Liabilities Of A Principal Employer Under The Contract Labour 6qr1h

LIABILITIES OF A PRINCIPAL EMPLOYER UNDER THE CONTRACT LABOUR (REGULATION AND ABOLITION) ACT, 1970 The liabilities of a principal employer under the Contract Labour Act are examples of vicarious liability on owners of establishments. The Contract Labour Act provides respite and recourse to contract labour from non-payment of wage by allowing them access to the principal employer in the event of a default by the contractor. A “principal employer” as defined under the Act covers any person responsible for the supervision and control of the establishment. In the case of a factory, such person would include the owner or occupier of the factory or a manager under the Factories Act, 1948. Any establishment where there were 20 or more workers employed as contract labour in any day of the preceding 12 months would be covered under the Contract Labour Act. The principal employer is required to ensure that a representative be present while the contractor is disbursing payment to the contract labour (Section 21(2)). The Act is silent on what is the role of such representative. Subsection 4 of Section 21 provides that in the event of a default on the part of the contractor to make payment of wages to the labour employed, the principal employer may need to step in and make good such payment or shortfall. It therefore, becomes imperative that, the representative of the principal employer fully understand the nature of his duties and be authorized to take necessary steps in the event of a default. The representative should be briefed / trained by the concerned department in the organization. Such steps could include issuing notice to the contractor and terminating the relationship, if required. Care should be taken while drafting the agreement with the contractor to ensure the same. The Contract Labour Act prescribes that the contractor shall provide certain amenities to the labour employed by it. The rules prescribe time periods within which such amenities may be provided. These facilities include: –

Canteen provisions;

–

Rest-rooms; and

–

First aid facilities.

In the event that the contractor fails to provide the same, the obligation automatically falls upon the principal employer. The law also provides that it may be recoverable from the contractor. While legal recourse to recover expenses incurred by the principal employer does offer some consolation, it would be prudent to establish and clearly define mutual rights, duties and obligations in an agreement executed with the contractor, within the confines of the law. Conditions may be imposed upon the contractor in the agreement to ensure compliance with the Contract Labour Act. Employers should provide for indemnity provisions that protect the principal employer in cases of default. In case of large corporates employing a vast number of persons under the Act (whether it be for housekeeping or security or for any other purpose), it would be prudent to obtain representations, in the nature of those provided below, from the contractor that in the past : –

the contractor has been in compliance with the relevant provisions of the Act;

–

has a valid license / registration under the Act; and

–

has not been in default of payment to labour provided by him to another principal employer.

A certain amount of due diligence may also be done to determine whether or not the contractor has been in default or in violation of the Contract Labour Act. Due diligence would be of significance where contractual safeguards may not offer adequate protection to principal employers. The law imposes very strict liabilities on the owners to ensure that the contract labour employed does not suffer in any manner. This needs to be kept in mind while drafting any agreement with a contractor for this purpose. While there are monetary liabilities on corporates, additional liabilities are imposed on directors of companies. The penalty for non-compliance with provisions of the Contract Labour Act while employing contract labour is imprisonment for 3 months or fine or both. Though the quantum of fines imposed is not high, directors, particularly, the independent directors, would not want the dagger of criminal proceedings hanging over their heads. This alone should operate as sufficient thrust to ensure compliance with this Act.

The next part on contract labour is intended to detail the commercial and other legal considerations for drafting / reviewing an agreement with a contractor. Bombay High Court Tradesvel Security Services Pvt. ... vs State Of Maharashtra on 2 November, 1982 Equivalent citations: (1982) 84 BOMLR 608

Author: P Sawant Bench: P Sawant JUDGMENT P.B. Sawant, J. 1. This is a group of petitions seeking to challenge the Maharashtra Private Security Guards (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as a said Act) and the Scheme viz. the Private Security Guards, (Regulation of Employment & Welfare) Scheme, 1981, deemed to have been prepared by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred under Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the said Act. The petitions are filed both by the agencies or agents who hitherto carried on the business of supplying security guards to various employers and also by the employers who engage the security guards on contract basis through such agencies or agents. Petitions Nos. 1204 of 1981, 136(1 of 1981, 1393 of 1981, 1692 of 1981, 1882 of 1981, 75 of 1982, 89 of 1982 and 195 of 1982 are filed by the agencies and Petitions Nos. 420 of 1982, 422 of 1982, 1205 of 1981, 1386 of 1981, 1408 of 1981, 1499 of 1981, 1884 of 1981 and 816 of 1982 are filed by the employers. Some of these petitions were filed immediately after the Ordinance viz. the Maharashtra Private Security Guards (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Ordinance, 1981, (Maharashtra Ordinance No. V of 1981) (hereinafter referred to as the said Ordinance) was promulgated on June 28, 1981 and after the said Scheme was made under Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the said Ordinance. The Ordinance was however replaced by the said Act with retrospective effect from June 29, 1981 after the Act received the assent of the President on September 25, 1981. The provisions of the said Ordinance stood bodily incorporated in the said Act and likewise there was no alteration in the Scheme which was already made under the said Ordinance which is now deemed to have been made under the said Act by virtue of Subsection (2) of Section 31 of the said Act. The-challenges to the provisions of the Ordinance and the Scheme are now therefore to be construed as challenges to the said Act and the Scheme made under the said Act. 2. Until the State Government promulgated the said Ordinance on June 28, 1981, about 250 agents and agencies were operating in Greater Bombay and Thane Districts, regularly supplying persons to work as Security Guards to various factories and establishments. The object of the legislation is to eliminate the agents and agencies who were working as middlemen for supplying the Security Guards, to create a pool of Security Guards and to supply them to the factories and establishments through the Board constituted for the purpose and also to induce the employers to engage as their direct employees the persons doing the security work and to prohibit their engagements on contract basis through the middlemen. The legislation does not apply to those persons who are doing security work and are directly employed with the factories and establishments.

