the ad interim appointments extended by the President to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are valid and do not constitute temporary or acting appointments.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 d. Sarmiento v. Mison (G.R. No. L-79974, December 17, 1987) Padilla, J. FACTS: Petitioners Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcialla seek to en respondent Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (BOC) and respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison’s salaries and emoluments. They assail that the appointment of Mison is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments (CA). The respondents maintain its constitutionality. ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of Mison as BOC Commissioner is unconstitutional. RULING: NO. Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are four groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. The first group includes the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. Such is clearly appointed with the Consent of the CA. The second group includes all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; and the third group are those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Appointment for any of the positions included in both groups of officers can be made by the President without the consent or confirmation of the CA. And finally, the fourth group are those officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may, by law, vest in the President alone. This implies that, in absence of such a law, lowerranked officers appointed by the President are also subject to confirmation by the CA. In this case, the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the CA is required. As a matter of fact, based on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commissions, the 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of “heads of bureaus” from appointments that need consent or confirmation of the CA. Therefore, Mison’s appointment is constitutional.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 e. Quintos-Deles v. Committee on Constitutional Commissions, Commission on Appointments (G.R. No. 83216, September 4, 1989) Bidin, J. FACTS: Petitioner Teresita Quintos-Deles and three others were appointed as Sectoral Representatives by President Corazon Aquino pursuant to Art. VII, Sec. 16 (2) and Art. XVIII, Sec. 17 of the Constitution. Quinton-Deles was the sectoral representative for Women. They were subsequently scheduled to take their oath of office, but the Commission on Appointments (COA) filed an opposition against petitioner and those appointed alleging that their appointment must have the concurrence of the COA. This compelled the House Speaker to suspend their oathtaking. During a committee meeting of COA, to which respondent was invited, the Committee of the Constitutional Commissions and Offices of COA ruled against the position of petitioner. Hence, petitioner filed a petition questioning the objection of COA. She claims that her appointment does not need the concurrence of COA, pursuant to Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, which does not require her appointment to be confirmed by the COA to qualify her to take her seat in the lower house. ISSUE: Whether or not the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives before they can assume office. RULING: YES. The seats reserved for sectoral representatives in Section 5 (2), Article VII of the Constitution may be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Article XVIII of the same. It is indubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the “other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution,” referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are-subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 f. Soriano v. Lista (G.R. No. 153881, March 24, 2003) Corona, J. FACTS: Eight officers of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) were promoted by the President to Vice iral, Rear iral, Commodore, Naval Captain and they assumed office without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (COA). Petitioner Elpidio Soriano, as member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and as a taxpayer, filed a petition against the officers and Emilia Boncodin in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management. In his petition, he questions the constitutionality of their assumption of office, which he claims requires confirmation of the COA. ISSUE: WON the promotions and appointment of said officers require confirmation of the COA. RULING: NO. The PCG is now under the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) pursuant to Executive Order (EO) No. 475 issued by President Fidel Ramos. It is no longer part of the Philippine Navy or Armed Forces of the Philippines. It is clear from Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution that only appointed officers from the rank of colonel or naval captain in the armed forces require confirmation by the COA. The clause “officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain” in the provision refers to military officers alone. Therefore, the promotions and appointments of respondent officers of the PCG, or any PCG officer from the rank of captain and higher for that matter, do not require confirmation by the CA.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 g. Bautista v. Salonga (G.R. No. 86439, April 13, 1989) Padilla, J. FACTS: On August 27, 1987, the President designated petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as “Acting Chairman, Commission on Human Rights (CHR)”, and after a few months, extended her permanent appointment. Immediately after taking her oath, she immediately discharged the functions and duties of her office. On January 8, 1989, Bautista received a letter from the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments (CA) requesting her to submit information and documents required by its rules in connection with the confirmation of her appointment. The CA wrote to her again, requesting her presence at a meeting that would deliberate on her appointment. She wrote back to the Chairman of the CA stating that the CA has no jurisdiction to review her appointment. The CA, on the other hand, disapproved her “ad interim appointment” in view of her refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the CA. Bautista’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. ISSUE: Whether or not the position of Chairman of the CHR is among those positions that require the confirmation of the CA. RULING: NO. Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are four groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. The appointment of the Chairman and of the CHR falls under the second sentence of the provision because they are officers of the government “whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint, pursuant to Section 2(c) of Executive Order (EO) No. 163. This type of appointment does not require the review or participation of the Commission on Appointments. Therefore, the CA does not have jurisdiction to review her appointment and likewise, cannot disapprove such.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 h. Calderon v. Carale (G.R. No. 91636, April 23 1992) Padilla, J. FACTS: Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amending the Labor Code (PD 442) was approved. It provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (COA). Pursuant to said law, President Corazon Aquino appointed the Chairman and Commissioners of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). After said appointments, then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon issued istrative Order (AO) No. 161, designation the places of assignment of the newly appointed commissioners. This petition instituted by Peter Calderon questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments extended by the President of the Philippines to the respondent Chairman and of NLRC, without submitting the same to the COA. ISSUE: Whether or not said appointments are subject to the confirmation of the COA. RULING: NO. The second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution refers to all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence, more specifically under the 3rd group of appointees – those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman and of NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 whose appointments require confirmation by COA. To that extent, RA 6715 which requires the confirmation of COA is unconstitutional because it amends by legislation the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and it amends by legislation the second sentence of the same provision, by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the President.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 i. Manalo v. Sistoza (G.R. No. 107369, August 11, 1999) Purisima, J. FACTS: On December 1990, Republic Act (RA) 6975 creating the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) was signed into law by President Corazon Aquino. Under Sections 26 and 31 of the same, it was provided that the PNP Chief as well as certain police officers including Directors and Chief Superintendents, after being appointed by the President, must be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments (COA) before they can take their office. On March 10, 1992, President Aquino promoted fifteen police officers by appointing them to positions in the PNP with the rank of Chief Superintendent to Director. Without their names submitted to the COA for confirmation, said police officers took their oath and assumed their respective positions. Thereafter, the Department of Budget and Management, under Secretary Salvador Enriquez, authorized for their salaries and other emoluments. On October 21, 1992, petitioner Jesulito Manalo brought to the Supreme Court a petition for prohibition to assail the legality of subject appointments and disbursements made thereof. ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of the police officers is valid. RULING: YES. There was no need for the confirmation of respondent officers by the Commission on Appointments because their positions are not included in the group of officers enumerated under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution that require the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Consequently, Sections 26 and 31 of RA 6974 are unconstitutional for empowering the Commission on Appointments to confirm the appointments of public officials whose appointments are not required by the Constitution. In view thereof, Secretary Enriquez did not act with grave abuse of discretion in authorizing and effecting disbursements for the salaries and other emoluments of the respondent police officers whose appointments are valid.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 j. Rufino v. Endriga (G.R. No. 139554, July 21, 2006) Carpio, J. FACTS: The Endriga group were appointed of the board of trustees of the Cultural Center of the Philippines (C) by President Fidel V. Ramos in 1995, with the qualification that their appointments would extend only until December 31, 1998. By December 22, 1998, then President Joseph Estrada advised petitioners that they were being replaced by seven new trustees to the C board, the Rufino group. This led the Endriga group to file quo warranto proceedings questioning the authority of the president to appoint new in the C board. They claim that under Section 6(b) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 15, vacancies in the board “shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of the trustees held at the next regular meeting.” Since there was only one seat vacant due to the expiration of Mañosa’s term, President Estrada could not appoint a new board. The Court of Appeals (CA) granted their petition and declared the Endriga group lawfully entitled to hold office and ousted respondents from the C board. The Rufino group filed for a motion for reconsideration, asserting that Section 6(b) of PD 15, which authorized the C trustees to elect their fellow trustees, should be declared unconstitutional for it is allegedly repugnant to Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution, which allowed the appointment only of “officers lower in rank” than the appointing power. ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 6(b) of PD No. 15 is unconstitutional. RULING: YES. Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution allows heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards to appoint only "officers lower in rank" than such "heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards." In this case, the President appointed the Endriga group as trustees, while the remaining C trustees elected the same Endriga group to the same positions. In effect, there are two appointing powers over the same set of officers in the Executive branch. Each appointing power insists on exercising its own power, even if the two powers are irreconcilable. Thus, the Court must put an end to this recurring anomaly.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 k. Lacson v. Romero (G.R. No. L-3081, October 14, 1949) Montemayor, J. FACTS: Petitioner Antonio Lacson was appointed by the President as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental. The appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments (COA) and thereafter, he took his oath of office and performed the duties of that office. Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice, the President nominated Lacson to the post of provincial fiscal of Tarlac. On the same date, the President nominated for the position of provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental respondent Honorio Romero. Both nominations were simultaneously confirmed by COA. Lacson neither accepted the appointment nor assumed the office of the fiscal of Tarlac. Romero, on the other hand, took his oath of office, notified the Solicitor General of the fact, and thereafter proceeded to his station. Upon arrival at Negros Oriental, Romero notified Lacson of his intention to take over the office, but the latter objected. Lacson then instituted a petition for quo warranto against Romero. ISSUE: Whether or not Lacson is entitled to the post of provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental. RULING: YES. There is no power in this country which can compel a man to accept an office. Consequently, since Lacson has declined to accept his appointment as provincial fiscal of Tarlac and no one can compel him to do so, then he continues as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental and no vacancy in said office was created unless Lacson had been lawfully removed as such fiscal of Negros Oriental. A provincial fiscal as a civil service official may not be removed from office even by the President who appointed him, and even with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, except for cause.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 l. Luego v Civil Service Commission (G.R. No. L-69137, August 5, 1986) Cruz, J. FACTS: On 18 February 1983, petitioner was appointed as istrative Officer II at the Office of the City Mayor in Cebu City by Mayor Florentino Solon. The appointment was described as "permanent" but the Civil Service Commission approved it as "temporary due to a protest filed by the private respondent. On March 22, 1984, after protracted hearings the legality of which does not have to be decided here, the Civil Service Commission found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and on June 28, 1984, said respondent was appointed by the new mayor, Mayor Ronald Duterte. ISSUE: WON the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee. RULING: NO. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent Civil Service Commission to reverse him and call it temporary. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 m. Lapinid v Civil Service Commission (G.R. No. 96298, May 14, 1991) Cruz, J. FACTS: Petitioner Renato M. Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine Ports Authority to the position of Terminal Supervisor at the Manila International Container Terminal on October 1, 1988. This appointment was protested on December 15, 1988, by private respondent Juanito Junsay. He contended that he should be designated terminal supervisor, or to any other comparable position, in view of his preferential right thereto. In a resolution dated February 14, 1990, the Commission disposed that Appellants Juanito Junsay and Benjamin Villegas be appointed as Terminal Supervisor (SG 18). Upon learning of the said resolution, Lapinid, who claimed he had not been informed of the appeal and had not been heard thereon, filed a motion for reconsideration on March 19, 1990. ISSUE: WON the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee. RULING: NO. The Court declares once again that the Civil Service Commission has no power of appointment except over its own personnel. Neither does it have the authority to review the appointments made by other offices except only to ascertain if the appointee possesses the required qualifications. The determination of who among aspirants with the minimum statutory qualifications should be preferred belongs to the appointing authority and not the Civil Service Commission. It cannot disallow an appointment because it believes another person is better qualified and much less can it direct the appointment of its own choice. Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even this Court cannot compel. While the act of appointment may in proper cases be the subject of mandamus, the selection itself of the appointee — taking into the totality of his qualifications, including those abstract qualities that define his personality — is the prerogative of the appointing authority. This is a matter addressed only to the discretion of the appointing authority.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 n. Pobre v Medieta (G.R. No. 106677, July 23, 1993) Grino-Aquino, J. FACTS: The controversy began on January 2, 1992, when the term of office of Honorable Julio B. Francia as PRC Commissioner/Chairman expired. At that time, Mariano A. Mendieta was the senior Associate Commissioner and Hermogenes P. Pobre was the second Associate Commissioner of the PRC. On January 6, 1992, Executive Secretary Franklin M. Drilon sought the opinion of Acting Secretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello, III on whether the President's power to appoint the Commissioner of the Professional Regulation Commission is restricted by Section 2 of P.D. No. 223, as amended. The Executive Secretary wanted to know whether the President may appoint as Commissioner/Chairman of the PRC another Associate Commissioner or any person other than the Senior Associate Commissioner. In a Memorandum dated January 22, 1991, Acting Secretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello, III answered that the said provision by the Executive Secretary does not limit or restrict the appointing power of the President. On February 15, 1992, President Corazon C. Aquino appointed the petitioner, then an Associate Commissioner, as the PRC Commissioner/Chairman. He took his oath of office on February 17, 1992. Even before Commissioner Pobre's appointment, the private respondent, Mariano A. Mendieta, as the Senior Associate Commissioner, filed a petition for declaratory relief against Commissioner Pobre, Executive Secretary Drilon, and Acting Secretary of Justice Eduardo Montenegro, praying that they be ened from appointing, or recommending, the appointment of Associate Commissioner Pobre as Chairman of the PRC because under Section 2 of P.D. No. 223, he (Mendieta), as the senior Associate Commissioner, was legally entitled to succeed Francia as Chairman of the PRC, being that “any vacancy in the Commission shall be filled for the unexpired term only with the most senior of the Associate Commissioners succeeding the Commissioner at the expiration of his term, resignation or removal”. On August 5, 1992, Judge Somera rendered a decision in favor of Mendieta and on August 19, 1992, she issued a writ of prohibitory injunction directing the Deputy Sheriff of Manila to stop Pobre from discharging the functions and duties of the Chairman/Commissioner of the PRC, and from enjoying the rights and privileges of that office. ISSUE: WON the President may appoint as Commissioner/Chairman of the PRC another Associate Commissioner or any person other than the Senior Associate Commissioner. RULING: YES. In interpreting this section of P.D. No. 223, consideration should be accorded the provision of the Constitution vesting the power of appointment in the President of the Philippines. Section 10, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution empowers the President to appoint "those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint." The Court finds unacceptable the view that every vacancy in the Commission (except the position of "junior" Associate Commissioner) shall be filled by "succession" or by "operation of law" for that would deprive the President of his power to appoint a new PRC Commissioner and Associate Commissioners — "all to be appointed by the President" under P.D. No. 223. The absurd result would be that the only occasion for the President to exercise his appointing power would be when the position of junior (or second) Associate Commissioner becomes vacant. We may not presume that when the President issued P.D. No. 223, he deliberately

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 clipped his prerogative to choose and appoint the head of the PRC and limited himself to the selection and appointment of only the associate commissioner occupying the lowest rung of the ladder in that agency. Since the appointment of the petitioner as PRC Chairman/Commissioner to succeed Julio B. Francia, Jr. at the expiration of his term, did not violate any provision of P.D. No. 223 and in fact conforms with the Chief Executive's interpretation and implementation of the law, the legality of said appointment should be upheld.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 o. Pimentel v Ermita (G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005) Carpio, J. FACTS: The Senate and the House of Representatives ("Congress") commenced their regular session on 26 July 2004. The Commission on Appointments, composed of Senators and Representatives, was constituted on 25 August 2004. Meanwhile, President Arroyo issued appointments 2 to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments. Respondents took their oath of office and assumed duties as acting secretaries. On 8 September 2004, petitioners filed the present petition as Senators of the Republic of the Philippines. Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004. On 23 September 2004, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments 3 to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity. ISSUE: WON President Arroyo's appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session is constitutional. RULING: YES. The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. 6 Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature. 7 The scope of the legislature's interference in the executive's power to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. 16 In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego.An alter ego,whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be. The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the President's confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee. The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that "[t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch." Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 p. De Rama v Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001) Ynares-Santiago, J. FACTS: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado L. de Rama wrote a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service Commission (or CSC), seeking the recall of the appointments of fourteen (14) municipal employees. Petitioner de Rama justified his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of the said employees were "midnight" appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. On April 30, 1996, the CSC denied petitioner's request for the recall of the appointments of the fourteen employees, for lack of merit. The CSC also dismissed petitioner's allegation that these were "midnight" appointments, pointing out that the Constitutional provision relied upon by petitioner prohibits only those appointments made by an outgoing President and cannot be made to apply to local elective officials. After reviewing the facts and issues raised by petitioner, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution 6 dated May 16, 1997 which held that there was no abuse of the power of appointment on the part of the outgoing mayor. ISSUE: WON there was abuse of the power of appointment on the part of the outgoing mayor. RULING: NO. In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. A thorough perusal of the records reveal that the CSC's ruling is ed by the evidence and the law. The fourteen (14) employees were duly appointed following two meetings of the Personnel Selection Board held on May 31 and June 26, 1995. There is no showing that any of the private respondents were not qualified for the positions they were appointed to. Moreover, their appointments were duly attested to by the Head of the CSC field office at Lucena City. By virtue thereof, they had already assumed their appointive positions even before petitioner himself assumed his elected position as town mayor. Consequently, their appointments took effect immediately and cannot be unilaterally revoked or recalled by petitioner. It has been held that upon the issuance of an appointment and the appointee's assumption of the position in the civil service, "he acquires a legal right which cannot be taken away either by revocation of the appointment or by removal except for cause and with previous notice and hearing." 17 Moreover, it is well-settled that the person assuming a position in the civil service under a completed appointment acquires a legal, not just an equitable, right to the position. This right is protected not only by statute, but by the Constitution as well, which right cannot be taken away by either revocation of the appointment, or by removal, unless there is valid cause to do so, provided that there is previous notice and hearing. The CSC correctly ruled, however, that the constitutional prohibition on so-called "midnight appointments," specifically those made within two (2) months immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 q. In Re: Mateo Valenzuela (A.M. No. 98-5-01, November 9, 1998) Narvasa, C.J. FACTS: Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta are appointed as Judges of the RTC of Bago City and Cabanatuan, respectively, by the President. These appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional provision prohibits the President from making any appointments two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. ISSUE: WON the President is required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution. RULING: NO. During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution “two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term” the President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes into effect once every 6 years. The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the period of the ban. They come within the operation of the prohibition relating to appointments. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 r. De Castro v Judicial and Bar Council (G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010) Bersamin, J. FACTS: C.J. Puno is set to retire on 17 May 2010 or 7 days after the presidential election. January 2010, the JBC begun to take applications for the position of C.J. Meanwhile, strong objections to Pres. GMA’s appointing C.J. Puno’s successor arose. The instant petitions were thus filed questioning her authority to appoint a new C.J. in the light of the ban imposed on presidential appointments two months immediately before the next presidential elections up to the end of the President’s term under Sec 15, Art VII of the Constitution. This view however seemingly conflicts with Sec 4(1), Art VIII which provides that any vacancy in the SC shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy, and Sec 9, Art VIII which provides that the President shall issue appointments to the Judiciary within 90 days from submission by the JBC of the list of nominees. It is further argued that there is no imperative need to appoint the next Chief Justice considering that Sec 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 can still address the situation of having the next President appoint the successor. It provides that in case of a vacancy in the office of the C.J. or of his inability to perform the duties and powers of his office, they shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in precedence, until such disability is removed, or another C.J. is appointed and duly qualified. It is also argued that there is no need for the incumbent President to appoint during the prohibition period the successor of C.J. Puno because anyway there will still be about 45 days of the 90 days mandated in Sec 4(1), Art VIII remaining (the period that remains of the 90 days counted from C.J. Puno’s retirement after the end of GMA’s term).. A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed. ISSUE: WON the ban on making presidential appointments under Sec 15, Art VII extend to appointments to fill vacancies in the SC and in the rest of the Judiciary. RULING: No. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Sec 15, Art VII to the appointment of of the SC, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. The exchanges during deliberations of the Constitutional Commission further show that the filling of a vacancy in the SC within the 90-day period was made a true mandate for the President. This was borne out of the fact that 30 years hitherto, the Court seldom had a complete complement. Further, the usage in Sec 4(1), Art VIII of the word “shall”—an imperative—should not be disregarded. Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Sec 15, Art VII, undoubtedly, the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Dept. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary and appointments to the Judiciary for the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential election, or of satisfying partisan considerations. The fact that Secs 14 and 16 of Art VI refer only to appointments within the Executive Dept. renders conclusive that Sec 15 of the same also applies only to the Executive Dept. This is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context. If the framers intended Sec 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments, they would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition. To hold that Sec 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Dept. for it will tie the Judiciary and the SC to the fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential election.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 s. VILLALUZ v ZALDIVAR (G.R. NO. L-22754, December 31, 1965) Bautista Angelo, J. FACTS: The petitioner seeks his reinstatement as of the Motor Vehicles Office. He alleged that he was as chief of said office on 20 May 1958 and two days thereafter his nomination was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In 1960, Congressman Joaquin Roces alleged that Villaluz was an ineffective leader and had caused losses to the government. He indorsed the removal of Villaluz. Consequently, Executive Secretary Calixto Zaldivar suspended Villaluz and ordered a committee to investigate the matter. After investigation, it was recommended that Villaluz be removed. The president then issued an istrative Order removing Villaluz from his post. Villaluz averred that the president has no jurisdiction to remove him. ISSUE: Whether or not Villaluz is under the jurisdiction of the President to be removed considering that he is an appointee of the president. RULING: Yes. The president has jurisdiction and not the Civil Service. The President of the Philippines has jurisdiction to investigate and remove him since he is a presidential appointee who belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service under Sec 5 of Republic Act No. 2260; being a presidential appointee, Villaluz belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government and as such he can only be investigated and removed from office after due hearing by the President of the Philippines under the principle that “the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint”. There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the President may extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service for such can be justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that “the Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department”.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 t. ALAJAR v ALBA (G.R. Nos. L-10360 & L-10433, January 17, 1957) Felix, J. FACTS: RA 603 created the City of Roxas. Sec 8 thereof provides that the vice mayor shall be appointed by the president. Pursuant to the law, Alba was appointed as the mayor. Later on, the president sent communication to Alba telling him that he will be replaced by a new appointee, Alajar. Alajar was then declared as the acting mayor. Alba refused to leave his post and he appealed his case before the Judge Evangelista who ruled in favor of him. Alajar then complained. Alba argued that section 2545 of the RAC w/c provides: “ Appointment of City Officials. – The President of the Philippines shall appoint, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the Congress of the Philippines, the mayor, the vicemayor . . . and he may REMOVE at pleasure any of the said officers . . .”, has been declared incompatible with the constitutional inhibition that “no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law”, because the two provisions are mutually repugnant and absolutely irreconciliable. ISSUE: Whether or not Alba can be removed by the president upon displeasure. RULING: The question is whether an officer appointed for a definite time or during good behavior, had any vested interest or contract right in his office, of which Congress could not deprive him. The question is not novel. There seems to be but little difficulty in deciding that there was no such interest or right. “ittedly, the act of Congress in creating a public office, defining its powers, functions and fixing the “term” or the period during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right and the “tenure” or the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office, is a valid and constitutional exercise of legislative power. In the exercise of that power, Congress enacted RA 603 on April 11, 1951, creating the City of Roxas and providing, among others for the position of Vice-Mayor and its tenure or period during which the incumbent Vice-Mayor holds office at the pleasure of the President, so, the logical inference is that Congress can legally and constitutionally make the tenure of certain officials dependent upon the pleasure of the President. Therefore, Alba was appointed by the pleasure of the resident and can also be removed when that pleasure ceases.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 u. APARRI v COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. L-30057, January 31, 1984) Makasiar, J. FACTS: On January 15, 1960, the Board of Directors of the defunct National Resettlement and Rehabilitation istration (NARRA) approved resolution no. 13 (series of 1960), which appointed Appari as a general manager of the said company which will take effect on January 16, 1960. However on March 15, 1962, the same Board of Directors approved resolution no. 24 (series of 1962) which states that the Chairman of the Board has transmitted to the Board of Directors the desire of the office of the Philippines to fix the term of Aparri, the general manager up to the closing time of the office on March 31, 1962 in accordance with paragraph 2, section 8 of R.A. 1160: Sec. 8. Powers and Duties of the Board of Directors. — The Board of Directors shall have the following powers and duties: 2) To appoint and fix the term of office of General Manager …, subject to the recommendation of the Office of Economic Coordination and the approval of the President of the Philippines, …. The Board, by a majority vote of all , may, for cause, upon recommendation of the Office of Economic Coordination and with the approval of the President of the Philippines, suspend and/or remove the General Manager and/or the Assistant General Manager (p. 46, rec., emphasis supplied). ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution no. 24 (series of 1962) was a removal or dismissal of the petitioner without cause. RULING: YES. It was affirmed that the term of office of petitioner expired on March 31, 1962. It is necessary in each case to interpret the word "Term" with the purview of the statutes so as to effectuate the statutory scheme pertaining to the office under examination. In the case at bar, the term of office is not fixed by law. However, the power to fix the term is rested in the board of directors subject to the recommendation of the office of economic coordination and the approval of the president of the Philippines. Resolution No. 24 speaks of no removal but an expiration of the term of office of the petitioner. The statute is undeniably clear. "It is the rule in statutory construction that if the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous. Its meaning and intention of the legislative must be determined from the language employed and where there is no ambiguity in words, there is no room for construction. The petitioner in this case was not removed before the expiration of his term rather, his right to hold office ceased by the expiration on March 31, 1962, of his term to hold such office.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 v. DOMINGO v ZAMORA (G.R. No. 142283, February 6, 2003) Carpio, J. FACTS: On 5 March 1999, former President Jospeh E. Estrada issued EO 81 entitled Transferring the Sports Programs and Activities of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports to the Philippine Sports Commission and Defining the Role of DECS in School-Based Sports. Pursuant to EO 81, former DECS Secretary Gonzales issued Memorandum No. 01592 reassingning all remaining BPESS staff to other divisions or bureaus of the DECS. Secretary Gonzales then issued another memorandum reasg the BPESS Staff named in the Memorandum to various offices within DECS. The petitioners were dissatisfied with the reassignment. They argue that EO 81 is void for being an undue legislation by President Estrada. They likewise challenged the DECS Memoranda for violating their right to security of tenure. ISSUE: WON EO 81 and DECS Memoranda are valid. RULING: YES. EO 81 is a valid exercise of the President’s delegated power to reorganize the Office of the President. The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office to achieve simplicity, economy, and efficiency. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is command post of the President. This is the rationale behind the President’s continuing authority to reorganize the istrative structure of the Office of the President. Petitioners contention that the DECS is not part of the Office of the President is immaterial. Under EO 292 which expressly grants the President the power to reorganize the Office of the President, the DECS is indisputably a Department of the Executive Branch. Even if it is not part of the Office of the President, said EO clearly authorizes the President to transfer any function or agency of the DECS.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 3. CONTROL a. Banda v. Ermita (G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010) LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. FACTS: President GMA issued Executive Order No. 378 on 2004 amending Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO (National Printing Office) over the printing services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to source their printing services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the condition that the services offered by the private supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost compared to what was offered by the NPO. Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPO’s appropriation in the General Appropriations Act to its income. Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the NPO, petitioners now challenge its constitutionality, contending that: (1) it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by former President Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers; and (2) Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners’ security of tenure, because it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO. ISSUE: Whether EO 378 is constitutional. RULING: YES. It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to re organize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the President’s constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes. Executive Order No. 292 or the istrative Code of 1987 gives the President continuing authority to reorganize and redefine the functions of the Office of the President. Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the said Code, is explicit: The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the istrative structure of the Office of the President. It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary (which in various times has been an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an agency under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of the Office of the President. To be very clear, this delegated legislative power to reorganize pertains only to the Office of the President and the departments, offices and agencies of the executive branch and does not include the Judiciary, the Legislature or the constitutionally-created or mandated bodies. Moreover, it must be stressed that the exercise by the President of the power to reorganize the executive department must be in accordance with the Constitution, relevant laws and prevailing jurisprudence.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 b. Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines v. Romulo (G.R. No. 160093, July 31, 2007) PUNO, C.J. FACTS: President Joseph E. Estrada issued E.O. No. 102 on May 24, 1999 pursuant to Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the istrative Code of 1987, and Sections 78 and 80 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8522, also known as the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 1998. E.O. No. 102 provided for structural changes and redirected the functions and operations of the Department of Health. On October 19, 1999, the President issued E.O. No. 165 "Directing the Formulation of an Institutional Strengthening and Streamlining Program for the Executive Branch" which created the Presidential Committee on Executive Governance (PCEG) composed of the Executive Secretary as chair and the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) as co-chair. Secretary of Health Issued issued istrative Order (A.O.) No. 94, Series of 2000, which set the implementing guidelines for the restructuring process on personnel selection and placement, retirement and/or voluntary resignation. A.O. No. 94 outlined the general guidelines for the selection and placement of employees adopting the procedures and standards set forth in R.A. No. 66564 or the "Rules on Governmental Reorganization," Civil Service Rules and Regulations, Sections 76 to 78 of the GAA for the Year 2000, and Section 42 of E.O. No. 292. On August 29, 2000, the Secretary of Health issued Department Memorandum No. 157, Series of 2000. Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP) is a union of affected employees in the Malaria Control Service of the Department of Health. MEWAP filed a case assailing that E.O. 102 violates E.O. 292 and R.A 8522. ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the power to reorganize structurally and functionally the functions of the Department of Health. RULING: Yes. The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of Health under the Constitution and statutory laws pursuant to Article VII, Sections 1 and 17 of the 1987 Constitution. The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence. The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the President’s power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 c. Domingo v. Zamora (G.R. No. 142283, February 6, 2003) Carpio, J. FACTS: On March 5, 1999, former President Joseph E. Estrada issued Executive Order No. 81 entitled "Transferring the Sports Programs and Activities of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports to the Philippine Sports Commission and Defining the Role of DECS in School-Based Sports." Pursuant to EO 81, former DECS Secretary Andrew B. Gonzales issued Memorandum No. 01592 on January 10, 2000. Memorandum No. 01592 temporarily reassigned, in the exigency of the service, all remaining BPESS Staff to other divisions or bureaus of the DECS effective March 15, 2000. On January 21, 2000, Secretary Gonzales issued Memorandum No. 01594 reasg the BPESS staff named in the Memorandum to various offices within the DECS effective March 15, 2000. Petitioners were among the BPESS personnel affected by Memorandum No. 01594. Dissatisfied with their reassignment, petitioners filed the instant petition. Petitioners argue that EO 81 is void and unconstitutional for being an undue legislation by President Estrada. Petitioners maintain that the President’s issuance of EO 81 violated the principle of separation of powers. Petitioners also challenge the DECS Memoranda for violating their right to security of tenure. ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order 81 and the DECS Memoranda are valid. RULING: Yes. Although the issue is moot and academic upon the ing of Republic Act 9155 which abolished the BPESS and transferred DECS’s functions relating to sports competition to the Philippine Sports Commission, the Supreme Court stressed that E.O. 292 (istrative Code of 1987), grants the President continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President “to achieve simplicity, economy, and efficiency”. The reorganization of the President of the Office of the President is limited only to transferring functions from the Office of the President to Departments or agencies or vice versa. Transfer does not result in the employee’s cessation in the office because his office continues to exist although in another department or agency. However, the President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President's power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or Agencies, and vice versa.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 d. Pichay vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012) Perlas-Bernabe, J. FACTS: On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs(ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint-affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities istration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent of the LWUA Board of Trustees, namely, Renato Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel Landingin, which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc. On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order3 signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his co-respondents to submit their respective written explanations under oath. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same transaction and charge of grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.", and docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman. ISSUE: Whether E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for abrogating unto an istrative office a quasijudicial function through and E.O. and not through legislative enactment by Congress. RULING: No, because the President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department under E.O. 292. In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora the Court affirmed that the President's authority to carry out are organization in any branch or agency of the executive department is an express grant by the legislature by virtue of Section 31, Book III, E.O. 292(the istrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy of the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the istrative structure of the Office of the President. "The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the command post of the President. (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated legislative authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.The President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President's power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or agencies, and vice versa. The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under Section31(1) on the one hand and Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other is

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 crucial not only as it affects employees' tenurial security but also insofar as it touches upon the validity of the reorganization, that is, whether the executive actions undertaken fall within the limitations prescribed under E.O. 292. When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it was composed of a Chairman and two (2) Commissioners who held the ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I, respectively, and was placed directly "under the Office of the President.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 e. DENR v DENR Region 12 Employees (G.R. No. 149724, August 19, 2003) Ynares-Santiago, J. FACTS: Regional Executive Director of DENR for Region 12, Israel Gaddi, issued a Memorandum, (pursuant to DENR Order 99-14) directing immediate transfer of the DENR [Region] 12 offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato Respondents filed with RTC a petition for nullity of orders with prayer for preliminary injunction. TC issued TRO ening petitioner from implementing assailed Memorandum Petitioner filed MR with motion to dismiss raising the ff grounds: 1. 2. 3. 4.

power to transfer the Regional Office of the DENR is executive in nature The decision to transfer the Regional Office is based on EO 429, which reorganized Region 12 The validity of EO 429 has been affirmed by the SC in the case of Chiongbian vs. Orbos (1995) Since the power to reorganize the istrative Regions is executive in nature citing Chiongbian, the SC has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition

Subsequently, TC rendered judgment ordering that the assailed Memorandum be not enforced for being bereft of legal basis and issued with grave abuse of discretion. Furthermore, TC ordered that the seat of the DENR Regional Offices be returned to Cotabato City. Petitioner’s MR was denied. Appeal before the CA was dismissed outright on procedural grounds. Another MR was denied, hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR. RULING: YES. Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and istrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and istrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under Article VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution. Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the President to reorganize the National Government may validly be delegated to his cabinet exercising control over a particular executive department. .In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 f. CITY OF ILIGAN v DIRECTOR OF LANDS (G.R. No. L-30852, February 26, 1988) Gancayco, J. FACTS: President issued Proclamation 335, withdrawing certain parcels of public land in Iligan from sale or settlement and reserving such for the use of NPC (Nat’l Power Corporation). By virtue of said proclamation, NPC constructed a fertilizer plant named “Maria Cristina” Later, NPC sold the fertilizer plant to “Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corp” with all the machineries, right of occupancy, and use of land and then covenanted to collaborate with DANR in facilitating sale and right to lease for at least 25 years, the lands where plant is erected. Proclamation 20 and 198 were issued. Proc. 20 – excluding from operation of Proc. 335 certain areas occupied by “Ma. Cristina” and Employees Housing and declaring such lands for open disposition. Proc. 198 – changing the technical description of said areas (6 lots). Then “Marcelo Steel” and “Ma. Cristina” filed a Msc. Sales Application with the Bureau of Lands “Marcelo Tire” and “Ma. Cristina” are sister corporations. Purchaser was “Marcelo Tire” but another sister corp. “Marcelo Steel” operated said plant. In the notice of sale issued in Manila, Director of Lands advised that Bureau will sell in an auction said lands of “Marcelo Steel.” President then issued Proc. 469 – excluding from the reservation made in favor to NPC certain lands in Iligan (Lot 1, 1-a, 3, and 4) and DONATING said lands in favor of Iligan City. Mayor of Iligan wrote to Director of Lands informing him that City is the owner of said lands and foreshores in auction. But no action was taken on said request for exclusion and so City filed a complaint for injunction in CFI against Director. Injunction temporarily issued. Pending case, President Marcos issued Proc. 94 – excluding from the donation in Proc. 469 certain lands (Lot 1-a, 2-a, and 3) and declaring same for open disposition. CFI dismissed the complaint of City and dissolved injunction. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not President has the authority to grant a portion of public domain to any government like the City of Iligan. RULING: YES • Section 60 of Public Land Act states that tracts of land can be disposed of by grant, donation or transfer made to a province, municipality, branch, or subdivision of government for purposes conducive to public interest. • Who has authority to donate? Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources through Director of Lands (Sec 60) • Can President donate instead of Secretary and Director? YES • Director has direct executive control of lands (e.g. lease, sale, concession, disposition of land of public domain) • Director SUBJECT to control of Secretary of Agriculture. • Secretary’s control is SUBJECT to control of PRESIDENT • Under Art VII Sec 17: President shall control ALL executive departments, bureaus, and offices. • Hence, President has the same authority to dispose of portions of public domain as his subordinates. • Such authority to dispose is also granted to the President under Section 69 of the Public Land Act. • Since, President has the authority to donate lands of public domain for residential, commercial, & industrial purposes. Questioned Proclamation 469 is VALID and binding: • Ownership of lands now vested in City of Iligan.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 •

•

Mayor of City upon proclamation immediately had the lots surveyed and entered into negotiation with National Investment and Development Corp. and those interested in developing the Coco-Chemical Plant in order to accelerate economic expansion in the City. Proclamation 94 is NULL and VOID as said parcels had been segregated and had become property of Iligan.

