Ltd Case Digests 3n1tc

LAND TITLE AND DEEDS DIGESTS GR 139405

March 13, 2001

People of the Philippines vs Arturo F. Pacificador FACTS: On October 27, 1988, Arturo Pacificador, the Chairman of the Board of the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation, was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of violation of RA 3019 aka Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. During the period of December 6, 1975 to January 6, 1976, together with Jose Marcelo, the President of Philippine Smelters Corporation, he caused the sale, transfer and conveyance of the rights, titles and interests over parcels of land owned by National Shipyard and Steel Corporation to Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte where Jose Panganiban Plant is located. National Shipyard and Steel Corporation is a governmentowned corporation and received only P85,144.50 as consideration for the sale. This caused injury to the Government because real fair market value of the lands were P862,150.00. The Deed of Sale for was executed on December 29, 1975. Pacificador stated that the prosecution of the crime has already prescribed since counting from the registration of the Deed of Sale (or execution of such), the filing of action against him should have prescribed. He further contends that during December 29, 1975, there was a constructive notice to the world of such registration and this should be tantamount to concealing his crime during that day and not on May 13, 1988 when the complaint was filed by the Solicitor General with the PCGG. ISSUE: Whether or not the prescription of the offense committed by Pacificador shall run from the date the Deed of Sale was executed. RULING: YES. The date of prescription shall run from the day the crime was committed and if that date is unknown, the date of discovery should be used as the reckoning point. In this case, since the land was transferred and presumably ed on December 29, 1975 when the perpetrators are already aware of their own crimes, the reckoning point should be that day. The Deed of Sale when ed constitutes a notice to the whole world, including the petitioner, of its contents, as well as all interests, legal and equitable. All persons are charged with the constructive knowledge of what it contains despite no actual knowledge on their part. No. 37 G.R. No. 92159 July 1, 1993 LEDITA BURCE JACOB and BUENAVENTURA JACOB, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, ROSARIO ALCERA FALCON, TRINIDAD ALCERA CRUZ and PURIFICACION ALCERA CHAY, rep. by TRINIDAD ALCERA CRUZ, respondents.

FACTS: The respondents are the grandchildren of Manuela Bobiles, who is the original owner of the subject lot holding OCT RO-3334 over the same land. In 1977, they ed the land under their names. Petitioners, on the other hand, came to know about the land only on 1976. In 1980, they acquired the land from Leditha Burce Jacob’s aunt, Concolacion Burce. Concolacion acquired the land through a sale from Emil Bonto, who in turn, acquired the same from a Leon Cabida. And finally, Leon Cabida acquired the land from Manuela Bobiles through an Escritura de Venta Con Pacto de Retro in 1933. ISSUES: Whether or not the respondents are the real owner of the land in dispute. RULING: YES. The land is still ed under the name of Manuela Bobiles when the transfer to the petitioners took interest of the land. And in 1977, the Manuela’s grandchildren who are also the respondents had the land ed under their name. Thus, the present holders of a ed title are the respondents. As a rule, a Torrens certificate of title serves as an evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose names appear therein. Since there are no ed title that can be presented by the petitioners, the respondents should be deemed the rightful owner since their names appear in the certificate.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, vs HONORABLE MARIANO UMALI, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 23, Trece Martires City, REMEDIOS, MICLAT, JUAN PULIDO, ROSALINA NAVAL and the OF DEEDS OF CAVITE FACTS: In 1992, a land situated in Tanza, Cavite was assigned to Martina, Maria and Gregorio all surnamed Cenizal by the land’s original owner, Florentina Bobadilla who purchased the same from the government on July 1, 1910. These three signed a t affidavit in 1971 which was filed with the Bureau of Lands. A Deed of Sale was executed on September 10, 1971 by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources while TCT No 55044 (replacing Boadilla’s OCT 180) was issued by the of deeds on October 13, 1971. The land went through several transfers until its ed owners became Juan Pulido, Rosalina, Enrique and Luz Naval, Remedios Miclat. The government asked for the return of the property after discovering that the sale was tainted with forgery as Gregorio Cenizal died on February 25, 1943, making it impossible for him to have also signed the t affidavit in 1971.

ISSUE: Whether or not the land can be reverted back to the government after discovering such defect on the deed of sale. Or whether or not the sale be considered null and void from the start, making all the titles derived therefrom ineffectual. RULING: NO. The present possessors and owners are innocent transferees for value. They all believed that the certificate of title that fell into their hands are free from all encumbrances, except as those indicated on the face of the certificate, and that the certificate is clean and not tainted with fraud. For that, they are entitled to the protection of Sec 39 of the Land Registration Act, which affords a title holder the stoppage of any question of the legality of their title over their land. The acts of their predecessors, even if proven as fraudulent, did not affect their own titles because they are presumed transferees in good faith and for value of the subject property.