3. The present petitions seek to challenge this legislation on various grounds. In order to understand the significance of the challenge it is necessary to know the object, the scheme and the various provisions of the legislation. Before we refer to the various provisions of the Act and the Scheme made thereunder it would be necessary to know the genesis of the present legislation. The evil of the contract labour system in various industries and establishments for various occupations had become the rule of the day. In engineering, cotton textile, cement, paper, coir-matting, mining and even in Central and Provincial Public Works Departments, contract labour was employed on a large scale and the percentage of such labour varied from 10 to 25 of the total number of employees employed in the units. There were certain advantages gained by the employers on of the engagement of the contract labour but there was a wide-spread feeling in responsible quarters that the disadvantages of the system were far more numerous and weightier. In particular, it was noticed that "the contract system enabled the employer to escape the provisions of most of the Labour Welfare Acts. Secondly, it enabled both the contractor as well as the employer to exploit the situation of wide-spread unemployment and hire workers at the lowest rates. The contractor was interested in securing them at comparatively cheap rates and the employer was interested in keeping his costs of labour down to the minimum. That resulted in unhealthy competition between the contractors supplying the contract labour to the ultimate disadvantage of the workers. Thirdly, since the contract system was found profitable to the employers, a tendency grew amongst the employers to engage contract labour in as many occupations and processes in the industry as they could. The result was that even in processes which were necessarily a part and parcel of the regular production and business activity, the employers tended to engage more and more contract labour resulting in widespread mal-practices of keeping a large army of casual workers on temporary basis for years together thus avoiding the payment of fair wages and the granting of the terminal benefits and other facilities such as leave, medical care, etc. to them. This was commented upon and condemned from time to time by various Committees and Commissions appointed to investigate into the conditions of labour, and recommendations were made from time to time to abolish the contract system particularly where the employment was regular and the processes and occupations in which the contract labour was engaged were essentially a part of the activities of the factories and establishments where they were employed. This demand for abolishing the contract labour led to the enactment of the Central Act called the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. It applied to all establishments in which 20 or more workmen were employed and prohibited employment of contract labour in any processes, operations or other work in such establishments. The Act also made provisions for the welfare and health of contract labour and required the contractors to supply various facilities to the contract labour and also cast a corresponding responsibility on the employer who engaged such contract labour to supply the amenities where the contractor failed to do so. The Act also made the contractor responsible for payment of

wages and also made the employer responsible for such payment of the wages remaining unpaid by the contractor. It appears that in spite of the enactment of the said legislation, certain occupations and processes continued to escape, the provisions of the said legislation. In particular, in this State certain sections of unprotected manual workers employed in certain employments continued to be exploited by the contractors and hence the State Government had to enact an Act called the Maharashtra Mathadi, Hamal and Other Manual Workers (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the Mathadi Act). The Act came into force on June 13, 1969 and applied to the employments specified in the Schedule to the said Mathadi Act. The security guards or those who were discharging the duties of watch and ward staff however were not brought within the purview of this Act. In the meanwhile the Trade Union of the security guards in the State called the Maharashtra Rajya Suraksha Rakshak and General Kamgar Union Bombay, which is a party to this petition, (having been added as respondents on their application) made representations to the State Government and demanded the constitution of a separate Board on the lines of the Mathadi Boards under the Mathadi Act, for ensuring regular employment and human service conditions to the security guards employed in various factories and establishments in Greater Bombay and Thane Industrial Complex and to prevent their exploitation at the hands of the agents and agencies which were engaging them on a meagre salary and supplying them to various factories and establishments in that region. With a view to ascertain the extent of exploitation and also to collect data with regard to the prevalent service conditions of the security guards, the State Government conducted a rapid sample survey of the security guards employed on contract basis in Greater Bombay and Thane Industrial Complex. According to this survey, there were about 200 to 250 security agents and agencies operating in the said regions. Most of these agencies were not even ed under the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948. There was only one ed Union of the security guards in Greater Bombay and Thene Industrial Complex and that was the respondent-Union which claimed a hip of about 2,200 security guards. According to the claim made by the Union, there were about 70,000 security guards employed in various factories and establishments, etc. all over the said region. The survey was based upon the examination of 50 such agencies carrying on the work of supplying security guards. It was noticed from this sample survey that only 28% of the agents were extending the benefit of provident fund and the said benefit was available only to 45.38% of the total security guards covered by the survey. Similarly, only 7. 38% of the total security guards enjoyed the benefit of gratuity. Likewise, only 35 agents engaging 2792 security guards were covered by the Employees' State Insurance Scheme and only 8 agents engaging 1541 security guards had extended medical facilities to the security guards. As regards leave, out of 50 agents which were covered by the survey, 43 were giving weekly-offs with wages, 4 agents were giving weekly-offs without wages and the remaining 3 agents were not giving any weekly-offs whatsoever. Out of the 50 agents

further, as many as 42 agents were not providing any casual leave to the security guards while the remaining 8 were giving some casual leave. Out of those who gave casual leave, 7 gave leave which varied between 6 to 10 days while the remaining one gave casual leave of 12 days. Out of the said 50 agents again, 6 were giving privilege leave between 11 to 15 days while one was giving between 16 and 20 days and 19 were giving over 20 days while the remaining 24 were not giving any privilege leave at all. As regards sick leave, 4 out of the said 50 agents alone were giving such leave and that varied between 5 to 10 days. As regards festival holidays, 10 agencies out of the said 50 were giving holidays upto 5 days, while 8 were giving 6 to 10 holidays and one was giving 11 to 15 days. The rest 31 were not giving any festival holidays at all. 4. The condition with regard to the working hours was equally un-uniform. Out of the 50 agencies 34 agencies had working days of 7 1/2 hours while 14 had a working day of 8 hours and one agency had a working day of 9 hours. The rest interval also varied, with 44 of the 50 agencies providing a rest interval of half an hour whereas 5 of them giving rest interval of one hour and one of the agencies providing no rest interval at all. 5. As regards monthly wages, the average monthly wages given to the security guards engaged by the 50 agencies worked out to Rs. 264.72 only. The payment of over-time likewise was un-uniform, twenty-eight of the 50 agencies paid over time only at single rate while 10 agencies paid it at double rate. The remaining 12 agencies did not pay any overtime at all. As regards bonus, out of the 150 security guards who were examined as and by way of sample survey, only 24 out of them were receiving bonus at the rate 8.33% of their total earnings while 13 of them were being paid cash benefits ranging from Rs. 10/- per annum to Rs. 250/- per annum. The rest of the security guards were not getting any bonus or cash benefits at all. 6. As regards the other amenities and facilities, out of 150 sampled security _guards, only 6 had drinking water facility, only 42 had canteen -facility, only 16 had transport facility, only 4 were given accommodation and only 31 had rest sheds. Eleven of the said sampled security guards were not even provided with sanitary arrangements. 7. On the basis of this rapid sample survey, certain conclusions were drawn and recommendations

were

made

in

the

report.