Decision of CFI REVERSED.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 g. Araneta v Gatmaitan (G.R. Nos. L-8895 L-9191, April 30, 1957) Felix, J. FACTS: San Miguel Bay, located between the provinces of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur, a part of the National waters of the Philippines with an extension of about 250 square miles and an average depth of approximately 6 fathoms, is considered as the most important fishing area in the Pacific side of the Bicol region. The operation of trawls in the area was said to have depleted the marine resources in the area. On April 4, 1954, the President issued Executive Order 22, prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, and the E.O 66 and 80 as amendments to EO 22, as a response for the general clamor among the majority of people living in the coastal towns of San Miguel Bay. A group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction to restrain the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from enforcing the said E.O. and to declare E.O 22 as null and void. ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order Nos. 22, 60 and 80 were valid. RULING: Yes. Congress provided under the Fisheries Act that a.) it is unlawful to take or catch fry or fish eggs in the waters of the Phil and; b.) it authorizes Sec. of Agriculture and Nat. Resources to provide regulations and restrictions as may be deemed necessary. The Fisheries Act is complete in itself, leaving to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources the promulgation of rules and regulations to carry into effect the legislative intent. It also appears from the exhibits on record in these cases that fishing with trawls causes "a wanton destruction of the mother shrimps laying their eggs and the millions of eggs laid and the inevitable extermination of the shrimps specie" , and that, "the trawls ram and destroy the fish corrals. The heavy trawl nets dig deep into the ocean bed. They destroy the fish food which lies below the ocean floor. Their daytime catches net millions of shrimps scooped up from the mud. In their nets they bring up the life of the sea". Consequently, when the President, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued Executive Order No. 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern (Sec. 63, R.A.C.) which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 h. Lacson-Magallanes Company, Inc. v. Pano (G.R. No. L-27811. November 17, 1967) Sanchez, J. FACTS: In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture land situated in Tamlangon, Municipality of Bansalan, Province of Davao. On January 9, 1953, Magallanes ceded his rights and interests to a portion (392,7569 hectares) of the above public land to Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc., and, on April 13, 1954, the portion Magallanes ceded to plaintiff was officially released from the forest zone as pasture land and declared agricultural land. On January 26, 1955, Jose Paño and nineteen other claimants applied for the purchase of ninety hectares of the released area. Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc., in turn filed its own sales application covering the entire released area. This was protested by Jose Paño and his nineteen companions upon the averment that they are actual occupants of the part thereof covered by their own sales application. The Director of Lands, following an investigation of the conflict, rendered a decision giving due course to the application of plaintiff corporation, and dismissing the claim of Jose Paño and his companions. A move to reconsider failed. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources — on appeal by Jose Paño for himself and his companions — held that the appeal was without merit and dismissed the same. The case was elevated to the President of the Philippines, and, the Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, "by authority of the President" decided the controversy, modified the decision of the Director of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and (1) declared that "it would be for the public interest that appellants, who are mostly landless farmers who depend on the land for their existence, be allocated that portion on which they have made improvements;" and (2) directed that the controverted land (northern portion of Block I, LC Map1749, Project No. 27, of Bansalan, Davao, with Latian River as the dividing line) "should be subdivided into lots of convenient sizes and allocated to actual occupants, without prejudice to the corporation's right to reimbursement for the cost of surveying this portion." Plaintiff corporation took the foregoing decision to the Court of First Instance praying that judgment be rendered declaring: (1) that the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has full force and effect; and (2) that the decision of the Executive Secretary is contrary to law and of no legal force and effect. ISSUES: 1. Whether decisions of the Director of Lands "as to questions of facts shall be conclusive when approved" by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, is controlling not only upon courts but also upon the President. 2. Whether the decision of the Executive Secretary herein is an undue delegation of power (It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the matter) 3. Whether one department head, on the pretext that he is an alter ego of the President, cannot intrude into the zone of action allocated to another department secretary RULING: 1. NO. The President can rule on the correctness of a decision of a department Secretary. The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 reposes upon the President's power of control over the executive departments. And control simply means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." 2. NO. the Chief Executive may delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not command that he perform in person. The President is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and istrative functions. The Office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that "under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order" that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue. 3. NO. The Executive Secretary acts "by authority of the President," his decision is that of the President's. Such decision is to be given full faith and credit by our courts. The assumed authority of the Executive Secretary is to be accepted. For, only the President may rightfully say that the Executive Secretary is not authorized to do so. Therefore, unless the action taken is "disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive," that remains the act of the Chief Executive, and cannot be successfully assailed.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 i. Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board (G.R. No. 181293, February 23, 2015) Sereno, C.J. FACTS: The Toll Regulatory Board was created under Presidential Decree No. 1112 in order to regulate the collection of toll fees and the operation of toll facilities. Presidential Decree No. 1113 was also enacted granting Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (now Philippine National Construction Company or PNCC) the right, privilege and authority to construct, operate and maintain toll facilities at the North and South Luzon Expressways for a period of thirty years starting May 1, 1977. Presidential Decree no. 1894 amended 1113, granting PNCC the right, privilege and authority to construct, operate, and maintain toll facilities not only in the North and South Luzon Expressways but also Metro Manila Expressway, provided that the franchise granted a thirty-year term to PNCC from the date of completion of the project. PNCC and CITRA, an Indonesian company, ed a t Investment Proposal of the financing, design and construction of the Metro Manila Skyways. It was approved by the TRB. PNCC and CITRA entered into a Business and t Venture Agreement. They established CITRA Metro Manila Tollways Corporation. In the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (STOA), the construction and design of the roads were primary and exclusive privilege of the CMMTC while maintenance and operation was given to PNCC Skyway Corporation. In 1997, an Amendment to the Supplemental Toll Operations Agreement was issued by TRB, PNCC and CITRA and replaced PSC with Skyway O & M Corporation (SOMCO) for the operation and maintenance of the Metro Manila Skyway. ISSUES: 1. Whether petitioners have standing; 2. Whether the TRB has the power to grant authority to operate a toll facility; 3. Whether the assumption of toll operations by SOMCO is disadvantageous to the government. RULING: 1. Petitioner filed as a legislator in her capacity as party-list representative of Akbayan. Hence, petitioners do not have the requisite legal standing, and as such, she was only allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action when it infringes on their prerogatives as of Congress. 2. The Court has ruled that first, it is clear that Congress does not have the sole authority to grant franchises for the operation of public utilities. Congress is not required before each and every public utility may operate. Unless there is a law that specifically requires a franchise for the operation of a public utility, particular agencies in the executive branch may issue authorizations and licenses for the operation of certain classes of public utilities. The authority to operate a public utility can be granted by istrative agencies when authorized by law. 3. The allegations of petitioners are nothing more than speculations, apprehensions, and suppositions. It is understandable that SOMCO does not yet have a proven track record in toll operations, considering that it was only the Amendment to the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (ASTOA) and the Memorandum of Agreement that gave birth to it.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 j. Angangco v. Castillo (G.R. No. L-17169, November 30, 1963) BAUTISTA ANGELO, J. FACTS: Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade Development Co. wrote a letter to the Secretary of Commerce and Industry requesting a special permit to withdraw certain items from the customs house which were imported without dollar allocation or remittance of foreign exchange. These were Pepsi-Cola concentrates which were not covered by any Central Bank release certificate. The company also sent a letter to the Secretary of Finance who was also Chairman of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank. After failure to secure the permit from the Central Bank, its counsels approached Collector of Customs Angangco to secure the immediate release of the concentrates, but advised the counsel to secure the release certificate from the No-Dollar Import Office. The Non-Dollar Import Office wrote a letter to Angangco that stated that his office had no objection to the release of the concentrates but could not take action on the request as it was not in their jurisdiction. Angangco telephoned the Secretary of Finance who expressed his approval of the release on the basis of said certificate. Collector Angangco finally released the concentrates. When Commissioner of Customs learned of the release he filed an istrative complaint against Collector of Customs Angangco. For three years Angangco had been discharging the duties of his office. Then, Executive Secretary Castillo, by authority of the President, rendered his judgment against the petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the power to remove officials under the classified civil service. RULING: The President does not have the power to remove officers or employees in the classified civil service. It is clear that under the present provision of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the case of petitioner comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and having been deprived of the procedure laid down in connection with the investigation and disposition of his case, it may be said that he has been deprived of due process as guaranteed by said law. The Power of control of the President may extend to the Power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that "the Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department" (Article VII, Section 10 [3], Constitution). With regard to these officers whose appointments are vested on heads of departments, Congress has provided by law for a procedure for their removal precisely in view of this constitutional authority. One such law is the Civil Service Act of 1959. It well established in this case that it is contrary to law to take direct action on the istrative case of an employee under classified service even with the authority of the President without submitting the case to the Commissioner of Civil Service

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 k. Hutchison Ports Philippines Limitedv.Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (G.R. No. 131367, August 31, 2000) YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. FACTS: The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SMBA) called for bidders for the development and operation of a modern marine container terminal within the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, which declared three pre-qualified bidders, which included the International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI), a consortium consisting of Royal Port Services, Inc. and HPC Hamburg PortConsulting GMBH (or RPSI); and (3) Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited (or HPPL) a corporation organized in the British Virgin Islands, representing a consortium composed of HPPL, Guoco Holdings (Phils.), Inc. and Unicol Management Services, Inc. After evaluation of the bids, and resolution of issues concerning ICTSI’s qualification, SMBA awarded the project to HPPL. The award was protested to by ICTSI with the President, which later on prompted the President to direct SMBA to conduct a rebidding, which led HPPL to file an injunction against the re-bidding, arguing that there was already a perfected contract since it was the winning bidder in the first bidding. During the pendency of the case, a re-bidding was ultimately conducted where ICTSI was declared as the winning bidder. In the petition, aside from the legality of the re-bidding, HPPL’s standing to file the case was questioned due to the lack of license to engage in business in the Philippines, thus this petition. ISSUE: Whether participating in the bidding is a mere isolated transaction, or did it constitute engaging in or transacting business in the Philippines such that HPPL needed a license to do business in the Philippines before it could come to Court. RULING: It was engaged in business in Philippines There is no general rule or governing principle laid down as to what constitutes "doing “or "engaging in" or "transacting" business in the Philippines. Each case must be judged in the light of its peculiar circumstances. Thus, it has often been held that a single act or transaction may be considered as "doing business" when a corporation performs acts for which it was created or exercises some of the functions for which it was organized. The amount or volume of the business is of no moment, for even a singular act cannot be merely incidental or casual if it indicates the foreign corporation’s intention to do business. Participating in the bidding process constitutes "doing business" because it shows the foreign corporation’s intention to engage in business here. The bidding for the concession contract is but an exercise of the corporation’s reason for creation or existence. Thus, it has been held that "a foreign company invited to bid for IBRD and ADB international projects in the Philippines will be considered as doing business in the Philippines for which a license is required." In this regard, it is the performance by a foreign corporation of the acts for which it was created, regardless of volume of business, that determines whether foreign corporation needs a license or not.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 l. Pimentel v. Aguirre (G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000) Panganiban, J. FACTS: On December 27, 1997, The President issued istrative Order No 372 stating that all government departments and agencies, including state universities and colleges, government-owned and controlled corporations and local government units will identify and implement measures in Fiscal Year 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services items. This is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to annul Section 2 of the istrative Order No. 372, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their expenditures and en the implementation of sec. 4 of the Order, withholding a portion of the internal revenue allotments. ISSUE: Whether Secs. 1 & 4 of AO 372 are valid exercises of the President’s power of general supervision over LGUs. RULING: Sec. 1 – YES; Sec. 4 – NO The Court held that Sec. 1 of AO 372, being merely an advisory is well within the powers of the President. It is not a mandatory imposition, and such directive cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. The AO is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country. It does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance. The Local Government Code also allows the President to interfere in local fiscal matters, provided that certain requisites are met: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management; and (4) any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than 30% of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one. However, Sec. 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Section 4 which orders the withholding of a portion of the LGU’s IRA clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 m. AMPATUAN V. HON. RONALDO PUNO (G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011) Panganiban, J. FACTS: The day following the massacre of 57 men and women, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing the province of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and the city of Cotabato under a state of emergency. She then directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to undertake such measures to prevent and suppress all forms of lawlessness as may be provided by law. Three days later, Arroyo issued istrative Order No. 273 (AO 273), transferring supervision of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) from the Office of the President to the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). Due to issues on terminology however, AO 273-A was issued, amending the term “transferring” to “delegating” supervision instead. Datu Zaldy Ampatuan and other ARMM officials subsequently filed a petition for prohibition, claiming that the aforesaid issuances encroached upon ARMM’s local autonomy, as it granted the DILG Secretary the power to exercise control over the ARMM, instead of mere istrative supervision, which in effect empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMM’s operations and seize its regional government’s powers. In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) insisted that the President issued the Proclamation to restore peace and order in the places in concern, that the issuance was pursuant to her “calling out” power, and that she merely delegate through the AOs her supervisory powers over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary as her alter ego. •

• •

In November 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre, PGMA issued Proclamation 1946, which placed Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City under the state of emergency (i.e., calling out the AFP and PNP). This was to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the mentioned places. Similarly, PGMA issued AO 273-A, which delegated the President’s supervision over ARMM to DILG Secretary. Petitioners assailed the said presidential issuances on the ground that it encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy pursuant to the Expanded ARMM Act and CONST., art. 10, sec. 16 and that there was no factual basis on the declaration of the state of emergency.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the said presidential issuances violate the principle of local autonomy? NO 2. Whether or not PGMA invalidly exercised the emergency powers stated in CONST. art. 7, sec. 18? NO 3. Whether or not PGMA had factual basis for her actions? YES RULING: 1. No. The DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement agents took respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao massacre, the ARMM Vice¬Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated post. The DILG Secretary did not take over the istration or operations of the ARMM.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 2. No. The President did not proclaim a national emergency as contemplated in CONST. art. 6, sec. 23(2), only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President as stated in CONST. art. 7, sec. 18. 3. Yes. It is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. In IBP v. Zamora, SC held that If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to the assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings – the burden of proof is with the petitioner asserting the lack of basis on the part of the president. Both the military and police had to prepare for and prevent reported retaliatory actions from the Mangudadatus, as they have ~1,800 personnel with ~200 firearms. On the other hand, the Ampatuans have ~2,400 personnel with ~2,000 firearms. Likewise, intelligence reports showed the potential involvement of rebel armed groups (RAGs) – both the Ampatuans and Mangudadatus are ed by different RAGs. The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned. PNoy even, has not withdrawn the declaration of state of emergency. The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 4. MILITARY POWERS a. GUDANI V SENGA (G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006) TINGA, J. FACTS: Senator Rodolfo Biazon (Sen. Biazon) invited several senior officers of the AFP to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security scheduled on 28 Sept. 2005. The hearing was scheduled after topics concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections emerged in the public eye, particularly allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation between President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and then COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano. At the time of the 2004 elections, Petitioner Gen. Gudani had been designated as commander, and co-petitioner Col. Balutan a member, of t Task Force Ranao by the AFP Southern Command. t Task Force Ranao was tasked with the maintenance of peace and order during the 2004 elections in the provinces of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur. Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan, and AFP Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Generoso Senga were among the several AFP officers who received a letter invitation from Sen. Biazon to attend the 28 Sept. 2005 hearing. On 26 Sept. 2005, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the AFP issued a Memorandum directing Gudani and Balutan to attend the 28 Sept. 2005 meeting. Gen. Senga wrote a letter to Sen. Biazon, requesting the postponement of the hearing scheduled for the following day. Then, on the evening of 27 Sept. 2005, a message was transmitted to the PMA Superintendent from the office of Gen. Senga PGMA, NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL. The next day, before the hearing, Gen. Senga called Commodore Tolentino on the latter’s cell phone and asked to talk to Gen. Gudani, but Gen. Gudani refused. In response, Gen. Senga instructed Commodore Tolentino to inform Gen. Gudani that it was an order, yet Gen. Gudani still refused to take Gen. Senga’s call. A few hours after Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their testimony, the office of Gen. Senga issued a statement which noted that the two had appeared before the Senate Committee in spite of the fact that a guidance has been given that a Presidential approval. The two were held to have disobeyed a legal order, in violation of Articles of War 65 (Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they will be subjected to General Court Martial proceedings. ISSUE: Whether the President has the authority to issue an order to the of the AFP preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry. RULING: Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute. SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege. At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow of the military to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. In as much as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The ime did not come to in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize. The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 b. DAVID V MACAPAGAL-ARROYO (G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006) SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. FACTS: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation (PP) 1017 and GO No.6 as to implement it. The reasons that the President stated for declaring such General Order to implement the Presidential Proclamation were that over the past several months, elements in political opposition have conspired with extreme left represented by NDF-C-NPA and military adventurists. This presented a clear danger to the president as political opposition tried to oust her as president and take over the government. On March 3, Presidential Proclamation 1017 was lifted by President Arroyo. The Solicitor General defended the basis of President Arroyo for declaring PP 1017, was that the intent of the Constitution was to give the President full discretionary powers in determining the necessity to call out the AFP. Notwithstanding the SG’s contentions, the Magdalo group instigated the Oakwood mutiny and wearing or read bands on their left arms to show disgust. Simultaneously, Oplan Hackle I (plans of bombings and attacks on the PMA alumni homecoming in Baguio, where the President was invited) was discovered. The next morning, after the discovery of the plan, a bomb was discovered in the campus. Also, information was intercepted by PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao regarding PNP-SAF that are planning to defect from the Arroyo istration, along with Congressman Peping Cojuanco who planned out moves to bring down said istration. A large number of soldiers ed the rallies as critical mass and armed components to antiarroyo protests. Another factual basis after the issuance of the Presidential Proclamation and General Order was the bombings of telephone communication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan. These events show a clear and present critical situation, leading the President to cancel all events related to EDSA People Power I. Executive Secretary Mike Arroyo, declared that warrantless arrest and takeover of facilities can be implemented. One of these warrantless arrests was Randy David (Filipino journalist, UP professor), due to mistake of fact that he was a participant in the street rallies. Also, Congressman Crispin Beltran (representative of Anakpawis party). The following facilities were taken over: Seizure of Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante (local news publications). This was done, according to the PNP. to show a strong presence to tell media outlets not to connive or help-out rebels to take down the government. ISSUES: 1. Whether Article 6 Section 23 was violated. 2. Whether PP 1017 is constitutional. RULING: 1. The provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also to “other national emergency.” If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to declare a “state of national emergency” pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so. But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress. The said powers of the President is additionally recognized during the state of national emergency under PP 1017, can call the military not only to enforce obedience “to all the laws and to all decrees x x x” but also to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17 which reads: In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency, but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following: • • • •

There must be a war or other emergency. The delegation must be for a limited period only. The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe. The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Thus, the warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU during their rallies are UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 2. PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria MacapagalArroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its “overbreadth.” They claim that its enforcement encroached on both unprotected and protected rights under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution and sent a “chilling effect” to the citizens. Overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free speech cases. A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 The said powers of the President is recognized in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution wherein it is stated that the President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. (Calling-out powers) The Court ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In the present case it is stated that, owing to her Office’s vast intelligence network, she is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the country. However, a President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the limitations. Thus according to Justice Mendoza, the PP 1017 is merely an exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated powers. The said powers of the President is also recognized in Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution wherein it is stated that The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Take Care powers). As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the Commanderin-Chief of all the armed forces of the country, including the Philippine National Police under the Department of Interior and Local Government. President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence. This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 c. AMPATUAN V PUNO (G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011) ABAD, J. FACTS: The day after the infamous Ampatuan massacre happened, President Gloria MacapagalArroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing the provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City under a state of emergency. She then directed the AFP and PNP to undertake measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the said areas. Three days later, President Arroyo issued istrative Order 273 which “transfers” the supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the President to the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). The word “transfer” was then changed to “delegate/delegating” because of some issues raised over the terminology. It was amended by AO 273-A. Petitioner contends that the President unlawfully exercised emergency powers when she ordered the deployment of AFP and PNP personnel in the places mentioned in the proclamation. But such deployment is NOT by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23(2), Article VI of the Constitution. They also claim that the issuance of the AO273/AO273-A encroached the autonomy of ARMM as a local government unit. Thus the petition of prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local autonomy under Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, and Section 1, Article V of the Expanded ARMM Organic Act 2. Whether President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City RULING: 1. No. the DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement agents took respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao massacre, the ARMM Vice-Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated post on December 10, 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession found in Article VII, Section 12, of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali-Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. In short, the DILG Secretary did not take over the istration or operations of the ARMM. 2. No. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President a stated in Section 18 of Article 7. Therefore, she did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 d. INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES V ZAMORA (G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000) KAPUNAN, J. FACTS: Because of the growing number of criminal incidents around Metro Manila, then President Estrada gave a verbal directive to the PNP and Marines to conduct a t visibility patrols to prevent and suppress crimes. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the AFP, the Chief of Staff of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and implement the said order. A Letter of Instruction 02/2000 (“LOI”) which detailed the manner of the “TASK FORCE TULUNGAN” was released by PNP. The IBP questioned the necessity of calling for the Marines and filed petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Marines, unconstitutional on the ground that: (a) There was no emergency situation obtains in Metro Manila as would justify such deployment (violates Art 2, Sec. 3 of the constitution), (b) Deployment constitutes an insidious incursion by the military in a civilian function of government (violates Art. 16, Sec. 5) (c)Deployment creates a dangerous tendency to rely on the military to perform civilian functions of the government. Unwittingly making the military more powerful than hat it should be under the constitution Prescinding from its argument that no emergency situation exists to justify the calling of the Marines, the IBP asserts that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Section 3, Article II. ISSUE: Whether the deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe the civilian character of the police force. RULING: We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of t visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines’ authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines t visibility patrols. Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. Chief of Staff of the AFP, by his alleged involvement in civilian law enforcement, has been virtually appointed to a civilian post in derogation of the aforecited provision. The real authority in these operations, as stated in the LOI, is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Additionally, the Philippine experience reveals that it is not averse to requesting the assistance of the military in the implementation and execution of certain traditionally “civil” functions (e.g. elections, Red Cross, disaster response, etc.)

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 e. LACSON V PEREZ (G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001) MELO, J. FACTS: On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an "angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons" assaulting and attempting to break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" were thereafter effected. Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a "state of rebellion," which allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests, the following four related petitions were filed before the Court ISSUE: Whether the Court can inquire into factual basis of “state of rebellion”. RULING: Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the People's Movement against Poverty (PMAP), for his part, argues that the declaration of a "state of rebellion" is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers, being an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary which has the constitutional prerogative to "determine or interpret" what took place on May 1, 2001, and that the declaration of a state of rebellion cannot be an exception to the general rule on the allocation of the governmental powers. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to , or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof. On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of this power. However, this is no longer feasible at this time, Proclamation No. 38 having been lifted. DISMISSED.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 f. GUAZON V DE VILLA (G.R. No. 80508, January 30, 1990) GUTIERREZ, JR., J. FACTS: The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial target zoning" that were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no specific target house to be search and that there is no search warrant or warrant of arrest served. Most of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification cards. The residents were rudely rouse from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their houses. The residents were at the point of high-powered guns and herded like cows. Men were ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks. The residents complained that they're homes were ransacked, tossing their belongings and destroying their valuables. Some of their money and valuables had disappeared after the operation. The residents also reported incidents of maulings, spot-beatings and maltreatment. Those who were detained also suffered mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical informations. The respondents said that such accusations were all lies. Respondents contends that the Constitution grants to government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements for the maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial target zoning were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the communities were the said drives were conducted. They said that they have intelligently and carefully planned months ahead for the actual operation and that local and foreign media ed the operation to witness and record such event. ISSUE: Whether or not the saturation drive committed consisted of violation of human rights. RULING: It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited rather it is the procedure used or the methods which "offend even hardened sensibilities" .Based on the facts stated by the parties, it appears to have been no impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is no showing that the objectives sought to be attained by the "aerial zoning" could not be achieved even as th rights of the squatters and low-income families are fully protected. However, the remedy should not be brought by a tazpaer suit where not one victim complaints and not one violator is properly charged. In the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman whom the court can order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts, no permanent relief can be given. In the meantime, where there is showing that some abuses were committed, the court temporary restraint the alleged violations which are shocking to the senses. Petition is remanded to the RTC of Manila.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 g. SANLAKAS V REYES (G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004) TINGA, J. FACTS: AFP-- demanded the resignation of the President and other executive officials because of the worsening corruption. Due to this, President issued Proclamation 427 and General Order 4 both of which declared a state of rebellion and calling the AFP to suppress such rebellion. Petitioners assert that the issuance of the respective Proclamation order 427 and General order 4 is unconstitutional claimed: • • •

Section 18 Article 8 of the constitution in so far that it does not authorize a declaration of a state of rebellion. Also they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as the congress has not delegated any power to the president. Also, it was an unwarranted and abuse of power to exercise martial law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proclamation calling the state of rebellion is proper. RULING: According to Article 18 Article 8 of the constitution the President is granted a “sequence of graduated powers”: calling out power, power to suspend and the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and power to declare martial law. The constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions namely 1) an actual invasion or rebellion and that 2) public safety requires the exercise of such power. The Article not only vests to the president the commander-in-chief power but also with executive powers. The Commander-in-chief Powers are broad enough when taken together with the provision on executive power. Thus, the president’s authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and draws strength from the commander-in-chief powers. The Solicitor-general points out Sec. 4 Chapter 2 Book III (Office of the President) of the Revised istrative Code of 1987. This provision states that the president’s proclamation gives notice to the nation that such state exists and that the AFP may be called upon to prevent or suppress it. Mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. These are purely executive powers vested on the President by Sec. 1 and 18 Art. 8 as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2) of Article 6.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 h. KULAYAN V TAN (G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012) SERENO, J. FACTS: Three of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped by three armed men who were confirmed as of the Abu Sayaf Group (ASG). Due to the said kidnapping of Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni and Marie Jean Lacaba, who were all of the ICRC, the Sulu Crisis Management, headed by Governor Abdusakur Mahail Tan, subsequently created the Civilian Emergency Forces. Embodied in the “Memorandum of Understanding” are the intents and purposes of the said creation which was for the main purpose of the prevailing situation in Sulu as well as the willingness of the civilian ers to offer their services to “rescue the hostages”. Ronaldo Puno, then Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government, confirmed that the government troops have already cornered the said military group but was forced to pull back due to the threat of the ASG of beheading one of its hostages. This instance triggered Gov. Tan to issue Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 declaring a state of emergency in the province, due to the terrorist act of kidnapping of the ASG and the need of the ‘carrying out’ of emergency measures. The Proclamation included the setting up of checkpoints and chokepoints, general searches and seizures and other public safety measures. Due to the implementation of the said Proclamation, several alleged ASG ers were held under the custody of the local government; hence this petition filed by respondents Jamar Kulayan, Temogen Tulawie, Hadji Mohammand Yusop Ismi, Ahajan Awadi and SPO1 Sattal H. Jadjuli. Petitioners claim that the Provincial Governor is not authorized by any law to create civilian armed forces under his command, nor regulate and limit the issuances of PTCFORs to his own private army. ISSUE: Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of a President. RULING: No. It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else. Corollary, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof. Additionally, Section 24 of Article XVIII of the Constitution prohibits private armies and other armed groups. Section 21 of Article XI states that, “The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions shall be the responsibility of the National Government.”