G.R. No. L-49686 August 31, 1988 FELIX GOCHAN & SONS REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner-appellant, vs. VICENTE CAÑADA, substituted by MONA LISA MA. REYES, and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents-appellees. FACTS: Juan Jabutay owns Lot 6733 and sold half of it to Eustaquio Paraiso on August 11, 1939. However, Jabutay continued to occupy the lot he just sold. Without informing, Jabutay, Paraiso sold the land to Vicente Cañada on July 20, 1951 or 22 years later. Cañada filed an action for partition against Jabutay to recover his half portion. The trial court declared both Cañada and Jabutay as co-owners and ordered that the land be partitioned between them in equal parts. Jabutay filed an application for registration of the entire Lot 6733 in his name, without informing Cañada and while his appeal to the CA was pending. On March 2, 1959, OCT 51 was issued to him. Later on April 22, 1959, he sold the entire lot to Felix Gochan & Sons Realty Corporation (GOCHAN) who was unaware of the pendency of the case. The company was issued a TCT for such sale. Five years later, Cañada learned of the sale and filed an action against Jabutay and Gochan to annul the sale, cancel Gochan’s TCT and have a new title issued to him. A lis pendens was annotated on Gochan’s TCT. Cañada later was substituted by Mona Lisa Reyes. ISSUE: Whether or not Gochan’s title was valid. RULING: YES. When Gochan bought the entire land from Jabutay, the title over it was clean and free from liens and encumbrances. Thus, when it was transferred to him, it was still clean. It was only five years later after the title was subject to lis pendens.

When Gochan ed the entire lot under its name, under the Torrens system, all claims, liens and encumbrances on the land asserted prior to the issuance of the decree of registration except statutory liens and those noted on the certificate were extinguished. Gochan was an innocent purchaser of the land for value. G.R. No. L-50420 May 29, 1987 REMEDIOS FERRER-LOPEZ, assisted by her husband, ENGR. JUAN LOPEZ, ANTONIO V. FERRER, TRINIDAD FERRER-DUMAUAL, and ROSARIO FERRER-GUTIERREZ, all heirs of the late DOMINGA VELASCO VDA. DE FERRER, petitioners, vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, TOMAS MANINGDING and Sp. MARIA NIEVES PUZON, Sps. FERMIN PERALTA and JULIANA PUZON, and HONORATA PUZON, assisted by her husband, Atty. DOMINGO PADLAN respondents. FACTS: Petitioners claim that they are the children of Dominga Velasco who owns the lot in dispute, Lot 12509. Such land was 54 hectares but due to the fault of the respondents’ father, Ramon Puzon, who gave the surveyor the “invalid” boundary thereby decreasing the petitioners’ total land area, the 54 hectares decreased to 51.8 hectares. This 51.80 land was later subdivided by Dominga herself to the petitioners and each petitioner were issued certificates of titles representing their portion. Petitioners presented tax declaration and receipts named under Dominga Velasco as evidence of ownership but such taxes didn’t indicate the land area covered by the declaration and payments. On the other hand, respondents presented an OCT in their name which includes the alleged deficiency being claimed by the petitioners. ISSUE: Whether or not the tax declarations or realty tax payments of property presented may be an evidence of ownership. RULING: NO. Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. The OCTs clearly totaled 51.80 and their shares of land were marked properly. Dominga was still alive when Ramon Puzon allegedly “pointed” the wrong boundaries but yet she or her successors about the deficiency in their land area. On the other hand, the respondents have their OCT which includes the “missing portion”. Both were marked according to the OCTs by both parties. Thus it only shows that there are separate ed titles of ownership, dominion over each was exercised by two separate groups of owners.

G.R. No. 73465 September 7, 1989 LEONIDA CUREG, ROMEO, PEPITO, HERNANDO, MANUEL, ANTONIO AND ELPIDIO (ALL SURNAMED CARNIYAN) petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, (4TH CIVIL CASES DIVISION), DOMINGO APOSTOL, SOLEDAD GERARDO, ROSA GERARDO, NIEVES GERARDO, FLORDELIZA GERARDO, AND LILIA MAQUINAD, respondent.