According

to

these

conclusions

and

recommendations, a majority of the security guards were in need of special legislative protection since they did not receive anything beyond a meagre wage of Rs. 264.72 per month on an average. It was also noted that most of these agencies were collecting from the employers substantially high amounts and pocketing the difference as their profits, and thus were carrying on a lucrative business in supplying human labour. The report also noted that

some unscrupulous agencies also employed untrained persons without a background of security work. It was therefore necessary to stop exploitation of the unprotected security guards and to provide them with better service conditions. A recommendation was therefore made that a notification could be issued under the Mathadi Act so as to provide the security guards with the same facilities as the workers covered by the said Act. The report further noted that the State Government had earlier tried to abolish the contract labour system amongst the security guards in about 28 establishments in Greater Bombay and Thane Districts by issuing a notification under the Contract Labour Act. The same however was struck down by this Court on the ground that the notification issued was not a speaking order. Hence the reports suggested that the security guards should be covered under the provisions of the Mathadi Act by amending the Schedule of employment to which the said Act applied. The report also observed that a non-official Bill was introduced by member of the Legislative Council to cover security guards under the Mathadi -Act but the same was opposed by the State Government at that time because the Government was considering issuing a notification under the Contract Labour Act. Since this Court had struck down the notification so issued under the Contract Labour Act, it was felt that; that course was not quite satisfactory. The report therefore concluded that the only course open was now to amend the Schedule of the Mathadi Act so as to include the employment of security guards in the employments mentioned in the said Schedule. The report further stated that the only argument that could perhaps be put forth against the said proposal was that in case there was a strike in a factory or establishment where the security guards are sent for employment, the security guards may hands with the workers and their agitation as well. According to the report there was not much force in that argument because when they are covered by the Mathadi Act they would be under the control and subject to the discipline of the Board constituted under the Mathadi Act. 8. It is against the background of this report which is at page 113 of the Compilation, that the present legislation was placed on the statute book. This history of the legislation would broadly indicate the object of the legislation. It will now be convenient first to examine the provisions of the said Act. There is no statement of object and reasons freshly given while replacing the Ordinance by the said Act. Hence the statement of the objects and reasons which accompanied the Ordinance would form the statement of objects and reasons of the said Act as well. The said statement says that it was represented to the Government that there were about 70,000 persons working as Security Guards in various factories and establishments in Greater Bombay and in Thane Industrial Complex. Majority of them were provided by about 250 flourishing agencies operating in the said areas. However, the service conditions of the Security Guards were not satisfactory. Their services depended merely on the whim and sweet will of the agencies supplying them and they were being exploited and even removed arbitrarily from service on flimsy grounds. In many cases, the security guards

received a small portion of the amounts recovered by the agencies from the employers and the balance was pockated by them. The Government had recently conducted a survey (to which I have already made a reference earlier) and the findings of the survey confirmed that there was a substantial truth in what was represented to the Government. The Government also noticed that the Security Guards were required to do not only the usual patrolling and watch and ward work but occasionally they were compelled to fight situations like thefts, assaults and fire. It was also noticed by Government that under the present system they were not entitled to any protection of the Labour Laws available to the other workers. In order therefore to ensure that the Security Guards in factories and establishments were not exploited and to make better provisions for their and conditions of employment and welfare, a separate representative Board was considered necessary by enacting a special law for the purpose on the lines of the Mathadi Act. This would also make it possible in due course to make recruitment of the Security Guards through the Board only. 9. The preamble of the Act reiterates the broad features of the said statement of objects and reasons accompanying the Ordinance and states that the Act was being placed on the statute book for regulating the employment of private security guards employed in factories and establishments in the State of Maharashtra and for making better provisions for their and conditions of employment and welfare, through the establishment of a Board therefor, and for matters connected therewith. 10. By section 1 of the Act, the Act is made applicable to the whole of the State. However, it is also provided that whereas it will come into force in Greater Bombay and Thane District on June 29, 1981, its application to the other areas of the State will depend upon the notifications that may be issued from time to time in that behalf and that different dates may be appointed for different areas and for different provisions of the Act to come into force. sub-s. (4) of Section 1 then makes it clear that the Act applies to persons who work as Security Guards in any factory or establishment but, who are not direct or regular employees of the factory or the establishment, as the case may be. The expressions "factory" and "establishment" are defined along with other expressions in Section 2 of the Act. What is however important to note is the fact that the Act does not apply to security guards or persons who are doing security work as direct employees in such factory or establishment. In other words it applies to security guards engaged through agents or agencies only. 11. Section 2 defines the various expressions relevant for the Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 2defines agency or agent in relation to a security guard and states that an individual or a body of individuals or a body Corporate who undertakes to execute any security work or watch and ward work for any factory or establishment by engaging such security guard on hire or otherwise, or who supplies such security guards either in groups or as individual,