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 Taken in conjunction with each other, it becomes clear that the Constitution does not authorize the organization of private armed groups similar to the CEF (Civilian Emergency Force) convened by the respondent Governor. Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 i. RUFFY V. CHIEF OF STAFF (G.R. No. L-533, AUGUST 20, 1956) TUASON, J. FACTS: During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were assigned at designated camps or military bases all over the country. Japanese forces went to Mindoro thus forcing petitioner and his band move up the mountains and organize a guerilla outfit and call it the "Bolo area". Capt. Beloncio relieved Ruffy and fellow petitioners of their position and duties in the "Bolo area" by the new authority vested upon him because of the recent change of command. Capt. Beloncio was thus allegedly slain by Ruffy and his fellow petitioners. ISSUE: Whether or not the Chief of Staff and the General Court Martial of the Philippine Army should desist from further proceedings in the trial of petitioners before them. RULING: No. The Court RULING that the petitioners were still subject to military law since of the Armed Forces were still covered by the National Defense Act, Articles of War and other laws even during an occupation. The constitutionality of the 93d Article of War is assailed. This article ordains "that any person subject to military law who commits murder in time of was shall suffer death or imprisonment for life, as the court martial may direct." The act of unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman is considered as a defiance of 95th Article of War RULING petitioners liable to military jurisdiction and trial. Moreover, they were operating officers, which makes them even more eligible for the military court's jurisdiction. Courts martial are agencies of executive character, and one of the authorities "for the ordering of courts martial has been held to be attached to the constitutional functions of the President as Commander in Chief, independently of legislation." (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d Edition, p. 49.) Unlike courts of law, they are not a portion of the judiciary. The petition thus has no merits and is dismissed with costs.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 j. KURODA V. JALANDONI (G.R. No. L-2662. MARCH 26, 1949) MORAN, C.J. FACTS: Petitioner Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was charged before the Philippine Military Commission of war crimes. He questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules on the trial of accused war criminals. He contended the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore he is charged of crimes not based on law, national and international. ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. No. 68 is valid and constitutional. RULING: Yes. The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his power as Commander in chief of all our armed forces as upheld by this Court in the case of Yamashita vs. Styer (L-129, 42 Off. Gaz., 664) 1 when we said — War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of armed hostilities incident of war may remain pending which should be disposed of as in time of war. An importance incident to a conduct of war is the adoption of measure by the military command not only to repel and defeat the enemies but to seize and subject to disciplinary measure those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of war. (Ex parte Quirin 317 U.S., 1; 63 Sup. Ct., 2.) Indeed the power to create a military commission for the trial and punishment of war criminals is an aspect of waging war. And in the language of a writer a military commission has jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war continues. This includes the period of an armistice or military occupation up to the effective of a treaty of peace and may extend beyond by treaty agreement. (Cowles Trial of War Criminals by Military Tribunals, America Bar Association Journal June, 1944.) Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this unfinished aspect of war namely the trial and punishment of war criminal through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 k. OLGAUER V. MILITARY COMMISSION (G.R. No. L-54558. MAY 22, 1987) GANCAYCO, J. FACTS: In 1979, Olaguer and some others, all civilians, were detained by military personnel and they were placed in Camp Bagong Diwa. They were charged conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion and other various crimes. On 1980, the petitioners went to the Supreme Court and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus. ISSUE: Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are open and functioning. RULING: No. Military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the Government and are simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the legislature for the President as Commanderin-Chief to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives. Following the principle of separation of powers underlying the existing constitutional organization of the Government of the Philippines, the power and the duty of interpreting the laws as when an individual should be considered to have violated the law is primarily a function of the judiciary. It is not, and it cannot be the function of the Executive Department, through the military authorities. And as long as the civil courts in the land remain open and are regularly functioning, as they do so today and as they did during the period of martial law in the country, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them and which are properly cognizable by the civil courts. To have it otherwise would be a violation of the constitutional right to due process of the civilian concerned.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 l. QUILOÑA V. GENERAL COURT MARTIAL (G.R. No. 96607, MARCH 4, 1992) PADILLA, J. FACTS: The petitioner, a policeman assigned at the Western Police District (WPD), was charged before respondent General Court Martial with the crime of murder on two (2) counts, under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The case is entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Patrolman Oscar Quiloña." On 14 December 1990, petitioner, through counsel, wrote a letter to President Corazon C. Aquino, expressing his desire to be tried by a civilian court and sought a waiver of military jurisdiction, for the reason, among others, that the "enactment of the Philippine National Police Law creates his honest belief that he should now be under the actual and real jurisdiction of a civilian court." Although set for oral argument on 3 January 1991, respondent court decided to have the motion argued on the day it was filed — 28 December 1990. And after a ten-minute closed-door deliberation among the of respondent court martial, it resumed session where it denied the petitioner's "MOTION FOR THIS HONORABLE COURT MARTIAL TO INHIBIT ITSELF FROM PURSUING THE ARRAIGNMENT OF THE ACCUSED AND TO HAVE HIS CASE INVESTIGATED BY THE CIVILIAN PROSECUTOR OR AT LEAST TRIED BY A CIVILIAN COURT.” ISSUE: Whether or not member of the Philippine National Police are within the jurisdiction of a military court? RULING: The Court RULING that pursuant to R.A. 6975 which states that "SEC. 46. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. — Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, criminal cases involving PNP shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts: Provided, That the courts-martial appointed pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1850 shall continue to try PC-INP who have already been arraigned, to include appropriate actions thereon by the reviewing authorities pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as, the Articles of War, as amended by Executive Order No. 178, otherwise known as the Manual for Courts-Martial: Provided, further, that criminal cases against PC-INP who may have not yet been arraigned upon the effectivity of this it shall be transferred to the proper city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge. The statute clearly provides for the jurisdiction of regular courts over PNP . Even if the statute is not yet effective on the day the petition was arraigned, it is presumed that the court had knowledge of the statute which was signed by the President and had been submitted for general circulation before the petition took place.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 m. NAVALES V. GENERAL ABAYA (G.R. 162318, OCTOBER 25, 2004) CALLEJO, SR., J. FACTS: At past 1:00 a.m. of July 27, 2003, more than three hundred junior officers and enlisted men, mostly from the elite units of the AFP — the Philippine Army's Scout Rangers and the Philippine Navy's Special Warfare Group (SWAG) — quietly entered the premises of the Ayala Center in Makati City. They disarmed the security guards and took over the Oakwood Premier Apartments (Oakwood). They planted explosives around the building and in its vicinity. Snipers were posted at the Oakwood roof deck. They claimed that they went to Oakwood to air their grievances against the istration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Around 9:00 a.m., Pres. Arroyo gave the soldiers until 5:00 p.m. to give up their positions peacefully and return to barracks. At about 1:00 p.m., she declared the existence of a "state of rebellion" and issued an order to use reasonable force in putting down the rebellion. An agreement was forged between the two groups at 9:30 p.m. Shortly thereafter, Pres. Arroyo announced that the occupation of Oakwood was over. The soldiers agreed to return to barracks and were out of the Oakwood premises by 11:00 p.m. Under the Information dated August 1, 2003 filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, the Department of Justice (DOJ) charged 321 of those soldiers who took part in the "Oakwood Incident" with violation of Article 134-A (coup d'etat) of the Revised Penal Code. Several of the accused filed for a motion praying that the trial court would assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed before the military tribunal in accordance with Republic Act No. 7055. While the said motion was pending resolution, the DOJ issued the Resolution dated October 20, 2003 finding probable cause for coup d'etat against only 31, including the petitioners, of the original 321 accused and dismissing the charges against the other 290 for insufficiency of evidence. Petitioners herein where charged before the general martial court. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court may assume jurisdiction. RULING: No. Charges filed under the RTC has been moot and academic with the resolution of the DOJ. Petitioners now are facing charges on violation of Articles of War before the general court martial. In enacting R.A. 7055, the lawmakers merely intended to return to the civilian courts jurisdiction over those offenses that have been traditionally within their jurisdiction, but did not divest the military courts jurisdiction over cases mandated by the Articles of War. In view of the clear mandate of R.A. 7055, the RTC (Branch 148) cannot divest the General Court-Martial of its jurisdiction over those charged with violations of Articles 63 (Disrespect Toward the President etc.), 64 (Disrespect Toward Superior Officer), 67 (Mutiny or Sedition), 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and 97 (General Article) of the Articles of War, as these are specifically included as service-connected offenses or crimes under Section 1 thereof. Pursuant to the same provision of law, the military courts have jurisdiction over these crimes or offenses.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 n. LANSANG V. GARCIA (G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971) CONCEPCION, C.J. FACTS: Two hand grenades caused 8 deaths and injury to people in the event of the Liberal Party of the Philippines holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the 1971 general elections. President Marcos then announced the issuance of Proclamation No. 889 which suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to suppress insurrection and rebellion by Marxist-Leninist-Maoist groups. Presently, petitions for writs of habeas corpus were filed, by a number of persons including the petitioner, who, having been arrested without a warrant therefor and then detained, upon the authority of said proclamation, assail its validity, as well as that of their detention. ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is constitutional? RULING: Yes. The court abandoned the Barcelon and Montenergro doctrine that "the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege or the writ of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his 'decision is final and conclusive' upon the courts and upon all other persons." It has been ruled that the Court had authority to and should inquire into the existence of the factual bases required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ. Proclamation to suspend must satisfy two (2) conditions for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ, to wit: (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or — pursuant to paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution — "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the suspension of the privilege. In the petitions involved, some of it became moot and academic for the fact that they have been already released. After deliberations, including closed-door hearings, the Supreme Court upholds the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus after finding satisfying evidences of a massive and systematic Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow the government by force.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 o. FORTUN V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO (G.R. NO. 190293, MARCH 20, 2012) ABAD, J. FACTS: On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in Maguindanao. In response to this carnage, on November 24 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1946, declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and suppress similar lawless violence in Central Mindanao. On December 4, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in that province except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. On December 9, 2009 Congress, in t session, convened pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to review the validity of the President's action. But, two days later or on December 12 before Congress could act, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao. ISSUE: Whether or not Presidential Proclamation 1959 is constitutional. RULING: It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense tly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have. Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the Presidents proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the t houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 p. LAGMAN, ET AL. V. MEDIALDEA, ET AL. (G.R. NO. 231658, JULY 4, 2017) DEL CASTILLO, J. FACTS: Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. The President submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of the proclamation. The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the ing of time. The President went on to explain that on May 23, 2017, a government operation to capture the high-ranking officers of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Maute Group was conducted. The lawless activities of the ASG, Maute Group, and other criminals, brought about undue constraints and difficulties to the military and government personnel, particularly in the performance of their duties and functions, and untold hardships to the civilians. The Report highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial and significant role it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole. In addition, the Report pointed out the possible tragic repercussions once Marawi City falls under the control of the lawless groups. In addition to the Report, representatives from the Executive Department, the military and police authorities conducted briefings with the Senate and the House of Representatives relative to the declaration of martial law. After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued P.S. Resolution No. 3888 expressing full to the martial law proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 "to be satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the law". In the same Resolution, the Senate declared that it found "no compelling reason to revoke the same". ISSUE: Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration of graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief, namely calling out powers, suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and declaration of martial law. RULING: The powers to declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus involve curtailment and suppression of civil rights and individual freedom. Thus, the declaration of martial law serves as a warning to citizens that the Executive Department has called upon the military to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and while the emergency remains, the citizens must, under pain of arrest and punishment, not act in a manner that will render it more difficult to restore order and enforce the law. As such, their exercise requires more stringent safeguards by the Congress, and review by the Court. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies... The provision is put there, precisely, to reverse the doctrine of the Supreme Court. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution; therefore, it does not suspend the principle of separation of powers. During martial law, the President may have the powers of a commanding general in a theatre of war. In actual war when there is fighting in an area, the President as the commanding general has the authority to issue orders which have the effect of law but strictly in a theater of war, not in the situation we had during the period of martial law. In a theater of war, civil courts are unable to function. If in the actual theater of war civil courts, in fact, are unable to function, then the military commander

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 is authorized to give jurisdiction even over civilians to military courts precisely because the civil courts are closed in that area. But in the general area where the civil courts are open then in no case can the military courts be given jurisdiction over civilians. This is in reference to a theater of war where the civil courts, in fact, are unable to function. It is a state of things brought about by the realities of the situation in that specified critical area and it is not something that is brought about by a declaration of the Commander-in-Chief. A state of martial law is peculiar because the President, at such a time, exercises police power, which is normally a function of the Legislature. In particular, the President exercises police power, with the military’s assistance, to ensure public safety and in place of government agencies which for the time being are unable to cope with the condition in a locality, which remains under the control of the State. In David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court stated that under a valid declaration of martial law, the President as Commander-in-Chief may order the "(a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) [takeover] of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees x x x". Worthy to note, however, that the abovecited acts that the President may perform do not give him unbridled discretion to infringe on the rights of civilians during martial law. This is because martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, neither does it supplant the operation of civil courts or legislative assemblies. Moreover, the guarantees under the Bill of Rights remain in place during its pendency. And in such instance where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is also suspended, such suspension applies only to those judicially charged with rebellion or offenses connected with invasion. Clearly, from the foregoing, while martial law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties, the Constitution has safeguards against the President's prerogative to declare a state of martial law.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 q. LAGMAN, ET AL. V. PIMENTEL III (G.R. NO. 235935, FEBRUARY 6, 2018) GESMUNDO, J. FACTS: Congress approved the extension of martial law for one year pursuant to the letter, dated December 8, 2017, of President Rodrigo R. Duterte. The AFP strongly believes that on the basis of the foregoing assessment, the following are cited as justification for the recommended extension, to wit: (1) The DAESH-Inspired DIWM groups and allies continue to visibly offer armed resistance in other parts of Central, Western, and Eastern Mindanao in spite of the neutralization of their key leaders and destruction of their forces in Marawi City; (2) Other DAESH-inspired and like-minded threat groups remain capable of staging similar atrocities and violent attacks against vulnerable targets in Mindanao; (3) The CTs have been pursuing and intensifying their political mobilization, terrorism against innocent civilians and private entities, and guerilla warfare against the security sector, and public government infrastructures; (4) The need to intensify the campaign against the CTs is necessary in order to defeat their strategy, stop their extortion, defeat their armed component, and to stop their recruitment activities; and (5) The threats being posed by the CTs, ASG, and the presence of remnants, protectors, ers and sympathizers of the DAESH/DIWM pose a clear and imminent danger to public safety and hinders the speedy rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction efforts in Marawi City, and the attainment oflasting peace, stability, economic development and prosperity in Mindanao; The 2nd extension of the implementation of Martial Law coupled with the continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao will significantly help not only the AFP, but also the other stakeholders in quelling and putting an end to the on-going DAESH inspired DIWM groups and CT-staged rebellion, and in restoring public order, safety, and stability in Mindanao; and In seeking for another extension, the AFP is ready, willing and able to perform anew its mandated task in the same manner that it had dutifully done so for the whole duration of Martial law to date, without any report of human rights violation and/or incident of abuse of authority. ISSUE: Whether or not there is sufficient factual basis for extending the period of martial significantly longer than the first. RULING: Indeed, with these factual bases, the military needs to intensify their efforts against these terrorist groups through the continued imposition of martial law. Lifting martial law would remove the leverage of the military against these terror groups during their on-going operations and would weaken the rigorous campaign against them and allow them to continuously threaten the civilian population. The rebellion has not been quelled. What the military has done is to resolve the Marawi conflict but the rebellion continues to exist. Although, the conflict in Marawi has already been resolved but still there are some elements there that continue to operate. With respect to the extension of martial law, the last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 18 clearly states that Congress is empowered to extend the duration of martial law. The President's only role in such an extension is that he is the one who initiates it. Notably, even if the President initiates the said extension, it is not immediately effective. It is only when Congress grants the extension, after determining that invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires it, that it

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 becomes operational. Evidently, the power of Congress is more potent than that of the President when it comes to the extension of martial law. If Congress does not find any basis to grant the requested extension, then it shall not exceed the sixty (60) day period of its initial declaration. The framers of the Constitution gave Congress flexibility on the period of the declaration of martial law. There is no specific period stated in the extension of the period of martial law because the Constitution leaves it to Congress to decide the reasonable period for such an extension. The rule-making power of Congress is a grant of full discretionary authority in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process. In the event that the President requires more time to quell a rebellion or invasion beyond the granted period of extension, then his remedy is to ask for another extension from Congress. It was emphasized therein that the final decision to extend the said declaration rests with Congress. Whether the President states a specific period of extension or not, Congress ultimately decides on the said period. Until it grants the extension, the sixty (60) day period of the initial declaration of martial law prevails. In effect, by becoming the granting authority, Congress limits the President's power to extend the period of martial law.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 5. PARDON a. People v Salle (G.R. No. 103567, December 4, 1995) DAVIDE, JR., J. FACTS: The President granted pardon to Francisco Salle and Ricky Mengote, Gencilla and ten John Does who were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals of the compound crime of murder and destructive arson.However, Atty. La'o informed this Court that her verification disclosed that Salle signed the motion without the assistance of counsel on his misimpression that the motion was merely a bureaucratic requirement necessary for his early release from the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) following the grant of a conditional pardon by the President on 9 December 1993. He was discharged from the NBP on 28 December 1993. She further informed the Court that appellant Ricky Mengote was, on the same dates, granted a conditional pardon and released from confinement, and that he immediately left for his province without consulting her. She then prays that this Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal and consider it withdrawn upon his acceptance of the conditional pardon. Until now, Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the conditional pardon is valid. RULING: Pardon can be granted only whether full or conditional after conviction by final judgment. No pardon may may be extended before a judgement of conviction becomes final, and it becomes final when 1) when no appeal is seasonably perfected, 2) when the accused commences to serve the sentences, 3) when the right to appeal is expressly waived in writing except where death penalty is imposed by the trial court and 4) when the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his right to appeal. The rational of final conviction is that to prevent the President from exercising executive power in derogation of judicial power, thus appealed conviction must be brought to finality. Furthermore, acceptance of pardon does not operate abandonment of appeal.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 b. People v Bacang (G.R. No. 116512, July 30, 1996) DAVIDE, JR., J. FACTS: Leopoldo Bacang, Francisco Palacio et al were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. William Casido and Franklin Alcorin then filed a notice of appeal on December 8, 1993 which the court accepted. On January 11, 1996, the court received a motion to withdraw appeal of Casido and Alcorin, it was filed on their own free will. Court required the counsel of Casido and Alcorin to comment, it was only at that time when the court was informed that the latter were released on conditional pardon. The Court then ordered to furnish them copies of the conditional pardon and discharge order. ISSUE: Whether or not the conditional pardon is valid. RULING: No. The practice of processing applications for pardon or parole despite pending appeals appears to be a clear violation of the law because pardon can only be granted after conviction by final judgment which is clearly stated in Section 19, Article VII of 1987 Constitution. No pardon, whether full or conditional, may be extended before a judgement of conviction becomes final or during the pendency of appeal from his conviction. The rule that acceptance of pardon does not operate abandonment of appeal, fully binds pardon extended after January 31, 1995 which is during the pendency of the accused’s appeal.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 c. People v Casido (G.R No. 116512, March. 7, 1997) DAVIDE, JR., J. FACTS: The Office of the Solicitor General alleged that the accused-appellants in this case, "in an effort to seek their release at the soonest possible time, applied for pardon before the Presidential Committee on the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon (PCGBRP), as well as for amnesty before the National Amnesty Commission (NAC)"; then contended that since amnesty, unlike pardon, may be granted before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes even after conviction. On August 11, 1992, a Presidential Committee for Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon is constituted, with Secretary of Justice as Chairman, and the Secretary of National Defense and Secretary of DILG as . On December 9, 1992, President Aquino issued guidelines for the committee. The Secretariat then process and evaluated the prisoners, they have an agreement to the counsels of applicant Casido and file motion to withdraw the applicant’s appeal. The committee failed to the counsel of the accused and no intention to violate the Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution, and they were not also aware if Hino and Salle rulings. Applications of for amnesty were favorably acted by National Amnesty Commission on February 22, 1996. ISSUE: Whether or not the amnesty is valid. RULING: Yes. Amnesty carry with it the extinguishment of criminal liability and restoration of civil and political rights and unlike pardon, it may be granted before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution. While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution, the grant of the amnesty, for which accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347, was valid. This Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress in Concurrent Resolution No. 12 adopted on 2 June, 1994. The release then of accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin can only be justified by the amnesty, but not by the "pardon."

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 d. People v. Nacional (G.R No. 111294, September 7, 1995) PUNO, J. FACTS: Walter Nacional, Absalon Millarnina, Efren Musa et al were charged with two counts of murder attended by conspiracy and were convicted on those crimes. On March 1, 1994, Walter Nacional, Zacarias Militante and Efren Musa, through counsel, moved to withdraw their appeal. They claimed that the charges against them were political in nature "committed while they were of the New People's Army (NPA)." They informed the Court that as political prisoners, they applied for and were recommended by then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon for conditional pardon by the President of the Philippines. The Court granted their motion on May 11, 1994.

On February 1, 1995, Rudy Luces, through counsel, also moved to withdraw his appeal for becoming moot and academic. He claimed that he had been granted conditional pardon by the President of the Philippines and had been released from prison per instruction. In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General opined that Rudy Luces abandoned his appeal when he accepted the pardon granted him. ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of pardon extinguish payment for civil indemnity. RULING: No. When pardon is granted, civil indemnity is not extinguished unless expressly remitted. We rule that the grant of conditional pardon and the consequent dismissal of the appeals of Walter Nacional, Zacarias Militante, Efren Musa and Rudy Luces does not exempt them from payment of the civil indemnity. A conditional pardon, when granted, does not extinguish the civil liability arising from the crime. The indemnity of P50,000.00 imposed by the trial court for each of the deaths of Quirino and Joel Lagason must be shared solidarily by all the accused.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 e. Monsanto v Factoran (G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989) FERNAN, C.J. FACTS: Salvacion A. Monsanto, Assistant Treasurer of Calbayog City, and three others were accused of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced them to imprisonment. They were further ordered to tly and severally indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended on December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted on December 21, 1984.||| Monsanto requested that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant, she also asked for the back pay for the entire period of her suspension. Finance Ministry ruled that Monsanto may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment. Deputy Secretary Factoran said that that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension pendente lite. Monsanto argued that general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of the fact that she was extended executive clemency while her conviction was still pending appeal in this Court. There having been no final judgment of conviction, her employment therefore as assistant city treasurer could not be said to have been terminated or forfeited. ISSUE: Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.’ RULING: No. Pardon cannot restore forfeited public office. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. Pardon cannot mask the acts of constituting the crime. The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. Hence, the pardon granted to Monsanto has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 f. Sabello v DECS (G.R. No. 86787, December 26, 1989) GANCAYCO, J. FACTS: Sabello is an elementary school Principal of Talisay and also the Assistant Principal of the Talisay Barangay High School. The barangay high school was in deficit at that time due to the fact that the students could hardly pay their tuition fees. Sabello was authorized by the the barrio council to withdraw the P2000.00 allotted by the President in each barrio which was subsequently deposited to the City Treasurer’s Office in the name of Talisay Barrio High school. Sabello together with the barrio council was then charged of the violation of R.A 3019 and sentenced to suffer one year imprisonment and disqualification to hold public office. Sabello was then granted by the President an absolute pardon. With this, he applied for the reinstatement on his office. However, he was reinstated not to the former position but as a mere classroom teacher. ISSUE: Whether or not Sabello merits reappointment to the position he held prior to the conviction. RULING: Affirmative. The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code and that pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. Sabello was reinstated as classroom teacher; justice and equity dictate that he be returned to his former position prior to conviction but he was not entitled to payment of his back salaries because this is only afforded to those illegally dismissed.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 g. Torres v Sumulong (G.R. No. 76872, July 23, 1987) FELICIANO, J. FACTS: Of two counts of estafa Torres was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila some time before 1979. These convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The maximum sentence would expire on November 2, 2000. 1. On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to Torres by the President of the Philippines on condition that Sumulong would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines." Sumulong accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. 2. On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres had been charged with twenty counts of estafa before, and convicted of sedition by, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. 3. On 4 June 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice wrote to the President of the Philippines informing her of the Resolution of the Board recommending cancellation of the conditional pardon previously granted to petitioner. 4.. On September 8, 1986, the President canceled the conditional pardon of Torres. 5. On October 10, 1986, then Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against Sumulong. He was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. ISSUE: Whether or not the President may cancel the conditional pardon granted. RULING: Affirmative. The grant of pardon and determination of the and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny. The determination of a branch of a condition of a purely pardon and the proper consequences of such breach may either be a purely executive act not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 4 of the Revised istrative Code or it may be a judicial act consisting of a trial for and conviction of violation for conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary in order that the convict may be recommended for violation of the conditional pardon.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 h. In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Wilfredo S. Sumulong (G.R No. 135457, December 29, 1995) HERMOSISIMA JR., J. FACTS: Of two counts of estafa Torres was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila some time before 1979. These convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The maximum sentence would expire on November 2, 2000. On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to Torres by the President of the Philippines on condition that Sumulong would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines." Sumulong accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres had been charged with twenty counts of estafa before, and convicted of sedition by, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On September 8, 1986, the President canceled the conditional pardon of Torres. On October 10, 1986, then Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against Sumulong. He was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Now, Torres, apparently through his wife and children, seeks anew relief from this court. ISSUE: Whether or not the cancellation of pardon is constitutional. RULING: Affirmative. A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one. By the pardonee's consent to the stipulated in this contract, the pardonee has thereby placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the and conditions of the pardon. The Chief Executive, who in the first place was the exclusive author of the conditional pardon and of its revocation, is the corollary prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his own judgment, the acquittal of the pardonee from the subsequent charges filed against him, warrants the same. There is likewise nil a basis for the courts to effectuate the reinstatement of a conditional pardon revoked by the President in the exercise of powers undisputedly solely and absolutely loaded in his office.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 i. People v. Patriarca (G.R. No. 135457, September 29, 2007) BUENA, J. FACTS: On June 30, 1987 at about 10:00 PM in the Municipality of Donsol, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, New People’s Army (NPA) led by Jose Patriarca Jr. conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with guns, forcibly took away ALFREDO AREVALO from his residence and brought him to Sitio Abre, Mabini, Donsol, Sorsogon, and did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and shoot ALFREDO AREVALO thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds, which directly caused his death to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs. They were charged with murder. Prior with this, Patriarca was also charged with murder for the killing of one Rudy de Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag. The RTC found him guilty and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Patriarca then filed his appeal and it was accepted by the court. Patriarca applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 entitled "Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National Amnesty Commission." In 1999, his application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board concluding that his activities were done in pursuit of his political beliefs. ISSUE: Whether or not the amnesty is proper. RULING: Yes, it is proper. Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. The Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to the appeal.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 j. Vera v. People (G.R. No. L-18184, January 31, 1963) BARRERA, J. FACTS: Gaudencio Vera, Restituto Figueras, Lorenzo Ambas, Justo Florido, Paulino Bayran, and 92 others, as John Does, were charged with the complex crime of kidnapping with murder of Amadeo Lozanes, alias Azarcon. The Commission is convinced that the motive for the kidnapping and killing of Lt. Amadeo Lozanes of the Hunters was the keen rivalry, between the Vera's Guerrilla Party and the Hunter's ROTC Guerilla organizations. It is noteworthy that the Hunters were driven away by General Vera from Pitogo in December, 1944, and that after said kidnapping and killing on February 13 and 14, 1945, Mayor Ramon Isaac of Unisan, was in turn kidnapped by the Hunters, Leopoldo Miciano, secretary of Col. de Luna, of the Vera's Guerrilla Party, testified that General Vera told him of his (Vera's) suspicion that Mayor Isaac was kidnapped by way of reprisal as he, Vera, had ordered the liquidation of Lt. Lozañes It is an established fact that when Lozañes was kidnapped, tortured, and later killed, he was actually a lieutenant of the Hunter's ROTC Guerrilla organization then engaged in the resistance movement, it may not be said with any amount of truth that the aforesaid killing was to further the resistance movement at the time, as the defense intimates. Vera contend that to be entitled to the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation No. 8, dated September 7, 1946, it is not necessary for them to it the commission of the crime charged, citing in of their submission the cases of Barrioquinto, et al. vs. Fernandez, et al "in order to entitle a person to the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation (No. 8) of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, it having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the of said Amnesty Proclamation." ISSUE: Whether or not persons invoking the benefit of amnesty should first it having committed the crime of which they were accused. RULING: Affirmative.The benefits of an amnesty proclamation, one must it his guilt of the offense covered by the proclamation. The invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance, which means that the leader its the allegation against him, but disclaims liability therefor on of intervening facts which, if proved, would bring the crime charged within the scope of the amnesty proclamation. Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 extends its provisions to "all persons who committed any act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy," and, hence, may not invoked, where the commission of a crime was not in furtherance of the resistance movement, but was due to rivalry between two guerilla outfits.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 6. DIPLOMATIC a. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS V. EASTERN SEA TRADING (G.R. No. L-14279, October 31, 1961) CONCEPCION, J. FACTS: Eastern Sea Trading (EST) was a shipping company which imports from Japan onion and garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import goods because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were pursuant to Executive Order 328. On the other hand, EO 328 was the implementing law of the Trades and Financial Agreements, an executive agreement, entered into between the Philippines and Japan. The said executive agreement states, among others, that all import transactions between Japan and the Philippines should be invoiced in dollar. In this case, the said items imported by EST from Japan were not invoiced in dollar. EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the executive agreement that the EO was implementing was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed. ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Agreement is subject to the concurrence by the Senate. RULING: No, Executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments — treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’. The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements — whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise — begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate. They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the ission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect to the settlement of claims against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any legislation.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 b. BAYAN V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (G.R. NO. 138570, OCTOBER 10, 2000) BUENA, J. FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total hip of the Philippine Senate. The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.” ISSUE: Whether or not the VFA is unconstitutional. RULING: NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not commit grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA. Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution the provision in Article XVIII requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it. This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the of the VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 XI. THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 1. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT a. General Principles i. ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION (G.R. No. L-45081, JULY 15, 1936) LAUREL, J. FACTS: Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly ed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution. On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935. Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion. ISSUE: Whether or not the Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly. RULING: No, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.The Court DENIED the petition. The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe. The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a general power is conferred or duty ened, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission,

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 ii. BONDOC V. PINEDA (G.R. NO. 97710, SEPTEMBER 26, 1991) GRIÑO-AQUINO, J. FACTS: In 1987 congressional election, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed as winner, in turn, Bondoc filed a protest before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and submission of memoranda, Bondoc's protest was submitted for decision. Therein the decision it was held that Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura, HRET member and member of LDP, voted with the Supreme Court Justices and Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest. Congressman Camasura itted to Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, that he voted for Bondoc not only in the final tally but also in the election itself. Congressman Cojuangco then expelled Congressman Camasura for betraying and disloyalty to LDP. Pineda also moved for the withdrawal of Congressman Camasura from HRET and was later on was removed by HRET’s chairwoman. ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the act of HRET. RULING: Yes. What is assailed in the case at bar is the act of the House of Representatives of withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman Juanito Camasura as a member of the HRET. The said case is a judicial one and not encroaching upon the separation of powers since what is in question is not the act of the congress but the act of HRET. The Supreme Court has the jurisdiction over actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 iii. YNOT V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (G.R. NO. 74457, MARCH 20, 1987) CRUZ, J. FACTS: On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC. ISSUE: Whether or not lower courts has jurisdiction on examining the constitutionality of a law. RULING: Yes. As the Constitution provides, the Court may "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide." In the case at bar the Court held that “while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court said that The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 iv. GARCIA V. DRILON (G.R. NO. 179267, JUNE 25, 2013) PERLAS-BERNABE, J. FACTS: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner. The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.” Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.” The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed. ISSUE: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law. RULING: Yes. Petitioners’ contention that RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality has no basis. He should have questioned the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 while the case is still in the RTC. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time. Thus, if such question of constitutionality is not in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial. Moreover, if it was not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 v. MIRASOL V. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. NO. 128448, FEBRUARY 1, 2001) QUISUMBING, J. FACTS: Petitioner spouses, sugarland owners and planters, entered into several crop loan financing schemes secured by chattel and real estate mortgages with respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB). In this scheme, PNB is authorized to negotiate and sell sugar produced and to apply the proceeds to the payment of the Mirasol’s loan. Pursuant to Presidential Decree 579, Philippine Exchange Co. Inc. was authorized to purchase sugar allotted for export with PNB. Petitioners herein requested for liquidation but was ignored by PNB. Petitioners filed a case before the trial court averring that their obligations had been already paid by virtue of compensation with the unliquidated amounts owed to them by PNB. Then the trial court, without notice to the Solicitor General, rendered judgment holding PD No. 579 unconstitutional ordering private respondents to pay petitioners the whole amount corresponding to the residue of the unliquidated actual cost price of sugar exported and to pay moral damages and attorney's fees. Respondents appealed on the Court of Appeals which reversed the findings of the constitutionality of PD No. 579 ruled by the trial court. ISSUE: Whether or not Regional Trial Court has authority and jurisdiction to rule on PD No. 579 constitutionality. RULING: Yes. It has been held that Regional Trial Court have the authority and jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree or executive order. However, the Solicitor General must be notified any action assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order or proclamation in pursuant to Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. ‘Without the required notice the government is deprived of its day in court and it was improper for the trial court to upon the constitutionality of the questioned PD.’ Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this power: First, there must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 vi. CORONA V. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 200242, JULY 17, 2012) VILLARAMA, JR., J. FACTS: This is a petition filed by the former Chief Justice of the Court, Renato C. Corona, assailing the impeachment case initiated by the of the House of Representatives (HOR) and trial conducted by Senate of the Philippines. Petitioner was charged with culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and graft and corruption because it is provided for in Art. XI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution that "a public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the of the Cabinet, and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law." Respondent failed to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth as required by the Constitution. It is also reported that some of the properties of Respondent are not included in his declaration of his assets, liabilities, and net worth, in violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act. The petition argued that the Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it: (1) proceeded to trial on the basis of the complaint filed by respondent Representatives which complaint is constitutionally infirm and defective for lack of probable cause; (2) did not strike out the charges discussed in Art. II of the complaint which, aside from being a "hodgepodge" of multiple charges, do not constitute allegations in law, much less ultimate facts, being all premised on suspicion and/or hearsay; (3) allowed the presentation of evidence on charges of alleged corruption and unexplained wealth and (4) issued the subpoena for the production of petitioner's alleged bank s as requested by the prosecution despite the same being the result of an illegal act ("fruit of the poisonous tree") considering that those documents submitted by the prosecution violates the absolute confidentiality of such s under Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6426 (Foreign Currency Deposits Act) which is also penalized under Sec. 10 thereof. ISSUE: Whether or not the case becomes moot and academic. RULING: Yes.The present petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s is DISMISSED on the ground of MOOTNESS. An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value.[18] In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would... be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Impeachment, described as "the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of democracy," was foreseen as creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or highlighting pre-existing factions with the greatest danger that "the decision will be regulated more... by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt." Given their concededly political character, the precise role of the judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure the effective... functioning of the separate branches while preserving the structure of checks and balance in our government. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or instrumentality of the