FACTS: Private respondents, except Domingo Apostol, are the heirs of Domingo Gerardo, the owner of the subject land (2.5 ha). Since July 26, 1894, Domingo’s father, Francisco, and predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession of the land, under a bona fide claim of ownership and adverse to all other claimants. Such land called “motherland” was declared for taxation purposes in the name of Francisco Gerardo. The respondents then sold the land to Domingo Apostol and executed an extra-judicial partition on September 10, 1982. During the time such was executed, there were already signs of accretion of 3 ha. on the north caused by the northward movement of the Cagayan River. The accretion and the motherland was declared by Domingo for taxation purposes under his name on September 15, 1982. On the other hand, petitioners contend that their predecessor, Antonio Carniyan, was the owner of the accretion of the subject land. Antonio Carniyan acquired the land from his father-in-law on October 5, 1956, as evidenced by an Absolute Deed of Sale. Antonio declared the land for taxation purposes and even had an OCT (issued November 24, 1968) pursuant to Free Patent dated May 21, 1968. This title includes the accretion portion and “the motherland” (total of 5.5 ha) being claimed by the Gerardos and Apostol. ISSUE: Whether or not Apostol and the Gerardos have better title over the accretion than Cureg. RULING: NO. The private respondents presented four tax declarations as evidence of their ownership over the land. These declarations are not sufficient evidence to prove ownership. On the other hand, petitioners have an OCT under the name of Antonio Carniyan to show. Tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership and should not prevail over a decree of registration. A decree of registration bars all claims and rights which arose or may have existed prior the decree. The issuance of the decree quiets the land. ISSUE 2: Whether or not the accretion (5.5 ha) became part of the ed land of Cureg. RULING: NO. The area covered by Antonio Carniyan’s OCT did not include the accretion of 5.5 hectares. . The increase in the area of Cureg's land, being an accretion left by the change of course or the northward movement of the Cagayan River does not automatically become ed land just because the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. It has not actually been placed yet in the Torrens system and for that it is but required that the owners place it under the system. G.R. No. L-17132

February 8, 1922

ORA SNYDER, plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF CEBU and JOSE AVILA, defendants-appellees. FACTS: Corazon Veloso leased her land to Arey and Zeeman for ten years, renewable. On December 5, 1916, Michael and Co., Inc. was, with the consent of Corazon subrogated to all the leaseholds of Arey and Zeeman, becoming the lessee of the land. The company erected a building on the land named the Cine Ideal. By virtue of Cadastal Case No. 9, Corazon Veloso obtained a certificate of title to said land, under the Torrens System. During such case, Michael and Co., Inc. did not appear nor present their lease right holding. The certificate of title was then declared free of all liens and incumbrances and without any memorandum or annotation of any real right which might exist pon said land. The building, Cine Ideal, was adjudicated to Michael and Co. On February 19, 1920, Michael and Co. sold, transferred and delivered to Jose Avila the Cine Ideal and all the leashold rights it held by virtue of the lease contract. Jose Avila applied to the of deeds to have the building and the lease annotated on the certificate of title of the land. The of deeds, without the consent of Veloso and taking advantage of the fact that Veloso’s duplicate of the certificate of title is with him, recorded and annotated on the duplicate and on the original, the contract of lease and its transfer to Jose Avila. On July 22, 1920, Corazon Veloso sold the land to Ora Snyder who obtained a transfer certificate for the land. It now brought action against the provincial fiscal as ex-officio of deed and Jose Avila to have the registration and annotation of the contract of lease null and void. She further prays that the and deed cancel the annotation and issue a new certificate of title under her (Ora Snyder) name. ISSUE: Whether or not the annotation on the certificate of title done by the of deeds be declared null and void. RULING: YES. Section 30 of Act No. 496, provides that "every applicant receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of ed land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith, shall hold the same free of all incumbrance except those noted on said certificate". The act of the of deed is an illegal act and he is compelled to undo what he has illegally done.

G.R. No. 84966 November 21, 1991 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONINA GUIDO, MAURO CASTAÑEDA, MARGARITA GUIDO, GRACIANO L. AMANTE, FELIZA GUIDO, ANTONIO AQUINO, CRISANTA GUIDO, BUENAVENTURA B. ENRIQUEZ, CANDIDA GUIDO,

JACOB ASSAD, ESPERANZA GUIDO, ANGEL BENITO, ALFREDO GUIDO, CLARA MINDA ANSELMO, EUFRONIA GUIDO, JOSE LORENO, PRISCILLA GUIDO VDA. DE ESGUERRA, BENEDICTO LOPEZ, PROFETIZA GUIDO, AIDA DEL CARMEN, BUENSUCESO GUIDO, HERMINIA VILLAREAL, CARLOS GUIDO, AMANDA C. RIVERA, JOSE A. ROJAS and EMILIAN M. ROJAS, the INTERPORT RESOURCES CORPORATION and the OF DEEDS OF RIZAL (Morong Branch), respondents. FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed a complaint on August 22, 1979 a complaint for declaration of nullity of Decreto 6145, the owner’s TCT 23377 duplicate copy and all titles derived from the said decree. The ground is that these documents are false, spurious and fabricated and were never issued. The respondents denied that Decreto 6145 and TCT 23377 were false and spurious. They claimed that the land in the title was a portion of Hacienda de Angono owned by their predecessor-in-interest, Don Buenaventura Guido. On March 29, 1976, Alfredo Guido, representing the other heirs, filed a petition for reconstitution of TCT No. 23377 with the Registry of Deeds of Morong. The petition alleged that the original of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23377 could not be located in the files of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal after he and his co-heirs sought the registration of their Extra-judicial Settlement with Quitclaim dated December 17, 1973. The petition was ed by the owner's duplicate copy of the title. The petition was granted. The entire land was later subdivided into 21 lots and sold to the Pacil Management Corporation but was reconveyed back to the former owners after two months. The trial court dismissed the complaint of the Republic and declared that Decree 6145 and TCT 23377 as genuine and authentic. ISSUE: Whether or not Decree 6145 and TCT 23377 are indefeasible. RULING: YES. TCT No. 23377, having been found true and authentic also possessed all the attributes of a torrens certificate of title. By express provision of Section 47 of P.D. 1529, no to ed land in derogation to that of the ed owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. declare that the decree and its derivative titles is valid but only with respect to the extent of the area described in the decree possessed by occupants with indefeasible ed titles or possessors with such lengths of possession which had ripened ownership is to undermine the people's faith in the torrens being conclusive as to all matters contained therein. The certificate serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the proper favor of the person whose names appear therein. After expiration of the one year period from the issuance of the decree of registration upon which it is based, it becomes incontrovertible, unless subsequent to issuance of the decree a third party may be able to show that acquired title thereto by any of the means recognized by law. G.R. No. 96302 November 29, 1991