would for the purposes of the Act mean agency or agent and would include a sub-agency or a sub-agent of such agency or agent. 12. Sub-section (3) of Section 2 defines employer to mean the principal employer when the security guard is engaged by or through an agency or agent and when he is not so engaged, the person who has ultimate control over the affairs of the factory or establishment and includes any other person to whom the affairs of the factory or establishment are entrusted whether such person is called an agent, manager or by any other name. Sub-section (4) defines establishment to mean an establishment as defined in Clause (8) of Section 2 of the Bombay Shops andEstablishments Act, 19^8 and Sub-section (5) defines factory to mean a factory as defined in Clause (m) of Section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948. Sub-section (8) defines principal employer to mean an employer who has engaged Security Guards through an agency or agent. Sub-section (1) defines Security Guard or private Security Guard to mean a person who is engaged or is to be engaged through any agency or an agent, whether for wages or not, to do security work or watch and ward work in any factory or establishment and, includes any person, not employed by any employer or agency or agent, but working with the permission of, or under an agreement with, the employer or agency or agent. This definition excludes the member of any employer's family or any person who is a direct or regular employee of the principal employer. The latter part of the definition is consistent with the provisions of Sub-section (4) of Section 1 referred to earlier and makes it once more clear that the Act does not apply to a security guard directly employed by the principal employer. We have then the definition of wages in Sub-section (11) which is not material for our purpose. 13. Section 3 of the Act then gives powers to the State Government to make a Scheme or Schemes for ensuring an adequate supply and full and proper utilisation of the Security Guards in factories and establishments, and generally for making better provisions for the and conditions of employment of the Security Guards, to provide for the registration of employers engaging them as well as of the Security Guards and for making a provision for the welfare of the Security Guards. The Scheme to be made by the State Government under the said section is in particular to provide for matters which are mentioned in Clauses (a) to (n) of Sub-section (2) of the said Section 3. By Sub-section (3) of the said Section 3, power is given to the State Government to provide for punishments and penalties for contravening any of the provisions of the Scheme or Schemes to be made. Then comes Sub-section CO of the said Section 3, which makes a provision for a transitory period and bar dismissal, discharge, retrenchment or any other form of termination of employment of the security guards by any principal employer, agency or agent on and from June 29, 1981 which is the date of the Ordinance, merely because the employer was liable to himself under the scheme framed under that section or merely because some other liability was likely to be

cast on him under such scheme or because the Security guard employed was liable to be ed under the Scheme. The bar operates from June 29, 1981 till the date the whole of the scheme framed under the section was applied to such employer and the Security Guard or for a period of one year from June 29, 1981 whichever is earlier. The dismissal, discharge, retrenchment or other termination of the appointment by way of penalty imposed for disciplinary action is however not within the purview of the said bar. 14. Section 4 gives power to the State Government to prepare one or more schemes for Security Guards or a class of Security Guards in one or more areas specified in the notification, and in like manner add to, amend or vary any Scheme or substitute another scheme for the Scheme already made. 15. Section 5 provides the machinery for resolving the dispute with regard to the application of any scheme to any class of Security Guards or employers and provides that such a dispute shall be referred to the State Government and the decision of the State Government which shall be taken by it after consulting the Advisory Committee constituted under section 15, shall be final. 16. Section 6 gives power to the State Government to constitute a Board for any Security Guards in any area and permits the establishment of one or more Boards for one or more classes of Security Guards or for one or more areas. The Board so constituted is to be a body corporate with all the trappings thereof. The Board is to consist of nominated by the State Government from time to time. The nominees are to represent the employers, the Security Guards and the State Government. The representing the employers and the security guards are to be equal in number and the representing the State Government are not to exceed one-third of the total number of representing both the employers and the Security Guards. The Chairman of the Board is to be from one of the nominated to represent the State Government and has to be nominated as such by the State Government. The term of office of the is to be prescribed by the State Government and the meetings of the Board and the procedure to be followed by the Board is to be regulated by the Board itself subject to the approval of the State Government. 17. Section 7 provides for an eventuality when the employers and the Security Guards refuse to recommend persons for representing them on the Board or for any other reason it is not possible to constitute a Board, and provides that in such an eventuality the State Government may appoint a suitable person to hold office until a Board is duly constituted as per the provisions of Section 6of the said Act.

18. Section 8 states the powers and duties of the Board and states that it shall exercise such powers and discharge such duties and functions as may be conferred on it by the Scheme. It also gives power to the Board to take such measures as it may deem fit for istering the Scheme. It then provides that the Board shall submit a report to the State Government every year after the 1st day of April, and not later than 31st October, on the working of the scheme during the preceding year ending on the 31st day of March of that year. The report is to be laid before each House of the Legislature. The Board is to be bound by such directions that the State Government may, for reasons to be stated in writing, give to it, from time to time for exercising the powers and for the performance and discharge of its duties and functions. 19. Section 14 of the Act gives power to the Board or such Officer as it may specify to determine any sum due from any employer or Security Guard and for that purpose to conduct such inquiry as may be deemed necessary. Sub-section (3) thereof states that no such order determining the sum shall be made without giving a reasonable opportunity to the employer or Security Guard as the case may be. The order made determining the said sum is to be final and not to be questioned in any Court. 20. Section 15 provides for constitution of an Advisory Committee by the State Government to advise the Government upon such matters arising out of the istration of the Act or any Scheme made under it or relating to the application of the provisions of the Act to any particular class of Security Guards or employers, as the Advisory Committee may itself consider to be necessary or the State Government may refer to it for advice. The Advisory Committee is to include an equal number of representing the employers, the Security Guards, the Legislature of the State and the State Government. The representatives of the State Government however are not to exceed one-fourth of the total number of . The Chairman of the Advisory Committee is to be one of the representing the State Government and nominated as such. 21. Section 16 provides for the appointment of Inspectors and the duties of such Inspectors are to assist the enforcement of the provisions of the Act and the scheme. 22. Section 17 provides that no Court will take cognizance of any offence made punishable by a Scheme or of any abetment thereof, except on a complaint in writing by an Inspector or by a person specially authorised in that behalf by the Board or the State Government. 23. Section 18 bars a child i.e. a person who has not completed 14 years from working as a Security Guard.

24. We have then the provisions of Sections 19 and 20 which have a direct bearing on the contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioners. Section 19 provides that the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, and the rules made thereunder, shall mutatis mutandis, apply to the ed Security Guards employed in any factory or establishment; and for that purpose the Security Guards shall be deemed to be "workmen" within the meaning of that Act. It also states that in relation to such Security Guards, the employer shall mean where a Board makes payment of wages to any such Security Guards, the Board, and in any other case, the employer as defined in this Act. This will mean the principal employer who has engaged the Security Guards and who has an ultimate control over the affairs of the factory or establishment, or where the affairs of such factory or establishment are entrusted to any other person, such person whether called an agent, manager or otherwise.