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 government, including those traditionally entrusted to the political departments, are proper subjects of judicial review if tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness. Petitioner was impeached through the mode provided under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec. 3, In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more than the required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and without any protest vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already in the process of screening applicants and nominees, and the President of the Philippines is expected to appoint a new Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-day period from among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by petitioner had been mooted by supervening events and his own acts.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 b. Requisites for Judicial Review i. Actual Case or Controversy 1. Guingona v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 125532, July 10, 1998) PANGANIBAN, J. FACTS: The NBI conducted an investigation on the alleged participation and involvement of national and local government officials in "jueteng" and other forms of illegal gambling. Potenciano Roque, claiming to be an eyewitness to the networking of politicians and gambling lords, sought ission into the Government's Witness Protection Security and Benefit Program (RA 6981). The Department of Justice itted Roque to the program. Thereafter, Roque executed a sworn statement before the NBI, and on the basis thereof, the latter recommended the filing of the necessary charges. Private respondent Pineda was included in the list of government officials who offered Roque money and other valuable considerations, which he accepted, upon his agreement to cease conducting raids on their respective gambling operations. Thereafter, Pineda filed a Petition for Reconsideration of ittance of Potenciano Roque to the Witness Protection Program, but the Secretary denied the same. Thus, Pineda filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction with the respondent Court of Appeals. It disposed in favor of the government. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not this case presents an actual controversy. RULING: No. The petition must fail, because the facts and the issue raised by petitioners do not warrant the exercise of judicial power. The Constitution provides that judicial power "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." One of the requisites of judicial review is that there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power; An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy its of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. The question must be ripe for adjudication. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. In the case at bar, it is at once apparent that petitioners are not requesting that this Court reverse the ruling of the appellate court and disallow the ission in evidence of Respondent Roque's testimony, inasmuch as the assailed Decision does not appear to be in conflict with any of their present claims. Petitioners filed this suit out of fear that the assailed decision would frustrate the purpose of said law, which is to encourage witnesses to come out and testify. But their apprehension is neither justified nor exemplified by this particular case. A mere apprehension, does not give rise to a justiciable controversy.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 2. John Hay People v. Lim (G.R. No 119775, October 24, 2003) CARPIO MORALES, J. FACTS: The Baguio City government ed a number of resolutions in response to the actions taken by BCDA as owner and of Camp John Hay. BCDA entered into a Memorandum of Agreement and Escrow Agreement with private respondents Tuntex (B.V.I.) Co., Ltd. (TUNTEX) and Asiaworld Internationale Group, Inc. (ASIAWORLD), private corporations ed under the laws of the British Virgin Islands, preparatory to the formation of a t venture for the development of Poro Point in La Union and Camp John Hay as premier tourist destinations and recreation centers. They stressed the need to declare Camp John Hay a SEZ as a condition precedent to its full development in accordance with the mandate of R.A. No. 7227. Thus, the issuance of Proclamation No. 420 by then President Ramos declaring a portion of Camp John Hay as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and creating a regime of tax exemption within the John Hay Special Economic Zone. A petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief was filed challenging, in the main, its constitutionality or validity as well as the legality of the Memorandum of Agreement and t Venture Agreement between public respondent BCDA and private respondents TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD. ISSUE: Whether or not there was an actual case or controversy. RULING: The court is convinced that the present petition embodies crucial issues, therefore assumes jurisdiction over the petition. More than the economic interests at stake, the development of Camp John Hay as well as of the other base areas unquestionably has critical links to a host of environmental and social concerns. Whatever use to which these lands will be devoted will set a chain of events that can affect one way or another the social and economic way of life of the communities where the bases are located, and ultimately the nation in general. An actual case or controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory. The controversy needs to be definite and concrete, bearing upon the legal relations of parties who are pitted against each other due to their adverse legal interests. There is in the present case a real clash of interests and rights between petitioners and respondents arising from the issuance of a presidential proclamation that converts a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay into a SEZ, the former insisting that such proclamation contains unconstitutional provisions, the latter claiming otherwise. Other requisites of a judicial review were complied.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 3. Imbong v. Ochoa (G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014) MENDOZA, J. FACTS: Despite the forgoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace. To rein in the problem, the RH law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and information to the full range of modern family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the people’s right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide information on the full range of modern family planning methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health education. After the President placed its imprimatur (signed) on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came to the Supreme Court; 14 petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention have been filed, on the ground that the petitioners, as citizens and taxpayers, the matter is of transcendental importance. The OSH asserts that the issue is political in nature it being “a product of a majoritarian democratic process”. The OSG further claimed that the Court has no authority to review social legislation like the RH Law. Moreover, it contends that as an “applied challenge”, the petition cannot prosper considering that the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims that RH law cannot be challenged “on its face” as it is not a speech-regulating measure. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy. RULING: The Court partially granted the Petition and declared RA 10354 as not unconstitutional except some provisions. In the case at bar, an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been ed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. Moreover, under the RH Law, medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. In view of the novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 4. Belgica v. Ochoa (G.R No. 208566, November 11, 2013) PERLAS-BERNABE, J. FACTS: First petition came from Samson Alcantara, President of Social Justice Society who filed a petition for prohibition assailing that the pork barrel is unconstitutional and a writ of prohibition be issued against respondents Franklin Drilon and Sonny Belmonte in their capacities as President of the Senate and Speaker of the House. Another petition came from Greco Belgica and others filed an urgent petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for an issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction to declare the Pork Barrel System which provided for the PDAF and Malampaya Funds be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being an abuse of discretion. They also pray for a TRO against cabinet secretaries Ochoa, de Leon, Abad, and to immediately cease any expenditure under the funds. A third petition came from Pedrito Nepomuceno filed a petition seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional and a cease and desist order be issued against President Noynoy Aquino and Secretary Abad from releasing the funds to Congress and instead allow their release to fund priority projects identified and approved by the local development councils in consultation with the respective departments. ISSUE: Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy. RULING: Yes. Judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy as is embodied in Art VIII Sec 1 of the 1987 Constitution. Actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. It must also be ripe for adjudication such as questions raised for constitutional scrutiny. A question is ripe when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action. Courts are without authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions. The Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 5. Dumlao v. COMELEC (G.R No. L-52245, January 22, 1980) MELENCIO-HERRERA, J. FACTS: Patricio Dumlao is a former candidate for Governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He filed his certificate of candidacy for the January 30, 1980 elections. He questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution which provides a special disqualification that “Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.” A colleague also assailed said law. Dumlao assails that said law is violative of the equal protection clause and it was directed insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation. He sought to prohibit COMELEC to implement the said law. ISSUE: Whether or not there is an actual controversy. RULING: No, Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of that provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC. His is a question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical issue, and in effect, a petition for an advisory opinion from this Court to be rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual record. His case is clearly within the primary jurisdiction of COMELEC as sole judge of all contests relating to the qualifications if all of elective provincial officials as provided by section 2, Art. XII-C of the Constitution.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 6. Province of Batangas v. Romulo (G.R No. 152774, May 27, 2004) CALLEJO, SR., J. FACTS: On December 7, 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the “Program for Devolution Adjustment and Equalization” to enhance the capabilities of LGUs in the discharge of the functions and services devolved to them through the LGC. The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora ed Resolutions No. OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD99-003 which were approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee required the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for funding under the portion of the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) and submit the project proposals and other requirements to the DILG for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent release of the corresponding funds. Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of P5 Billion for the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed conditions for the release thereof. He invokes Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. ISSUE: Whether or not there is an actual controversy. RULING: Yes. The question of whether or not the assailed provisos contained in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 is undoubtedly a legal question, thus it is justiciable. There is also no need to remand the case to the lower courts since the factual issues needed to answer the legal question are not disputed. The assailed provisos in the General Appropriations Acts of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the assailed OCD Resolutions, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violating of the principle of local autonomy.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 7. Pormento v. Estrada (G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010) CORONA, C.J. FACTS: Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected as President of the Republic of the Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He sought the presidency again in the general elections held on May 10, 2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed private respondent's candidacy and led a petition for disqualification. However, his petition was denied by the Second Division of public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC).His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the COMELEC en banc. Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran. ISSUE: Whether or not there is an actual case for controversy. RULING: Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase "any re-election" will be premised on a person's second--whether immediate or not--election as President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties herein. As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case. As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable. Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections; the same is no longer true today. Following the results of that election, private respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his "re-election" will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 8. Enrile v. Senate Electoral Tribunal (G.R No. 132986, May 19, 2004) SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. FACTS: Senator Pimentel filed with the Senate Electoral Tribunal an election protest Against Enrile and other senators who won in the 1995 elections. Thereafter, petitioner filed his answer with counterprotest. The SET conducted revision of the ballots in various provinces. Then, the SET directed the parties to submit their evidence and memoranda. On August 1997, the SET without resolving the election protest, held a press conference at the SC Session Hall announcing the partial and tentative results of the revision of ballots in the pilot precincts. In the result, the name of petitioner dropped from number 11 to number 15.On September of 1997, petitioner filed a motion to set aside the partial results in Pimentel’s protest and to conduct another appreciation of ballots in the presence of all parties. He alleged that the partial results were erroneous. In its assailed Resolution No. 97-22, the SET itted there was an "oversight," hence, the tally of votes for Paoay, Ilocos Norte should be made. Consequently, the 30,000 votes deducted by the SET from those garnered by petitioner were "given back to him." But the SET denied the motion on the ground that there was no sufficient basis to discard the partial tabulation. Petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration but was denied by the SET in Resolution 98-02.Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not SET committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion. RULING: The case is moot and academic, because the process of how the SET arrived in the determination of partials results was different to that of petitioner. The tenure of the contested senatorial position subject of this petition expired as early as June 30, 1998. A case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in pason the merits. In Garcia vs. COMELEC, we held that "where the issues have become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or value."

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 9. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006) SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. FACTS: In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest. Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His ers cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an over breadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an over breadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care power and take over power. ISSUE: hether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic. RULING: The power of judicial review may be exercised only when the following requisites are present: first, there must be an actual case or controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a question of constitutionality; third, the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is “definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest;” a real and substantial controversy itting of specific relief. The Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy, contending that the present petitions were rendered “moot and academic” by President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021. Such contention lacks merit.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. The Court holds that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues that must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that “an unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative.” The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify the Supreme Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public’s interest, involving as they do the people’s basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees. And lastly, respondents’ contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 10. Lacson v. Perez (G.R. No. 147780, May 20, 2001) MELO, J. FACTS: Gloria Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. Such declaration was rooted on a the violent behavior of the angry mob who assaulted and attempted to break into Malacanang using explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones, and other deadly weapons. General Order No. 1 was subsequently issued to direct the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress such rebellion which led to warrantless arrests against several alleged leaders and promoters of such rebellion. Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests and the declaration of a state of rebellion, which gave a semblance of legality to arrests, the four consolidated petitions were filed before the Court. Significantly, on May 6, 2001, President Macapagal Arroyo ordered the lifting of the declaration of a "state of rebellion" in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic. ISSUE: Whether or not the case can be dismissed because it is moot and academic since the state of rebellion has ceased to exist. RULING: No, according to Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez dissenting in this case, the lifting of the assailed Proclamation and General Order by the President does not render moot and academic the very serious and unprecedented constitutional issues at hand, considering their grave implications involving the basic human rights and civil liberties of our people. A resolution of these issues becomes all the more necessary since, as reported in the papers, there are saturation drives being conducted by the police wherein individuals in Metro Manila are picked up without warrants of arrest. Moreover, the acts sought to be declared illegal and unconstitutional are capable of being repeated by the respondents. In Salva vs. Makalintal, this Court held that "courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is 'capable of repetition, yet evading review' . . ."