AMBROCIO MUYCO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SERGIO SAGA, respondents FACTS: On July 6, 1939, Eugenio Saga was issued a Homestead Patent over a portion of Lot 5164 by the Director of Lands. The lot was subdivided into two smaller lots: Lot 5956 and 6331. He sold his rights over the homestead to Sergio, his son, on February 2, 1952. Sergio filed a homestead application over Lot 5956 and an OCT was issued to him over the same lot. On the other hand, Leon Tolabing also filed a homestead application over Lot 5956 on March 4, 1946. It was approved October 5 of the same year. On April 11, 1955, he sold his homestead rights to Ambrocio Muyco. Muyco filed his homestead application over the lot but was not issued a certificate of title. On May 7, 1955, the Public Land Inspector of Negros Oriental conducted an investigation of the matter and found that Sergio Saga was occupying and cultivating Lot No. 6331 but not Lot 5956, which was occupied and cultivated by Leon Tolabing. Accordingly, it was recommended that the title issued to Sergio Saga be recalled and modified to cover Lot No. 6331. These findings were questioned by Sergio Saga. Sergio Saga filed a case for “Recovery of Possession” against Ambrocio Muyco, claiming that he has a Certificate of Title covering the lot in question before the lower trial court. The land was granted to him based on the original certificate of title under his name. Issue: Whether or not Sergio Saga has a better claim over the lot in question than Ambrocio Muyco or Leon Tolabing. Ruling: YES. As early as 1939, Eugenio Saga became the owner of the lot by virtue of a patent granted to him by the Director of Lands. His reapplication for a homestead patent is unnecessary since his father has already acquired one before it was sold to him. Hence, it will readily be seen that it was Eugenio Saga who acquired a vested right over the lot in question, and not Leon Tolabing. It was this vested right which Sergio Saga likewise acquired by virtue of the sale on February 2, 1952 involving the homestead. Other facts to prove this are Leon Tolabing’s application was denied while Sergio Saga was granted and given due course. And finally, an OCT covering the lot in question was issued to Saga on October 23, 1954, thereby creating an indefeasible and incontrovertible title in his favor. G.R. No. 84201 August 3, 1990

NORMA S. TIRADO, petitioner, vs. LILIA SEVILLA, THOMAS S. ONG, CELSO UY and COURTS OF APPEALS, respondents. FACTS: Norma S. Tirado owns a parcel of land through assignment from her father on October 12, 1967. She asked for the help of Lilia Sevilla to have her land titled and Sevilla agreed on the condition that Tirado sells a hectare from the same land to her. A deed of sale between them was finalized on September 30, 1974. However, Sevilla failed to pay the downpayment within the agreed one-week period. They made another agreement: Tirado will execute another deed of sale with Sevilla and sell to the latter 1.5 hectares of land for a consideration of three fishing boats worth P150,000. The first deed was deemed cancelled and the second deed was finalized on December 23, 1975. Sevilla, despite repeated demands from Tirado, failed to institute any proceedings nor to pay for the titling of the land. She instead filed for a petition for the issuance of title over the entire lot of Tirado. A transfer certificate was indeed transferred into her name. On July 29, 1977, Tirado’s mother, Rodelia Rodriquez, filed for a petition to nullify the transfer certificate issued to Sevilla, including all subsequent titles emanating from it. A lis pendens was inscribed on such certificate. However, her petition was denied because she is not a party-in-interest. The lis pendens was cancelled on December 17, 1977. Meanwhile, on November 8, 1977, Sevilla sold 4/5 of the land to Thomas Ong and 1/5 of it to Celso Uy. Both were issed TCT’s on February 14, 1978. Tirado again caused to be inscribed a lis pendens still on Sevilla’s transfer certificate on April 22, 1980. ISSUE: Whether or not the notice of lis pendens filed by Tirado’s mother nullified the transfer certificates of Thomas Ong and Celso Uy. RULING: NO. The purpose of filing notice of lis pendens is to charge strangers with notice of the particular litigation referred to in the notice; and if the notice is effective, a third person who acquires the property affected by the lis pendens takes same subject to the eventuality of the litigation. But when the adverse right fails in such litigation, the lis pendens loses its efficacy. Ong and Uy were aware that the land they purchased is a subject in a litigation but they took the risk of completing the sale, hoping that the litigation would result to a decision favorable to them. The petition of Rodriguez was denied and the lis pendens was cancelled. When Ong and Uy were issued their titles, the Torrens Titles were clear from notice of lis pendens. They are then purchasers in good faith and for value.