Similarly, Section

20 states

that

notwithstanding

anything

contained

in

the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, the State Government may by notification direct that all or any of the provisions of that Act and the rules made thereunder shall apply to all or any class of ed Security Guards employed in any factory or establishment, with the modification that, in relation to ed Security Guards, an employer shall mean, where a Board makes payment of wages to such Guards, the Board, and in any other case, the employer as defined under Sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Act. The import of the provisions of Sections 19 and 20 is that except for the purposes of the said two Acts viz. the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 and the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, neither the Board nor the employer as defined under Sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the said Act is to be looked upon as an employer notwithstanding the fact that the wages are paid by the Board or by such employer as the case may be. What is further, were it not for the provisions of Section 19 and

the

notification

issued

under Section

20,

the

provisions

of

the

Workmen's Compensation Act, 1.923 and those of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, as the case may be, would not be applicable to the Security Guards covered by the said Act. 25. Section 21 makes a similar provision with regard' to- the applicability of the Maternity Benefit Act, as Section 20 makes, with; reference to the applicability of. the. Payment of Wages Act, 1936. Here again, the Board and; the employer as defined in the said Act can be looked upon as an, employer in relation to the Security Guards only by virtue of the notification issued under Section 21 of the said Act for the purposes of the Maternity Benefit Act and not otherwise. 26. Section 22 saves generally the rights and privileges which any ed Security Guard employed in any factory or establishment is entitled to, on the date the said Act came into force and which rights or privileges were available to such Security Guards under any other law, contract, custom or usage applicable to such Security Guards, if such rights or privileges are more favourable to them than those to which they would be entitled to under

the said Act. This provision in the context can only mean that if the Security Guard employed with any agency or agent was entitled to higher benefits from such agent or agency, he would continue to be given the same benefits wherever he may be assigned by the Board hereafter. 27. Section 23 then provides for exemption from the operation of all or any of the provisions of the said Act or any Scheme made thereunder. It is intended to be the usual exemption provision. However, the language of the said section is so cast that it is not capable of being applied to any class whatsoever as will be shown at the relevant time. For the present it will suffice to note that the exemption, under this section is to be given only to the Security Guards of all or any of the classes employed in any factory or establishment or in any class or classes of factories or establishments. The exemption further is to be given only if the Security Guards concerned are in the enjoyment of benefits, which are on the whole not less favourable to them than the benefits provided by or under the said Act or under any Scheme made thereunder. 28. Section 24 then gives power to the State Government to make an inquiry into the working of the Board or the Scheme made under the said Act and submit its report to the State Government in that behalf. 29. Section 25 provides for supersession of the Board. Section 26 declares that any contract or agreement, whether made before or after the commencement of the said Act, whereby a ed Security Guard relinquishes any right, privilege or concession conferred or accruing to him under the Act or the Scheme, shall be void and of no effect, if it purports to deprive him of any such right or privilege or concession. It is difficult to understand the provisions of this section as will be shown hereafter. 30. Section 27 provides for the quantum of penalty for the offence under the said Act. Section 28gives protection to the State Government or the Board or its Chairman or other Officers from any legal proceedings. Section 29 gives power to the State Government to make rules under the said Act and Section 30 provides that the scheme and the rules made under the said Act shall be placed before the Houses of the Legislature. These are all the material provisions of the said Act which are necessary to be considered. 31. We may now refer to the provisions of the Scheme. As stated earlier, the Scheme was made under Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Ordinance but by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 31of the said Act it is deemed to have been made under Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the said Act.

32. Clause 2 of the scheme mentions that the objects of the Scheme are to regulate employment of private Security Guards employed in factories and establishments and to make better provisions for their and conditions of employment and welfare through the establishment of a Board therefore, and for matters connected therewith. The said Clause also states that the scheme will apply to the ed Security Guards in any factory or establishment in the areas specified in the Schedule to the scheme and to the ed employers employing them. The schedule to the Scheme mentions two areas viz. Greater Bombay and Thane District. Therefore, the Scheme under challenge is applicable to Greater Bombay and Thane District only. 33. Clause 3 makes Clauses 14 and 15 of the scheme operative from October 1, 1981 and the remaining Clauses from November 1, 1981. Clauses l4 and 15 incidentally provide for registration of employers and of existing and new Security Guards respectively. Clause 4 is an interpreting or definition provision and the material sub-cls. are (a), (b), (f), (j) and (k). Sub-clause (a) defines appointed day as June 29, 1981, being the day of the commencement of the Ordinance. Sub-clause (b) defines Board to mean the Security Guards Board for Greater Bombay and Thane District constituted under Section 6 of the Ordinance. Sub-clause (f) defines 'pool' to mean a list or of Security Guards maintained by the Board but which does not include directly employed Security Guards. This definition further is consistent with the provisions of Sub-section (b) of Section 1 and of Sub-section (10) of Section 2 of the Act. It once again emphasises the fact that the directly employed Security Guards are outside the purview of the Act. ed employer is defined accordingly by Sub-clause (j) to mean the employer whose name is for the time being entered in the of employers and ed Security Guard or ed private Security Guard is defined by Sub-clause (k) to mean a person whose name is for the time being entered in the of pool Security Guards. 34. Clause 6 of the Scheme enum

Bombay High Court Dilip Singh Parocha And Ors. vs Mahalaxmi Co-Op. Housing Society ... on 16 August, 2002

Equivalent citations: 2002 (6) BomCR 581, (2002) 1 BOMLR 732, 2003 (96) FLR 1114, 2002 (4) MhLj 554 Author: R Kochar Bench: R Kochar JUDGMENT R.J. Kochar, J. 1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the judgment and order of the Labour Court dated 13th November 1995 in application under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 filed by the petitioners praying for determination and computation of the monies due from the respondent No. 1 society. According to the petitioners, they were entitled to get difference in minimum wages payable under the Minimum wages Act, 1948 and the actual wages paid by the respondent No. 1 society, wages in lieu of weekly offs, leave wages, national paid holidays and overtime wages. The application filed by the petitioners reflect that they are claiming the aforesaid monies due from 1961 onwards in their application dated June 1987. The petitioners appeared to have dared to file such a stale claim for the period from 1961 onwards as there is no statutory limitation under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. From such applications the employers must guard themselves and must preserve the books and every piece of record, may be for a period of 50 years as any of their employees would wake up and file such claims as there is no limitation under the aforesaid provision. 2. The respondent No. 1 society appeared before the Labour Court and filed its written statement contesting the claim of the petitioners on the following grounds:-(a)

That the Co-operative Housing Society is not an industry.