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 11. Salonga v. Pano (G.R. No. 59524, February 18, 1985) GUTIERREZ, JR., J. FACTS: This is a petition by Jovito Salonga invoking the his constitutional rights of life and liberty as guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion against him. Ex-Senator Jovito Salonga, a victim of the still unresolved and heinous Plaza Miranda bombings, was arrested at the Manila Medical Center while hospitalized for bronchial asthma. When arrested, he was not informed of the nature of the charges against him. Neither was counsel allowed to talk to him until this Court intervened through the issuance of an order directing that his lawyers be permitted to visit him. Only after four months of detention was Salonga informed for the first time of the nature of the charges against him. After the preliminary investigation, he moved to dismiss the complaint but the same was denied. Subsequently, the respondent judge issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information after finding that a prima facie case had been established against all of the forty persons accused. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court can pursue a case against Salonga even if there is no prima facie evidence against petitioner. RULING: No, but the Supreme Court denied the Petition of Salonga for being moot and academic, because the Respondents Fiscal and Judge manifested that they will drop Salonga in the information filed against his co-accused, as a co-conspirator. The respondent, Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of City Fiscal Segio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of Jovito Salonga as only of the accused in the information. Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is concerned, this decision has been rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution. The Court has been constrained by said actions.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 12. ACOP v. GUINGONA (G.R. No. 134855, July 2, 2002) Austria – Martinez, J. FACTS: In 1995, eleven suspected of the gang, Kuratong Baleleng, were killed in an alleged shootout with PNP. SPO2 delos Reyes, who was one of the officers assigned to investigate on the incident, made a public disclosure of his findings that there was no shootout and the said of the gang were summarily executed. This was attested by SPO2 dela Cruz. The Senate conducted hearings to determine the circumstances surrounding the subject incident and SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz testified before the Senate hearings. Former Senator Roco recommended that SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz be itted to the government’s witness protection program. Petitioners, who are among the PNP officers implicated in the alleged rubout, contend that under Sec. 3(d) for R.A. No. 6981, law enforcers are disqualified from being itted into the witness protection program even though they may be testifying against other law enforcers. According to the Solicitor General, the petition has been rendered moot and academic because the coverage of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz under the Program has already been terminated, as evidenced by the letter of the Director of the Program addressed to OSG. ISSUE: WON petition for judicial review should prosper despite having become moot RULING: Yes. Although the issue had become moot and academic, the Court find it necessary to resolve the case for the future guidance of both bench and bar as to the applications of Sec. 3(d) and 4 of R.A. No. 6981, and for the proper disposition of the issue on whether the two policemen should return the monetary benefits they may have received under the program.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 13. SANLAKAS v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004) Tinga, J. FACTS: In 2003, three hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City armed with high-powered ammunitions and explosives. They demanded among other things, the resignation of Pres. Arroyo, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chief of the PNP. The President then issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order 4, both declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. Despite the occupation ending on the same night, the President did not immediately lift the declaration and did so after 5 days. In the interim, several petitions were filed challenging the petition of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order 4. The Solicitor General argues that the petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of the declaration. ISSUE: WON petition for judicial review should prosper despite having become moot RULING: Yes. The Court agrees with Solicitor General that the issuance of Proclamation has rendered the case moot. Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is “capable of repetition yet evading review”.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 14. FUNA v. CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014) Bersamin, J. FACTS: In 2010, President Arroyo appointed Duque as Chairman of the CSC. The Commission on Appointments confirmed Duque’s appointment. Thereafter, Pres. Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 864 in which Duque was designated as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the following government owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs): a. GSIS, b. Philhealth, c. ECC and d. HDMF. Petitioner Funa filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of EO 864. However, during the pendency of the petition, Duque’s designation could have terminated or been rendered invalid by the enactment of RA 10149, thus causing this petition and the main issue tendered herein moot and academic. ISSUE: WON petition for judicial review should prosper despite having become moot and academic RULING: Yes. The Court has exercised its power of judicial review in cases otherwise rendered moot and academic by supervening events on the basis of certain recognized exceptions: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public interest; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The Court proceeded to resolve the substantive issue concerning the constitutionality of Duque’s ex officio designation for the guidance of and as restraint upon the future.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 15. ARAULLO v. AQUINO III (G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014) Bersamin, J. FACTS: When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his istration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP). The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. In 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators. Petitioner Araullo and several other concerned citizens filed various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Sec. Abad manifested during his oral arguments that the DAP as a program had been meanwhile discontinued. The Solicitor General then quickly confirmed the termination of the DAP as a program, and urged that its termination had already mooted the challenges to the DAP's constitutionality. ISSUE: WON the Court may exercise the power of judicial review. RULING: Yes. The first requisite in order for the Court to exercise the power of judicial review demands that there be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power by the Court. An actual and justiciable controversy exists in the cases at bar. The incompatibility of the perspectives of the parties on the constitutionality of the DAP and its relevant issuances satisfy the requirement for a conflict between legal rights. The issues being raised herein meet the requisite ripeness considering that the challenged executive acts were already being implemented by the DBM, and there are averments by the petitioners that such implementation was repugnant to the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Moreover, the implementation of the DAP entailed the allocation and expenditure of huge sums of public funds. The fact that public funds have been allocated, disbursed or utilized by reason or on of such challenged executive acts gave rise, therefore, to an actual controversy that is ripe for adjudication by the Court.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 16. OPLE v. TORRES (G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998) Puno, J. FACTS: In 1996, istrative Order No 308, otherwise known as “Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System” was issued by President Fidel Ramos. Senator Blas Ople filed a petition to invalidate the said order for violating the right to privacy. He contends that the order must be invalidated on two constitutional grounds, (1) that it is a usurpation of the power to legislate; and (2) that it intrudes the citizen’s right to privacy. Respondents raise the issue of justiciability of the case at bar since the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. ISSUE: WON the Court may exercise the power of judicial review even though the implementing rules of the order have yet to be promulgated. RULING: Yes. The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important constitutional principle and a fundamental right.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 17. MONTESCLAROS v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 152295, July 9, 2002) Carpio, J. FACTS: The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed the Kabataang Barangay to Sangguniang Kabataan and limited its hip to youths “at least 15 but no more than 21 years of age.” Montesclaros demanded from COMELEC that SK elections be held as scheduled on 6 May 2002. COMELEC Chairman Benipayo wrote to the House of Representatives and the Senate, inquiring on the status of pending bills on SK and Barangay elections and expressed to postpone the SK election. On 11 March 2002 the Bicameral Committee consolidated Senate Bill 2050 and House Bill 4456, resetting the SK election to 15 July 2002 and lowered the hip age to at least 15 but no more than 18 years of age. This was approved by the Senate and House of Representative on 11 March and 13 March 2002 respectively and signed by the President on 19 March 2002. The petitioners filed prohibition and mandamus for temporary restraining order seeking the prevention of postponement of the SK election and reduction of age requirement on 11 March 2002. ISSUE: WON the proposed bill presents an actual justiciable controversy. RULING: No. This petition presents no actual justiciable controversy. Petitioners do not cite any provision of law that is alleged to be unconstitutional. Petitioner’s prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill does not present actual controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. Having no legal effect it violates no constitutional right or duty. At the time petitioners filed this petition, RA No. 9164 was not yet enacted into law. After its age, petitioners failed to assail any provision in RA No. 9164 that could be unconstitutional.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 18. MARIANO v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995) Puno, J. FACTS: At bench are petitions for prohibition and declaratory relief, assailing provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati" as unconstitutional. Mariano together with the other petitioners, assail as unconstitutional Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds: 1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code; 2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the 'three consecutive term' limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. 3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for: (a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be ed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every census; (b) the increase in legislative district, was not expressed in the title of the bill; and (c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. ISSUE: WON the petition presents a justiciable controversy. RULING: No. The petitions are based on the occurrence of contingent events, and are merely hypothetical, such as Mayor Binay’s re-election which at some point may or may not happen. Thus, said petition is not yet ripe to be an actual case or controversy. Petitioners failed to comply with the requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law. They are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 19. FERNANDEZ v. TORRES (G.R. No. 102940, November 6, 1992) Feliciano, J. FACTS: Petitioners seek prohibit and restrain the enforcement and implementation of Item No. 1 of DOLE Circular No. 01-91 entitled "Prescribing Additional Requirements, Conditions and Procedures for the Deployment of Performing Artists." Item No. 1 of the assailed DOLE Circular provides as follows: "1. No Filipino entertainer shall be deployed outside the Philippines except for legitimate performing artists consisting of musicians, singers and of dance troupes. In all cases, the performing artists must have a track record of legitimate and reputable performance in the Philippines for at least one year. In no case shall the performing artist be below 23 years old. The Secretary of Labor and Employment may, for justifiable reasons, exempt performing artists from coverage hereof." The labor representatives recommended that the minimum age for performing artists seeking overseas deployment be raised from eighteen (18) years to twenty three (23) years. In the present proceeding, petitioners allege themselves to be "qualified performing artists, mostly singers and dancers," of ages eighteen (18) to twenty-two (22) years. Through counsel, they challenge the constitutional validity of Item No. 1 of DOLE Circular No. 01-91. Solicitor General urges that the petition at bar does not present a justiciable controversy. ISSUE: WON the petition presents a justiciable controversy. RULING: No. The petitioners never sought exemption from the Secretary of Labor, and therefore cannot claim that they have been denied of such. More so, petitioners cannot say that respondent have continually threatened to deny all applications which may lead to their assumption that they will likely be denied if they seek such exemption. There is no actual case or controversy for this petition is grounded on mere hypothetical circumstances, which in fact, may or may not happen.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 20. PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 119694, May 22, 1995) Feliciano, J. FACTS: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information. Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election. ISSUE: WON the petition presents an actual case or controversy. RULING: No for Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. Petitioner failed to allege any act by the COMELEC to enforce said provision. Neither has it claimed that it sustained any actual injury. Yes for Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772. Even though the petition may have been considered as moot and academic upon COMELEC’s resolution to clarify on May 1995, the Court still deemed it appropriate to upon this issue due to an invalid exercise of the power of eminent domain. The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media companies to donate “Comelec space” amounts to “taking” of private personal property without payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 21. MACASIANO v. NATIONAL HOUSING INSTITUTE (G.R. No. 107921, July 1, 1993) Davide, Jr., J. FACTS: Petitioner seeks to declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44 of Republic Act No. 7279 or the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992. He alleges that said Sections "contain the seeds of a ripening controversy that serve as drawback" to his "tasks and duties regarding demolition of illegal structures"; because of the said sections, he "is unable to continue the demolition of illegal structures which he assiduously and faithfully carried out in the past." Petitioner maintains that the said provisions are unconstitutional because: (a) They deprive the government, and more so, private property owners of their property without due process of law and without compensation; (b) They reward, instead of punish, what this Honorable Court has categorically declared as unlawful acts; (c) They violate the prohibition against legislation that takes away one's property to be given to plain interlopers; (d) They sweep over broadly over legitimate concerns of the police power of the State; and (e) They encroach upon the judicial power to execute its valid judgments and orders. The Solicitor General contends: that there is no actual case or controversy with litigants asserting adverse legal rights or interests; that the petitioner merely asks for an advisory opinion; and that there is no showing that the question of constitutionality is the very lis mota presented. He argues that Sections 28 and 44 of the Act are not constitutionally infirm. ISSUE: WON the petition presents an actual case or controversy. RULING: No. The Court finds indubitable ground for the constitutional challenge, not even a necessity to resolve it. In the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary, acts of political departments are presumed to be valid based on the Doctrine of Separation of Powers.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 22. BOARD OF OPTOMETRY v. COLET (G.R. No. 122241, July 30, 1996) Davide, Jr., J. FACTS: The Congress enacted RA 8050, regulating the practice of optometry education, integrated optometrists, among others. In Civil Case No. 95-74770, private respondents herein filed with the RTC Manila a petition for declaratory relief, assailing the validity of the Act on the grounds that it derogated the orderly procedure essential to the legislative process and vitiating legislative consent, violates the due process clause of the Constitution; violates the principle against undue delegation of legislative power; and in violation of the guarantee of freedom of speech and press. In his decision, public respondent Judge Colet issued an order prohibiting the petitioners "from undertaking in any form or manner, the enforcement or implementation of the Revised Optometry Law (RA 8050) or any regulations or Code of Ethics issued thereunder." The petitioners then filed this special civil action alleging that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the implementation of R.A. No. 8050, there being no actual case or controversy. ISSUE: WON there is an actual case or controversy in Civil Case No. 95-74770. RULING: No. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory. It cannot be disputed that there is yet no actual case or controversy involving all or any of the private respondents on one hand, and all or any of the petitioners on the other, with respect to rights or obligations under R.A. No. 8050. This is plain because Civil Case No. 95-74770 is for declaratory relief.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 ii. Proper Party 1. SALONGA V. WARNER BARNES & CO., LTD. (G.R. No. L-2246, JANUARY 31, 1951) BAUTISTA ANGELO, J. FACTS: This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila ordering the defendant, as agent of Westchester Fire Insurance Company of New York, to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P717.82 with legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint until paid, and the costs. The case was taken to this court because it involves only questions of law. On August 28, 1946, Westchester Fire Insurance Company of New York entered into a contract with Tina J. Gamboa whereby said company insured one case of rayon yardage which said Tina J. Gamboa shipped from San Francisco, California, on steamer Clovis Victory, to Manila, Philippines and consigned to Jovito Salonga, plaintiff herein. According to the contract of insurance, the insurance company undertook to pay to the sender or her consignee the damages that may be caused to the goods shipped subject to the condition that the liability of the company will be limited to the actual loss which is not to exceed the sum of P2,000. The ship arrived in Manila on September 10, 1946. Upon examination the surveyors found a shortage in the shipment in the amount of P1,723.12. Plaintiff filed a claim for damages in the amount of P1,723.12 against the American President Lines, agents of the ship Clovis Victory, demanding settlement, and when apparently no action was taken on this claim, plaintiff demanded payment thereof from Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd., as agent of the insurance company in the Philippines, and this agent having refused to pay the claim. In the meantime, the American President Lines, in a letter dated November 25, 1946, agreed to pay to the plaintiff the amount of P476.17 and when this offer was rejected, the claim was finally settled in the amount of P1,021.25. As a result, the ultimate liability of the defendant under the insurance contract was reduced to P717.82 only. After trial, the court rendered judgment as stated in the early part of this decision. The motion for reconsideration filed by the defendant having been denied, the case was appealed to this court. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not petitioner is the proper party to raise the issue. 2. Whether or not petitioner may proceed with the case against Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd. HELD: 1. Yes. Petitioner Jovito Salonga has suffered a direct injury in the case at bar, due to the consignment deal with Tina Gamboa who shipped the rayon yardage from San Francisco. 2. No. It is claimed that a judgment, for or against an agent, in no way binds the real party in interest. If the party sued upon is not the proper party, any decision that may be rendered against him cannot be enforced or executed. Such would be the result of this case if it will be allowed to proceed against the defendant, for even if a favorable judgment is obtained against it, it cannot be enforced because the real party is not involved. The defendant cannot be made to pay for something it is not responsible.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 2. ADVOCATES OF TRUTH IN LENDING, INC. V. BANKO SENTRAL MONETARY BOARD (G.R. No. 192986. JANUARY 15, 2013) REYES, J. FACTS: Petitioners, claiming that they are raising issues of transcendental importance to the public, filed directly with this Court this Petition for Certiorari seeking to declare that the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board (BSP-MB), replacing the Central Bank Monetary Board (CB-MB) has no authority to continue enforcing Central Bank Circular No. 905, which "suspended" Act No. 2655, or the Usury Law of 1916. Petitioner "Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc." (AFTIL) is a non-profit, non-stock corporation organized to engage in pro bono concerns and activities relating to money lending issues. It filed this petition, ed by its founder and president, Eduardo B. Olaguer, suing as a taxpayer and a citizen. R.A. No. 265, which created the Central Bank (CB) of the Philippines, empowered the CB-MB to set the maximum interest rates which banks may charge for all types of loans and other credit operations, within limits prescribed by the Usury Law. On March 17, 1980, the Usury Law was amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1684, giving the CB-MB authority to prescribe different maximum rates of interest which may be imposed for a loan or renewal thereof or the forbearance of any money, goods or credits, provided that the changes are effected gradually and announced in advance. In its Resolution No. 2224 dated December 3, 1982, the CB-MB issued CB Circular No. 905. Under its General Provisions, it removed the ceilings on interest rates on loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits. Petitioners contend that under Section 1-a of Act No. 2655, as amended by P.D. No. 1684, the CB-MB was authorized only to prescribe or set the maximum rates of interest for a loan or renewal thereof. Thus, according to petitioners, CB Circular No. 905 is void because it violated Article 5 of the New Civil Code. They further claim that just weeks after the issuance of CB Circular No. 905, the benchmark 91-day Treasury bills (T-bills), then known as "Jobo" bills shot up to 40% per annum, as a result. Finally, petitioners point out that R.A. No. 7653 did not re-enact a provision similar to Section 109 of R.A. No. 265, and therefore, BSP-MB has been stripped of the power either to prescribe the maximum rates of interest or to suspend Act No. 2655 and continue enforcing CB Circular No. 905. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have locus standi to file the petition. RULING: No. The petitioners failed to show that they sustained any injury brought by CB Circular No. 905. Even as taxpayers, petitioners also do not claim that public funds were being misused in this issue. Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." The real party in interest is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put, a party's standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 3. CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATION V. ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (G.R. No. 174697, JULY 8, 2010) BRION, J. FACTS: This is a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction to nullify Section 2.6 of the Distribution Services and Open Access Rules (DSOAR), promulgated by respondent Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC. Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders' Associations, Inc. asserts that Section 2.6 of the DSOAR, is unconstitutional and contrary to Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as "The Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA)." Pursuant to its rule-making powers under the EPIRA, the ERC promulgated the Magna Carta for Residential Electricity Consumers (Magna Carta), which establishes residential consumers' rights to have access to electricity and electric service, subject to the requirements set by local government units and distribution utilities (DUs). Article 14 of the Magna Carta pertains to the rights of consumers to avail of extension lines or additional facilities. The same article specifies that if a developer initially pays the cost of the extension lines but es it to the ed customer, the customer would still be entitled to recover the cost in the manner provided. On January 18, 2006, the ERC modified this provision when it issued the DSOAR. Section 2.6.1 reiterates the old rule requiring consumers located beyond 30 meters from existing lines to advance the costs of the requested lines and facilities. Section 2.6.2 likewise provides that the costs advanced by consumers may be refunded at the rate of 25% of the annual gross distribution revenue derived from all customers connected to the line extension. However, Section 2.6.2 amends Article 14 of the Magna Carta by limiting the period for the refund to five years, whether or not the amount advanced by the consumer is fully paid. The petitioner seeks to nullify Section 2.6 of the DSOAR, on the following grounds: (1) it is unconstitutional since it is oppressive and it violates the due process and equal protection clauses; (2) it contravenes the provisions of the EPIRA; and (3) it violates the principle of unjust enrichment. Petitioner claims that Section 2.6 of the DSOAR is unconstitutional as it is oppressive to the affected end-s who must advance the amount for the installation of additional facilities. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners has legal standing to challenge a statute or government act. RULING: No. Petitioners do not question the DSOAR provision as a residential end- and it cannot do so because the challenged provision only refers to the rights and obligations of DUs and residential end-s. Thus, neither the petitioner nor its can claim any injury, as residential end-s, arising from the challenged Section 2.6 of the DSOAR. Nor cite any benefit accruing to them as residential end-s that would result from the invalidation of the assailed provision. Legal standing refers to a party's personal and substantial interest in a case, arising from the direct injury it has sustained or will sustain as a result of the challenged governmental action. The term "interest" means a material interest, affected by the governmental action.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 4. PEOPLE V. VERA (G.R. No.L-45685, NOVEMBER 16, 1937) LAUREL, J. FACTS: This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and of prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Manila so that this court may review the actuations of the Court of First Instance in criminal case No. 42649 entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", more particularly the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221, and thereafter prohibit the said Court of First Instance from taking any further action or entertaining further the aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with the final judgment of conviction rendered by this court in said case. Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine Islands and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants in the criminal case. Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by Court of First Instance of Manila. Upon appeal, the court, on March 26, 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from five years and six months of prision correccional to seven years, six months and twenty-seven days of prison mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Unjieng filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the Supreme Court and the was remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office (IPO). The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec. 1 Art. 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the islands. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon. ISSUE: Whether or not the People of the Philippines is a proper party in the case. RULING: Yes. The People of the Philippines is a proper party, which has a substantial interest, as represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of Manila. It is a rule that the person who challenges the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest. Also, it has been held that the State can validly challenge the validity of its own laws.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 5. INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ZAMORA (G.R. No.141284, AUGUST 15, 2000) KAPUNAN, J. FACTS: At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines to the Philippine National Police in visibility patrols around the metropolis for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 which detailed the manner by which the t visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted. Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila. Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President also declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP") filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that the deployment of marines in Metro Manila is violative of the Constitution because no emergency situation would justify, even only remotely, the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement work; hence, said deployment in derogation of Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner IBP has the legal standing to challenge the President’s Order. RULING: No. Petitioner has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case, lacking a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 6. DAVID V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO (G.R. No. 171396. MAY 3, 2006) LAUREL, J. FACTS: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency. In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA), and some of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger. During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified the facts leading to the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Significantly, there was no refutation from petitioners’ counsels. The Solicitor General argued that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. He emphasized that none of the petitioners has shown that PP 1017 was without factual bases. While he explained that it is not respondents’ task to state the facts behind the questioned Proclamation, however, they are presenting the same, narrated hereunder, for the elucidation of the issues. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the constitutionality of the proclamation. RULING: Yes. This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” Therefore, the court ruled that the petitioners have a locus standi, for they suffered “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 7. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (G.R. No.155336. NOVEMBER 25, 2004) CHICO-NAZARIO, J. FACTS: Before this Court is a petition for review filed by petitioner Commission on Human Rights Employees' Association (CHREA) challenging the Decision dated 29 November 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59678 affirming the Resolutions dated 16 December 1999 and 09 June 2000 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which sustained the validity of the upgrading and reclassification of certain personnel positions in the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) despite the disapproval thereof by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM). Also assailed is the resolution dated 11 September 2002 of the Court of Appeals denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. On 14 February 1998, Congress ed Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of its special provisions, the CHR, promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 on 04 September 1998, adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission. Annexed to said resolution is the proposed creation of ten additional plantilla positions, namely: one Director IV position, with Salary Grade 28 for the Caraga Regional Office, four Security Officer II with Salary Grade 15, and five Process Servers, with Salary Grade 5 under the Office of the Commissioners. By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17 November 1998, the CHR "collapsed" the vacant positions in the body to provide additional source of funding for staffing modification. The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its approval, but then DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied the request. The officers of petitioner CHREA, in representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office. The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA's request and reversed the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office denied the same. CHREA elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. It affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action is within the ambit of CHR's fiscal autonomy. Petitioner CHREA grouses that the Court of Appeals and the CSC-Central Office both erred. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has locus standi. RULING: Yes. Petitioner, which consists of rank and file employees of respondent CHR, protests that the upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in the upper level positions in the Commission resulting to the demoralization of the rank and file employees. This sufficiently meets the injury test.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 8. AGAN V. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TERMINALS, CO. (G.R. No.155001. MAY 5, 2003) PUNO, J. FACTS: Petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention filed the instant petitions for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to prohibit the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and its Secretary from implementing the following agreements executed by the Philippine Government through the DOTC and the MIAA and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO). On October 5, 1994, Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government for the development of Ninoy Aquino International Airport International enger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) under a build-operate-and-transfer arrangement pursuant to RA 6957, as amended. It was endorsed to the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), which, in turn, reviewed and approved it for bidding. The Paircargo Consortium was the only company that submitted a competitive proposal. Later, Paircargo Consortium incorporated into Philippine International Airport Terminals Co., (PIATCO). And for failure of AEDC to match the price proposal submitted by PIATCO, the project was awarded to PIATCO. On July 12, 1997, the Government signed the 1997 Concession Agreement. Thereafter, the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) and three Supplements thereto were signed by the Government and PIATCO. Consequently, the workers of the international airline service providers, claiming that they stand to lose their employment upon the implementation of the said agreements, filed before this Court a petition for prohibition. Later, the service providers ed their cause. Congressmen Salacnib Baterina, Clavel Martinez and Constantino Jaraula, alleging that the said contracts compelled government expenditure without appropriation, filed a similar petition. And several employees of the MIAA likewise filed a petition assailing the legality of these agreements. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners, NAIA concessionaires and service contractors, have locus standi. RULING: Yes. Petitioners are facing a direct injury or threat of losing their source of income or livelihood upon implementation of PIATCO Contracts. Thus, conferring upon them legal standing due to the financial prejudice brought by these said contracts.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 9. BAGATSING V. COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION (G.R. No.112399. JULY 14, 1995) QUIASON, J. FACTS: The petition for prohibition in G. R. No. 112399 sought: (1) to nullify the bidding conducted for the sale of a block of shares constituting 40% of the capital stock (40% block) of Petron Corporation (PETRON) and the award made to Aramco Overseas Company, B.V. (ARAMCO) as the highest bidder in the bidding conducted on December 15, 1993; and (2) to stop the sale of said block of shares to ARAMCO. The Supplemental Petition in said case sought to annul the bidding of the 40% block held on December 15, 1993 and to set aside the award given to ARAMCO. The petitioners all in their capacity as of Congress, taxpayers and concerned citizens, except in the case of Mr. Saguisag, who sued as a private law practitioner, member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, taxpayer and concerned citizen. PETRON was originally ed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1966 under the corporate name "Esso Philippines, Inc." (ESSO) as a subsidiary of Esso Eastern, Inc. and Mobil Petroleum Company, Inc. In acquiring PETRON, the government aimed to have a buffer against the vagaries of oil prices in the international market. Indeed, PETRON helped alleviate the energy crises that visited the country. President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 50, in the exercise of her legislative power under the Freedom Constitution, entitled "Proclaiming and Launching a Program for the Expeditious Disposition and Privatization of Certain Government Corporations and/or the Assets thereof, and Creating the Committee on Privatization and the Asset Privatization Trust." On January 12, 1993, the Cabinet approved the privatization of PETRON as part of the Energy Sector Action Plan. COP Chairman, President Ramos approved the privatization of PETRON up to a maximum of 65% of its capital stock. The Petron Privatization Working Committee (PWC) was thus formed. In a meeting of the Petron PWC held on December 15, 1993 at 12:00 noon, it decided that Westmont Holdings (WESTMONT) was disqualified from participating in the bidding for its alleged failure to comply with the technical and financial requirements for a strategic partner. On February 3, 1994, PNOC and ARAMCO signed the Stock Purchase Agreement and on March 4, 1994, the two companies signed the Shareholders' Agreement. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners, as of Congress, have locus standi to challenge the contract in question. RULING: No. Petitioners, as of Congress, in the absence of a claim that the contract in question violated the rights of petitioners or impermissibly intruded into the domain of the Legislature, petitioners have no legal standing to institute the instant action in their capacity as of Congress. However, petitioners can bring the action in their capacity as taxpayers under the doctrine laid down in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 10. KMU Labor Center v. Garcia (G.R. No. 115381, December 23, 1994) KAPUNAN, J. FACTS: Then DOTC Secretary Oscar M. Orbos issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then LTFRB Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to charge engers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year. This range was later increased by LTFRB thru Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 providing, among others, that “The existing authorized fare range system of plus or minus 15 per cent for provincial buses and jeepneys shall be widened to 20% and -25% limit in 1994 with the authorized fare to be replaced by an indicative or reference rate as the basis for the expanded fare range.” In March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first having filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing, announced a fare increase of 20% of the existing fares. Petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) opposed the move and filed a petition before LTFRB, which was denied. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for a TRO. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to raise issues on transportation fares. RULING: Petition granted. The rule requires that a party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant an invocation of the court’s jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the court’s remedial powers in his behalf. Petitioner, whose had suffered and continue to suffer grave and irreparable injury and damage from the implementation of the questioned memoranda, circulars and/or orders, has shown that it has a clear legal right that was violated and continues to be violated with the enforcement of the challenged memoranda, circulars and/or orders. KMU , who avail of the use of buses, trains and jeepneys everyday, are directly affected by the burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in enger fares. They are part of the millions of commuters who comprise the riding public. Certainly, their rights must be protected, not neglected nor ignored.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 11. Paguia v. Office of the President (G.R. No. 176276, June 25, 2010) CARPIO, J. FACTS: Petitioner Alan F. Paguia, as citizen and taxpayer, filed an original action for the writ of certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's nomination of respondent former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. as permanent representative to the United Nations (UN) for violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues that respondent Davide's age at that time of his nomination in March 2006, 70, disqualifies him from holding his post. In their separate Comments, respondent Davide, the Office of the President, and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs raised the following issues: 1) petitioner’s standing to bring the suit because of his indefinite suspension from the practice of law; 2) neither petitioner's citizenship nor his taxpayer status vests him with standing to question respondent Davide's appointment because he remains without personal and substantial interest in the outcome of a suit which does not involve the taxing power of the state or the illegal disbursement of public funds; and 3) the suit is in truth a petition for quo warranto, which can only be filed by a contender for the office in question. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner, as a citizen and taxpayer, has legal standing to bring the subject suit. RULING: The SC held that access to citizen suits is granted on the narrowest ground, when issues of “transcendental” importance calling urgent resolution are raised. The parameters for the determination of allowing third party suits are: (1) character of the funds or assets involved in the controversy; (2) clear disregard of constitutional and statutory prohibition; and (3) lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest to bring suit. None of the foregoing is present in the case. Petitioner Paguia is incapacitated to bring legal actions. Paguia’s suspension from the practice of the law bars him from performing “any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.” Petitioner’s act of preparing a petition raising carefully crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules of statutory construction falls within the proscribed conduct.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 12. Automotive Industry Workers Alliance v. Romulo (G.R. No. 157509, January 18, 2005) CHICO-NAZARIO, J. FACTS: Executive Order No. 292 was issued whereby the National Labor Relations Commission became an agency attached to the Department of Labor and Employment for policy and program coordination and for istrative supervision. On 02 March 1989, Article 213 of the Labor Code was expressly amended by Republic Act No. 6715 declaring that the NLRC was to be attached to the DOLE for program and policy coordination only while the istrative supervision was turned over to the NLRC Chairman. Executive Order No. 185 dated 10 March 2003 supervision of NLRC reverted to the Sec. of Labor and Employment. Petitioners, composed of ten labor unions assailed the constitutionality of EO 185 for allegedly revert the set-up prior to RA 6715, which only Congress can do. Solicitor General contend that petitioners have no locus standi to assail the validity of E.O. No. 185, not even in their capacity as taxpayers, considering that labor unions are exempt from paying taxes, citing Sec. 30 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997. Even assuming that their individual are taxpayers, respondents maintain that a taxpayer suit will not prosper as E.O. No. 185 does not require additional appropriation for its implementation. ISSUE: Whether or not the labour unions have legal standing to assail the constitutionality of EO 185. RULING: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. For a citizen to have standing, he must establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the enactment of E.O. No. 185. As labor unions it cannot be said that E.O. No. 185 will prejudice their rights and interests considering that the scope of the authority conferred upon the Secretary of Labor does not extend to the power to review, reverse, revise or modify the decisions of the NLRC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 13. Domingo v. Carague (G.R. No. 161065, April 15, 2005) SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. FACTS: Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the legality of Resolution No. 2002-05 of the Commission on Audit (COA) providing for Organizational Restructuring Plan. The petitioners alleged therein that this Plan is intrinsically void for want of an enabling law authorizing COA to undertake the same and providing for the necessary standards, conditions, restrictions, limitations, guidelines, and parameters. Petitioners further alleged that in initiating such Organizational Restructuring Plan without legal authority, COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), countered that petitioners have no legal standing to file the present petition since they have not shown "a personal stake in the outcome of the case" or an actual or potential injury that can be redressed by our favorable decision. In essence, it is alleged that the petitioners are not a party in interest, but the petitioners claim otherwise by reason that the matter is of public concern. The said Organizational Restructuring Plan is not just a mere reorganization but a revamp or overhaul of the COA, with a "spillover effect" upon its audit performance. This will have an impact upon the rest of the government bodies subject to its audit supervision, thus, should be treated as a matter of transcendental importance. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to institute the instant petition. RULING: Petitioners have not shown any direct and personal interest in the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan. There was also an ission that "they do not seek any affirmative relief nor impute any improper or improvident act against the respondents" and "are not motivated by any desire to seek affirmative relief from COA or from respondents that would redound to their personal benefit or gain." Hence, the petitioners do not have any legal standing to file the instant suit. He who is directly affected and whose interest is immediate and substantial has the standing to sue. A party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision in order to warrant an invocation of the court.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 14. Cutaran v. DENR (G.R. No. 134958, January 31, 2001) GONZAGA-REYES, J. FACTS: Cutaran et al. assails the validity of DENR Special Orders 31 and 25, and Department istrative Order 2 for being issued without prior legislative authority. In 1990, the Assistant Secretary for Luzon Operations of the DENR issued Special Order no. 31 entitled "Creation of a Special Task force on acceptance, identification, evaluation and delineation of ancestral land claims in the Cordillera istrative Region". The special task force created was authorized to accept and evaluate and delineate ancestral land claims within the said area, and after due evaluation of the claims, to issue appropriate land titles in accordance with existing laws. On January 15, 1993, the Secretary of the DENR issued Special Order no. 25 entitled "Creation of Special Task Forces provincial and community environment and natural resources offices for the identification, delineation and recognition of ancestral land claims nationwide" and Department istrative Order no. 02, containing the Implementing Rules and Guidelines of Special Order no. 25. In 1990, the same year Special Order no. 31 was issued, the relatives of herein petitioners filed separate applications for certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC) over the land they respectively occupy inside the Camp John Hay Reservation. In 1996 the applications were denied by the DENR Community Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands on the ground that the Bontoc and Applai tribes to which they belong are not among the recognized tribes of Baguio City. Hence, this petition for prohibition originally filed with the Court of Appeals. CA held that the assailed DENR Special Orders Nos. 31, 31-A, 31-B issued in 1990 prior to the effectivity of RA 7586 known as the National Integrated Protected Areas Systems (NIPAS) Act of 1992, are of no force and effect "for preempting legislative prerogative" but sustained the validity of DENR Special Order No. 25, and its implementing rules by the appellate court on the ground that they were issued pursuant to the powers delegated to the DENR. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi. RULING: There is no justiciable controversy for the court to resolve. The adverse legal interests involved are the competing claims of the petitioners and heirs of Carantes to possess a common piece of land. Since the CALC application of the Heirs of Carantes has not yet been granted or issued, and which the DENR may or may not grant, there is yet no actual or imminent violation of petitioner’s asserted right to possess the disputed land. The Court cannot rule on the basis of petitioners’ speculation that the DENR will approve the application of the heirs of Carantes. There must be an actual governmental act, which directly causes or will imminently cause injury to the alleged legal right of the petitioner to possess the land before the jurisdiction of the Court may be invoked. There is no showing that the petitioners were being evicted from the land by the heirs of Carantes under orders from the DENR.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 15. Joya v. PCGG (G.R. No. 96541, August 24, 1993) BELLOSILLO, J. FACTS: All thirty-five (35) petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus r seeking to en the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) from proceeding with the auction sale by Christie's of New York of the Old Masters Paintings and 18th and 19th century silverware seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila. Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the preservation and protection of the country's artistic wealth, they have the legal personality to restrain respondents Executive Secretary and PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by the 1987 Constitution, particularly Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to 18, on Arts and Culture, and R.A. 4846 known as "The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act," ISSUE: Whether petitioners have legal standing to file the subject petition. RULING: None. They themselves allege that the paintings were donated by private persons from different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-stock corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts. Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends and dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver wedding and anniversary, an occasion personal to them. The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino istration however should not be understood to mean that the ownership of these paintings has automatically ed on the government without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the government, any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper parties — the true owners thereof — whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition. Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done by the government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of istering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be ened at the request of a taxpayer. Obviously, petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they allege to be public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners it that the paintings and antique silverware were acquired from private sources and not with public money.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 16. TELEBAP v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998) MENDOZA, J. FACTS: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens, taxpayers, and ed voters. Petitioners challenge the validity of §92 on the ground (1) that it takes property without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the period of election. ISSUE: Whether TELEBAP has standing in this suit. RULING: None. In the case at bar, as will presently be shown, petitioner's substantive claim is without merit. To the extent, therefore, that a party's standing is determined by the substantive merit of his case or preliminary estimate thereof, petitioner TELEBAP must be held to be without standing. Indeed, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury fairly is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. of petitioner have not shown that they have suffered harm as a result of the operation of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881. Nor do of petitioner TELEBAP have an interest as ed voters since this case does not concern their right of suffrage. Their interest in §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 should be precisely in upholding its validity. Much less do they have an interest as taxpayers since this case does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. A party suing as a taxpayer must specifically show that he has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute. Nor indeed as a corporate entity does TELEBAP have standing to assert the rights of radio and television broadcasting companies. Standing jus tertii will be recognized only if it can be shown that the party suing has some substantial relation to the third party, or that the third party cannot assert his constitutional right, or that the eight of the third party will be diluted unless the party in court is allowed to espouse the third party's constitutional claim. None of these circumstances is here present. The mere fact that TELEBAP is composed of lawyers in the broadcast industry does not entitle them to bring this suit in their name as representatives of the affected companies.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 17. Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr. (G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994) DAVIDE, JR., J. FACTS: This action seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the "Contract of Lease" executed by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) in connection with the on-line lottery system, also known as "lotto." Petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated (KILOSBAYAN) avers that it is a non-stock domestic corporation composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders who are committed to the cause of truth, justice, and national renewal. Petitioners submit that the PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed Contract of Lease with the PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold and conduct the on-line lottery system in "collaboration" or "association" with the PGMC, in violation of Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities "in collaboration, association or t venture with any person, association, company or entity, foreign or domestic." On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioners do not appear to have the legal standing or real interest in the subject contract and in obtaining the reliefs sought. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to maintain this suit. RULING: Yes. A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821)." Insofar as taxpayers' suits are concerned, this Court had declared that it "is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained,” or that it "enjoys an open discretion to entertain the same or not." In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute actions before this Court to question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities. We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counterproductive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 18. Tatad v. Secretary of Energy (G.R. Nos. 124360 and 127867, November 5, 1997) PUNO, J. FACTS: The petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes" which ends twenty six (26) years of government regulation of the downstream oil industry. The petition is anchored on three arguments: First, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Petitioner contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad. Second, that the imposition of different tariff rates does not deregulate the downstream oil industry but instead controls the oil industry, contrary to the avowed policy of the law. Third, that the inclusion of the tariff provision in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 violates Section 26(1) Article VI of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its title. Petitioner contends that the imposition of tariff rates in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the subject of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have the standing to assail the validity of the subject law and executive order. RULING: Yes. In language too lucid to be misunderstood, this Court has brightlined its liberal stance on a petitioner's locus standi where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. In Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, we stressed: Objections to taxpayers' suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing or interest are, however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 19. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 159139, January 13, 2004) PANGANIBAN, J. FACTS: For the automation of the counting and canvassing of the ballots in the 2004 elections, Comelec awarded the Contract to "Mega Pacific Consortium" an entity that had not participated in the bidding. Despite this grant, the poll body signed the actual automation Contract with "Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc.," a company that ed the bidding but had not met the eligibility requirements. On May 29, 2003, petitioner and four other individuals and entities protested the award of the Contract to Respondent MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process had been conducted." ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have locus standi in this case. RULING: Yes. As taxpayers, they are allowed to sue when there is a claim of "illegal disbursement of public funds," or if public money is being "deflected to any improper purpose"; or when petitioners seek to restrain respondent from "wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law." In the Petition, they claim that the bidding was defective, the winning bidder not a qualified entity, and the award of the Contract contrary to law and regulation. Accordingly, they seek to restrain respondents from implementing the Contract and, necessarily, from making any unwarranted expenditure of public funds pursuant thereto. Moreover, our nation's political and economic future virtually hangs in the balance, pending the outcome of the 2004 elections. Hence, there can be no serious doubt that the subject matter of this case is "a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest"; 18 in other words, it is of "paramount public interest" and "transcendental importance."

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 20. LIM v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002) DE LEON, JR. J. FACTS: Pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in "Balikatan 02-1”. The entry of American troops into Philippine soil is proximately rooted in the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the tragic events that occurred on September 11, 2001. On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the t exercise. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing. RULING: Yes. The Court relaxed stringent rule on parties’ standing to file suit because of the primordial importance of the issue involved. Although the Court agreed with the Solicitor General in his contentions that (1) they may not file suit in their capacities as taxpayers inasmuch as it has not been shown that "Balikatan 02-1" involves the exercise of Congress' taxing or spending powers, (2) their being lawyers does not invest them with sufficient personality to initiate the case, and (3) petitioners have failed to demonstrate the requisite showing of direct personal injury, it reiterated its decision in Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr. In cases of transcendental importance, the Court may relax the standing requirements and allow a suit to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 21. KILOSBAYAN v. MORATO (G.R. No. 118910, July 17, 1995) MENDOZA, J. FACTS: In Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, the Court declared invalid the contract between Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the privately owned Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) for the operation of a nationwide on-line lottery system. The contract violated the provision in the PCSO Charter which prohibits PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries through a collaboration, association, or t venture. Both parties again signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) for online lottery equipment and accessories on January 25, 1995. Kilosbayan again filed a petition to declare amended ELA invalid because (1) It is the same as the old contract of lease; (2) it is still violative of PCSO’s charter; (3) it is violative of the law regarding public bidding – it has not been approved by the President and it is not most advantageous to the government. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has standing to sue. RULING: No. The parties in the previous and the present case may be the same, but the case is not. Strictly speaking, standing is concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The issue in this case is whether petitioners are the "real parties-in-interest". It is true that the present action involves not a mere contract between private individuals but one made by a government corporation. There is, however, no allegation that the public funds are being misspent so as to make this action a public one and justify relaxation of the requirement that an action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest. Question as to the nature or validity of public contracts or the necessity for a public bidding before they may be made can be raised in an appropriate case before the Commission on Audit or before the Ombudsman.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 22. CHAVEZ vs PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY (G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002) CARPIO, J. FACTS: The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation ("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has legal standing to sue. RULING: Yes. The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to information on matters of public concern. Second is the application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens. The thrust of the first issue is to compel PEA to disclose publicly information on the sale of government lands worth billions of pesos, information which the Constitution and statutory law mandate PEA to disclose. The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation. Moreover, the petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the public.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 23. TATAD vs GARCIA (G.R. No. 114222, April 6, 1995) QUIASON, J. FACTS: In 1989, DOTC planned to construct a light railway transit line along EDSA to provide a mass transit system along EDSA and alleviate the congestion and growing transportation problem in the metropolis. Certain corporations were invited to prequalify for the bids and it was awarded to EDSA LRT Consortium. DOTC and the latter then entered into an agreement to build the light railway transit under a Build, Operate, and Transfer (BOT) scheme. Upon full or partial completion and viability thereof, ESDA Consortium shall deliver the use and possession of the completed portion to DOTC which shall operate the same. DOTC shall pay private respondent rentals on a monthly basis through an Irrevocable Letter of Credit. The rentals shall be determined by an independent and internationally accredited inspection firm to be appointed by the parties. As agreed upon, EDSA Consortium’s capital shall be recovered from the rentals to be paid by the DOTC which, in turn, shall come from the earnings of the EDSA LRT III. After 25 years and DOTC shall have completed payment of the rentals, ownership of the project shall be transferred to the latter for a consideration of only US $1.00. Petitioners opposed the implementation of the said agreement insofar as it grants EDSA LRT CORPORATION, LTD., a foreign corporation, the ownership of EDSA LRT III, a public utility, and that it violates the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have standing to sue. RULING: Yes. The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the national government or government-owned or controlled corporations allegedly in contravention of the law (Kilosbayan vs Guingona) and to disallow the same when only municipal contracts are involved (Bugnay vs. Laron). For as long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present action.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 24. BRILLANTES vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004) CALLEJO, SR., J. FACTS: On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections. It also mandated the COMELEC to acquire automated counting machines (ACMs), computer equipment, devices and materials; and to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials. On October 29, 2002, the COMELEC adopted, in its Resolution No. 02-0170, a modernization program for the 2004 elections consisting of three (3) phases, to wit: (1) PHASE I – Computerized system of registration and voters validation or the so-called "biometrics" system of registration; (2) PHASE II – Computerized voting and counting of votes; and (3) PHASE III – Electronic transmission of results. The SC, in a previous ruling, declared COMELEC Resolution No. 6027, implementing Phase II of the AES, unconstitutional. Despite that, the COMELEC nevertheless ventured to implement Phase III of the AES through an electronic transmission of advanced "unofficial" results of the 2004 elections for national, provincial and municipal positions, also dubbed as an "unofficial quick count." Petitioners claimed that it would allow the usurpation of the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the votes for President (Pres.) and Vice-President (VP) and encroach upon the authority of the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) to conduct the "unofficial" quick count. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing. RULING: Yes. Since the implementation of the assailed resolution obviously involves the expenditure of funds, the petitioner and the petitioners-in-intervention, as taxpayers, possess the requisite standing to question its validity as they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. Most of the petitioners-in-intervention are also representatives of major political parties that have participated in the May 10, 2004 elections. On the other hand, petitionersin- intervention Concepcion and Bernas represent the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), which is the citizens' arm authorized to conduct an "unofficial" quick count during the said elections. They have sufficient, direct and personal interest in the manner by which the respondent COMELEC would conduct the elections, including the counting and canvassing of the votes cast therein. Moreover, the petitioners-in-intervention Drilon and De Venecia are, respectively, President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives, the heads of Congress, which is exclusively authorized by the Constitution to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President. They have the requisite standing to prevent the usurpation of the constitutional prerogative of Congress.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 25. JUMAMIL vs CAFÉ (G.R. No. 144570, September 21, 2005) CORONA, J. FACTS: Petitioner Jumamil questioned the constitutionality of Municipal Resolution No. 7 which provided for an initial appropriation of P 765,000 for the construction of stalls around a proposed terminal fronting the Panabo Public Market which was destroyed by fire. The same was amended by Resolution No. 10 appropriating a further amount of P1,515,000 for the construction of additional stalls in the same public market. Prior to the age of these resolutions, respondent Mayor Cafe had already entered into contracts with those who advanced and deposited (with the municipal treasurer) from their personal funds the sum of P40,000 each. Some of the parties were close friends and/or relatives of the public respondents. After completion, the stalls were leased through a public raffle limited to said individuals. Jumamil, as taxpayer, filed a petition questioning the constitutionality of the ordinances. The lower courts declared Jumamil to lack legal standing because he was not a party to the contract entered into. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has legal standing. RULING: No. A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity but parties suing as such must specifically prove sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. In the case at bar, petitioner did not seasonably allege his interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of public funds or the specific injury to him as a result of the enforcement of the questioned resolutions and contracts. It was only in the "Remark to Comment" he filed in this Court did he first assert that "he (was) willing to engage in business and (was) interested to occupy a market stall." Such claim was obviously an afterthought.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 26. ESTRADA vs SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001) BELLOSILLO, J. FACTS: Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659, wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The which the petitioner challenges for vice for vagueness are “combination”, “series” and “unwarranted”. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the law. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has legal standing to sue. RULING: Yes. The onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing; there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain." Petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 27. IMBONG vs OCHOA (G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014) MENDOZA, J. FACTS: R.A. 10354, The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds: The RH Law violates (1) the right to life of the unborn; (2) the one subject-one title rule; (3) he right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products; (4) the right to religious freedom; among others. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have locus standi in this case. RULING: Yes. Notwithstanding the fact that the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against the petitioners and the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive, the Court leaned on the transcendental importance doctrine. It states that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest." In cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. Considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 iii. Earliest Opportunity 1. MATIBAG V. BENIPAYO (G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002) CARPIO, J. FACTS: COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as “Acting Director IV” of the Education and Information Department (EID) on February 1999. On February 2000, Chairperson Demetriou renewed the appointment of petitioner in a “Temporary” capacity. Commissioner Javier again renewed the appointment of petitioner to the same position in a “Temporary” capacity. On February 2001. On March 2001, The President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of seven years and all expiring on February 2008. Benipayo took his oath of office and assumed the position of COMELEC Chairman. Borra and Tuason likewise took their oaths of office and assumed their positions as COMELEC Commissioners. On June 2001, The President renewed the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions and for the same term of seven years, expiring on February 2008. In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum addressed to petitioner as Director IV of the EID and to Cinco as Director III also of the EID, designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID and reasg petitioner to the Law Department. During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department Petitioner then filed an instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and . ISSUE: Whether or not the instant petition provides for all the requisites before the Court may exercise its power of judicial review. RULING: Yes. The requisites are all present, which earliest opportunity is thus present. Petitioner filed the instant petition only on August 3, 2001, when the first ad interim appointments were issued as early as March 22, 2001. However, it is not the date of filing of the petition that determines whether the constitutional issue was raised at the earliest opportunity. The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same, such that, "if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal." Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason when she filed her petition before this Court, which is the earliest opportunity for pleading the constitutional issue before