The inscription made again by Tirado is also unnecessary as it was made two years, as opposed to the allowable period of one year, after the transfer certificate of Sevilla became indefeasible. G.R. No. 80140 June 28, 1991 RAYMUNDO ORTEGAS, AURELIA PALER, ARTHUR MATURAN, ARTURO CARMONA, NACIANCINO LEE, ROGELIO TUBURAN, RELINO OLMOGIS, SR., petitioners, vs. HON. VICENTE A. HIDALGO, The Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, 10th Judicial Region, Branch V, and DIOSDADO ROBLE, in his capacity as the of the Estate of Villa, respondents. FACTS: Petitioners have been residing and paying rentals on Lot 1524 from 1968 to 1974. They have been paying their rentals to the Estate of Villa on the belief that the latter was the owner of the property. However, on 1974, upon discovering that the land was actually a public land, they stopped paying rentals and claimed ownership over the property. For this, they secured tax declarations and paid for the corresponding taxes. They petitioned with the Office of the President to have the land awarded to them. The case was referred to the Bureau of Lands for investigation and disposition. On September 28, 1981, the Estate of Villa filed a complaint against the petitioners for violating the Anti-Squatting Law. The respondent trial court found them guilty of squatting and they were likewise ordered to vacate the land. Since no appeal was made, the judgment was deemed final and executor. On February 18, 1987, the Director of Lands (Cagayan de Oro City) in B.L.C. No. 1838 rendered a decision declaring Lot 1524 a public land and giving due course to the claim of petitioners thereon. ISSUE: Whether or not the findings that the land was indeed a public land warrants a stay (or a stop) of the execution of the judgement. RULING: YES. Although the decision of the trial court has become final and executory, the respondent judge should not have issued a writ of execution. There was a change of the situation when the Director of Lands found out that the land was a public land and such would render the execution of the judgment unjust and inequitable. The petitioners have transformed from private land dwellers to public land settlers. In the case at bar, the Court finds that by virtue of the decision of the Director of Lands rejecting the claim of the estate of Villa and giving due course to the claims of petitioners, the situation of the parties has substantially changed from private land dwellers to public land settlers. In view thereof, the execution of the assailed judgment must therefore be stayed.

The Estate of Villa is also not the ed owner of the land since it only took interest over the land when it occupied it and introduced improvements thereon. The claimant, Theresa Villa, never prayed for the registration of the land. And under PD 1529, for the owner to become a title holder, he should have the land ed under his name. It follows that the title have never been perfected and not indefeasible. A patent becomes indefeasible as a Torrens Title only when said patent is ed with the of Deeds pursuant to the provisions of the Land Registration Act. G.R. No. 92159 July 1, 1993 LEDITA BURCE JACOB and BUENAVENTURA JACOB, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, ROSARIO ALCERA FALCON, TRINIDAD ALCERA CRUZ and PURIFICACION ALCERA CHAY, rep. by TRINIDAD ALCERA CRUZ, respondents. FACTS: The respondents are the grandchildren of Manuela Bobiles, who is the original owner of the subject lot holding OCT RO-3334 over the same land. In 1977, they ed the land under their names. Petitioners, on the other hand, came to know about the land only on 1976. In 1980, they acquired the land from Leditha Burce Jacob’s aunt, Concolacion Burce. Concolacion acquired the land through a sale from Emil Bonto, who in turn, acquired the same from a Leon Cabida. And finally, Leon Cabida acquired the land from Manuela Bobiles through an Escritura de Venta Con Pacto de Retro in 1933. ISSUES: Whether or not the Escritura de Venta Con de Retro (Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase validly constitutes evidence that petitioners are the owners of the land. RULING: NO. Although such deed constitutes an importance in the case, it cannot prevail against the transfer certificate of title in the name of the private respondents. The deed only shows that there was indeed a transfer to the petitioner’s predecessor in interest Leon Cabida. But the title is a constructive notice to the world. This means that when the land was ed under the name of the respondents, the petitioners should have been constructively notified. In other words, no one can plead ignorance of the registration. G.R. No. 76265 April 22, 1992 VIRGINIA CALALANG, petitioner, vs. OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, OF NATIONAL LAND TITLES AND DEEDS REGISTRATION ISTRATION, LUCIA DE LA CRUZ, CONSTANCIO SIMANGAN and IGLESIA NI KRISTO, respondents. G.R. No. 83280 April 22, 1992