(b) That the Co-operative Housing Society is not a commercial establishment within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act. (c) That there is no employer employee relationship between the applications and the opponent Housing Society; (d) That the Applicants are/was the independent contractors engaged in the work of cleaning and sweeping on sharing basis. Further the applicant No. 1 was such a contractor in the year 1974 but himself terminated the said contract. (e) That since the Co-operative Housing society is neither a commercial establishment nor an industry the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act as well as Minimum Wages Act are not applicable to it.

(f) That since the Co-operative Housing Society is not a commercial establishment or an industry, this Hon'ble Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try the present application. (g) That in sum and substance, the applicants are asking for difference of Minimum Wages but since, the Minimum Wages Act in a Special stature, this Court does not have jurisdiction to try and entertain an application under Section 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act. The Labour Court framed the points for determination as under :-1.

Does the applicant prove that they are entitled for the relief as prayed for;

2.

What order?

Additional Issues:-1A.

Does the opponent prove that the Opponent is not an industry?

1B.

Does the applicant prove that they are the workmen of the opponent?

On the basis of the pleadings and the oral and documentary evidence, the Labour Court held that the petitioners did not prove that they were entitled for the reliefs as prayed for and dismissed the application, without answering the other issues which obviously according to the Labour Court did not survive. The Labour Court dismissed the application only on the ground of jurisdiction as the respondent society had raised an issue that it was not an industry as contemplated underSection 2(j) of the I.D. Act and, therefore, the application filed by the petitioners under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act was not maintainable and that the Court had no jurisdiction to go into any other issues. 3. Shri Patel, the learned Advocate for the petitioners submits that the Labour Court has committed a grave error of law by throwing the application at the threshold of the proceedings without deciding the question whether the respondent society was or was not an industry underSection 2(j) of the I.D. Act. Shri Patel submits that the Labour Court accepted the contention of the respondent society that according to it was not an industry and, therefore, whether it was an industry or not was not the issue which could be decided by the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. Shri Patel submits that the Labour Court ought to have decided the question whether the respondent was an industry or not and after holding that it was not an

industry, in that case, it ought to have dismissed the application as not maintainable. 4. According to Shri Patel, merely because the respondent whispered or raised a contention that the application was not maintainable as it was not an industry will certainly not oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act. Shri Patel has relied upon the following judgments :-i) Ramakrishna Ramnath v. The State of Maharashtra and Ors., 1975 Mh.LJ. 212 = 1975 Lab.I.C. 1561; ii) Namer Ali Choudhery and Ors. and Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. and Anr., 1978 I LLJ 167 Shri Patel submits that the question whether the respondent society was an industry or not was an incidental question, which fall within the parameters of the jurisdiction under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act. Shri Patel submitted that the issues like whether the applicants are or were not workmen or whether the employer was or was not an industry or whether the act of the employer amounts to lock out or closure and whether the workmen are entitled to get retrenchment compensation under Section 25F of the I.D. Act can be decided by the trial Court under the aforesaid provision. What cannot be decided is the legality or otherwise of the aforesaid issues. The workman cannot call upon the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of the Act to decide that his retrenchment was illegal or the employer had declared an illegal lock out and, therefore, full wages should be computed and awarded. The Labour Court cannot enter into that controversy under the said provisions. Shri Patel has a serious grievance against the judgment of the Labour Court that the Labour Court has ousted its jurisdiction by merely accepting the contention of the society that it was not an industry. Shri Patel submits that the Labour Court ought to have decided whether it was an industry or not and, thereafter, ought to have proceeded further to appropriate orders. 4-A. Shri Kuldeep Singh, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent society s the judgment of the Labour Court and submits that the question whether the respondent society was or was not an industry was not an incidental question but was a foundational one which goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. According to Shri Singh the said question required investigation and full fledged adjudication under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Such question, according to Shri Singh, cannot fall within the jurisdictional parameters of the executing Court under Section 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act. Shri Singh has relied upon the following judgments in of his contentions. i) Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak and Anr., 1995 I CLR 171 ii) Tarn and Ors. and Director, Social Welfare and Ors., 1998 II LLJ 632 5. In my opinion, the impugned judgment and order of the Labour Court cannot be sustained. The Labour Court has misunderstood the scope and jurisdiction under Section 33-C(2) of the Act to be extremely narrow, without any scope for deciding the issue such as whether the applicants are or are not the workmen or the employer is or is not an industry. All such questions or issues or contentions raised by the other side have to be decided by the Labour Court at the threshold and such applications cannot be dismissed merely at the whisper of the employer that the applicants are not the workmen or that the employer is not an industry. The Labour

Court must decide the issue as to on what basis, the applicants could be held to be workmen or under what circumstances the employer cannot be termed as industry to be covered by the provisions of theI.D. Act. If finally, the Labour Court comes to the conclusion that the applicants do not fall within the definition of the workman or the employer is not an industry as defined under Section 2(j) of the Act, in that case, the Labour Court can take appropriate decision to proceed further with the application or to reject the application if both or either of the points are decided against the applicants. In the present case, the Labour Court has adopted a curious approach and has accepted the contention of the respondent society that the application was not maintainable and that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction because the respondent was not an industry. The Labour Court ought to have further probed into the matter to find out why the respondent society could not be called an industry in accordance with law. If the Labour Court had decided that question that the respondent society was not an industry on the basis of its activities and, thereafter, the Labour Court was justified in rejecting the application. But the Labour Court could not deny itself the jurisdiction which is legitimately vested under the provisions to determine and compute the money due from the employer. There is no doubt about the scope and parameters of the aforesaid provisions which is known as executing jurisdiction. The applicant has to establish that he has an existing right to invoke the said jurisdiction to claim money due from the employer. In the present case, the applicants have claimed difference in the wages actually paid and which they are alleging that they are entitled to get under the Minimum Wages Act. The aforesaid and all other claims are made on the basis of the averments made by the applicants that they have an existing right. Whether they have or they do not have the existing right will have to be gone into by the Labour Court on the basis of evidence and material adduced by both the parties. The applicants, however, could not be thrown on the threshold merely because the respondents raised a plea that it was not an industry. The Labour Court ought to have further decided it as an incidental question whether the respondent society was an industry or was not an industry. The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra), the facts were totally different, the applicants in that case claimed equal wages for equal work on the basis that the claimants were also doing the same work which was being done by the regular employees. They filed an application under Section 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act to claim the difference and computation of the arrears. The Supreme Court has held that such application under Section 33-C(2) was not maintainable. In the said decision of the Supreme Court, the claimants had no existing right to claim the wages which they were claiming. Their claim was to be adjudicated, however, before getting their claim adjudicated, they claimed wages on par with the regular employees. In that case, the claim of the daily rated casual workers were not settled by adjudication or recognition by the employer without which the stage for computation of that benefit could not reach. The said judgment, therefore, does not help Shri Singh to oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court on the threshold of the application. 6. Similarly the other judgment of the Supreme Court in Tara and Ors. (supra) does not also help Shri Singh. Even in that case, there was no prior adjudication of the status and nature of the employment of the claimants who moved an application under Section 33-C(2) for computation of wages. Following the judgment of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra), the Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petition filed by the workmen.

7. Shri Patel has rightly relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ramkrishna Ramnath v. State of Maharashtra (supra). In a very exhaustive and analytical manner, the Division Bench has held that the incidental question can always be decided underSection 33-C(2) of the Act. The Division Bench has held that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court cannot be ousted merely by disputing the status of the person invoking its jurisdiction. Para 7 of the said judgment sets out the scope and parameters of Section 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act, which is reproduced hereinbelow :-"7. The Punjab and the Delhi High Courts in the decisions relied upon by the petitioner have taken a view that the Labour Court cannot be go into the question whether a person is a workman or not. In Sher Singh Verma's case (1967) 2 Lab. LJ. 682 (Punj), the learned Single Judge referred to Section 33-C(2) and observed as follows :-"The reading of the section shows that it is only where a workman is entitled to certain benefits that the Labour Court can compute them. But, where the existence of relationship of workman and employer is itself in dispute, the matter would fall under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act and consequently, the remedy available to an employee would be to raise an industrial dispute. The Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) is primarily given power to execute or implement his existing individual right and it may therefore, be necessary in some cases to determine such right. Such determination, however, must be confined to matters incidental to the main issue, namely, the computation of benefits to which workman is entitled. The question whether the claimant is a workman at all or not would not be incidental to the determination of the main question." The learned Judge has taken the view that if Section 33-C(2) is so construed as to enable the Labour Court to go into the question, whether the claimant is a workman at all or not, could fall under Section 33-C(2) then the provisions of Section 10 would, at least to a considerable extent, be reduced to silence. With respect we are unable to agree with the view taken by the learned Judge. By enacting Section 33-C(2), the Legislature wanted to provide for a speedy remedy to an individual workman in working of his existing rights. If on a mere raising of the objection of the employer that the employee who has made an application under Section 33-C(2) is not a workman, the Labour Court is to be divested of the jurisdiction vested in it under that provision the very object of enacting sec. 33-C(2) could be frustrated by the employer. While it is true that the scope of Section 33-C(2) could not be so widened as to enable the Labour Court to decide the dispute which can legitimately be described as industrial dispute between the employer and the employee, it must be borne in mind that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court which functions as an executing Court cannot be ousted merely by disputing the status of the person invoking its jurisdiction. Since the question whether a person is a workman or not relates to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court, as already pointed out by us, it must be open to that Court to decide the facts on which it gets the jurisdiction or the jurisdiction is ousted. In the other case in Tek Chand v. The Labour Court Delhi, (1973) 1 Lab.LJ. 470 (Delhi), a learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court following the decision in Sher Singh Verma's case (1967) 2 Lab.LJ. 682 (Punj) has observed that where the very status of the petitioner was in dispute, it could not be urged

that it was open to the Labour Court to adjudicate upon the question of the petitioner's status as a workman. However, in a later decision, a Division Bench of same High Court has taken a contrary view and did not follow the decision in Shersingh's case and the decision in Tek Chand's case was overruled." 8. The Division Bench has also followed another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of R.B. Bansilal Abirchand Mills Co., 1972 LIC 285 where the question arose whether it was an illegal lay off or closure. It was argued on behalf of the employer that question could not be decided under Section 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act. The Supreme Court negatived the said contention and held that it was an incidental question and, therefore, it could be decided under the said provision. The Division Bench has taken the stock of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the following para 11:-"..........The decision, therefore, is clearly an authority for the proposition that where the claim is founded on the statutory provisions such claim is contested on the ground that there was no retrenchment or that there was no closure, then merely on such a plea the jurisdiction of the Labour Court cannot be ousted and the Labour Court was competent to go into the question firstly, whether there was a retrenchment or not or closure or not; and in case finding was in favour of the employee, then to proceed further to compute the benefit in of rights given in Chapter V-A of the Act. The present case falls squarely within the dictum of the Supreme Court in R.B. Bansilal Abirchand Mitts Co., 1972 Lab.I.C. 285. The whole case of the employee is that there had been a closure and it is the benefit to which she is entitled under the provisions of Section 25FFF that she wants to be computed. The Labour Court in such circumstances would clearly have jurisdiction to go into the question of the closure the factum of which does not now seem to be disputed. The question whether there was closure or not, therefore, does not arise. The claim which then survives is merely one for computation, if the employee proves her entitlement or title to the benefit, for which she relies on the statutory provisions. We may refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Ramkrishna Ramnath v. The Presiding Officer Labour Court, Nagpur, (1970) 2 Lab.LJ. 306 = 1973 Lab.I.C. 57, where the employees had made a claim for retrenchment compensation for some period and those claims were contested on the ground that the claimants were not employees but independent contractors and that there was closure to attract the provisions of Section 25FFF of the Act and that the dispute could not be referred to the Labour Court. It does not appear that the challenge which is now made, viz., that the claimant was not a workman was raised in that case. The Labour Court allowed the claims of all the applicants barring three and held that they were entitled to compensation under the provision to Section 25FFF and pay in lieu of notice as per schedule attached to the order. The points agitated before the Supreme Court were (1) the disputes which were referred to the Labour Court fell within the jurisdiction of an Industrial Tribunal. The jurisdiction under Section 33C(2) was a limited one and could not embrace a dispute of the nature in the case which could only fall under Section 10of the Act; (2) the issue raised in each case was a fundamental one not limited to mere computation of a benefit in respect of a right envisaged by Section 33-C (2), (3) There was really no closure of the appellant's business but only a lock out or a temporary stoppage of work not attracting the operation of Section 25FFF. The fourth question which was raised before the Supreme Court was that in order to entitle the applicant to the benefit

of Section 25F it was obligatory on her to show that she had worked for 240 days in each year of service for which the claim was made. The Supreme Court held that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to make a preliminary enquiry as to whether there had been a closure of the business and the text of the notice made the determination of the question quite a simple affair. It was pointed out that the examination of the claim under Section 33-C(2) may in some cases have to be preceded by an enquiry into the existence of the right and a mere denial of the fact of retrenchment would not be enough to take the matter out of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. On facts it was found that the employer had failed to show that the undertaking was closed down on of the unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer and as such he was liable to pay the compensation under the principal part of the Sub-section (1) of Section 25FFF of the Act. We are now informed that the petitioner had applied for the review of the finding that the closure was not covered by the provisions of Section 25F and the Supreme Court, has reviewed its finding and the operative finding in that case was that the closure fell within the provisions of Section 25FFFof the Act. That, however, was relevant only for the purposes of quantum of compensation and it would not change the basic finding that an application made for computation of the benefit underSection 25FFF could be enquired into by the Labour Court." 9. The law laid down by the Division Bench is still a good law, and, therefore, I have no hesitation in concluding that the impugned judgment and order of the Labour Court holding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the application filed by the petitioners merely because the respondent society had raised an issue that it was not an industry, does not sustain. The impugned order is, therefore, quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute with no orders as to costs. The matter is remanded back to the Labour Court for decision in accordance with law. 10. The Labour Court shall decide all the issues which arise in the process of determination and computation of the money claim made by the petitioners in accordance with law.

Is your security agency ed?

Jyotirmoy Dey’s murder brings to focus the rise in crime and the role of guards supposed to ensure safety, writes Gajanan Khergamker Senior scribe, Jyotirmoy Dey’s murder in broad daylight at Powai brings to fore, once again, issues of security that housing societies across Mumbai sadly tend to overlook. Whether it’s the 26/11 terror

blitzkrieg on the city that left hundreds dead or the murderous attack on the journalist, one thing stands. It couldn’t happen without suspect elements keeping a watch on a potential victim’s whereabouts and movements who ought to have been nabbed earlier itself thereby averting the incidents. That, however, isn’t as easy as it sounds. Watchman Chhotelal works for 12 hours non-stop at a CHS at Colaba’s Third Pasta Lane by day and for a further 12 hours non-stop all night long at another society a couple of lanes away, and for days at end too. Struggling to keep his eyes open, Chhotelal goes through the motions risking health and sanity alike. After all, nobody can work 24x7 for 365 days in a year. With him asleep or out of his senses most of the time, there’s really no way he performs his duty of keeping any society secure by day or night. The society’s officials manage to keep a security personnel ‘on a chair’ to placate its and the watchman gets a salary for sitting asleep in his place and everyone’s happy: that is only till the law catches up with everyone or, worse still, that catastrophe lurking around the corner, finally happens. By law, besides being forced to do just an eight-hour shift, a guard is entitled to a weekly off too. You can’t make a watchman work for 12-hour shifts for days on end without giving him a break. It has been decided that if a Security Guard is found sleeping while on duty or not found at his work place at the time of Night Checking by the Inspectors of the Security Guard Board for Brihan Mumbai and Thane District, the concerned Security Guard will be liable to fine for such misconduct, equivalent of four (4) days’ wages. But then, with motivated authorities more than keen to turn a blind eye to the sleepy activities of watchmen, the law is given the convenient go-by placing both life and property of residents at risk. This anomaly gathers further momentum with the absence of authorities to regularise the guard-society arrangements. There is also a pressing need to keep identity records of watchmen/guards working at societies through the intervention of the local police who should be involved at all times. Cooperative housing societies risk life and property directly by employing shady fly-by-night security agencies to provide them services at low cost and untaxed/unbilled arrangements. Worse still, they don’t bother checking its credentials. While the instances of watchmen and security personnel directly involved in acts of brutality, murder and robbery targeting the very they are supposed to protect, society officials continue to flagrantly violate the law governing security personnel which is well in place too. While, cooperative housing societies, on their part, are not covered by The Maharashtra Private Security Guards (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1981 that was ed with retrospective effect from 29th June, 1981 as they don’t qualify as either ‘factories’ or ‘establishments’ under the law and hence don’t have to complete any formalities. That however, doesn’t stop them from scrutinising the credentials of the security agency making tall claims of having offered services to factories / establishments / shops / commercial chains. The agency has to be ed – by law - with the Security Guards Board of Brihan Mumbai and Thane District. Under the act, both the Principal Employer and the Employer Agency have to get ed with the Board. The security guards of the employers should open their individual Saving Bank s in Union Bank of India which is near to the place of their posting. After opening individual Saving Bank s, they should submit the list of their Numbers

alongwith their Name and Registration Numbers to the Board. The cheques of the payment are distributed from 5th to 12th and thereafter on Tuesday and Friday upto 25th of every month on receipt of Wages and Levy cheques by the Board. Even for disbursement of cheques, the guards need to present their Identity Cards. Sounds like a tall order doesn’t it, at least for the present lot of watchmen we’re forced to deal with, right? But then, that’s the law, well in place for you. Cooperative housing societies don’t have to deal with shabby watchmen, leaving their sites at the drop of a hat, scratching away at unmentionables in full public view and more. All they need to do is establish their credentials by visiting any of their ‘factory’ or ‘establishment’ sites and double-check their claims; insist on copies of documents that they have provided the police while applying for a license; draw up a detailed legal agreement between the cooperative housing society and the agency enlisting the list of pertinent office orders among the string laid down by the statute with list of corresponding penalties and ensure it delivers.