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 a competent body. Furthermore, this Court may determine, in the exercise of sound discretion, the time when a constitutional issue may be ed upon. There is no doubt petitioner raised the constitutional issue on time.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 2. ESTARIJA V. RANADA (G.R. No. 159314, June 26, 2006) QUISUMBING, J. FACTS: Respondent Ranada, a member of the Davao Pilots Association, Inc. (DPAI) and Davao Tugboat and Allied Services, Inc. (DTASI) filed an istrative complaint for Gross Misconduct before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, against petitioner Estarija, Harbor Master of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), Port in Davao City. Thereafter, the Ombudsman rendered a decision in the istrative case, finding Estarija guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct. Estarija filed a motion for reconsideration and assails RA 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act 1989" as unconstitutional because it gives the Office of the Ombudsman additional powers that are not provided for in the Constitution. The Court of Appeals (CA) held that the attack on the constitutionality of RA 6770 was procedurally and substantially flawed. The constitutionality issue was belatedly raised in the motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Ombudsman. ISSUE: Whether or not the question of constitutionality of RA 6770 was raised at the earliest possible opportunity. RULING: Yes, the question of constitutionality of RA 6770 was raised at the earliest possible opportunity. Petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 6770 in his motion for the reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s decision. Verily, the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to entertain questions on the constitutionality of a law. Thus, when petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality of RA 6770 before the CA, the constitutional question was raised at the earliest opportune time. Furthermore, this Court may determine, in the exercise of sound discretion, the time when a constitutional issue may be ed upon.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 3. UMALI V. GUINGONA (G.R. No. 131124, March 29, 1999) PURISIMA, J. FACTS: Petitioner was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. President Fidel V. Ramos, received a confidential memorandum against petitioner for alleged violations of internal revenue laws, rules and regulations. On receipt of the said confidential memorandum, former President Ramos authorized the issuance of an Order for the preventive suspension of Umali and immediately referred the Complaint against the latter to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for investigation. The PCAGC found prima facie evidence to six (6) charges of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance against petitioner. Acting upon the recommendation of the PCAGC, President Ramos issued an istrative Order dismissing petitioner with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law. His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Office of the President, petitioner brought a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction before the RTC of Makati which dismissed the same. The Court of Appeals likewise dismissed the petition when its jurisdiction was invoked, hence, petitioner found its way to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner raised the issue at its earliest opportunity for judicial review. RULING: As regards the issue of constitutionality of the PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner in his motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It was certainly too late to raise the said issue for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings below.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 4. ZANDUETA V. DELA COSTA (G.R. No. 46267, November 28, 1938) VILLA-REAL, J. FACTS: Prior to the promulgation of Commonwealth Act No. 145, the petitioner, the Honorable Francisco Zandueta was discharging the office of judge of first instance, Ninth Judicial District, comprising solely the City of Manila, and was presiding over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of said city, by virtue of an ad interim appointment issued by the President of the Philippines in his favor on June 1936, and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly on September of the same year. On November 1936, the date on which Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise known as the "Judicial Reorganization Law", took effect, the petitioner received from the President of the Commonwealth and new ad interim appointment as judge of first instance, this time of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, issued in accordance with said Act. As the National Assembly adjourned on November 1937, without its Commission on Appointments' having acted on said ad interim appointment, another ad interim appointment to the same office was issued in favor of said petitioner, pursuant to which he took a new oath, before discharging the duties thereof. On May 1938, the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly disapproved the aforesaid ad interim appointment of said petitioner, who was advised thereof by the Secretary of Justice on the same month and year. President of the Philippines appointed the herein respondent, Honorable Sixto de la Costa, judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Fifty Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and his appointment was approved by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can question the Constitutionality of the Commonwealth Act No. 145. RULING: No, the petitioner cannot question the Constitutionality of the Commonwealth Act No. 145. The respondent, in answer to the petition, its some of the facts alleged therein and denies the rest, and alleges, as one of his special defenses, that the petitioner is estopped from attacking the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145, for having accepted his new appointment as judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, issued by virtue thereof, to preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, and for having taken the necessary oath, entering into the discharge of the functions of his office and performing judicial as well as istrative acts.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 iv. Lis Mota 1. KALIPUNAN NG DAMAY ANG MAHIHIRAP V. ROBREDO (G.R. No. 200903, July 22, 2014) BRION, J. FACTS: The of petitioners Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. and Corazon de Jesus Homeowners' Association as well as the individual petitioners, Fernando Sevilla, Estrelieta Bagasbas, Jocy Lopez, Elvira Vidol and Delia Frayres, were/are occupying parcels of land owned by and located in the cities of San Juan, Navotas and Quezon (collectively, the LGUs). These LGUs sent the petitioners notices of eviction and demolition pursuant to Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 in order to give way to the implementation and construction of infrastructure projects in the areas illegally occupied by the petitioners. On March 23, 2012, the petitioners directly filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus before the Court, seeking to compel the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, et al. (the public respondents) to first secure an eviction and/or demolition order from the court prior to their implementation of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279. The petitioners argue that Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 offend their constitutional right to due process because they warrant evictions and demolitions without any court order. They point out that Section 6, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits the impairment of liberty of abode unless there is a court order. Moreover, Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 violate their right to adequate housing, a universal right recognized in Article 25 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Section 2 (a) of RA 7279. The petitioners further complain that the respondents had previously conducted evictions and demolitions in a violent manner, contrary to Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not can the Court can exercise their power of judicial review in this case. RULING: No. The issue of the case is not the lis mota of the case. Lis mota literally means "the cause of the suit or action"; it is rooted in the principle of separation of powers and is thus merely an offshoot of the presumption of validity accorded the executive and legislative acts of our co-equal branches of the government. This means that the petitioner who claims the unconstitutionality of a law has the burden of showing first that the case cannot be resolved unless the disposition of the constitutional question that he raised is unavoidable. If there is some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the question of constitutionality should be avoided. Thus, to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 2. PLANTERS PRODUCTS V. FERTIPHIL (G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008) REYES, R.T., J. FACTS: Petitioner Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) and private respondent Fertiphil are private corporations incorporated under Philippine laws. They are both engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural chemicals. On June 3, 1985, then President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 1465 which provides for, to include in its fertilizer pricing formula a capital contribution component of not less than P10 per bag. This capital contribution shall be collected until adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable. Such capital contribution shall be applied by FPA to all domestic sales of fertilizers in the Philippines.| After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. With the return of democracy, Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI No. 1465, but PPI refused to accede to the demand. Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages against FPA and PPI with the RTC in Makati. It questioned the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust, unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due process of law. Fertiphil alleged that the LOI solely favored PPI, a privately owned corporation, which used the proceeds to maintain its monopoly of the fertilizer industry. In its Answer, FPA, through the Solicitor General, countered that the issuance of LOI No. 1465 was a valid exercise of the police power of the State in ensuring the stability of the fertilizer industry in the country. It also averred that Fertiphil did not sustain any damage from the LOI because the burden imposed by the levy fell on the ultimate consumer, not the seller. ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutionality of LOI 1465 cannot be collaterally attacked. RULING: No, LOI cannot be collaterally attacked in a complaint for collection. The resolution of the constitutional issue is not necessary for a determination of the complaint for collection. Fertiphil counters that the constitutionality of the LOI was adequately pleaded in its complaint. It claims that the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 is the very lis mota of the case because the trial court cannot determine its claim without resolving the issue. The constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 is also the very lis mota of the complaint for collection. Fertiphil filed the complaint to compel PPI to refund the levies paid under the statute on the ground that the law imposing the levy is unconstitutional. The thesis is that an unconstitutional law is void. It has no legal effect. Being void, Fertiphil had no legal obligation to pay the levy. Necessarily, all levies duly paid pursuant to an unconstitutional law should be refunded under the civil code principle against unjust enrichment. The refund is a mere consequence of the law being declared unconstitutional. The

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 RTC surely cannot order PPI to refund Fertiphil if it does not declare the LOI unconstitutional. It is the unconstitutionality of the LOI which triggers the refund. The issue of constitutionality is the very lis mota of the complaint with the RTC.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 3. TARROSA V. SINGSON (G.R. No. 111243, May 25, 1994) QUIASON, J. FACTS: Appointment of Respondent Gabriel Singson as Governor of the Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas for not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, is being questioned by the petitioner as a "taxpayer". The petition seeks to en respondent Singson from the performance of his functions as such official until his appointment is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments and respondent Salvador M. Enriquez, Secretary of Budget and Management, from disbursing public funds in payment of the salaries and emoluments of respondent Singson. Respondents claim that Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointment of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral. They contend that an appointment to the said position is not among the appointments which have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, citing Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not the issue raised is the lis mota of the case at bar. RULING: The instant petition is in the nature of quo warranto proceeding as it seeks the ouster of respondent Singson and alleges that the latter is unlawfully holding or exercising the powers of Governor of the Bangko Sentral. Such a special civil action can only be commenced by the Solicitor General or by a "person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by another. To uphold the action would encourage every disgruntled citizen to resort to the courts, thereby causing incalculable mischief and hindrance to the efficient operation of the governmental machinery. The Court refrains from pason the constitutionality of Section 6, R.A. No. 7653 in deference to the principle that bars a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question unless the resolution thereof is indispensable for the determination of the case.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 4. TY V. TRAMPE (G.R. No. 117577, December 1, 1995) PANGANIBAN, J. FACTS: Petitioner Alejandro B. Ty is a resident of and ed owner of lands and buildings in the Municipality (now City) of Pasig, while petitioner MVR Picture Tube Inc. is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws and is likewise a ed owner of lands and buildings in said Municipality. Respondent Aurelio C. Trampe is being sued in his capacity as presiding judge of Branch 163, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region. sitting in Pasig, whose Decision dated 14 July 1994 and Order dated 30 September 1994 in Special Civil Action No. 629 (entitled "Alejandro B. Ty and MVR Picture Tube. Inc. vs. The Hon. Secretary of Finance, et al.") are sought to be set aside. Respondent Secretary of Finance is impleaded as the government officer who approved the Schedule of Market Values used as basis for the new tax assessments being enforced by respondents Municipal Assessor and Municipal Treasurer of Pasig and the legality of which is being questioned in this petition. On 06 January 1994, respondent Assessor sent a notice of assessment respecting certain real properties of petitioners located in Pasig. Metro Manila in a letter dated 18 March 1994, petitioners through counsel "requested the Municipal Assessor to reconsider the subject assessments." Not satisfied, petitioners on 29 March 1994 filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 163, presided over by respondent Judge, a Petition for Prohibition with prayer for a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to declare null and void the new tax assessments and to en the collection of real estate taxes based on said assessments. In a Decision 4 dated 14 July 1994, respondent Judge denied the petition "for lack of merit". ISSUE: Whether or not the approval of the Schedule of Market Values used as a basis for the new tax assessments can be questioned. RULING: It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case. The Court does not ordinarily upon constitutional questions unless these questions are properly raised in appropriate cases and their resolution is necessary for the determination of the case. The Court will not upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some other found such as the application of a statute or general law.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 5. ARCETA V. JUDGE MAGROBANG (G.R. No. 152895, JUNE 15, 2004) QUISUMBING, J. FACTS: The City Prosecutor of Navotas, Metro Manila charged Ofelia V. Arceta with violating Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 in an Information, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. The information reads that Arceta issued a check amounting to P740,000 to an Oscar Castro payable to cash. The said accused well-knowing that at the time of issue did not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for the payment. Arceta did not move to have the charge against her dismissed or the Information quashed on the ground that B.P. Blg. 22 was unconstitutional. She reasoned out that with the Lozano doctrine still in place, such a move would be an exercise in futility for it was highly unlikely that the trial court would grant her motion and thus go against prevailing jurisprudence. Thereafter, Arceta was arraigned and pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. However, she manifested that her arraignment should be without prejudice to the present petition or to any other actions she would take to suspend proceedings in the trial court. ISSUE: Whether or not B.P. Blg. 22 may be question on the issue of the case. RULING: No, the Court did not find the question to be very lis mota. After minute scrutiny of petitioners' submissions, we find that the basic issue being raised in these special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus concern the unconstitutionality or invalidity of B.P. Blg. 22. When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, it is the established doctrine that the Court may exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) an actual and appropriate case and controversy exists; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised is the very lis mota of the case. Only when these requisites are satisfied may the Court assume jurisdiction over a question of unconstitutionality or invalidity of an act of Congress. With due regard to counsel's spirited advocacy in both cases, we are unable to agree that the abovecited requisites have been adequately met. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 c. Fiscal Autonomy i. Bengzon v. Drilon (G.R. No. 103524, April 15, 1992) Gutierrez, Jr., J. FACTS: In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were “repealed” during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and of the constitutional commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these laws to standardize retirement benefits among government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) claiming the law should not give preferential treatment to certain or select government officials. Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court asking the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was one of those unpublished PDs which were subject of the case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non-publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions. Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992, Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the allotment in the following manner: Congress made an item entitled: “General Fund Adjustment”; included therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations in different branches of the government; among such obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary. However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the retired justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297. This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President was represented by then Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon. ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional. RULING: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws. The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It appears that in the same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the others. This cannot be done. The rule is: The Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this case, the president did not veto the entire line item of the general

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the portion which pertained to the pensions of the justices but did not veto the other items covering obligations to the other departments of the government.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 ii. Nitafan v. CIR (G.R. No. 78780, July 23, 1987) Melencio-Herrera, J. FACTS: Judge David Nitafan and several other judges of the Manila Regional Trial Court seek to prohibit the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries or compensation for such would tantamount to a diminution of their salary, which is unconstitutional. Earlier however, or on June 7, 1987, the Court en banc had already reaffirmed the directive of the Chief Justice which directs the continued withholding of taxes of the justices and the judges of the judiciary – but the SC decided to rule on this case nonetheless to settle the issue once and for all. ISSUE: Whether or not the of the judiciary are exempt from the payment of income tax. RULING: No. The clear intent of the framers of the Constitution, based on their deliberations, was NOT to exempt justices and judges from general taxation. of the judiciary, just like of the other branches of the government, are subject to income taxation. What is provided for by the constitution is that salaries of judges may not be decreased during their continuance in office. They have a fix salary which may not be subject to the whims and caprices of congress. But the salaries of the judges shall be subject to the general income tax as well as other of the judiciary. But may the salaries of the of the judiciary be increased? Yes. The Congress may a law increasing the salary of the of the judiciary and such increase will immediately take effect thus the incumbent of the judiciary (at the time of the ing of the law increasing their salary) shall benefit immediately. Congress can also a law decreasing the salary of the of the judiciary, but such will only be applicable to of the judiciary which were appointed AFTER the effectivity of such law.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 iii. In Re: Clarifying and Strengthening The Organizational Structure and istrative SetUp of the Philippine Judicial Academy (A.M. No. 01-1-04-SC-PHILJA, January 31, 2006) CALLEJO, SR., J. FACTS: The instant istrative matter has its roots in the Resolution of the Court promulgated on February 24, 2004, clarifying and strengthening the organizational structure and istrative setup of the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA).1 Pursuant to said resolution, the positions of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer and Supervising Judicial Staff Officer with Salary Grades (SG) 25 and 23, respectively, were created in the following Divisions of the PHILJA: Publications Division, and External Linkages Division (Research, Publications and Linkages Office); Mediation Education and Management Division (Judicial Reforms Office); Corporate Planning Division, and istrative Division (istrative and Finance Office). However, in its Notice of Organization, Staffing, and Compensation Action (NOSCA) dated May 5, 2005, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) downgraded said positions and their corresponding salary grades. Meantime, pursuant to the recommendation of the Office of istrative Services, the Court issued a Resolution on July 5, 2005, retaining "the originally proposed titles and salary grades of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer (SG 25) and Supervising Judicial Staff Officer (SG 23) in the [PHILJA]". Thereafter, in a Memorandum addressed to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. dated October 10, 2005, PHILJA Chancellor, Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, requested the Court to issue another resolution retaining the position titles and salary grades of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer and Supervising Judicial Staff Officer, in light of the NOSCA issued by the DBM downgrading said positions. Chancellor Melencio- Herrera invoked the Court’s Resolution of November 21, 1995 (Re: Requests for Upgrading of the Positions of Chief Justice Staff Head, Judicial Staff Head, Director IV [Chief, Fiscal Management and Budget Office], Director III, Chief of Division and Assistant Chief of Division with corresponding change in Position Titles, if Warranted),3 which she alleged the DBM violated by such downgrading. According to the PHILJA Chancellor, to allow the DBM to disregard such resolution would "undermine the independence of the Judiciary and impinge on the Supreme Court’s exercise of its fiscal autonomy expressly granted by the Constitution." Upon the recommendation of the Office of istrative Services, the Court issued a Resolution on November 8, 2005, resolving to "deny the request of Justice Ameurfina A. MelencioHerrera for the issuance of another resolution retaining the position titles and salary grades of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer (SG 25) and Supervising Judicial Staff Officer (SG 23), as the resolution dated 5 July 2005 will suffice." In compliance with the Court’s Resolution dated October 18, 2005 referring the Memorandum of Justice Melencio-Herrera for evaluation, report and recommendation, Atty. Edna E. Diño, Office of the Chief Attorney, submitted her Report dated December 1, 2005. She recommended that the Court reiterate its July 5, 2005 Resolution (retaining the originally proposed titles and salary grades of the positions of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer [SG 25] and Supervising Judicial Staff Officer [SG 23]). She, likewise, recommended that the DBM be directed to implement the Court’s Resolutions of February 24, 2004 and July 5, 2005, as it (DBM) had "no authority to revise a Resolution of this Court

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 issued in the exercise of its constitutional mandates of fiscal autonomy and istrative supervision over court personnel." ISSUE: Whether or not DBM has authority to revise a Resolution of the Court issued in the exercise of its constitutional mandates of fiscal autonomy and istrative supervision over court personnel. RULING: The primary role of the DBM is to breathe life into the policy behind the Salary Standardization Law of "providing equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions." Pursuant to its mandate, the DBM is authorized to evaluate and determine whether a proposed reclassification and upgrading scheme is consistent with applicable laws and regulations. The task of the DBM is simply to review the compensation and benefits plan of the government agency or entity concerned and determine if it complies with the prescribed policies and guidelines issued in this regard. Thus, the role of the DBM is "supervisorial in nature, its main duty being to ascertain that the proposed compensation, benefits and other incentives to be given to [government] officials and employees adhere to the policies and guidelines issued in accordance with applicable laws." As such, the authority of the DBM to review Supreme Court issuances relative to court personnel on matters of compensation is even more limited, circumscribed as it is by the provisions of the Constitution, specifically Article VIII, Section 37 on fiscal autonomy and Article VIII, Section 68 on istrative supervision over court personnel. Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. The authority of the DBM to "review" the plantilla and compensation of court personnel extends only to "calling the attention of the Court" on what it may perceive as erroneous application of budgetary laws and rules on position classification. The DBM may not overstep its authority in such a way as to cause the amendment or modification of Court resolutions even if these pertain to istration of compensation and position classification system. Only after its attention to an allegedly erroneous application of the pertinent law or rule has been called by the DBM may the Court amend or modify its resolution, as its judgment and discretion may dictate under the law. In this instance, the change of two position titles was made apparently to conform to position titles indicated in the personnel services itemization for all government positions, clearly oblivious of the fact that positions in the Judiciary are peculiar only to that branch of government. It appearing that the salary grades of 25 and 23 are proper positions equivalent to those of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer and Supervising Judicial Staff Officer, respectively, under the Salary Standardization Law, and that the Court prescribed those position titles only after consideration of the nature of work and functions that the holders of those positions must perform, there is no reason to amend the Resolutions of 24 February 2004, and of 5 July 2005, so as to reflect the position titles and salary grades stated in the NOSCA for the same positions.12 CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the Court REITERATES its Resolution of July 5, 2005 retaining the originally proposed titles and salary grades of the positions of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer (SG 25) and Supervising Judicial Staff Officer (SG 23) in the Philippine Judicial Academy. The Department of Budget and Management is DIRECTED to implement the Resolutions of the Court dated February 24, 2004 and July 5, 2005.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 iv. Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court. (A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012) FACTS: This issue has its roots in the June 8, 2010 Opinion issued by the Legal Services Sector, Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA), which found that an underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five (5) retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court. The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division erroneously appraised the subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) t Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997 and its guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01,3 when it should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum No. 98-569-A4 dated August 5, 1998. Recommendations of the Office of istrative Services In her Memorandum dated August 10, 2010, Atty. Candelaria recommended that the Court advise the COA to respect the in-house computation based on the CFAG formula, noting that this was the first time that the COA questioned the authority of the Court in using CFAG t Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines in the appraisal and disposal of government property since these were issued in 1997. As a matter of fact, in two previous instances involving two (2) retired Court of Appeals Associate Justices,5 the COA upheld the in-house appraisal of government property using the formula found in the CFAG guidelines. More importantly, the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of its budget and resources. Full autonomy, among others,6 contemplates the guarantee of full flexibility in the allocation and utilization of the Judiciary’s resources, based on its own determination of what it needs. The Court thus has the recognized authority to allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided or required by law in the course of the discharge of its functions. To allow the COA to substitute the Court’s policy in the disposal of its property would be tantamount to an encroachment into this judicial prerogative. ISSUE: Whether or not in-house computation should be followed. RULING: The COA’s authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, which states: Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all s pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution. emphasis ours

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 This authority, however, must be read not only in light of the Court’s fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with the constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 v. RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NETWORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEET OR CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE JUDICIARY and RE: REQUEST OF PHILIPPINE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM [PCIJ] FOR THE 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEETS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICES. (A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC, August 26, 2014) MENDOZA, J. FACTS: In a letter, dated July 30, 2009, Rowena C. Paraan, Research Director of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), sought copies of the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth (SALN) of the Justices of this Court for the year 2008. She also requested for copies of the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) or the Curriculum Vitae (CV) of the Justices of this Court for the purpose of updating their database of information on government officials. In her Letter, dated August 13, 2009, Karol M. Ilagan, a researcher-writer also of the PCIJ, likewise sought for copies of the SALN and PDS of the Justices of the Court of Appeals (CA), for the same above-stated purpose. The two requests were ordered consolidated by the Court on August 18, 2009. On the same day, the Court resolved to create a special committee (Committee) to review the policy on requests for SALN and PDS and other similar documents, and to recommend appropriate action on such requests. On November 23, 2009, the Committee, chaired by then Associate Justice Minita V. ChicoNazario submitted its Memorandum dated November 18, 2009 and its Resolution dated November 16, 2009, recommending the creation of Committee on Public Disclosure that would, in essence, take over the functions of the Office of the Court (OCA) with respect to requests for copies of, or access to, SALN, and other personal documents of of the Judiciary. Meanwhile, several requests for copies of the SALN and other personal documents of the Justices of this Court, the CA and the Sandiganbayan (SB) were filed. ISSUES: Whether or not the SALN and other personal documents of the Justices should be released. RULING: In essence, it is the consensus of the Justices of the above-mentioned courts and the various judges associations that while the Constitution holds dear the right of the people to have access to matters of concern, the Constitution also holds sacred the independence of the Judiciary. Thus, although no direct opposition to the disclosure of SALN and other personal documents is being expressed, it is the uniform position of the said magistrates and the various judges associations that the disclosure must be made in accord with the guidelines set by the Court and under such circumstances that would not undermine the independence of the Judiciary.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 d. Appointment i. In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta (A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998) NARVASA, CJ. FACTS: Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional provision prohibits the President from making any appointments two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. ISSUE: Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII RULING: During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution “two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term” the President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes into effect once every 6 years. The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the period of the ban. They come within the operation of the prohibition relating to appointments. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 ii. De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council (G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010) Bersamin, J. FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice. Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively. The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice. A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement. RULING: Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary. Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict. The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven . Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the of the Supreme Court. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the of the Supreme Court. Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 e. Judicial and Bar Council i. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council (G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012) Mendoza, J. FACTS: The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of Supreme Court Chief Justice following Renato Corona’s departure. Originally, the of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that “(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio , a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.” In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio . In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7) , an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating “a representative of the National Assembly” to the JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism which was adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if the Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would have made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to be a member of JBC would deprive the other house of representation, defeating the principle of balance. The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress to be of the JBC does not render JBC’s purpose of providing balance nugatory; that the presence of two (2) from Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six (6) who are undeniably presidential appointees Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019

ISSUE: Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) , two (2) of whom are of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution. RULING: No. The current practice of JBC in itting two of the Congress to perform the functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is unconstitutional. One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical are employed. As such, it can be clearly and unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase, “a representative of Congress,” the use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain , so provided. Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated. Every meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look into the minds of the of the Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7) only. The underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting of the JBC for that matter. With the respondents’ contention that each representative should be itted from the Congress and House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of the records of Constitutional Commission, held that “Congress,” in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as one body. While it is true that there are still differences between the two houses and that an inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of the legislative powers conferred to them by the Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the three branches of government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would “negate the principle of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.” It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress with an equal voice with other of the JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what the tides of time may be. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of the government and the people who run it. Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts, actions before the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby ened to reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This disposition is immediately executory.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 ii. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council (G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013) Mendoza, J. FACTS: The Judicial Bar Council (JBC) as mandated by the constitution is composed of only seven, however on 1994 it was substantially altered. An eighth member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting simultaneously having one-half (1/2) vote each. The JBC En Banc, on 2001, decided to allow the two representatives be entitled with one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. SECTION 8. (1) A JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL IS HEREBY CREATED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE SUPREME COURT COMPOSED OF: • • • • • • •

The Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, The Secretary of Justice, and A representative of the Congress as ex officio , A representative of the Integrated Bar, A professor of law, A retired Member of the Supreme Court, an A representative of the private sector.

It is this issue that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. In simplistic , the House of Representatives, without the Senate and vice-versa, is not Congress. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. ISSUE: Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) , two (2) of whom are of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of Section 8 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. RULING: Yes. The word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government – to legislate. In the age of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) only. Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 iii. Jardeleza v. Sereno (G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014) Mendoza, J. FACTS: Associate Justice Roberto Abad was about to retire and the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announce an opening for application and recommendation for the said vacancy. Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic was included in the list of candidates. Hence, he was interviewed. However, he received calls from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself – CJ Sereno, will be invoking unanimity rule against him. It is invoked because Jardeleza’s integrity is in question. During the meeting, Justice Carpio disclosed a confidential information which characterized Jardeleza’s integrity as dubious. Jardeleza answered that he would defend himself provided that due process would be observed. His request was denied, and he was not included in the shortlist. Hence, Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to include him in the list claiming the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite having garnered enough votes to qualify for the position. ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process is available during JBC proceedings in cases where an objection or opposition to an application is raised. RULING: Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due process. The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. Notwithstanding being “a class of its own,” the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is availing. In cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither contradicts the fulfillment of the JBC’s duty to recommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Its adherence to the precepts of due process s and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness because the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness. Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process. True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 iv. Aguinaldo, et al v. Aquino, et al (G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016) Leonardo-De Castro, J. FACTS: On June 11, 1978, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) issued Presidential Decree No. 1486, creating a special court called the Sandiganbayan, composed of a Presiding Judge and eight Associate Judges to be appointed by the President, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in government owned or controlled corporations. A few months later, on December 10, 1978, President Marcos also issued Presidential Decree No. 1606, which elevated the rank of the of the Sandiganbayan from Judges to Justices, co-equal in rank with the Justices of the Court of Appeals; and provided that the Sandiganbayan shall sit in three divisions of three Justices each.5 Republic Act No. 7975 was approved into law on March 30, 1995 and it increased the composition of the Sandiganbayan from nine to fifteen Justices who would sit in five divisions of three each. Republic Act No. 10660, recently enacted on April 16, 2015, created two more divisions of the Sandiganbayan with three Justices each, thereby resulting in six vacant positions. On July 20, 2015, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) published in the Philippine Star and Philippine Daily Inquirer and posted on the JBC website an announcement calling for applications or recommendations for the six newly created positions of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan.8 After screening and selection of applicants, the JBC submitted to President Aquino six shortlists contained in six separate letters, all dated October 26, 2015. President Aquino issued on January 20, 2015 the appointment papers for the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, namely: (1) respondent Musngi; (2) Justice Reynaldo P. Cruz (R. Cruz); (3) respondent Econg; (4) Justice Maria Theresa V. Mendoza-Arcega (Mendoza-Arcega); (5) Justice Karl B. Miranda (Miranda); and (6) Justice Zaldy V. Trespeses (Trespeses). The appointment papers were transmitted on January 25, 2016 to the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, who took their oaths of office on the same day all at the Supreme Court Dignitaries Lounge. Respondent Econg, with Justices Mendoza-Arcega and Trespeses, took their oaths of office before Supreme Court Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Sereno); while respondent Musngi, with Justices R. Cruz and Miranda, took their oaths of office before Supreme Court Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza). According to petitioners, the JBC was created under the 1987 Constitution to reduce the politicization of the appointments to the Judiciary. It is the function of the JBC to search, screen, and select nominees recommended for appointment to the Judiciary. It shall prepare a list with at least three qualified nominees for a particular vacancy in the Judiciary to be submitted to the President, who, in turn, shall appoint from the shortlist for said specific vacancy. Petitioners emphasize that Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution is clear and unambiguous as to the mandate of the JBC to submit a shortlist of nominees to the President for "every vacancy" to the Judiciary, as well as the limitation on the President's authority to appoint of the Judiciary from among the nominees named in the shortlist submitted by the JBC. In this case, the JBC submitted six separate lists, with five to seven nominees each, for the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan, particularly, for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 Associate Justices. Petitioners contend that only nominees for the position of the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice may be appointed as the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, and the same goes for the nominees for each of the vacancies for the 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. However, on January 20, 2016, President Aquino issued the appointment papers for the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. ISSUES: Whether President Aquino, under the circumstances, was limited to appoint only from the nominees in the shortlist submitted by the JBC for each specific vacancy. RULING: The Court answers in the negative. The JBC was created under the 1987 Constitution with the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It is a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process, intended to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of political pressure and partisan activities. The extent of the role of the JBC in recommending appointees vis-a-vis the power of the President to appoint of the Judiciary was discussed during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission (CONCOM) on July 10, 1986 It should be stressed that the power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to restrict or limit the President's power to appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose someone whom he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the end, the President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment is valid. On this score, the Court finds herein that President Aquino was not obliged to appoint one new Sandiganbayan Associate Justice from each of the six shortlists submitted by the JBC, especially when the clustering of nominees into the six shortlists encroached on President Aquino's power to appoint of the Judiciary from all those whom the JBC had considered to be qualified for the same positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 f. Supreme Court i. Jurisdiction 1. FORTICH vs. CORONA (G.R. No. 131457, April 24, 1998) YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. FACTS: On March 29, 1996, the Office of the President (OP) issued a decision converting a large parcel of land from agricultural land to agro-industrial/institutional area. Because of this, a group of farmer-beneficiaries staged a hunger strike in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Compound in Quezon City in October 9, 1997. The strike generated a lot of publicity and even a number of Presidential Candidates (for the 1998 elections) intervened on behalf of the farmers. Because of this “blackmail”, the OP re-opened the case and through Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona issued the so-called, “politically motivated”, “win-win” resolution on November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its 1996 decision after it had become final and executory. ISSUE: WON the “win-win” resolution, issued after the original decision had become final and executory, had any legal effect. RULING: No; When the OP issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed “Win-Win” Resolution. Section 7 of istrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in “exceptionally meritorious cases,” as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to istrative determinations. The orderly istration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 2. DE CASTRO VS. JBC (G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010) BERSAMIN, J. FACTS: This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC ed a resolution which stated that they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice. As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star. In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved. The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the prohibition of the JBC to the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to the shortlist, or that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment. A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed. ISSUES: W/N there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination? RULING: There is a justiciable issue We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the “interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed.” The resolution of the controversy will surely settle – with finality – the nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 3. LIMKETKAI SONS MILLING, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 118509, December 1, 1995) MELO, J. FACTS: On June 23, 1988, Pedro Revilla, Jr., a licensed real estatebroker was given formal authority by BPI to sell the lot for P1,000.00 per square meter. The owners of the Philippine Remnants concurred this arrangement. Broker Revilla ed Alfonso Lim of petitioner company who agreed to buy the land. On July 9, 1988, Revilla formally informed BPI that he had procured a buyer, herein petitioner. On July 11, 1988, petitioner's officials, Alfonso Lim and Albino Limketkai, went to BPI to confirm the sale. Vice-President Merlin Albano and Asst. Vice-President Aromin entertained them. The parties agreed that the lot would be sold at P1,000.00 persquare meter to be paid in cash. The authority to sell was on a first come, first served and non-exclusive basis; there is no dispute over petitioner's being the first comer and the buyer to be first served. Alfonso Lim then asked if it was possible to pay on . The bank officials stated that there was no harm in trying to ask for payment on because in previous transactions, the same had been allowed. It was the understanding, however, that should the term payment be disapproved, then the price shall be paid in cash. Two or three days later, petitioner learned that its offer to pay on had been frozen. Alfonso Lim went to BPI on July 18, 1988 and tendered the full payment of P33,056,000.00 to Albano. The payment was refused because Albano stated that the authority to sell that particular piece of property in Pasig had been withdrawn from his unit. The same check was tendered to BPI VicePresident Nelson Bona who also refused to receive payment. An action for specific performance with damages was thereupon filed on August 25, 1988 by petitioner against BPI. In the course of the trial, BPI informed the trial court that it had sold the property under litigation to NBS on July 14, 1989. Upon elevation of the case to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was reversed and the complaint dismissed on 12 August 1994. It was held that no contract of sale was perfected because there was no concurrence of the three requisites enumerated in Article 1318 of the Civil Code. On its decision in Dec. 1, 1995, the Supreme Court reversed and set aside the questioned judgment of the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the 10 June 1991 judgment of Branch 151 of the RTC of The National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Pasig, Metro Manila except for the award of P10,000,000.00 damages, which was deleted. On March 26, 1996, Motion for Reconsideration was granted. Petitioner’s opposition to the MR was denied. The SC sets aside Dec. 1, 1995 decision and affirmed in toto the decision of CA. Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration by Petitioner. ISSUE: WoN the case should be referred to the court en banc. RULING: The Petitioner is contending that the case should be referred to the court en banc because as the doctrines laid down in Abrenica v. Gonda and De Gracia, 34 Phil. 739, Talosig v. Vda. de Nieba, 43 SCRA 473, and Villonco Realty Co. v. Bormaheco, Inc., et. al., 65 SCRA 352, have been modified or reversed.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 The court held that a more circumspect analysis of these cases vis-a-vis the case at bench would inevitably lead petitioner to the conclusion that there was neither reversal nor modification of the doctrines laid down in the Abrenica, Talosig and Villonco cases. In fact, the inapplicability of the principle enunciated in Abrenica and Talosig to this case has already been extensively discussed in the Court’s resolution, hence the same will not be addressed anew. As regards the case of Villonco, petitioner mistakenly assumes that its case has a similar factual milieu with the former. The Court finds no further need to elaborate on the issue, but will simply point out the significant fact that the offer of the buyer in Villonco, unlike in this case, was accepted by the seller, Bormaheco, Inc.; andVillonco involves a perfected contract, a factor crucially absent in the instant case as there was no meeting of the minds between the parties. What petitioner bewails the most is the present composition of the Third Division which deliberated on private respondents’ motions for reconsideration and by a majority vote reversed the unanimous decision of December 1, 1995. More specifically, petitioner questions the assumption of Chief Justice Narvasa of the chairmanship of the Third Division and arrogantly rams its idea on how each Division should be chaired, i.e., the First Division should have been chaired by Chief Justice Narvasa, the Second Division by Mr. Justice Padilla, the next senior Justice and the Third Division by Mr. Justice Regalado, the third in line. We need only to stress that the change in the hip of the three divisions of the Court was inevitable by reason of Mr. Justice Feliciano’s retirement. Such reorganization is purely an internal matter of the Court to which petitioner certainly has no business at all. In fact, the current “staggered” set-up in the chairmanships of the Divisions is similar to that adopted in 1988. In that year, the Court’s Third Division was likewise chaired by then Chief Justice Fernan, while the First and Second Divisions were headed by the next senior Justices--Justices Narvasa and Melencio-Herrera, respectively. ACCORDINGLY, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and motion to refer the case to the Court En Banc are hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY, without prejudice to any and all appropriate actions that the Court may take not only against counsel on record for the petitioner for his irresponsible remarks, but also against other persons responsible for the reckless publicity anent this case calculated to maliciously erode the people’s faith and confidence in the integrity of this Court.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 4. Francisco, Jr. v. Toll Regulatory Board (G.R. No. 166910, October 19, 2010) Velasco, Jr. J. FACTS: President Marcos issued PD 1112 authorizing the establishment of toll facilities on public improvements. It acknowledged the huge financial requirements and the need to tap the resources of the private sector to implement the government’s infrastructure programs. PD 1112 allowed the collection of toll fees for the use of certain public improvements that would allow a reasonable rate of return on investments. The same decree created the Toll Regulatory Board, vesting it with the power to enter into contracts for the construction, maintenance, and operation of tollways, grant authority to operate a toll facility, issue the necessary Toll Operation Certificate (TOC) and fix initial toll rates, and adjust it from time to time after due notice and hearing. PD 1113 was issued granting the Philippine National Construction Corporation for a period of 30 years, a franchise to operate toll facilities in the North Luzon and South Luzon Expressways. Subsequently, PD 1894 was issued further granting the PNCC a franchise over the Metro Manila Expressway and the expanded delineated NLEX and SLEX. Then came the 1987 Constitution with its franchise provision. In 1993, the Government Corporate Counsel held that the PNCC may enter into a t venture agreement with private entities without going into public bidding. On February 1994, the DPWH together with other private entities executed a MOU to open the door for entry of private capital in the Subic and Clark extension projects. PNCC entered into a financial and technical JVAs with entities for the toll operation of its franchised areas. Several Supplemental Toll Operation Agreements (STOA) were entered for the South Metro Manila Skyway, NLEX Expansion, and South Luzon Expressway Projects. Petitioners seek to nullify the various STOAs and assail the constitutionality of Sections 3(a and d) of PD 1112 in relation to Section 8(b) of PD 1894. Insofar as they vested the TRB the power to issue, modify, and promulgate toll rate changes while given the ability to collect tolls. ISSUE: Whether or not the TRB may be empowered to grant authority to operate the toll facility/system. RULING: The TRB was granted sufficient power to grant a qualified person or entity with authority to operate the toll facility/system. By explicit provisions of the PDs, the TRB was given power to grant istrative franchise for toll facility projects. The limiting thrust of Article 11, Section 11 of the Constitution on the grant of franchise or other forms of authorization to operate public utilities may, in context, be stated as follows: (a) the grant shall be made only in favor of qualified Filipino citizens or corporations; (b) Congress can impair the obligation of franchises, as contracts; and (c) no such authorization shall be exclusive or exceed fifty years. Under the 1987 Constitution, Congress has an explicit authority to grant a public utility franchise. However, it may validly delegate its legislative authority, under the power of subordinate legislation, to issue franchises of certain public utilities to some istrative agencies.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 5. JARDELEZA v. SERENO (G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014) MENDOZA, J. FACTS: Associate Justice Roberto Abad was about to retire and the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announce an opening for application and recommendation for the said vacancy. Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic was included in the list of candidates. Hence, he was interviewed. However, he received calls from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself – CJ Sereno, will be invoking unanimity rule against him. It is invoked because Jardeleza’s integrity is in question. During the meeting, Justice Carpio disclosed a confidential information which characterized Jardeleza’s integrity as dubious. Jardeleza answered that he would defend himself provided that due process would be observed. His request was denied and he was not included in the shortlist. Hence, Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to include him in the list on the grounds that the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position. ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process is available in the course of JBC proceedings in cases where an objection or opposition to an application is raised. RULING: Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due process. The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. Notwithstanding being “a class of its own,” the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is availing. In cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither contradicts the fulfillment of the JBC’s duty to recommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process s and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness because the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness. Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process. True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 6. People v. Redulosa (G.R. No. 94594, March 29, 1996) MENDOZA, J. FACTS: Appellant Romeo Redulosa (alias Micmic Redulosa, Romeo Solon and Micmic Solon) and Roselo Carton were accused of kidnapping for ransom with murder. The information alleged: That on or about the 3rd day of December, 1981, at about 8:00 oclock A.M., and for sometime subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a deadly weapon, with the use of a motor vehicle, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, did then and there kidnap or detain one Christopher Jason Tan, aged 9 years, or deprive him of his liberty by bringing him to Tan-awan, Carcar, Cebu, and at the same time demanding money in the amount of P100,000.00 from the parents of said Christopher Jason Tan as ransom for the liberty of said Christopher Jason Tan, and upon failure of said parents to come up with the full amount of P 100,000.00, with deliberate intent and intent to kill, with treachery, abuse of superior strength, evident premeditation, and in disregard the respect due the offended party on of his age, did then and there stab with the use of a bladed weapon aforesaid Christopher Jason Tan several times on different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him the following injuries: STAB WOUNDS ON DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE BODY: as a consequence of which said Christopher Jason Tan died. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can grant requests to dismiss an appeal for crimes with capital punishment. RULING: In its resolution dated April 30, 1987, in istrative Matter No. 87-5-3173-0, this Court ruled: (1) that notices be given to all the accused in the pending cases before the Court wherein the death penalty has been imposed, advising said accused that the death penalty imposed upon them has been officially commuted to reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) by virtue of the abolition of the death penalty under the 1987 Constitution and that with such abolition of the death penalty their cases are no longer subject to automatic review by this Court, and (2) to GRANT said accused a period of thirty (30) days from notice within which to file a written statement, personally signed by them with the assistance of their counsel, stating whether or not they wish to continue with their said cases as an appealed case. (a) If they file such statement that they wish to continue with this Courts reviewing their conviction as an appealed case, the Court will do so, rendering a judgment of affirmance, modification of the penalty or reversal as may be warranted by the evidence and applicable law; and (b) If they file a statement that they are satisfied with the judgment of the trial court whose death penalty has now been commuted to reclusion perpetua, or if they fail to file any statement within the

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 30-day period herein given, the Court will dismiss the case and remand the same to the trial court for execution of judgment. This ruling is now embodied in Circular No. 9 dated May 20, 1987 of this Court. Consequently this case has remained in this Court only because of appellants decision to continue his case as an appealed case. However, as appellant had the right to continue with his case as an appealed one, so does he have a right - subject to the approval of this Court - to terminate the appeal by withdrawing it.[1] Both the appellants counsel and the Solicitor General urge approval of appellants motion.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 7. Garcia v. People (G.R. No. 106531, November 18, 1999) PARDO, J. FACTS: On September 29, 1986, the Provincial Fiscal of Guimaras filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, an information charging petitioners with murder for the killing of one Jose Estrella. After due trial, on September 21, 1990, the trial court promulgated its decision convicting petitioners of the crime charged and sentencing each of them to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay tly and severally, the heirs of Jose Estrella the sum of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, to suffer the accessory penalties of the law and to pay the costs. On September 24, 1990, petitioners filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the decision. However, on September 2, 1991, the trial court denied the motion. On September 5, 1991 petitioner received notice of the order of denial. Petitioners did not interpose an appeal from the decision by the filing of a notice of appeal. Thus, the decision became final on September 17, 1991. Accordingly, the trial court issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners. On November 13, 1991, petitioners filed with the trial court a motion to lift warrant of arrest and to allow accused to appeal, arguing that there was no need for them to appeal the decision as the same was subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court. On January 17, 1992, the trial court denied the motion. On February 14, 1992, the trial court also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present recourse. ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court must automatically review a trial court’s decision convicting an accused of a capital offense and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. RULING: No. The issue is not new. We have consistently ruled that it is only in cases where the penalty actually imposed is death that the trial court must forward the records of the case to the Supreme Court for automatic review of the conviction. As the petitioners did not file a notice of appeal or otherwise indicate their desire to appeal from the decision convicting them of murder and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua, the decision became final and unappealable.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 8. Republic v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 135789, January 31, 2002) PARDO, J. FACTS: The Case is a petition for certiorari to nullify two (2) resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, namely: (1) Resolution dated April 13, 1998 ordering the lifting of the writ of sequestration over the assets, shares of stocks, property, records and bank deposit of Hans M. Menzi Holdings and Management Inc. (HMHMI); and (2) Resolution dated August 21, 1998 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not there was prima facie factual basis for the issuance of a writ of sequestration over the assets, shares of stock, property records and bank deposits of HMHMI. RULING: We deny the petition. The issue is factual. It is well settled that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over decisions or final orders of the Sandiganbayan is limited to questions of law.[19] A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being itted.[20] A question of facts exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.[21] The Supreme court is not a trier of facts. It is not the Courts function to examine and weigh all over again the evidence presented in the proceedings below.[22] At any rate, we agree with respondents that the Sandiganbayan has full authority to decide on all incidents in the ill-gotten case, including the propriety of the writs of sequestration that the PCGG initially issued. Based on the evidence the PCGG submitted so far to the Sandiganbayan, the late Hans M. Menzi owned the Bulletin Publishing Corporation almost one hundred (100%) per cent since 1957, except those Bulletin shares sold to U.S. Automotive corporation in 1985, those converted to treasury shares in 1986, and those sold to the general public at public offerings. In the absence of competent evident showing thus far that President Ferdinand E. Marcos or his cronies ever acquired Bulletin shares of the late Hans M. Menzi or HMHMI that might be subject to sequestration, we may not void the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in question.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 9. Fabian v. Desierto (G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998) REGALADO, J. FACTS: Petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which participated in the bidding for government construction projects including those under the First Manila Engineering District (FMED), and private respondent Nestor V. Agustin, incumbent District Engineer, reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. After misunderstandings and unpleasant incidents, Fabian eventually filed the aforementioned istrative case against Agustin in a lettercomplaint. The Graft Investigator of the Ombudsman issued a resolution finding private respondent guilty of grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. On a motion for reconsideration, Agustin was exonerated of the istrative charges. In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that — In all istrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Emphasis supplied) ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can resolve the constitutionality of Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 not raised in the trial. RULING: Yes. Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the court’s own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 10. CARPIO-Morales vs. CA (G.R. No. 217126-27, Nov 10, 2015) Perlas-Bernabe, J. FACTS: Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed on March 25, 2015 by petitioner Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity as the Ombudsman (Ombudsman), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), assailing: (a) the Resolution dated March 16, 2015 of public respondent the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, which granted private respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the implementation of the t Order dated March 10, 20,15 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-150058 to 0063 (preventive suspension order) preventively suspending him and several other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati, for six (6) months without pay; and (b) the Resolution5 dated March 20, 2015 of the CA, ordering the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt6 in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI ening the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman. RULING: OMB contends that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any provisional injunctive writ against her office to en its preventive suspension orders. As basis, she invokes the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 in conjunction with her office's independence under the 1987 Constitution. She advances the idea that "[i]n order to further ensure [her office's] independence, [RA 6770] likewise insulated it from judicial intervention,"157particularly, "from injunctive reliefs traditionally obtainable from the courts,"158 claiming that said writs may work "just as effectively as direct harassment or political pressure would." Gonzales III v. Office of the President is the first case which grappled with the meaning of the Ombudsman's independence vis-a-vis the independence of the other constitutional bodies. the concept of Ombudsman's independence covers three (3) things: First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be abolished, nor its constitutionally specified functions and privileges, be removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or an amendment thereto is made;cralawlawlibrary Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be obstructed from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to [its] functions;168hence, its budget cannot be strategically decreased by officials of the political branches of government so as to impair said functions; and Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that those within the ranks of the office can only be disciplined by an internal authority. Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of the Ombudsman from political harassment and pressure, so as to free it from the "insidious tentacles of politics."

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt from an incident of judicial power - that is, a provisional writ of injunction against a preventive suspension order - clearly strays from the concept's rationale of insulating the office from political harassment or pressure.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 11. ESTIPONA V. LOBRIGO (G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017) Peralta, J. FACTS: Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165. On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12 (NOTE: should have been Section 15?) of the same law, with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining in all violations of said law violates: 1. The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; 2. The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and 3. The principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached upon the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure. RULING: YES. The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Their exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments. The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other branches tres upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court. Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court’s authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our institutional independence.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 12. Republic v. Sereno (G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018) Tijam, J. FACTS: From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University of the Philippines-College of Law. While being employed at the UP Law, or from October 2003 to 2006, Sereno was concurrently employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two international arbitrations known as the PIATCO cases, and a Deputy Commissioner of the Commissioner on Human Rights. The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified that there was no record on Sereno’s file of any permission to engage in limited practice of profession. Moreover, out of her 20 years of employment, only nine (9) Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) were on the records of UP HRDO. In a manifestation, she attached a copy of a tenth SALN, which she supposedly sourced from the “filing cabinets” or “drawers of UP”. The Ombudsman likewise had no record of any SALN filed by Sereno. The JBC has certified to the existence of one SALN. In sum, for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs were recovered. On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief Justice was declared vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants to submit documents, among which are “all previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in the government and “SALN as of December 31, 2011” for those from the private sector. The JBC announcement further provided that “applicants with incomplete or out-of-date documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered for nomination.” Sereno expressed in a letter to JBC that since she resigned from UP Law on 2006 and became a private practitioner, she was treated as coming from the private sector and only submitted three (3) SALNs or her SALNs from the time she became an Associate Justice. Sereno likewise added that “considering that most of her government records in the academe are more than 15 years old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and that the clearance issued by UP HRDO and CSC should be taken in her favor. There was no record that the letter was deliberated upon. Despite this, on a report to the JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete requirements.” On August 2012, Sereno was appointed Chief Justice. On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno, alleging that Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The House of Representatives proceeded to hear the case for determination of probable cause, and it was said that Justice Peralta, the chairman of the JBC then, was not made aware of the incomplete SALNs of Sereno. Other findings were made: such as pieces of jewelry amounting to P15,000, that were not declared on her 1990 SALN, but was declared in prior years’ and subsequent years’ SALNs, failure of her husband to sign one SALN, execution of the 1998 SALN only in 2003 On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the latter, in representation of the Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno. The OSG, invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to the special civil action under Rule 66, the Republic, through the OSG filed the petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare as void Sereno’s appointment as CJ of the SC and to oust and altogether exclude Sereno therefrom. [yourlawyersays]

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened. Sereno then filed a Motion for Inhibition against AJ Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro, imputing actual bias for having testified against her on the impeachment hearing before the House of Representatives. Contentions: Office of the Solicitor General (petitioner): OSG argues that the quo warranto is an available remedy because what is being sought is to question the validity of her appointment, while the impeachment complaint accuses her of committing culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in office, citing Funa v. Chairman Villar, Estrada v. Desierto and Nacionalista Party v. De Vera. OSG maintains that the phrase “may be removed from office” in Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution means that of the SC may be removed through modes other than impeachment. OSG contends that it is seasonably filed within the one-year reglementary period under Section 11, Rule 66 since Sereno’s transgressions only came to light during the impeachment proceedings. Moreover, OSG claims that it has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo warranto petition under the maxim nullum tempus occurit regi (“no time runs against the king”) or prescription does not operate against the government. The State has a continuous interest in ensuring that those who partake of its sovereign powers are qualified. Even assuming that the one-year period is applicable to the OSG, considering that SALNs are not published, the OSG will have no other means by which to know the disqualification. Moreover, OSG maintains that the SC has jurisdiction, citing A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC which created a permanent Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, tasked to investigate complaints involving graft and corruption and ethical violations against of the SC and contending that this is not a political question because such issue may be resolved through the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution, laws, JBC rules, and Canons of Judicial Ethics. OSG seeks to oust Sereno from her position as CJ on the ground that Sereno failed to show that she is a person of proven integrity which is an indispensable qualification for hip in the Judiciary under Section 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution. According to the OSG, because OSG failed to fulfill the JBC requirement of filing the complete SALNs, her integrity remains unproven. The failure to submit her SALN, which is a legal obligation, should have disqualified Sereno from being a candidate; therefore, she has no right to hold the office. Good faith cannot be considered as a defense since the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. 3019) and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA No. 6713) are special laws and are thus governed by the concept of malum prohibitum, wherein malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial. Sereno (respondent): Sereno contends that an impeachable officer may only be ousted through impeachment, citing Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution, and Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Hon. Fernan, In Re: First lndorsement from Hon. Gonzales, and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment Against SAJ Antonio T. Carpio. Sereno contends that the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution was to create an exclusive category of public officers who can be removed only by

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 impeachment and not otherwise. Impeachment was chosen as the method of removing certain highranking government officers to shield them from harassment suits that will prevent them from performing their functions which are vital to the continued operations of government. Sereno further argues that the word “may” on Section 2 of Article XI only qualifies the penalty imposable after the impeachment trial, i.e., removal from office. Sereno contends that the since the mode is wrong, the SC has no jurisdiction. Sereno likewise argues that the cases cited by OSG is not in all fours with the present case because the President and the Vice President may, in fact, be removed by means other than impeachment on the basis of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the Court the power to be the “sole judge” of all contests relating to the qualifications of the President and the VicePresident. There is no such provision for other impeachable officers. Moreover, on the rest of the cases cited by the OSG, there is no mention that quo warranto may be allowed. Sereno also argues that since a petition for quo warranto may be filed before the RTC, such would result to a conundrum because a judge of lower court would have effectively exercised disciplinary power and istrative supervision over an official of the Judiciary much higher in rank and is contrary to Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII of the Constitution which vests upon the SC disciplinary and istrative power over all courts and the personnel thereof. Sereno likewise posits that if a Member of the SC can be ousted through quo warranto initiated by the OSG, the Congress’ “check” on the SC through impeachment would be rendered inutile. Furthermore, Sereno argues that it is already time-barred. Section 11, Rule 66 provides that a petition for quo warranto must be filed within one (1) year from the “cause of ouster” and not from the “discovery” of the disqualification. Moreover, Sereno contends that the Court cannot presume that she failed to file her SALNs because as a public officer, she enjoys the presumption that her appointment to office was regular. OSG failed to overcome the presumption created by the certifications from UP HRDO that she had been cleared of all istrative responsibilities and charges. Her integrity is a political question which can only be decided by the JBC and the President. Regarding her missing SALNs, Sereno contends that the fact that SALNs are missing cannot give rise to the inference that they are not filed. The fact that 11 SALNs were filed should give an inference to a pattern of filing, not of non-filing. Intervenors’ arguments: The intervenors argue that it is not incumbent upon Sereno to prove to the JBC that she possessed the integrity required by the Constitution; rather, the onus of determining whether or not she qualified for the post fell upon the JBC. Moreover, submission of SALNs is not a constitutional requirement; what is only required is the imprimatur of the JBC. The intervenors likewise contend that “qualifications” such as citizenship, age, and experience are enforceable while “characteristics” such as competence, integrity, probity, and independence are mere subjective considerations. ISSUE: Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo warranto.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 RULING: A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable officials and SC has jurisdiction. The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo warranto. A direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, and in this case, direct resort to SC is justified considering that the action is directed against the Chief Justice. Granting that the petition is likewise of transcendental importance and has far-reaching implications, the Court is empowered to exercise its power of judicial review. To exercise restraint in reviewing an impeachable officer’s appointment is a clear renunciation of a judicial duty. an outright dismissal of the petition based on speculation that Sereno will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s duty to settle actual controversy squarely presented before it. Quo warranto proceedings are essentially judicial in character – it calls for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty and power to decide cases and settle actual controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any other branch of the government including the Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment court through the Senate. To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto involves a judicial determination of the eligibility or validity of the election or appointment of a public official based on predetermined rules while impeachment is a political process to vindicate the violation of the public’s trust. In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the legality of the appointment. The title to a public office may not be contested collaterally but only directly, by quo warranto proceedings. usurpation of a public office is treated as a public wrong and carries with it public interest, and as such, it shall be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor. The SolGen is given permissible latitude within his legal authority in actions for quo warranto, circumscribed only by the national interest and the government policy on the matter at hand.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 iii. Rule-Making Power 1. PRIMICIAS v. OCAMPO (G.R. No. L-6120, June 30, 1953) BAUTISTA ANGELO, J. FACTS: Section 129 of the Revised istrative Code. He chartered a vessel of Philippine registry to an alien without the approval of the President, and iled to submit to the Collector of Customs the manifests and authenticated documents for the vessel “Antarctic.” He also failed to obtain the necessary clearance from the Bureau of Customs prior to the departure of the vessel to a foreign port. Before the trial, petitioner invokes Section 49 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, which provides that the aid of assessors in the trial of any civil or criminal action in the Municipal Court or the Court of First Instance may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. The CFI dismissed the petition stating that the rule-making power vested in the Supreme Court expressly omits the portions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding assessors in the Rules of Court. ISSUE: W/N the right to trial with the aid of assessor is impaired by the rule-making power of the Supreme Court RULING: NO. The right to trial with the aid of assessors is a substantive right and as such, are not embraced by the rule-making power of the Supreme Court. Section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 2477 of the istrative Code grant this right to a party litigant. This right has been declared absolute and substantial by the Supreme Court in several cases where the aid of assessors had been invoked. Inclusion of trial by assessor in the Rules of Court would be a travesty of its rulemaking power, as directed by the Constitution to be limited to powers referring to pleading, practice, and procedure. While our Constitution has given the power to adopt the rules of procedure to the Supreme Court, such grant did not preclude Congress from enacting any procedural law or altering, amending, or supplementing any of the rules that may be promulgated by the Supreme Court.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 2. FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS v. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 110571, March 10, 1994) NOCON, J. FACTS: Petitioner, First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. was granted its application to amend its Board of Investments Certificate of Registration by changing the scope of its ed product from “glazed floor tiles” to “ceramic tiles.” Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals required petitioner to comment on the case, and issued a temporary restraining order against the implementation of the BOI decision. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the CA has no appellate jurisdiction over the BOI case, contending that it is exclusively vested in the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of EO 226. CA dismissed the petition, hence, this petition. ISSUE: W/N CA has jurisdiction over the BOI case. RULING: YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed Article 82 of EO 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the CA. The argument that Article 82 of EO 226 cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-91 because the former grants a substantive right, which under the Constitution cannot be modified, diminished or increased by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making power is not entirely defensible as it seems. Respondent correctly argued that Article 82 grants the right of appeal from decisions of the BOI and in granting such right, it also provided where and in what manner such appeal can be brought. These latter portions simply deal with procedural aspects which this Court has the power to regulate by virtue of its constitutional rule-making powers.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 3. IN RE: INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (49 SCRA 22, 9 January 1973) PER CURIAM FACTS: The Supreme Court created the Commission on Bar Integration to ascertain the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar. The Congress then ed House Bill 3277, an act providing for the integration of the Philippine bar and appropriating funds therefor. President Marcos signed the measure and became Republic Act No. 6397, which authorizes the Supreme Court to adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar. ISSUE: W/N the integration of the Philippine Bar is constitutional RULING: YES. RA 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court’s inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more specifically, will raise the standards of the legal professions, improve the istration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. The Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law. Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer’s public responsibilities. Given existing Bar conditions, the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 4. ECHEGARAY v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE (G.R. No. 132601, 19 January 1999) PER CURIAM FACTS: Petitioner was convicted for rape of his common law spouse’s ten year old daughter and was sentenced to death penalty. He filed for a motion for reconsideration raising the constitutionality of RA 6759 or the Death Penalty Law. The motion were denied. Thereafter, RA 8177 was ed amending Article 8 of the RPC, in which the mode of execution was changed from electrocution to lethal injection. The Secretary of Justice promulgated the rules and regulations to implement RA 8177 and directed the Director of Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual. Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition to en the Secretary of Justice and Director of Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution. The Supreme Court issued a TRO. Respondent assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve. ISSUE: W/N the TRO issued by SC encroached upon the powers of the Executive in granting a reprieve, and the Legislature in promulgating such rules RULING: NO. The Supreme Court has the constitutional power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts as provided in Art. VII Sec. 5(5) of the Constitution. There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify, or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcing the judgment, while the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. The power of Congress under the 1937 and 1973 Constitution to repeal, alter or supplement rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure was taken away by the present constitution in the expansion of the rule-making power of the Supreme Court in the furtherance of its independence.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 5. Writ of Amparo a. CANLAS V. NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION (G.R. No. 182795, 5 June 2008) REYES, R.T., J. FACTS: Petitioners are settlers in a certain pace of land. Their dwellings have been demolished or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment. They filed a petition for writ of amparo to summon some unprincipled Land Officials as they allege to answer their participation in the issuance of fraudulent titles to NAPICO. ISSUE: W/N writ of amparo is proper in this case RULING: NO. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides that it shall be available to any person whose rights to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official. The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of final judgment of the court is not included among the enumeration of rights covered by the writ. There must be a clear allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be protected for a writ of amparo to be issued. Their claim to dwelling does not constitute right to life, liberty an security.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 b. TAPUZ V. DEL ROSARIO (G.R. No. 182484, 17 January 2008) BRION, J. FACTS: Spouses Sanson filed a complaint before the MCTC of Baruanga-Malay, Aklan for forcible entry with damages against the Tupaz’s. The Sansons allege that they own 1 hectare of land as evidenced by the TCT in their name, and that the Tupaz’s came in to the property armed with bolos and suspected firearms, with force and intimidation, and took possessions of the disputed property and built a nipa and bamboo structure. The MCTC ruled in favor of the Sansons. Petitioners appealed to the RTC, which was denied. The sheriff of Aklan served the notice to vacate and for demolition to the Tupaz’s. Petitioners came to the Supreme Court praying for three remedies: certiorari, writ of habeas data, and writ of amparo. ISSUE: W/N writ of amparo may be issued for the Tupaz’s in this case RULING: NO. The writ of amparo is fatally defective with respect to content and substance. The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It was not conceived to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. It cannot be issued as well on the basis of amorphous and uncertain grounds. As the threat posed to petitioners seemed to be purely properly-related and focused on a land dispute, the proper remedy sought for may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 c. CARAM v. SEGUI (G.R. No. 193652, 5 August 2014) VILLARAMA, JR., J. FACTS: Petitioner had an amorous relationship with Marcelino Constantino III, to which she became pregnant without the benefit of marriage. She intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children, which shouldered all her hospital and medical expenses. She voluntarily surrendered the baby by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD. Thereafter, a certificate was issued declaring the baby as legally available for adoption. The baby was matched with Spouses Medina and supervised trial custody was commenced. Petitioner changed her mind about the adopted and asked DSWD to suspend the adoption proceedings. DSWD responded, through Atty. Segui, informing her that the certificate effectively terminated her parental authority. Petitioner then filed a petition for the issuance of writ of amparo seeking custody of the baby. ISSUE: W/N a petition for a writ of amparo is proper RULING: No. There was no enforced disappearance in this case. The Court enumerated the three elements constituting “enforced disappearances”: (1) there be an arrest, detention, abduction, or any form of deprivation of liberty; (2) it be carried out by, or with the authorization, or acquiescence of the State or a political organization; (3) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person; (4) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of law for a prolonged period of time. There was no disappearance because the respondent DSWD never concealed the baby’s whereabouts, and the adoption proceedings were conducted in accordance with law.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 6. Writ of Habeas Data a. Lee v Ilagan (G.R. No. 203154, 8 October 2014) Perlas-Bernabe, J. FACTS: Ilagan, a police officer, filed a petition for the issuance of Writ of Habeas Data against Joy, her former common law partner. According to him, sometime in July 2011 he visited Joy’s condominium and rested or a while. When he arrived at his office, he noticed his digital camera missing. On August 23, 2011, Joy confronted him about a purported sex video she discovered from the digital camera showing him and another woman. He denied the video and demanded the return of the camera, but she refused. They had an altercation where Ilagan allegedly slammed Joy’s head against a wall and then walked away. Because of this, Joy filed several cases against him, including a case for violation of republic Act 9262 and istrative cases before the Napolcom, utilizing the said video. The use of the same violated his life to liberty, security and privacy and that of the other woman, thus he had no choice but to file the petition for issuance of the writ of habeas data. RTC issued the writ and directed Lee to appear before the court and produce Ilagan’s digital camera, as well as the original and copies of the video, and to make a return within five days from receipt. In her return, Lee itted keeping the memory card of the digital camera and reproducing the video but only or use as evidence in the cases she filed against Ilagan. Ilagan’s petitions should be dismissed because its filing was only aimed at suppressing the evidence in the cases she filed against him and she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan. The RTC granted Ilagan’s petition and ordered the turnover of the video to Neri and ened Lee from reproduction of the same. It disregarded Lee’s defense that she is not engaged in the collection, gathering and storage of data, and that her acts to reproducing the same and showing it to other persons (Napolcom) violated Ilagan’s right to privacy and humiliated him. It clarified that it ruling only on the return of the video and not on its issibility as evidence. Dissatisfied, Lee filed the instant petition before the Supreme Court ISSUE: WON the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of Ilagan RULING: AM No. 08-01-16 SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived as a response given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals, which is defined as the right to control the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about oneself. As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of the habeas data now stands as a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party. Thus, in order to a petition or the

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, “the manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. In other words, the petition must adequately show that there exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand and the right to life, liberty, or security of the victim. In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in of the petitions therefor are vague of doubtful. In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan has not able to sufficiently alleged that his right to privacy in life, liberty, or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video, which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be ed in the internet for public consumption, he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 b. Gamboa v Chan (G.R. No. 193636, 24 July 2012) Sereno, J. FACTS: Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a Private Army Group (PAG). Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte. ISSUE: WON the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when the right to privacy is invoked as opposed to the state’s interest in preserving the right to life, liberty or security. RULING: NO. The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her ers susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome. [T]he state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 c. Vivares v St. Theresa’s College (G.R. No. 202666, 29 September 2014) Velasco,Jr., J. FACTS: In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College (STC), ed on Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara) wearing only their undergarments. Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero, through her students, viewed and ed said pictures. She showed the said pictures to STC’s Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action. Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the student’s handbook and banned them from “marching” in their graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012. The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining order) granted by the Cebu RTC ening the school from barring the students in the graduation ceremonies, STC still barred said students. Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data against the school. They argued, among others, that: 1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook s was set at “Friends Only.” They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected. 2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook s of the children were intruded upon; 3. The intrusion into the Facebook s, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory; They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subject data and have such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the children’s right to privacy. The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper. RULING: Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper. Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that: 1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a case of extralegal killing or enforced disappearance; and 2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an entity engaged in the business of “gathering, collecting, or storing data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party”.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data. Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites) The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy tools, and the makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy (right to informational privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy must be respected and protected. In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned made use of such privacy tools. Evidence would show that that their post (status) on Facebook were published as “Public”. Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view a ’s posts on his “wall” (profile page): (a) Public – the default setting; every Facebook can view the photo; (b) Friends of Friends – only the ’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo; (c) Friends – only the ’s Facebook friends can view the photo; (d) Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook ; and (e) Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the . The default setting is “Public” and if a wants to have some privacy, then he must choose any setting other than “Public”. If it is true that the students concerned did set the posts subject of this case so much so that only five people can see them (as they claim), then how come most of their classmates were able to view them. This fact was not refuted by them. In fact, it was their classmates who informed and showed their teacher, Escudero, of the said pictures. Therefore, it appears that Tan et al never use the privacy settings of Facebook hence, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy on the pictures of them scantily clad. STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. The manner which the school gathered the pictures cannot be considered illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates of the students who showed the picture to their teacher and the latter, being the recipient of said pictures, merely delivered them to the proper school authority and it was for a legal purpose, that is, to discipline their students according to the standards of the school (to which the students and their parents agreed to in the first place because of the fact that they enrolled their children there).

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 7. Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (AM No. 09-6-8-SC): MMDA v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (G.R. No. 17947-48, 8 December 2008) Velasco, Jr., J. FACTS: The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be tly and/or solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and other forms of recreation. ISSUES: (1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents; (2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay. RULING: (1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality “has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage.” Section 17 & 20 are of general application and are not for specific pollution incidents only. The fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well -nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general pollution incident. (2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While the implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. Under what other judicial discipline describes as “continuing mandamus ,” the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by istrative inaction or indifference.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 ii. Change of Venue 1. People v Gutierrez (G.R. No. 142905, March 18, 2002) YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. FACTS: A group of armed persons descended on barrio Ora Centro, municipality of Bantay, Province of Ilocos Sur, and set fire to various inhabited houses therein. On the afternoon of the same day, in barrio Ora Este of the same municipality and province, several residential houses were likewise burned by the group, resulting in the destruction of various houses and in the death of an old woman named Vicenta Balboa. After investigation by the authorities, the provincial fiscal, filed in the Court of First Instance of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, two information for arson with homicide and for arson, charging that the seventeen private respondents herein, together with 82 other unidentified persons, for the crimes. On 22 June 1970, the prosecution moved the respondent judge for a transfer of cases 47V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, issued at the instance of the witnesses seeking transfer of the hearing from Vigan to either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City, for reasons of security and personal safety, as shown in their affidavits. The respondent judge declined the transfer. Because of the lower court’s denial, they filed a case for certiorari and mandamus to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer of venue can be allowed. RULING: Though the Secretary of Justice is not authorized to transfer specific and individual cases, the Constitution has vested the Judicial Power in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law (Article VIII, Section 13), and such judicial power connotes certain incidental and inherent attributes reasonably necessary for an effective istration of justice. The courts "can by appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of government". One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring the trial of cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands. The requirements for proper jurisdiction have been satisfied in the filing of the criminal case in Ilocos Sur. The holding of the trial is a matter of venue rather than jurisdiction. There is factual basis that the witnesses claim: (1) 82 of the armed suspects are still unidentified; (2) Vincent Crisologo, private respondent, belongs to an influential family in the province; (3) it is not shown that the Executive branch is able or willing to give these witnesses full security during the trial and possible murderous assault after; (4) confirmation and promotion of Judge Gutierrez was actively ed by Cong. and Gov. Crisologo.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 iv. istrative Supervision 1. Fuentes v Ombudsman Mindanao (G.R. No. 124295, October 23, 2001) PARDO, J. FACTS: The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao filed a criminal complaint charging Judge Renato A. Fuentes with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3(e). The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao through Graft Investigation Officer II Marivic A. Trabajo-Daray issued an order directing petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit within ten days. Petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a motion to dismiss complaint and/or manifestation to forward all records to the Supreme Court. The Graft Investigation Officer, however, denied the motion of petitioner. Hence, the present petition. Petitioner maintained that the respondent OmbudsmanMindanao committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he initiated a criminal complaint against petitioner for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Section 3[e]. According to petitioner, public respondent encroached on the power of the Supreme Court of istrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. The Supreme Court granted the petition. According to the Court, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or istrative complaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court for appropriate action. The Court stressed that Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court istrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and take the proper istrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the land. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers. ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in the exercise of his official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an istrative charge for the same acts before the Supreme Court. RULING: No. Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides: “Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases.” Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or istrative complaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action. Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court istrative supervision over all courts

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and take the proper istrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the land. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers. Petitioner’s questioned order directing the attachment of government property and issuing a writ of execution were done in relation to his office, well within his official functions. The order may be erroneous or void for lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, whether or not such order of execution was valid under the given circumstances, must be inquired into in the course of the judicial action only by the Supreme Court that is tasked to supervise the courts. “No other entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution or investigation service of any other branch, not any functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or decision--whether final and executory or not-and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or istrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 2. Maceda v Vasquez (G.R. NO. 102781, 22 April 1993) Nocon, J. RULING: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months. ISSUE: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SC’s constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts. RULING: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is istratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act. In the absence of any istrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of istrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC istrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper istrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their istrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their istrative duties.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 v. Consultations/Decisions 1. Prudential Bank v. Castro (A.C. No. 2756, March 15, 1988) En banc FACTS: In the Macro Textile Mills Corporation (Macro) v. Prudential Bank, Macro filed the complaint alleging that Go Cun Uy, President and General Manager of Macro, had no authority to mortgage their property and that his execution of the mortgage was due to the fraudulent manipulations of the petitioner Prudential Bank. Through a summary judgment, respondent Judge Jose Castro resolved the case declaring the mortgage null and void and ordering Prudential Bank to pay Macro more than PHP 33 million in damages plus attorney’s fees. The latter moved for reconsideration, however it was denied “not only for pro forma but also for lack of merit.” Consequently, respondent judge considered his decision to be final and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. Petitioner instituted an istrative complaint against respondent judge for committing serious and grave misfeasance. The Supreme Court found respondent judge to be guilty for showing partiality towards Macro and was accordingly dismissed from service. The latter filed for a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court denied it with finality upon a Minute Resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court disregarded the Constitutional provision in promulgating the Minute Resolution against respondent judge. RULING: NO. Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is inapplicable because this is an istrative case. And even if it were, the Minute Resolution stated the legal basis for their denial of the motion for reconsideration. Lack of merit, which was one of the grounds for denial, is a legal basis pursuant to the Rules of Court.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 2. Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources (G.R. No. 13585, December 6, 2000) En banc FACTS: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa and several intervenors to the case assail the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act (RA) No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. They contend that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain, as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. Petitioners also contend that, by providing for an all-encoming definition of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands”, such may violate the rights of private landowners. In addition, petitioners also question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution. Finally, petitioners assail the validity of NCIP istrative Order No. 1 which they claim infringes upon the President’s power of control over executive departments. ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional. RULING: After deliberation of the petition, the Supreme Court en banc were equally divided. Seven voted to dismiss the petition, while seven others voted to grant such. The case was redeliberated upon, however, after such, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is dismissed.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 3. Mendoza v. Court of First Instance of Quezon, 9th Judicial District, Gumaca Branch (G.R. No. L-35612-14, June 27, 1973) Fernando, J. FACTS: Petitioner Norberto Mendoza motioned for reconsideration for the Supreme Court Minute Resolution dismissing his petitions for habeas corpus, certiorari and mandamus for lack of merit. The Court ruled that petitioner failed to sustain the burden of showing that his confinement was marked by illegality or that the order cancelling the bail previously issued was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. ISSUE: Whether or not the minute resolution violated Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution RULING: NO. According to jurisprudence (Jose v. Santos), what is expected of the judiciary is that the decision rendered makes clear why either party prevailed under the applicable law to the facts as established. Nor is there any rigid formula as to the language to be employed to satisfy the requirement of clarity and distinctness. The discretion of the particular judge in this respect, while not unlimited, is necessarily broad. There is no sacramental form of words which he must use upon pain of being considered as having failed to abide by what the Constitution directs.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 4. Borromeo v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 82273, June 1, 1990) En banc FACTS: Petitioner Joaquin Borromeo filed a complaint for damages against personnel of the Third Division of the Supreme Court, namely Atty. Julieta Carreo, Division Clerk of Court; Atty. Afredo Marasigan, Asst. Division Clerk of Court; and Atty. Jose Ilustre, Chief of the Judicial Records Office. All three allegedly usurped judicial functions by issuing a biased, fake and unconstitutional ‘Resolution’ and ‘Entry of Judgment’ in his case docketed as G.R. No. 82273 which caused Borromeo grave moral shock, mental anguish, sleepless nights, severe embarrassment and endless worry, thus, the group must be condemned to pay moral damages in the amount of not less that PHP 50,000.00. The alleged fake resolution which disposed of Borromeo’s petition complies with the constitutional requirements governing resolutions refusing to give due course to petitions for review. Borromeo’s motion for reconsideration was received by the Court more than a month after the release of the resolution, so it was noted to have merely reiterated the same arguments and already ed upon by the Court and was, therefore without merit. ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged minute resolution was valid. RULING: YES. The Court disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is ed by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is led merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition always gives the legal basis. As emphasized in jurisprudence (In Re: Wenceslao Laureta), the Court is not ‘duty bound‘ to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 5. Solid Homes v. Laserna (G.R No. 166051, April 8, 2008) Chico-Nazario, J. FACTS: Respondents Evelina Laserna and Gloria Cajipe bought a parcel of land from petitioner Solid Homes, Inc. (SHI). Both parties agreed upon a systematic payment wherein a down-payment shall be paid upon g of the contract, with the remaining balance payable for a period of three years at a monthly installment. When 90% had been paid, the respondents demanded the execution and delivery of the property upon final payment of the balance, but SHI did not comply. Respondents filed a complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), which then directed the petitioner to comply with the execution. SHI appealed to the HLURB Board of Commissioners, who in turn, modified the decision rendered previously. Upon appeal, the Office of the President (OP) affirmed the same, who later, denies their move for reconsideration. The case was elevated Court of Appeals (CA), but was dismissed for lack of merit. The same denied the motion for reconsideration, hence, this petition alleging that the Decision made was in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not the Decision runs afoul of the mandate of the Constitution. RULING: NO. The constitutional mandate that the decision shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of ‘memorandum decisions’, which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. Memorandum decisions are a species of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 40, B.P. 129, as amended, on the grounds of expediency, practicality, convenience and docket status of our courts. To be valid, it cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by means of remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision should actually embody the findings of facts and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 6. Dizon v. Judge Lopez (A.M. No. RTJ-96-1339, September 5, 1997) Mendoza, J. FACTS: Petitioner Engr. Fernando Dizon filed a complaint charging respondent Judge Lilia Lopez with the violation of the Constitution, serious misconduct, inefficiency and falsification in connection with her decision in the criminal case wherein petitioner was a respondent. The promulgation of the judgment in the case consisted of reading the dispositive portion of the decision sentencing him to imprisonment, without serving him a copy of the decision. Dizon alleged that the failure of respondent judge to furnish him a copy of the decision until almost one (1) year and eight (8) months after the promulgation of its dispositive portion constitutes a violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which prohibits courts from rendering decisions without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which they are based; and Section 15 of the same, which provides that in all cases lower courts must render their decisions within three (3) months from the date of their submission. Judge Lopez claimed that when the decision was promulgated, her decision was already prepared. She simply withheld its dispositive portion to prevent leakage in the process of preparing it. She further stated that she gave it to Ma. Cleotilde Paulo (Social Worker II) for typing and incorporating into the text of the decision the dispositive portion. ISSUE: Whether or not the Judge Lopez violated Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution. RULING: YES. Pursuant to Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, merely reading the dispositive portion of the decision to the accused is not sufficient. It is the judgment that must be read to him, stating the facts and the law on which such judgment is based. Thus, it is obvious that the respondent failed to render her decision within three (3) months as required by Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution. The proper recourse for the judge should have been an application for an extension of time to decide the case and put off the promulgation of the decision until she had finished it. What must be promulgated must be the complete decision, as there would be no more reason to keep the dispositive portion a secret, once the judgment has been promulgated.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 7. People v. Baring (G.R. No.137933, January 28, 2002) En banc FACTS: Accused-appellant Valentin Baring was convicted of statutory rape committed against the seven-year old granddaughter of his common-law wife. Because of the penalty imposed, his case was automatically sent to the Supreme Court for review. Through his counsel, he filed a petition before the Court to dismiss the cause that is subject for automatic review claiming that the decision rendered by the lower court is bereft of material facts ing the conviction; the medico-legal certificate is not reliable since the physician who conducted the examination was not presented as a witness, depriving him of his right to cross-examination; the case of attempted homicide filed by the victim’s grandmother was provisionally dismissed; and that he was merely a “fall guy” and another person is responsible for the crime charged against him. ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be dismissed on of the decision rendered by the lower court. RULING: NO. The trial court's decision may cast doubt as to the guilt of accused-appellant. Such doubt may be engendered not by the lack of direct evidence against accused-appellant, but by the trial court's failure to fully explain the correlation of the facts, the weight or issibility of the evidence presented for or against the accused, the assessments made from the evidence presented, and the conclusions drawn therefrom after applying the pertinent law as basis of the decision. A decision need not be a complete recital of the evidence presented, so long as the factual and legal bases are clearly and distinctly laid down.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 8. Martinez v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 123547, May 21, 2001) Mendoza, J. FACTS: Private respondents Godofredo De la Paz and his sister, Manuela, sold a vacant lot at Villa Fe Subdivision in Cabanatuan City to petitioner Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez, then Assistant parish priest of Cabanatuan City, for the sum of PHP 15,000.00. They agreed upon that Martinez would give a down-payment of PHP 3,000.00 and that the balance would be payable by installment. After construction of their house on the lot and completion of payment, the deed of sale, however, was never delivered. After some time, Martinez discovered that De la Paz had sold three lots, including the one sold to him, to private respondent spouses Reynaldo and Susan Veneracion after receiving a letter from Reynaldo claiming ownership of the land and demanding that they vacate the property and remove their improvements thereon. Martinez, through his counsel, demanded the execution of the deed of sale from De la Paz and informed Veneracion that he was the rightful owner of the property. Veneracion, in turn, brought an action for ejectment before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) against Martinez, which ruled adversely against him and held that Martinez and his mother were, in good faith, the rightful possessors of the land. Veneracion then appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which found them the rightful owners of the land, and ordered for Martinez to vacate said land. Martinez thereafter filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Martinez assailed the ruling, alleging that the CA overlooked relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion, and that the denial his motion for reconsideration is in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not CA violated Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution in denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. RULING: NO. The requirement embedded in Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution was fully complied with when the CA, in denying reconsideration of its decision, stated in its resolution that it found no reason to change its ruling because petitioner had not raised anything new. It is provided for in their resolution that the points and arguments raised by Martinez have been considered and ed upon in the Decision, therefore, they find no reason to disturb the same.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 9. Komatsu Industries v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 127682, April 24, 1998 Regalado, J. FACTS: National Investment and Development Corp. (NIDC) granted Komatsu Industries Phils. Inc. (Komatsu) a direct loan of PHP 8 million and a PHP 2 million guarantee to secure Philippine National Bank (PNB). As security thereof, a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed by Komatsu in favor of NIDC, covering among others, a parcel of land in Makati. A Mortgage Deed was then executed concerning the same land, in favor of PNB and NIDC. Upon full payment of petitioner’s with NIDC and credit line with PNB, NIDC executed a Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage for the return of the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of the mortgaged land. It was then found that there were some s chargeable to Komatsu on deferred letters of credit opened and established settled by PNB with foreign suppliers, but came only to the latter’s knowledge after several years. Upon making the request, the TCT of the land in question was returned to PNB. However, the land covered by the TCT was extra-judicially foreclosed by way of Chattel Mortgage. Petitioner then contested the foreclosure, alleging that the release by the NIDC had the effect of releasing the real estate mortgage. The Court of Appeals (CA) ruled adversely against petitioner, thus, was prompted to file a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. For failure to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error in its judgment, the petition was denied, rendered in a minute resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not the minute resolution is in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution. RULING: NO. As stated in jurisprudence (Novino, et. al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al), “resolutions” are not “decisions” within the constitutional requirements of Section 14, Article VIII. They merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained and the petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the Court's denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' decision.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 10. Tichangco v. Enriquez (G.R. No. 150629, June 30, 2004) Panganiban, J. FACTS: Sometime in March 1996, Renato Tichangco, in behalf of the occupants of various parcels of land in Gagalangin and Sunog Apog in Tondo, Manila, filed a land title verification request with the Land Registration Authority (LRA). The verification request was prompted by an alleged claim of ownership of a certain Manotok over the land which petitioners occupy, and which allegedly have been identified as Area for Priority Development under the Urban Poor Law. The LRA-Task Force issued a report stating that a part of the land belonged to Ricardo Manotok. Public respondent LRA Alfredo Enriquez, upon being directed to review and evaluate the records on the issuance of Transfer Certificate Titles (TCT) by the Office of the Solicitor General, rendered the assailed decision finding no legal ground to initiate an action for the nullification of the assailed certificates of title. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the resolution of public respondent. In its decision, no mention of the completion of the magnetic survey was made. Petitioners, in elevating the case to the Supreme Court, argue that the CA did not comply with the requirement laid down in Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA complied with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution. RULING: NO. Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution deals with the disposition of petitions for review and of motions for reconsideration. In appellate courts, the rule does not require any comprehensive statement of facts or mention of the applicable law, but merely a statement of the "legal basis" for denying due course. Thus, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement when a collegiate appellate court, after deliberation, decides to deny a motion; states that the questions raised are factual or have already been ed upon; or cites some other legal basis. There is no need to explain fully the court's denial, since the facts and the law have already been laid out in the assailed Decision.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 g. Tenure of Justices/Judges i. In Re First Indorsement from Hon. Raul M. Gonzales (A.M. No. 88-4-5433, 15 April 1988) PER CURIAM: FACTS: The Court considered the 1st Indorsement dated March 16, 1988 from Mr. Raul M. Gonzalez, “Tanodbayan/Special; Prosecutor” forwarding to Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan a “letter-complaint, dated 14 December 1987 with enclosure of the concerned employees of the Supreme Court,” together with a telegram of Miguel Cuenco, for “comment within (10) days from receipt hereof.” Mr. Justice Fernan had brought this first Indorsement to the attention of the Court en banc in view of the important implications of policy raised by said 1st Indorsement. Gonzales was the Tanodbayan or Special Prosecutor. He forwarded to Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan a letter-complaint. The letter was said to be from concerned employees of the SC as an anonymous letter. The letter was originally addressed to Gonzales referring to the charges for disbarment sought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Justice Fernan, and asking Gonzales to do something about the matter. The second attachment is a copy of a telegram from Mr. Miguel Cuenco addressed to Hon. Raul Gonzalez, where Mr. Cuenco refers to pleadings he apparently filed on 29 February 1988 with the SC Court in an istrative case, which, in the opinion of Mr. Cuenco, made improper any ‘intervention’ by Mr. Raul Gonzalez. Mr. Cuenco, nonetheless, encourages Mr. Gonzalez ‘to file responsive pleading to the Supreme Court en banc. The Court furnished to Mr. Raul M. Gonzalez a copy of the per curiam Resolution which the Court resolved to dismiss the charges made by complaint Cuenco against Mr. Justice Fernan for utter lack of merit. In the same Resolution, the Court resolved to require complainant Cuenco to show cause why he should not be istratively dealt with for making unfounded serious accusations against Mr. Justice Fernan. Upon request of Mr. Cuenco, the Court had granted him an extension of up to 30 March 1988. Mr. Cuenco filed a pleading which appears to be an omnibus pleading relating to, inter alia, istrative Case No. 3135. Insofar as a per curiam Resolution dated 15 April 1988, the Court denied with finality Mr. Cuenco’s Motion for Reconsideration. ISSUE: WON a Supreme Court Justice can be disbarred during his term of office. RULING: NO. A public officer who, under the Constitution, is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such police officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan, or any other court, with any offense which carries with it the penalty of removal from office. Another reason why the complaint for disbarment should be dismissed is because under the Constitution, of the SC may be removed only by impeachment. The above provision proscribes removal from office by any other method. Otherwise, to allow such public officer who may

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office with an office which carries the penalty of removal from such, would be violative of the clear mandate of the Constitution. The impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under the Republic. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office. But the party convicted shall nevertheless be held liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law. The court is not saying that its or other constitutional officers are entitled to immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehavior. What the court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. A member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office, via the constitutional route of impeachment, and then only he may be held liable either criminally or istratively (that is, disbarment), for any wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 ii. People v Gacott (G.R. No. 116049, 13 July 1995) Regalado, J. FACTS: The Second Division of the SC resolved to reprimand Judge Gacott of the RTC and fine him with P10,000 for gross ignorance of the law. In this motion for reconsideration, he questions the competence of the Second Division to istratively discipline him. He claims that the clause “The SC en banc shall have the power to discipline judges xxx or order their dismissal xxx” of Sec 11, Art VIII of the Constitution means that only the full Court, not a division thereof, can istratively punish him. ISSUE: WON only the Court sitting en banc that can istratively discipline judges RULING: No. There are two situations envisaged in Art VIII, Sec 11. The first clause which states that “the SC en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts” is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and a determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not therein intended that all istrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the Court en banc since it would result in an absurdity. To require the entire Court to participate in all istrative cases would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court. This would subvert the constitutional injunction for the Court to adopt a systematic plan to expedite decisions/resolutions and the very purpose of authorizing the Court to sit en banc or in divisions. The second clause declares that the Court en banc can “order the dismissal by a vote of majority of the who actually took part in the deliberations xxx and voted thereon”. Evidently, in this instance, the istrative case must be deliberated upon and decided by the full Court itself. Nonetheless, it is only when the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of one year or a fine of P10,000 or both that the istrative matter may be decided in division.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 iii. Caiobes v Ombudsman (G.R. No. 132177, 19 July 2001) Buena, J. FACTS: On May 23, 1997, respondent Florentino M. Alumbres, Presiding Judge of Branch 255 of the RTC of Las Pinas City, filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, a criminal complaint for physical injuries, malicious mischief for the destruction of complainants eyeglasses, and assault upon a person in authority. On June 13, 1997, the respondent Judge lodged another complaint against the petitioner, this time and istrative case with the Supreme Court praying for the dismissal of petitioner from the judiciary on the ground of grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a judicial officer. On June 25, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman required petitioner to file a counter-affidavit within 10 days from the receipt thereof. Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, petitioner filed on an “Ex-Parte Motion for referral to the Honorable Supreme Court,” praying that the Office of the Ombudsman hold its investigation of the case, and refer the same to the SC which is already investigating the case. Petitioner contended that the SC, not the Office of the Ombudsman, has the authority to make a preliminary determination of the respective culpability of petitioner and respondent Judge who, both being of the bench, are under its exclusive supervision and control. On August 22, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman denied the motion for referral to the SC stating that under Sec 15 (1) of RA 6770, it s within its jurisdiction to investigate on the criminal charges. It likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: WON the Office of the Ombudsman should defer action on the criminal complaint pending resolution of the SC for appropriate action. RULING: YES. Under Sec. 6, Art. VIII f the Constitution, it is the SC which is vested with exclusive istrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves an istrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the SC for determination as to whether an istrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should hold true regardless of whether as istrative case based on the act subject of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For, aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless he is informed of it, he should give due respect for and recognition of the istrative authority of the Court, because in determining whether an istrative matter is involved, the Court es upon not only istrative liabilities but also other istrative concerns. The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a case before it does or does not have istrative implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of the exercise of its istrative prerogatives and to arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. This is a dangerous policy which impinges, as it does, on judicial independence. It is only the SC that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper istrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 iv. Fuentes v Ombudsman-Mindanao (G.R. No. 124195, 23 Oct 2001) Pardo, J. FACTS: On Jan. 15, 1996, Director Valenzuela of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao recommended that petitioner Judge Fuentes be charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of RA 3019, Sec 3 (e) and likewise be istratively charged before the SC with acts unbecoming of a judge for the anomalous implementation of the writ of execution the petitioner issued. Petitioner alleged that the respondent encroached on the power of the SC of istrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. The Solictor General submitted that the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation because the Supreme Court is not in possession of any record which would the propriety of the issuance of the questioned order and writ. Moreover, the Court has not field any istrative case against petitioner judge that would pose similar issues on the present inquiry of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in the exercise of his official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an istrative charge for the same acts before the Supreme Court. RULING: NO. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action. Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court istrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, form the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and take the proper istrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the land. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers. Petitioner’s questioned order directing the attachment of government property and issuing a writ of execution were done in relation to his office, well within his official functions. The order may be erroneous or void for lack of excess jurisdiction. However, whether or not such order of execution was valid under the given circumstances, must be inquired into in the course of the judicial action only by the Supreme Court that is tasked to supervise the courts.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 h. Periods for Decision i. Young v. De Guzman (A.M. No. RTJ-96-1365, February 18, 1999) VITUG, J. FACTS: In verified letter-complaint, dated 26 March 1996, Robert G. Young, President of Banawe Realty Development Corporation, Charged Judge Pastor V. De Guzman, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 60, with unreasonable delay in the disposition of Civil Service No. 873R, entitled "La Commercial Company, et al. vs. China Banking Corporation," for recovery of unpaid rentals owing from store space lessees and ing of all rentals due and demandable, as well as the proceeds and receivables from the sales of units, over a condominium property. During the pendency of the case, La Commercial Company was substituted by Inter Realty Development Corporation, While China Banking Corporation was substituted by Banawe Realty Development Corporation. On 16 July 1990, the condominium building was destroyed by a relatively strong earthquake, prompting the parties to file a manifestation to the above effect along with a t motion to dismiss the case, with the Court. On 01 December 1994, counsel for both parties submitted, reiterating the above motion to dismiss, an opposition to a request for answers by written interrogatories caused to be made by the manager of Prudential Bank of Baguio City. The motion remained unresolved until the institution, months later, of the instant istrative case. Instead, complainant averred, Judge De Guzman had acted "with indecent haste" on a collateral issue granting Atty. Helenea M. Dauz, former counsel of Banawe Realty Development Corporation, attorney's fees amounting to P250,000.00 issuing forthwith a writ of execution to enforce the award. It was unfortunate, he said, that the issue on the withdrawn rentals, submitted for resolution on 04 August 1995, remained unresolved because he had to take a prolonged leave of absence due to sickness until, in fact, he finally had to file, on 16 February 1996, an application for retirement on total disability which the Court approved on 18 June 1996. Respondent Judge denied that he had hastily decided the motion for payment of attorney's fees to Atty. Helenea Dauz, which, he said, indeed took him three months to resolve in favor of Atty. Dauz and only because no opposition was filed by Banawe Realty. The petition to reverse the said order, he stressed, was even dismissed by the Court of Appeals on 26, June 1996. The Office of the Court , to which the case was referred for evaluation, report and recommendation, opined that respondent Judge had failed to abide by paragraph 1.2 of istrative Circular No. 4. ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge failed to abide to the rules of periods of decision. RULING: No. It is truly the duty of every judge to resolve cases filed before him with good dispatch; no less than the Rules of Court commands that justice must be istered without unnecessary delay. Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct generally onishes a judge to dispose of the business of his court promptly. Nevertheless, the judge must not sacrifice for expediency's sake the fundamental requirements of due process nor to forget that he must conscientiously endeavor each time to seek the truth, to know and aptly apply the law, and to dispose of the controversy objectively and impartially, all to the end that justice is done to every party.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 Respondent Judge, in this instance, evidently felt that the issues raised could only be resolved properly if and after all the parties concerned would have been fully heard. He made it clear in his order of 20 December 1990 that the issue presented, i.e., the entitlement to the rental deposits demanded, would require the question of ownership to be first resolved. The matter was judicial in nature. This istrative case would not be the right forum for it. There was utterly no showing that respondent Judge had been motivated by, or had acted in, bad faith or malice. With regard to the claim that respondent resolved the motion for payment of attorney's fees to Atty. Helenea Dauz with undue haste, the order of 11 April 1995 would show that the motion was granted only when Banawe Realty had failed to file any comment thereon, let alone an opposition thereto, despite the opportunity given by the trial court.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 ii. Sanchez v Vestil (A.M No. RTJ-98-1419, October 13, 1993) PANGANIBAN, J. FACTS: In a complaint dated July 3, 1996, Atty Raul A. Sanchez charged Presiding Judge Augustine A. Vestil of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56, with (1) grave misconduct, (2) graft, (3) gross ignorance of the law and (4) falsification of his certificate of service in relation to Special Proceedings No. MAN 185 entitled Intestate Estate Proceedings of the Deceased Jose D. Sanchez. Aside from the mentioned case, so far as known to this representation, the following some criminal cases submitted to the court for decision which has gone beyond the NINETY (90) day reglementary period. In this connection, respondent would like to respectfully inform this Honorable Supreme Court that he has been exerting utmost efforts reducing his case load which at one time reaches more than one thousand one hundred (1,100) cases including the almost seven hundred (700) unloaded to him in 1993. Almost EVERY SATURDAY and during some holidays, respondent with two or three of this staff have been reporting for work at no additional compensation. After the judicial audit was conducted, the Court, in its Resolution dated December 3, 1997, adopted the following recommendations of the OCA and directed respondent (1) to concentrate meanwhile in deciding with dispatch those cases which have remained unresolved beyond the constitutionality prescribed ninety days and (2) to explain within ten days from notice the reason for the delay in the resolution of said cases. The Court further directed the Fiscal Management and Budget Office of the OCA to withhold the salary of respondent until he has decided the said cases and has submitted copies of the decision to the Office of the Court . ISSUE: Whether respondent Judge should be sanctioned. RULING: Yes. The Court reiterate that a "judge, as the person presiding over the court, is the visible representation of the law and justice, “and that " a judge's official conduct should be free and untainted by the appearance of impropriety, and his or her personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in performance of judicial duties, but also in his or her everyday life, should be beyond reproach. “Evidently, the acts of herein respondent judge have not been consistent with the conduct expected of his stature and profession. Judges, when burdened by heavy caseloads which prevent them from disposing their cases within the reglementary period, may ask for additional time. While the certificate of service of respondent judge contained a statement that there were cases before his sala that were still undecided beyond the reglementary period, he made no attempt to request an extension of time.

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019 iii. Bernardo v. Fabros (A.M. No. MTJ-99-1189, May 12, 1999 PANGANIBAN, J. FACTS: The Court stresses this principle in resolving the February 29, 1996 sworn Complaint of Fe T. Bernardo, in which Judge Amelia A. Fabros (Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9) was charged with failure to decide Civil Case No. 150796, an ejectment case, within the reglementary period of thirty days. In her Comment filed on June 26, 1997, Judge Fabros itted that she failed to decide the said case within the prescribed period due to oversight. She offered no excuse for the omission, but assailed the legal standing of complainant. In her own words: “While the case was submitted for decision on June 11, 1996 it was only on December 23, 1996 that it was decided. The explanation is simply that in the course of [my] working as the Presiding Judge of Branch 9 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila there was an oversight. There was a failure to record the due date when it should be decided. I offer no excuses. I cannot even say that because of the volume of work now facing Metropolitan Trial Court Judges it is virtually impossible to monitor each and every case. My court receives an average monthly input of raffled cases at the rate of 157 a month. I have 994 pending cases as of April 1997. Despite this I am able xxx to the best of my ability xxx resolve an average of 42 cases a month.” ISSUE: Whether the act of the judge constitute gross dereliction of duty . RULING: Yes. The failure of a judge to decide a case within the reglementary period constitutes gross dereliction of duty. The gravity of this offense depends on several factors, including the number of cases not decided on time, the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, and the presence of other aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Respondent its that she failed to decide the aforementioned case within the thirty-day period prescribed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. For this reason, she should be istratively sanctioned.