AUGUSTO M. DE LEON, JOSE M. DE CASTRO, JOSE A. PANLILEO, FELICIDAD VERGARA VDA. DE PINEDA, FERNANDO L. VITUG I, FERNANDO M. VITUG II, FERNANDO M. VITUG III, FAUSTINO TOBIA, ELENA M. OSTREA and FELISA C. CRISTOBAL-GENEROSO, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and BISHOP ERAÑO MANALO, respondents. FACTS: Amando Clemente owns Lot 671-A as evidenced by a transfer of certificate. He later converted it into a subdivision named Clemville Subdivision. The petitioners of this case are the buyers and occupants of portions of the said lot. The other petitioner, Virginia Calalang alleged that she is the ed owner of a portion of Lot 671-A as evidenced by TCT’s. She only came to know of INK’s claim when she a prospective buyer of a portion of the land saw "no tresing" sign. She inquired on the status of the land and learned that it has a pending consulta case filed before the of the Naitonal Land Titles and Deeds Registration istration (NLTDRA). This consulta case arise when the of Deeds found that there are two sets of titles issued on the same land to different owners. Lot 671-A is actually a part of Lot 671 which is owned by Iglesia ni Kristo (INK) who claimed to have bought it from Lucia dela Cruz in 1975. INK began fencing the whole area and placed the sign "NO TRESING — IGLESIA NI KRISTO PROPERTY SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 61969, July 25, 1984." Case 61969 was a case that upheld the validity of the sale between Lucia dela Cruz and INK. ISSUE 1: Whether or not the dela Cruz case (Case no 61969) should apply to this case to determine the validity of the titles of the petitioners. RULING: YES. The dela Cruz case was already final when it was decided upon by the Supreme Court on July 25, 1984. That issue of ownership in that case has been resolved already and the principle of res judicata should be applied. Even if the parties were not the parties in such case, they cannot claim that they were never notified of that the case was pending. Amando Clemente was never a ed owner of the land because his predecessors-in-interest have lost their rights over that land when the lot was sold to Lucia dela Cruz in 1943. The sale to Lucia dela Cruz was valid and the registration the lot under her name in the Primary Book of the Registry of Deeds was a constructive notice to the whole world. And even if they claim that Clemente, their predecessor, has a title, the same cannot be preferred over Lucia’s since Clemente’s title was issued in 1951. ISSUE 2: Whether or not the title of Lucia dela Cruz over the land has become indefeasible and incontrovertible. YES. INK was issued a Torrens Title over the lot as a result of the sale in 1975. The actions instituted by the petitioners took place in 1986. Under the Torrens System of registration, the Torrens Title became indefeasible and incontrovertible one year from its final decree of registration. A Torrens Title is generally a conclusive evidence of the

ownership of the land referred to therein. It is, therefore, too late in the day for the petitioners to reopen or question the legality of INK's title over Lot 671 at this time. September 30, 1927 G.R. No. 27895 CLEMENTE REYES and ANSELMO NADRES, petitioners, vs. The honorable PABLO BORBON, As judge of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, respondents. FACTS: Clemente Reyes owns Lot 1-A while Anselmo Nadres owns Lot 2 wherein both lots are located in the barrio of Mayabobo, Candelaria in the Province of Tayabas. Both men have transfer certificates that had been ed under the Torrens system to show, wherein Reyes received his on October 10, 1919 and Nadres his on December 12, 1917. A cadastral survey was presented to the Court of First Instance, known as Expediente No. 10 GLRO, for the registration of parcels of land divided into numbered lots, including that which were ed under Reyes and Nadres under the Torrens system. During that survey, Reyes and Nadres did not appear and they were rendered in general default. Since no opposition was presented, several numbered lots found within the boundaries of Lot 1-A and Lot 2 were declared to be public lands on September 19, 1924. The petitioners had no knowledge of such declaration until January 18, 1927. For the months February and March 19927, they moved to have the decree null and void. ISSUE: Whether or not the decree declaring the lots public land are null and void. RULING: YES. Two valid Torrens titles were issued to the petitioners in 1917 and 1919. Once a land has been ed under the Torrens land system, the title becomes settled and unimpeachable after one year. It cannot be subject to another action for the registration under the Torrens system. In this case, when the cadastral survey was conducted, there already exist two valid titles. These titles should remain to be untainted. It follows now that Reyes and Nandres should still be retained as the valid and ed owners of the lots since they were the first ones who ed such. G.R. No. 92159 July 1, 1993 LEDITA BURCE JACOB and BUENAVENTURA JACOB, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, ROSARIO ALCERA FALCON, TRINIDAD ALCERA CRUZ and PURIFICACION ALCERA CHAY, rep. by TRINIDAD ALCERA CRUZ, respondents. FACTS:

The respondents are the grandchildren of Manuela Bobiles, who is the original owner of the subject lot holding OCT RO-3334 over the same land. In 1977, they ed the land under their names. Petitioners, on the other hand, came to know about the land only on 1976. In 1980, they acquired the land from Leditha Burce Jacob’s aunt, Concolacion Burce. Concolacion acquired the land through a sale from Emil Bonto, who in turn, acquired the same from a Leon Cabida. And finally, Leon Cabida acquired the land from Manuela Bobiles through an Escritura de Venta Con Pacto de Retro in 1933. ISSUE: Whether or not the title held by the respondents are indefeasible. YES. Leditha only came to know the land in 1975 and the property was transferred and ed in the respondents’ name in November 1977. However, Leditha and Buenaventura never filed an opposition to the certificate of title issued to the respondents. They were given a year to contest such registration but they never did that, losing the opportunity to question the title. And for that, petitioners can never contest the validity of the such because they slept on the one year period limitation. They were in possession of the lot for years but they were never vigilant in knowing on the existence of any adverse claim, such as the registration of title by the respondents. And this entire time, they knew that the title is still under the name of Manuela Bobiles, under OCT RO-3334.

G.R. No. 151440. June 17, 2003 HEIRS OF SIMPLICIO SANTIAGO, Represented by ANGELITA S. CASTRO, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF MARIANO E. SANTIAGO, respondents. FACTS: Simplicio Santiago acquired the subject land, Lot 2344, from his father Pablo and brother Guillermo. In 1968, he constructed a house on the same lot and applied for a free patent on May 6, 1983, which was granted. Also, on September 26, 190, he was issued an OCT covering the lot. In 1983, Mariano Santiago built a land on a portion of the lot. He was demanded through oral and written demands to vacate but he refused to do so. Mariano, on his side, claimed that Lot 2344 was subdivided into three portions: Lot 2344-A, Lot 2344-B and Lot 2344-C. Lot 2344-A and Lot 2344-C were fraudulently included in the free patent and certificate of title issued to Simplicio. He stated that he purchased Lot 2344-A from as evidenced by a deed of sale executed September 15, 1972 while Lot 2344-C was inherited by him and his sister from their grandmother.

On August 6, 1991, the trial court found that Mariano’s claim over the lots lack basis and that his defense constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of a Torrens title which was barred by prescription for having been raised for more than a year after entry of the decree registration. On the appeal to the CA, the lower court’s decision was reversed, with CA declaring that the OCT and Free Patent issued to Simplicio are null and void, because the subject land is a private land and cannot be subject to a patent. ISSUE: Whether or not not the free patent and the certificate of title issued to Simplicio Santiago are valid. RULING: NO. A free patent issued over a private land is null and void and produces no legal effects whatsoever. Quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum. Free patent applications under the Public Land Act apply only to disposable lands of the public domain, and not to private lands which became such by virtue of a duly ed possessory information or by open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, of the present or previous occupants. Here, it was established that the lot was a private property of the Santiago family since time immemorial and that they have declared the same for taxation. The tax payments and declarations constitute a good indicia possession in the concept of owner. This gives them a ray of hope, telling them they have a claim of the title of the property. Considering the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land by respondents and their predecessors in interests, they are deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a government grant without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land was thus segregated from the public domain and the director of lands had no authority to issue a patent. Hence, the free patent covering Lot 2344, a private land, and the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto, are void. 2. Whether or not the homestead patent covering the lots is indefeasible as a certificate of title. NO. Under the Land Registration Act, title to the property covered by a Torrens certificate becomes indefeasible after the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree of registration. The date of the issuance of the patent corresponds to the date of the issuance of the decree. However, this one-year rule does not

apply in cases where the person seeking annulment of title or reconveyance is in possession of the lot. The action for such is to quiet title and is imprescriptible. Mariano’s action to annul the OCT is not barred by prescription. G.R. No. 117971

February 1, 2001

ESTRELLITA S. J. VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, LAURENCE and JENNIFER, BOTH SURNAMED VILLANUEVA, ROGELIO MILLAMA and ROLLY DE JESUS, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LINA F. VDA. DE SANTIAGO, EDDIE, ROLANDO, WILLY and MARILOU, ALL SURNAMED SANTIAGO, respondents.

FACTS: Victorino Santiago purchased two parcels of land from spouses Angeles on October 9, 1967. He converted a portion of such into fishponds which he sold later to Anecleto Santiago on August 9, 1977. At the time he purchased the lands, there were no decree of registration issued yet for the same lands. On August 12, 1977, Anacleto employed the services of Pedro Adona to develop the ponds. Adona and his men lived in a nipa hut near the creek as they worked on the development. Meanwhile, on February 28, 1978, Victorino filed an action for forcible entry against Carlos Villanueva and his wife, petitioner Estrellita Villanueva. The lawsuit was dismissed on June 19, 1978. On September 22, 1978, Adona reported to Anacleto that the nipa hut where he was staying was destroyed by some people. Lina, Anacleto’s wife, testified that some weeks before the incident, Carlos Villanueva threatened them (LIna and Anacleto) with a gun, telling them to leave. On February 22, 1979, the certificates of title over the lands were issued to Anacleto who declared such lands for taxation purposes. And later on February 26, he sued the Villanuevas for forcible entry (civil case) and for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law (criminal). While these cases are pending, Anacleto discovered that Carlos was granted a Fisheries Lease Agreement over the lands on February 28, 1980. He sought for the cancellation of the agreement but his petition was dismissed. On the Villanueva’s part, they contend that the lots were bought from the father of Carlos where the lands were classified as “swamp land”. When they approached with the Bureau of Fisheries to have the properties titled, they were told that this was not possible due to the land’s classifications. Carlos then applied for a Fisheries Lease agreement. The Villanuevas also contend that they have been possessing the lots for twenty years, not even including the initial 20 years when their predecessor have occupied it. ISSUES:

1. WON the present action was barred by res judicata. 2. WON the respondents’ titles constitute valid and indefeasible proof of ownership. RULING: 1. NO. the principle of res judicata does not apply in this case. The two earlier actions filed by Anacleto and Victorino were for forcible entry which involved only the issue of physical possession (possession de facto) and not ownership.24 Meanwhile, the instant case is an accion reinvindicatoria or a suit to recover possession of a parcel of land as an element of ownership. A judgement rendered in a forcible entry case will not bar an action between the same parties respecting title or ownership25 because between a case for forcible entry and an accion reinvindicatoria, there is no identity of causes of action. 2. Are respondents' certificates of title valid and indefeasible proof of ownership? NO. The validity of said titles cannot be assisted in a counterclaim, as resorted to by petitioners, since a collateral attack is not allowed under the law. A collateral attack is made when, in another action to obtain a different relief, the certificate of title is assailed as an incident in said action. Petitioners raised the issue of invalidity of the titles as a defense in an answer counterclaim to respondents' action for recovery of ownership. This partakes of the nature of a collateral attack and is an indirect challenge to the final judgement and decree of registration which resulted in the issuance of the titles. The respondents' titles constituted indefeasible proof of ownership which entitles them to possession of the properties. In land cases, the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and inconvertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. A title once ed under the Torrens system cannot be defeated by adverse, open and notorious possession; neither can it be defeated by prescription. It is notice to the whole world and such all persons are bound by it and no one can plead ignorance of the registration. G.R. No. L-29831 March 29, 1972 GUILLERMO VIACRUCIS, LUISA DE VIACRUCIS, CLAROS MARQUEZ, and RUSTICA AREVALO MARQUEZ, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ANASTACIO ORAIS and CELESTINA MALAZARTE, respondents. FACTS: Anastacio Orais and Celestina Malazarte, his wife, claims that they own the four hectare land in Candilomot, Leyte as it was sold to them on June 8, 1936 by Pedro Sanchez by virtue of a deed of sale. They claim that the land was a part of a bigger land. It was later found out that Pedro Sancez issued another deed, conveying the land to Balentin Ruizo on July 7, 1941.

Guillermo Viacrus and Luisa de Viacrucis also claim that the 4-hectare land is theirs. They purchased the land from Balentin Ruizo on October 10, 1945, thus also showing their proof of the deed executed in favor of the Viacrus spouses. They claim that the deed of sale held by Anastacio is merely a simulated transaction and that the action is barred by the statue of limitations (prescription). The trial court ruled in favor of Anastacio and Celestina, rejecting the defenses of prescription and simulation of contract as raised by the Viacrus spouses. ISSUE: Whether or not spouses Viacrus has validly acquired the land. RULING: NO. There are visible facts proving that Orais has a better right over the land. First, he had taken possession of the land, though constructively, after purchasing it. This is incorporated in a public document or the deed of sale. Evidence of the constructive possession is the agreement between Orais and the present possessor, Costelo, where in Costelo was awarded the right of possession as the creditor of Sanchez. And finally, the filing of the public document (deed of sale) with the of Deeds and having it recorded therein. Even if we treat the land as uned by the time Sanchez sold it to Orais on June 8, 1936 or the date of the deed on July 30, 1936, there is no denying that the land has been ed under Orais when he filed the deed on September 10, 1936 with the of Deeds. Thus, it only logically implies that when Sanchez sold the land to Ruizo on July 7, 1941, five years after the sale to Orais, Sanchez is not already the owner of the land. Spouses Viacrucis then cannot acquire title over the land because the land has already been subjected to registration under the name of Orais. "No title to ed land in derogation to that of the ed owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession."